居 留

自由生活的热爱者。天生的享乐主义者，自愿的放荡不羁者，有责任感的野蛮人。

[居 留 @ju_1iu]

一直在寻找狐狸精。
他们给生活带来欢乐。
我爱狐狸精。

[Ma Wukong 马悟空 @Ma_WuKong]

🇯🇵 Los museos japoneses no admiten que se grabe en ellos porque son lugares que no reconocen crímenes de guerra y hacen apología del fascismo.

Como bien muestra la chica, al genocidio de Nanjing, los japoneses se refieren como «incidente».

[Jeffrey J. Hall 🇯🇵🇺🇸 @mrjeffu]

A Chinese content creator filmed a video inside the Yushukan Museum on the grounds of the Yasukuni Shrine, so she could criticize its nationalist take on history.
It has multi-lingual signs stating that filming & taking photos is prohibited.

[iPaul @iPaulCanada]

抖音女博主发布视频，探秘靖国神社，指责日本不能正视历史，就不会拥有未来。

[Hermosa China（Beautiful China） @90Hercost]

Noticia de última hora: Este importante documento de la dinastía Ming de China, el "Edicto Imperial que confiere el título de Rey al gobernante de las islas Ryukyu", demuestra de forma concluyente que Ryukyu fue en su momento un estado tributario de China, y no territorio japonés.#China

[Ignis Rex @Ignis_Rex]

The American Retreat and the Birth of a Multipolar World: A Eurasian Reading of Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). China is now downgraded to an Economic Competitor!

The United States has just published the most honest national-security document of the past eighty years. In thirty-three sober pages, Washington has admitted what Moscow, Beijing and much of the Global Majority have been saying for two decades: the unipolar era is over, liberal hegemony is dead, and the United States is returning home to its own hemisphere. The rest of the world is now explicitly invited – or rather instructed – to take responsibility for its own security.

This is Buck-Passing on a continental scale.

Buck-passing is a strategy in Offensive Realism where a great power attempts to shift the responsibility for deterring or fighting a dangerous rising state onto another power. The buck-passer avoids the costs and risks of direct confrontation, hoping the "buck-catcher" and the aggressor will weaken each other through bloodletting, thereby maximizing the buck-passer's relative power.

The NSS of November 2025 does not merely downgrade China from “pacing threat” to “economic competitor”; it quietly demotes the entire Indo-Pacific to fourth place, after (1) homeland defence, (2) the Western Hemisphere [the Americas], and (3) economic re-industrialisation [focus on American industrial renewal]. Europe and the Middle East barely merit a subsection each. The message could not be clearer: the American security blanket is being pulled back, and regional powers are expected to step forward.

Why is China downgraded to only an Economic Competitor? See 2/2

East Asia: Japan’s Moment of Truth

In Asia, the beneficiary – and the new buck-catcher – is obviously Japan.

By openly stating that defending Taiwan is merely “a priority” (not a vital interest) and that it is “ideal” to preserve military overmatch but no longer guaranteed as China is too strong militarily), the United States is effectively telling Tokyo: “If you want the First Island Chain to hold, you will have to do much of the holding yourselves.” Which explains PM Takaichi brash statement that a potential Chinese military attack or blockade against Taiwan could constitute a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan – she is trying to step up to say Japan can hold the First Island Chain on its own.

The document repeatedly insists that “our allies must step up and spend – and more importantly do – much more for collective defence.” Translation: the post-war arrangement in which Japan enjoyed security at American expense while remaining constitutionally and politically castrated is finished.

This creates an historic opportunity for Japan to become a fully sovereign great power for the first time since 1945. The grey zones deliberately left in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1972 Okinawa Reversion Agreement – under which Japan regained only administrative control of Okinawa while the United States retained exclusive use of the bases – can now be renegotiated. If Japan is to become the eastern anchor of any serious containment policy toward China, it will need genuine command authority over the 31 U.S. military installations on its soil, especially the strategic hub at Kadena.

