Junaiditomang21

never give up

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

Win up to $25 on ETH, SOL or BNB on the Daily Spin on @arctionapp

Free spin every 24h. Real withdrawable Rewards, not points.
https://t.co/i9vSdlUdcK

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

@arctionapp first green

[Arction @arctionapp]

$ARC airdrop — few days left

1,930 $ARCT confirmed per user. 15% of supply going to the airdrop and community.

Spins, boxes and missions pay real ETH, BNB and SOL — withdraw daily. No TGE wait.

→ Connect X, clear the tasks, check in daily
→ Snapshot ends Sept 23
→ TGE + Gate listing Nov 1

Claim yours here: https://t.co/cMOgpw1LQ0

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

I just won 50 $ARCT on the Daily Spin on @arctionapp! Free spin every 24h. Real ETH, BNB and SOL — withdrawable, not points. Your turn: https://t.co/i9vSdlUdcK

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

@DeepSafe_AI Innovative & brilliant idea, good

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

@DeepSafe_AI #DeepSafe
Developers love that it combines advanced tech like Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) and Multiparty Computation (MPC). This ensures that user data stays private while still being completely verifiables.
Good innovatives bro

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

@DeepSafe_AI #DeepSafe
For users looking at the DeepSafe network (built as a Crypto Random Verification Agent layer), the feedback focuses heavily on its ability to build trust in data and AI.
It's very nice

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

Core DAO runs a Layer-1 blockchain that is completely EVM-compatible. This means software developers can easily build applications (like decentralized finance tools or games) using the same code structure as Ethereum, while benefiting from the foundational strength of Bitcoin.

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

On September 5, Core DAO published its post-mortem on the reward-accounting exploit that ran from August 28 to 31. Roughly 255M CORE of rewards were issued ahead of schedule.

The cap held. In Core's words, the exploit "did not create any CORE beyond the protocol's limits; the 2.1B maximum supply was never violated." What it did was accelerate rewards the emission schedule would otherwise have released later. What broke was when.

That makes the damage an unusual shape. No user or staking account was drained — Core states that no user or staker funds were lost and that delegated stake was never at risk. What existed instead was surplus, sitting in balances, and it arrived through the ordinary path: the extra rewards "appeared both in attacker-controlled addresses and, unintentionally, in the reward addresses of honest validators who simply received an inflated payout they did not cause."

That made the on-chain reconciliation an arithmetic problem before it was a balance-editing problem. Before any affected balance could be corrected, Core needed a rule for what that balance should have been at the upgrade block.

It used two. Attacker-controlled reward pools were set to zero. For affected honest validators, it defined a fair-earnings floor — the pre-incident balance plus three rounds of that validator's own normal reward — left balances at or below it untouched, and removed only the excess above. Together the reconciliation took 186,153,491 CORE out of supply by direct state reduction. A further ~69M had been moved before the upgrade and sits outside what an on-chain reconciliation can reach; Core says it is pursuing that with law enforcement.

Core says the reconciliation can be checked independently against chain state at the upgrade block, and that the reward paths were subsequently reviewed by Halborn. That part matters as much as the fix. A correction that affected users and independent observers cannot verify is only a second assertion about the balances.

A supply cap is a promise about how much will ever exist. It says nothing about how much should exist yet. Restoring the second one requires knowing a number the cap never had to track.

Sources:
https://t.co/TMhZdwRHaQ
#DeepSafe #CRVA #Web3Security

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

On September 5, Core DAO published its post-mortem on the reward-accounting exploit that ran from August 28 to 31. Roughly 255M CORE of rewards were issued ahead of schedule.

The cap held. In Core's words, the exploit "did not create any CORE beyond the protocol's limits; the 2.1B maximum supply was never violated." What it did was accelerate rewards the emission schedule would otherwise have released later. What broke was when.

That makes the damage an unusual shape. No user or staking account was drained — Core states that no user or staker funds were lost and that delegated stake was never at risk. What existed instead was surplus, sitting in balances, and it arrived through the ordinary path: the extra rewards "appeared both in attacker-controlled addresses and, unintentionally, in the reward addresses of honest validators who simply received an inflated payout they did not cause."

That made the on-chain reconciliation an arithmetic problem before it was a balance-editing problem. Before any affected balance could be corrected, Core needed a rule for what that balance should have been at the upgrade block.

