The case for Islamabad:
1.Trump trusts Pakistan
2.Mojtaba trusts Pakistan
3.MBS trusts Pakistan
4.Pakistan is an active Message-Carrier, not a Passive Venue
5.Pakistan is Muslim
6.Pakistan is non-Arab
7.Pakistan is Nuclear
Pakistan trying to come up with a strategy that allows it to keep borders with India, Afg & Iran secured, condemn attacks on Iran, keep the GCC happy, avoid any sectarian conflicts at home, stay in good books of USA while shielding itself from Israel too.
>Entered the room.
>Broke back of TTP.
>Dismantled gangs in Karachi.
>Stopped ISIS infiltration.
>Made BLA fighters surrender.
>Encouraged political solution.
>Banned hate literature.
>Retired on time.
>Disappeared.
Getting nukes is the best thing GHQ/ISI ever did and it's not close. The older I get (a) the happier I am Pakistan did this, and (b) the more amazed I am that Pakistan managed to do this.
Captain Ahsan & his 140 men held off an entire Indian brigade at Kamalpur, enduring IAF strikes & relentless artillery with no backup or supplies whatsoever for 21 days. He earned such veneration that the Indian Chief, Field Marshal Manekshaw, himself recommended him for an award
Those who have read Feroz Hassan Khan’s “𝐄𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐆𝐫𝐚𝐬𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐌𝐚𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐁𝐨𝐦𝐛” would know that this is the best book on Pakistan’s nuclear history.
So I’ll share a brief overview of 𝐒𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐚𝐧 𝐁𝐚𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐫𝐮𝐝𝐝𝐢𝐧 𝐌𝐞𝐡𝐦𝐨𝐨𝐝’𝐬 contributions to Pakistan’s Nuclear Program from my research.
In the 1950s, Pakistan sent young scientists abroad for advanced training. Among them was Sultan Bashiruddin – one of the earliest, most innovative, and most respected engineers in Pakistan’s nuclear establishment. Known for his technical ingenuity and reactor stabilization expertise, he played a role second only to A.Q. Khan in both civil and military nuclear development.
▪️“Vision for a Comprehensive Nuclear Program”
Trained at the UK Atomic Energy Authority and the Risley Design Centre, he returned to PAEC in the late 1960s with a firm sense of mission. At a time when PAEC focused almost entirely on civilian energy, he forcefully advocated pursuing a comprehensive program: reactor design, reprocessing, enrichment, and fuel fabrication.
Feroz Hassan Khan, in Eating Grass and Making the Bomb, recounts him standing up in a PAEC meeting to declare:
“𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑙𝑙. 𝑊𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠, 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙.”
He authored the first internal report demanding a nuclear weapons program, formed the “Association of Nuclear Engineers for a Nuclear Pakistan,” and wrote directly to Prime Minister Bhutto helping shape the historic Multan meeting.
▪️“Technical Breakthroughs and Indigenous Innovation”
Following the Multan meeting, Munir Ahmad Khan tasked Mehmood with producing a report comparing enrichment techniques.
These were testing times: KANUPP had lost half its Bengali technical staff, Canada had withdrawn, and the reactor was suffering heavy water leaks. Since heavy water imports were unaffordable, Mehmood designed and patented the “SBM Probe” – a device to detect leaks in CANDU reactors. It was a critical, entirely indigenous breakthrough. He embodied the ingenious “jugaar” often associated with Pakistan’s nuclear journey.
▪️“Secret Reactor Work and Project-706”
As Pakistan moved toward weaponization, Mehmood was selected to lead a small secret team to replicate India’s CIRUS reactor. Within eight months, the team completed the reactor design.
The next challenge was fuel. Since KANUPP’s oxide fuel could not generate weapons-grade plutonium, PAEC launched Project-706 in October 1974 – the covert uranium enrichment program – with Mehmood as project manager. He personally selected Kahuta as the site.
▪️“Sultan Bashir’s Collaboration with A.Q. Khan”
Still lacking key technical insight, Munir Khan sent Mehmood to meet his former IAEA colleague Maurizio Zifferero at Italy’s Casaccia Nuclear Research Centre. During that visit, Mehmood obtained and copied detailed engineering drawings of enrichment plants and centrifuges.
Although valuable, the material was incomplete. Mehmood and procurement chief Shafique Ahmad Butt therefore established contact with A.Q. Khan to acquire URENCO designs. When A.Q. Khan formally joined the program in 1976, he served under Mehmood as Director R&D.
▪️“Expansion of Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure”
By 1983, Pakistan’s centrifuge systems were functional. With enrichment and fuel cycle facilities now underway, the Zia government revived the plutonium route, which required a dedicated production reactor and a heavy water plant.
In 1984, PAEC reorganized. The Directorate of Industrial Liaison was merged into the new Scientific and Engineering Services (SES) Directorate and placed under Mehmood, who also became head of the Division of Nuclear Power. He oversaw both civil and classified reactor projects.
He retired in 1999 after opposing the government’s stance on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
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