Whether Washington will voluntarily surrender these extraterritorial privileges is doubtful. More likely, Tokyo will have to force the issue – and that, in turn, will require the acquiescence of Beijing and Moscow. Why? Because the legal foundation for the original American seizure of Okinawa rests on the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, both of which promised that all territories “stolen” from China by Japan would be returned to the Republic of China. Russia, as co-signatory to Potsdam and as the successor to the Soviet seat on the Allied Council, retains a theoretical veto over any final settlement of Okinawa’s status. So Taiwan has to be returned to China?

In other words, Japan’s path to full sovereignty over its own territory now runs through Beijing and Moscow, not Washington. The irony is exquisite: the very powers Japan is supposed to help contain may hold the keys to its liberation from the post-war order.

Europe: Abandonment in Slow Motion

Across the Eurasian landmass, the same logic applies. The 2025 NSS mentions Russia exactly twice – once in passing, once to say that Europe must restore its “civilisational self-confidence and Western identity.” There is no mention of NATO’s Article 5 as the cornerstone of American strategy, no pledge to defend every inch of Allied soil, no promise to keep 100,000 troops in Europe indefinitely. The message to Paris, Berlin and Warsaw is unmistakable: if you wish to manage the Russian frontier, you will do it largely with your own money and your own blood.

The Europeans, predictably, are in denial. But the mathematics are brutal. Without the American security subsidy, the combined GDP of the EU plus UK is still larger than Russia’s, but their collective defence spending remains anaemic and their arms industries are decades behind. The coming years will be a frantic, and probably unsuccessful, attempt to create a European pillar capable of deterring Moscow on its own. The more likely outcome is a Finnish-style accommodation with Russia or, in the case of Germany and France, a reluctant drift toward Eurasian economic integration once the American shield is visibly lowered.

The Gulf: An Arab-Israeli Condominium over Energy

In the Middle East, the strategy is equally revealing. The United States will no longer police the region with occupation forces or regime-change adventures. Instead, it will rely on the expanded Abraham Accords framework – effectively an Israeli-Saudi-Emirati-Qatari condominium – to ensure that no single power (i.e., Iran) can close the Strait of Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb. American naval power will remain over the horizon, ready to intervene only if the regional balance collapses entirely. This explains why Trump sold F-35 to Saudi Arabia as now the Saudi will have to police the Middle East with Israel-Emirati-Qatari. How Iran will react to this is anyone’s guess?

This is classic offshore balancing: let the local heavyweights fight the limited wars, sell them the weapons, secure the insurance policy, but refuse to pay the premium forever.

The New Geometry of Power

What we are witnessing is the orderly (for now) dissolution of the American world order and its replacement by a multipolar system organised around continental spheres of influence:

- The United States consolidates an expanded Monroe Doctrine in the entire Western Hemisphere.
- China dominates mainland East Asia and the South China Sea.
- Russia re-establishes privileged influence in the post-Soviet space and the Arctic.
- India emerges as the swing power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
- A reluctant European bloc, possibly led by a Franco-German directorate, tries to find a modus vivendi with Russia while keeping the Americans at arm’s length.
- An Israeli-Arab coalition polices the greater Middle East.

Japan, the eternal outlier, faces the most consequential choice. It can cling to the fading American protectorate and remain a political dwarf with American bases on its soil forever, or it can seize the moment, negotiate with its continental neighbours, and finally become a normal great power – sovereign in Tokyo and sovereign in Naha (capital city of Okinawa)

The 2025 NSS is a plan for American Restraint and Renewal. It is the strategic re-orientation document of a power that has accepted its limits. The age of ideological crusades is over; the age of pragmatic spheres of influence has begun. America will have to invest in itself if it wants to renew its industrial and manufacturing base. The only question left is whether the former hegemon will manage its decline with grace – or whether its former dependents will force the issue themselves.

It will also open the question of the structure of the UN Security Council where you have 3 Western powers – US, France and UK where France and UK are small countries that may have to make way for India, one Muslim and one African country to be UNSC permanent member – but the new members may not have a regular veto power like the original members US, Russia and China.

We are living in interesting time.