It used two. Attacker-controlled reward pools were set to zero. For affected honest validators, it defined a fair-earnings floor — the pre-incident balance plus three rounds of that validator's own normal reward — left balances at or below it untouched, and removed only the excess above. Together the reconciliation took 186,153,491 CORE out of supply by direct state reduction. A further ~69M had been moved before the upgrade and sits outside what an on-chain reconciliation can reach; Core says it is pursuing that with law enforcement.

Core says the reconciliation can be checked independently against chain state at the upgrade block, and that the reward paths were subsequently reviewed by Halborn. That part matters as much as the fix. A correction that affected users and independent observers cannot verify is only a second assertion about the balances.

A supply cap is a promise about how much will ever exist. It says nothing about how much should exist yet. Restoring the second one requires knowing a number the cap never had to track.

Sources:
https://t.co/TMhZdwRHaQ
#DeepSafe #CRVA #Web3Security

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

Core DAO is the decentralized organization that manages the development of the Core network, an advanced blockchain built to combine the security of Bitcoin with the flexibility of Ethereum.
Hmm very interested.

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

On September 5, Core DAO published its post-mortem on the reward-accounting exploit that ran from August 28 to 31. Roughly 255M CORE of rewards were issued ahead of schedule.

The cap held. In Core's words, the exploit "did not create any CORE beyond the protocol's limits; the 2.1B maximum supply was never violated." What it did was accelerate rewards the emission schedule would otherwise have released later. What broke was when.

That makes the damage an unusual shape. No user or staking account was drained — Core states that no user or staker funds were lost and that delegated stake was never at risk. What existed instead was surplus, sitting in balances, and it arrived through the ordinary path: the extra rewards "appeared both in attacker-controlled addresses and, unintentionally, in the reward addresses of honest validators who simply received an inflated payout they did not cause."

That made the on-chain reconciliation an arithmetic problem before it was a balance-editing problem. Before any affected balance could be corrected, Core needed a rule for what that balance should have been at the upgrade block.

It used two. Attacker-controlled reward pools were set to zero. For affected honest validators, it defined a fair-earnings floor — the pre-incident balance plus three rounds of that validator's own normal reward — left balances at or below it untouched, and removed only the excess above. Together the reconciliation took 186,153,491 CORE out of supply by direct state reduction. A further ~69M had been moved before the upgrade and sits outside what an on-chain reconciliation can reach; Core says it is pursuing that with law enforcement.

Core says the reconciliation can be checked independently against chain state at the upgrade block, and that the reward paths were subsequently reviewed by Halborn. That part matters as much as the fix. A correction that affected users and independent observers cannot verify is only a second assertion about the balances.

A supply cap is a promise about how much will ever exist. It says nothing about how much should exist yet. Restoring the second one requires knowing a number the cap never had to track.

Sources:
https://t.co/TMhZdwRHaQ
#DeepSafe #CRVA #Web3Security

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

@DeepSafe_AI a strong community can save from extreme exploit

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

@DeepSafe_AI ethereum always found creative way

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

A draft Ethereum standard for AI agents keeps reputation and validation in two separate registries. Both are records. Neither is a guarantee, and the proposal is candid about that.

"Trustless Agents" was created in August 2025 and is still a Draft. It defines three registries: identity, reputation, validation.

The Reputation Registry takes feedback from client addresses — a score, optional tags, pointers to supporting data. It supports on-chain filtering by reviewer and by tag; the proposal expects more complex aggregation to happen off-chain. Its own Security Considerations say the rest plainly: Sybil attacks are possible, inflating the reputation of fake agents. The registry's contribution is to make signals public and put them in one schema.

The Validation Registry records a request for a named validator contract to check a piece of work, followed by that validator's response. The response ranges from 0 to 100 and can represent binary pass/fail or an intermediate outcome. The validator may respond more than once to the same request, enabling updates such as soft and hard finality. It may use stake-secured re-execution, a zkML verifier, a TEE oracle or a trusted judge. The registry is agnostic about which.

Both registries standardise the shape of a trust signal and leave its reliability to the party and procedure behind it. For a registry, that is a reasonable boundary. It also means neither record becomes reliable by being on-chain.