1/2
https://t.co/LeQcM6h8Og

[Arnaud Bertrand @RnaudBertrand]

This part is also incredible: "We massively f*cked up by trying to be a global empire"

[bob gonzales @BobgonzaleBob]

🙏Super read of the NSS ! Appears indeed to be a big change.
“Trump Corollary” to Monroe Doctrine is now the core pillar.
China downgraded from existential threat to economic competitor.
Taiwan deterrence = “ideal” but conditional on allies paying up.
Indo-Pacific secondary, Western Hemisphere + homeland first.
No more democracy crusades, no value imposition abroad.
Tariffs quietly admitted as failure, focus shifts to multilateral pressure.
Biggest shift since 1945: from global cop to fortified hemisphere power.
Allies will be asked to foot the bill while US rebuilds at home.
Fortress America is back.

[Arnaud Bertrand @RnaudBertrand]

This is big. The final U.S. National Security Strategy was just published and the refocus on the Western Hemisphere (i.e. the Americas) is confirmed.

The document clearly establishes this as the U.S.'s number 1 priority, saying that the U.S. will now "assert and enforce a 'Trump Corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine."

In terms of military presence, they write that this means "a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere, and away from theaters whose relative import to American national security has declined in recent decades or years."

On China, a couple of points.

The most striking aspect to me is that China is NOT anymore defined as "the" primary threat, "most consequential challenge," "pacing threat," or similar formulations used in previous such documents.

It's clearly downgraded as a priority. Based on the document's structure and emphasis, the top U.S. priorities could be characterized as:
1) Homeland security and borders (migration, cartels, etc.)
2) Western Hemisphere (Monroe Doctrine restoration)
3) Economic security (reindustrialization, supply chains)
4) China and Indo-Pacific

To be clear they don't define China as an ally or a partner in any shape or form but primarily as 1) an economic competitor, 2) a source of supply chain vulnerabilities (but also a trading partner) and 3) a player who regional dominance should be "ideally" denied because it "has major implications for the U.S. economy."

Interestingly, I believe for the first time ever, they mention the possibility of being overmatched militarily by China:
- They write that "deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority": "ideally" clearly means that it's ideal, but not necessarily a given. The fact that they call deterring conflict over Taiwan merely "a priority" also suggests, by definition, that it's no more a top strategic priority, or a vital interest.
- On Taiwan they also clearly imply that if the U.S.'s "First Island Chain allies" don't "step up and spend - and more importantly do - much more for collective defense", then there might be "a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible."

They still maintain that "the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait" but, clearly, there's a widening gap between what the US says it opposes and what it's actually willing to do about it.

Interestingly as well, contrary to previous such document, there is zero ideological dimension in the document when it comes to China. No "democracy vs. autocracy" framing, no "rules-based international order" to defend, no values-based crusade. China is treated as a practical issue to be managed, not an ideological adversary to be defeated.

In fact the document explicitly mentions, I think for the first time ever as well, that US policy is now:
- "not grounded in traditional, political ideology"
- that they "seek good relations and peaceful commercial relations with the nations of the world without imposing on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories"
- and that they seek "good relations with nations whose governing systems differ from ours."

Which is quite a stunning departure from the rhetoric of the past few decades. We all knew this but it's now amply clear that the era of missionary liberal internationalism in US foreign policy is dead and buried.

The competition with China is primarily described in economic terms, explicitly so: they write the competition is about "winning the economic future" and that economics are "the ultimate stakes."

Notably, they admit that the tariffs approach "that began in 2017" when it comes to China essentially failed because "China adapted" and has "strengthened its hold on supply chains."

The new strategy, as described in the document, is to build an economic coalition against China that can exert more leverage than the US economy alone - a tacit admission that America just isn't powerful enough on its own anymore.

The contradiction is however obvious: unclear how you build an economic coalition against China while simultaneously waging trade wars against your coalition partners, demanding they shoulder more of their own defense, and treating every allied relationship as a deal to be renegotiated in America's favor.

At some point these "allies" will be asking a very obvious question: why sacrifice our economic interests to prop up an America that can no longer compete on its own - and that offers us less and less in return?

The document can be found here: https://t.co/IuMSAiz5RX

[International Cyber Digest @IntCyberDigest]

‼️🇮🇱 Smartphones worldwide were silently infected with Israeli malware via malicious ads

Simply viewing their ads was enough to get infected.

Surveillance company Intellexa gained full access to cameras, microphones, chat apps, emails, GPS locations, photos, files, and browsing activity.

[Jason Smith - 上官杰文 @ShangguanJiewen]

This is in the back of my mind everytime a bot slanders China, or a headline insults the efforts of the Chinese people.

The US isn't free, so long as headlines are just disinformation paid for by the US government.

[non aesthetic things @PicturesFoIder]

Bamboo scaffolding retaining its structural integrity while fire ravaged through green netting in Hong Kong incident

[RealityNotFiction @RealNotFiction]

@ChiefTrumpster @DHSgov ...

[Megatron @Megatron_ron]

NEW:

🇮🇱🇺🇲 X activated locations last night which showed US gov accounts like DHS opened and operating from Israel.

Then 20 mins later, X deactivated the feature and today, Gov accts are “exempt” from the location feature.

@GenXGirl1994

[Johannes Maria @luo_yuehan]

Why Huawei’s Founder Isn’t Among China’s Top 20 Richest People

Huawei’s founder Ren Zhengfei is not on the list of China’s richest — even though Huawei’s revenue is more than 100 times larger than companies like Cambricon, whose founder is on that list.

In the 1990s, Ren Zhengfei introduced a unique ownership structure at Huawei. The company belongs to its employees. Out of Huawei’s 208,000 employees, more than 150,000 are shareholders. Ren Zhengfei himself now holds only 0.65% of the shares — the remaining 99.35% are owned by the employees.

Independent from stock market fluctuations
Not controlled by any family or single person

Driven by a system where the employees directly benefit from success

The result?
Remarkable motivation, deep loyalty, and a true sense of ownership across the entire company.

In my view, this makes Ren Zhengfei the greatest entrepreneur of them all — not because of personal wealth, but because he built a company where collective success outweighs individual fortune.

#China #Huawei

[司马平邦 @chinasmpb]

【大炼钢铁！大炼稀土！中国走过的路美西方还想再走一遍：张艺谋们懂吗？｜2039】

这是余华原著、张艺谋导演的电影《活着》里的一个片段，《活着》一直被认为是中国最优秀的故事片电影之一，也是获得西方电影界最多尊重的作品之一，这个桥段里，创作者用激情饱满的表演讽刺了1958年发生在中国的大炼钢铁运动，牛犇饰演的公社干部领着社员们抬着刚刚炼出来的一堆废铁“夸街”，众人欣欣然，然后牛犇说：咱们炼铁能造出来3发炮弹，都要打到台湾去，一发要打到蒋介石的床上，一发要打到蒋介石的饭桌上，一发要打到蒋介石的茅房里，让蒋介石睡不成觉、吃不成饭、拉不成屎，那时候我们就解放台湾喽！

于是人们大笑——电影里众人的笑被表演成了大炼钢铁动中乌合大众的麻木之笑，而电影之外，这段所谓经典表演引发的笑声则是带着后人对毛泽东时代夸张工业革命理想发出的嘲笑。

但是，我相信张艺谋如果看完我的这期节目，一定会觉得自己很蠢，一定会为自己在艺术上的愚蠢而后悔，我相信张艺谋是有这个觉悟的，余华则说不好——因为他们用这样一个短暂讽刺性的艺术瞬间，动机极为丑陋地抹煞了大炼钢铁运动的真正光彩，给那样一个主流上非常伟大光荣的时代覆盖了一张墨黑墨黑的黑幕。

艺术家的愚蠢如果被放的太大了，真的会误国害民。

1954年，包头钢铁公司在荒无人烟的内蒙古戈壁荒滩上打下地理坐标，新中国第一代钢铁工业之子——包钢，开启了建设之旅，一群从鞍钢支援过来的科学家和工程师，带领着一大批优秀的中国军人开始了从零创业。