One line sets up the question the proposal leaves open. A validation request must be submitted by the owner or operator of the agent, and the request names the validator address — but the ERC does not say how that validator should be chosen. Incentives and slashing are likewise left to the surrounding validation protocol. CRVA works on that layer: Ring-VRF draws the verifier set for each request, so the set is not fixed in advance. That reduces one selection risk: a set that persists across requests gives an attacker time to prepare. It does not make the check itself correct.

A registry can record who said what. Whether they were right is a different question. Who gets asked is a third one.

Source:

https://t.co/rpBV5ERoya

#DeepSafe #CRVA #Web3Security

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

@DeepSafe_AI What Cronos did was a safe move to prevent any untoward incidents.

[DeepSafe @DeepSafe_AI]

Cronos halted on Sunday after an exploit on Tectonic. On Monday it said block production had resumed and that the chain state had been restored to before the exploit. It called that a validator-consensus emergency action. Tectonic said it would reopen in phases once its own checks clear, beginning with withdrawals and repayments while deposits and borrowing stay paused. Neither team has confirmed a loss figure, and both say a full post-mortem is coming.

Cronos resumed from block 90,896,189. The Defiant puts that 10,961 blocks behind the branch users had already watched confirm, roughly one hour and 54 minutes of chain history. On the new canonical chain, the attacker's Cronos-side gains no longer exist. The portion that had already crossed to Ethereum does. PeckShield and Lookonchain both tracked about 2,592 ETH, worth roughly $6.29M at the time, that reached Ethereum before block production stopped.

One exploit, three outcomes. What reached Ethereum stayed beyond the rollback's reach. The attacker's Cronos-side gains were removed from the canonical state. And so were the trades, transfers and liquidations of people with no connection to the exploit — confirmations they had already watched land inside that window.

The rollback did not separate exploit transactions from ordinary ones. It separated only what Cronos validators could rewind from what they could not. As of September 1, neither team has published an accounting of how those unrelated transactions will be handled, or whether any of them can be replayed.

This is not an argument that the rollback was right or wrong, and it is not a claim about decentralisation. The narrower point is what this remedy requires and how far it reaches. It requires validator consensus. It reaches only the chain those validators run. And it invalidates every prior confirmation inside the history it replaces, no matter whose transaction it was.

CRVA does not remove the need for emergency controls, and it would not have prevented the flaw inside Tectonic. The narrower distinction is the unit of refusal. Where an applicable check already sits in the execution path and its result is enforced, one request can be refused without an ad hoc validator intervention that replaces unrelated chain history.

The chain is back. The exploit's Cronos transactions are out of the canonical state. What is still open is everything the rollback could not reach, and everything else it reached on the way.

Sources:

https://t.co/fgxVSZif8s

#DeepSafe #CRVA #Web3Security

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

@PrivataSwap i hope lucky today
8Q8ayxR9pj6BkMRbwsUjnifXg9uk6KrhcAW5W38HoB1V

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

@Feliciaa_26 @RobinhoodApp @Lina_CryptoA 0x6d203C5E87E0B30dc5f566B59B87A487946BbFFB
i hope lucky today

[Feliciaa_Calista @Feliciaa_26]

DO YOU NEED TICKER?? Yeah the ticker is $LINA the queen meme on @RobinhoodApp 🔥🔥
@Lina_CryptoA

The CA : 0x5102a70C21F924F4ca1Db1cff5CB86E41b0EC5D1

Stay Bullish And Hold The Token!!

Paste 3 Address Wallet Robinhood I Sent $LINA

[Foreso @ForesoGlobal]

Foreso × TaskOn BTC Win-Streak Challenge is open.🎯

Complete the TaskOn tasks first, then trade on Foreso with the same wallet. Complete 8 valid BTC 15-min orders, with a minimum of 1 USDT per order.

1,550 USDT + fee rebates
Ends Sep 7, 10:00 (UTC+8)
https://t.co/G0NuqVYLLC
@taskonxyz

[Junaiditomang21 @junaiditomang21]

I just love tokenshit all day everyday. @Tokenshit_ — every token is SH!T until proven otherwise.

solana:fEbiuDdZZ1QaWYpJFPqk23ZkaRnAyHg4aivhrCTshit

https://t.co/bry2RFwcAz