1959年9月26日，包钢一号高炉流出第一炉铁水，敬爱的周总理亲临现场剪彩，那正是大炼钢铁运动晚期；就在这一年年底，包钢成功炼出中国第一炉稀土硅铁合金，就是说中国人从那天起能人造磁铁了，中国的稀土工业正式在白云鄂博矿源之上拉开大幕。但当时谁又能想到今天的中国稀土会成为与美国进行战略竞争的第一利器？

如果有一个人想到了，我想那就是毛主席。

1961年，包钢建立了8861稀土实验厂，这就是现在的中国北方稀土（集团）的前身，这是整个中国稀土产业的总开端。

老人家曾经说过，抗美援朝战争中，气多钢少的中国人民志愿军打败了钢多气少的美国鬼子——但我们也付出了重大代价。战争胜利后，和与苏联开始合作156个大项目建设之后，我党认定要想实现国家工业化，必须首先实现钢铁工业的现代化，这就是“超英赶美”的大炼钢铁运动和大跃进运动的由头。

实际上，“超英赶美”的具体目标真的在毛时代已经实现，中国能在1960年代完成了“两弹一星”，没有国家的工业化，没有钢铁工业的现代化，怎么可能？

但是，你不要指望余华和张艺谋这些文化人能正确认知到那个时代的伟大，所以他们也更无法理解，今天的中国何以能手握着倚天剑和屠龙刀——即中国在稀土产业和稀有金属产业，也就是在战略资源产业上的全球垄断力，与拥有全球军事霸权和金融霸权的美帝相对抗，中国的力量、能量和逻辑的来源到底在哪里？

其实，即使出现在金庸武侠小说里的倚天剑和屠龙刀，它们之所以可以达到号令天下兵器，可能也在于中国古代的一些高超的冶铁师在冶铁技术上（和在陶瓷技术上）早就掌握了稀土工艺。

1955年10月29日，老人家在中共中央工商业社会主义改造问题座谈会上的讲话里早就预言了今天的中国对美国的超越，他说了：“我们的目标是要赶上美国，并且要超过美国。...... 究竟要几十年，看大家努力，至少是五十年吧，也许七十五年，七十五年就是十五个五年计划。哪一天赶上美国，超过美国，我们才吐一口气。现在我们不像样子嘛，要受人欺负。我们这么大一个国家，吹起来牛皮很大，历史有几千年，地大物博，人口众多，但是一年才生产二百几十万吨钢，现在才开始造汽车，产量还很少，实在不像样子。......世界上四个人中间就有我们一个人，这么不争气，那不行，我们一定要争这一口气。”

我们知道，当年中国在完成了工商业社会主义改造之后，实质上就开始大炼钢铁和大跃进，那么毛主席的智慧是怎么计算出中国要到“十五五”时代才有可能赶上美国或超过美国呢？你问我我又问谁？反正现在这个时代的一步步都在老人家预料和预言中，上面的这段文字现在读来都令人震撼。

说了这么多，说到了毛主席的预言，说到了大炼钢铁，说到了中国稀土产业从大炼钢铁里的起步和后来的崛起，再回头去看这部《活着》，大家拍良心说说又有什么体会？

你们拍了那么多控诉语式的电影，写了那么多伤痕语式的文学，是否有人能把这15个“五年计划”之久的预言，和中国钢铁工业、稀土产业堪称穿透时空，历经三分之二世纪地火蔓延式的崛起，以及由此带来的中国对美国的整体国力的赶超，中国工业制造业对整个西方世界的碾压，还有因为这种超越和碾压而造成的全球地缘政治的巨大变化，即百年未有之大变局，有人能拍出一部更成功的好电影吗？

1958年的大炼钢铁与稀土的开采和冶炼密切相关，它旨在通过对加速提高钢铁产量实现国家工业现代化，稀土作为钢铁工业的重要原材料，其开采和冶炼在这一过程里扮演了重要角色，于此同时也找到了直接奔向国家工业化的必由之路的路口，并且完全统一了全民意识。

中国现在之所以能够获得在稀土世界的垄断霸权，原因在于在泛金属提炼和制造上有着数十年的艰苦奋斗史，而从现在的国际局势看来，我们有必要对大炼钢铁进行重新评价了。

不过你看，没等中国重新评价，美西方已经开始用脚投票了。

10月31日，七国集团（G7）成员国的能源部长在加拿大多伦多聚会，G7一口气公布26个涉及一系列高科技所需金属的项目与合作计划，包括要大跃进式地发展稀土产业。

所以，那个一卡脖子就翻白眼一放手就吹牛逼的美国财长，老嫂子贝森特才信誓旦旦地声称，中国对美国的稀土优势只能撑到12至24个月，因为风水轮流转了，整个西方都动员起来了，他们也要大炼钢铁了，也要大炼稀土了。

美国特朗普政府牵头的G7新的稀土计划如下：

🔻美国的角色：关于美国国内稀土产业的振兴计划，我们已多次聊过，美国曾经是全球最大的稀土资源生产国和出口国，至少现在，美国政府正在向全世界表现出一种重振稀土产业的底气，当然从中国的稀土产业成功史看来，没有钢铁产业振兴，稀土复兴难以实现，而在这点上，凭其不足中国十五分之一的钢铁产能，美国还差得很远很远很远很远，累折他们的裤衩带。

🔻加拿大的角色：要生产3种稀土。加拿大在魁北克省设立了一个钪生产设施，用于生成宇航业和军工业的铝合金材料，在安大略省还扩大了一个稀土处理设施，让加拿大能够囤积矿产，用于汽车制造业和军工业等。要知道，加拿大尼奥性能材料公司曾经在中国控制了两家镝的冶炼厂，但一年前他们不得不把股份出售给了盛和资源，而盛和资源的最大股东是中国国土资源部，由此，中国控制了全球99.9%的稀土镝的产能和销售网络。

🔻澳大利亚的角色：澳大利亚的莱纳斯（Lynas）公司是中国以外唯一具备规模化稀土分离能力的企业，同时，澳大利亚本身还拥有大量矿产资源。所以，澳大利亚此番角色特别重要，澳大利亚已经分别与美国、加拿大签署合作协议。

🔻日本的角色：日本主要出钱和出资源。日本打算开发南鸟岛海域海底稀土泥，2026年1月将启动5500米深海试验开采，若成功将成为全球首例深海稀土开采案例。‌‌南鸟岛海域海底稀土储量达到1600万吨（全球第三），含镝和钆等关键元素。

🔻而G7国家其它成员担任的角色只有两个：有钱出钱，有资源出资源。

🔻特别还要提到马来西亚。2023年，马来西亚宣布全面禁止稀土原矿出口，以说服投资者在马来西亚建立稀土工厂，目标是建立一条端到端的稀土供应链，澳大利亚莱纳斯公司已在马来西亚彭亨州关丹建立了稀土工厂。现在，马来西亚被西方世界寄托了最大希望，视其为破解中国稀土霸权的秘密武器，不过，出于技术限制，马来西亚稀土产业据说仍然能被中国的技术供应链所控制。

总之，现在的美西方正在想方设法补上大炼钢铁和大炼稀土这一课，至于能不能补上呢不知道，但补课是必须的——所以再过10年或者20年，也许美国的余华和美国的张艺谋，还有美西方的《活着》就会诞生了，我们中国是不是该给他们提前预备好一顶顶闪亮的王冠呢？

[🇮🇷🇵🇸🇯🇵 Thoton Akimoto @AkimotoThn]

Openly showing off firearms, US military police are patrolling the streets of Naha, Okinawa at night.

This is what a colony looks like.

[Carlos @agent_of_change]

300 million people visited Xinjiang and failed to notice the genocide we've been telling them about. Either all of these 300 million people have very limited powers of perception, or we were talking utter nonsense. Who can say which? 🤔

[Sharing Travel @TripInChina]

Morning in Mount Huangshan.😍😍😍

[Dragon kingdom.wu🌃 @loongkingdom]

The best toy

[马家村党群办副主任 马文才 @66567848787A]

贵阳的广场舞遥遥领先