@KanekoMioVT Yeah, this applies to all kinds of art too. I got a lot less self-conscious about my guitar playing when I started hearing the mistakes I obsessed over in major studio recordings. In classics and modern hits both.
@ChankaBanka Regardless of your stance, the dog poop argument falls extra flat when you consider the FDA literally has standards for what is considered an “acceptable” level of fecal matter in food because it’s impossible to avoid completely at industrial scale.
Internet security situation so bad not only can you not login to XIV til its fixed but they've temporarily suspended the housing demo
Something they only usually do during natural disasters
oh my god
Crazy 72 hours in security. Three major incidents dropped back-to-back: eMudhra, PingCAP (TiDB Cloud), and PHP.
Here is the short version of what happened and who got hit.
1. eMudhra (Trusted CA compromise)
eMudhra generated 8 intermediate CA certificates in April 2025 (cross-signed by Sectigo). A bug in their HSM key-wrapping test script created a second set of P-384 keys where the private keys were single-byte numbers under 256. Operators picked the wrong key labels and signed them into real CA certs.
One of the intermediate CA private keys was literally the number 4.
The other seven: 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.
Three weeks later (May 2025), their CRL signatures started failing because the CRL signer was using the real keys instead of the weak ones. Instead of asking why the keys didn't match, someone switched the CRL signer to the weak keys and closed the ticket.
• Browsers are safe: Chrome, Firefox, Apple, and Microsoft already blocked them, and zero rogue certs hit CT logs.
• Servers are not: curl, Python (certifi), Go binaries, and Docker base images don't check CRLs. Update ca-certificates, certifi, and Go (1.27.3 / 1.26.10).
• 10-second check on any server:
curl https://t.co/vhiGLxNhIS
(TLS error = safe. 200 OK = still vulnerable.)
2. PingCAP / TiDB Cloud (10.6 TB breach)
Attackers found GCP and Azure credentials committed inside PingCAP's own repos. They set up a replication feed of TiDB Cloud's production control plane and exported the entire database every 6 hours for 22 straight days. 88 full exports, zero alerts. 200 GB is already out on torrents.
Beyond the 413 private repos and 20.6M customer SQL queries logged from their web SQL Editor, PingCAP engineers were pasting customer secrets into Jira tickets.
Who is affected in the leaked records:
• Live credentials exposed in support tickets:
- Pinterest: AWS keys for their pingcap-logs S3 bucket
- CardX / Silverlake (NPCI-linked env): AWS admin key in a backup log with full access to 258 external S3 buckets
- DeBank: 38 presigned S3 URLs
- An unnamed AI/dev platform: a 314 MB slow-query log attached to a ticket containing 8,027 live customer secrets (an AWS root key, a GitHub admin PAT over 1,701 repos, 7,485 AWS STS tokens, and 192 OpenAI/Anthropic/Gemini keys)
• Tenants with infra metadata, VPC CIDRs, app-server IPs, or contract pricing exposed:
- Tech: Atlassian, Databricks, Airbnb, Baidu, LINE, Nylas, Persona, PatSnap
- E-comm & Travel: https://t.co/C512KFOEq5, Shopee, Flipkart, Mercari, ZOZO, AEON, Delhivery, Klook
- Gaming: Capcom, Square Enix, Konami, Bandai Namco, Cygames, Colopl, DMM
- Finance: PayPay, SoftBank, SBI, SB Payment Service, Fujitsu, TOPPAN, Bank of China, China Life
- Crypto: Bitget (said only public trade logs were on it and they already left), Pionex, DigiPlus, NFTscan, Chainbase
• Developer profiles leaked (from a purchased https://t.co/28tjHqd5Wr table in PingCAP's BigQuery):
- 24,900 personal emails + GitHub/LinkedIn profiles of engineers at Tencent (3,327), Huawei (2,726), ByteDance (2,475), AIG (2,140), Mastercard, Flipkart, and bKash.
If you use TiDB Cloud: rotate your console API keys, DB passwords, and anything you ever pasted into a support ticket.
3. PHP "PHP2Shell" (CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619)
Two CVSS 9.2 pre-auth RCEs leaked yesterday ahead of today's 14:00 UTC patch.
Public writeups trace it to a heap Use-After-Free in PHP's native C multipart/form-data session upload-progress handler (ext/session/session.c).
Because C-level multipart parsing runs before line 1 of index.php:
• App auth, Laravel/WordPress middleware, and file_uploads = Off do not stop it.
• Only PHP 8.2–8.5 get official patches today (59% of PHP servers on Shodan are on EOL <= 8.1).
• Until you patch php-fpm: lock php_admin_flag[session.upload_progress.enabled] = off and block unexpected multipart requests at Nginx/Apache/Cloudflare.
So, two big things this morning:
1. A Certificate Authority (CA) was stupid and used a ridiculously-easily-guessable value for its private keys. Which means the entire SSL/TLS chain of trust is broken.
This means anyone can impersonate any site, and you won't be able to tell, because the site certificate will be legitimate (in fact, the only way you COULD tell is to know that eMudhra wasn't in the chain of trust for the site before, but is now).
Anything that checks/processes certs needs to be updated, to revoke the CA's certs. That means computers, phones, video game consoles, smart appliances, and a ton of phone apps and computer programs. And a lot of them don't have patches ready yet.
2. There's going to be an announcement later today of a vulnerability that's being exploited right now that allows anyone to take over any computer running a website that uses PHP, with a single request. It does not require authentication. If you're running any websites using any version of PHP, research "PHP2Shell" immediately, and take the necessary mitigation steps ASAP. Like I said, this is already being exploited right now, but once the announcement's official, the internet's gonna get slammed with people trying to take control of millions of computers worldwide.
All onkey artist alley reimbursements have been made, we had a donor come in to help finish them off, thank you so much to @daph_vt who stepped in to handle the remaining few artists, they have been paid this morning.
We can only facilitate specifically artist alley people, if you were a vendor, had a vendor agreement or were a sponsor im sorry we cant help, the cost you paid was larger than what we could take on reasonably. The window now for SVA to help is now closed as we have to focus on other things. Thank you so much to my assistant Fable for gathering and compiling the data so we could reimburse the artists and another huge thank you to Daph who was so kind to get it over the finish line!
"the broker situation" is misleading. You're doing this because your group got correctly classified as a broker account by Vgen and Muncha and you disagreed because youre "one of the good ones". This feels out of spite rather than a good honest attempt at fixing a problem.
These guys just casually changed engine and kept all mods and saves fully compatible. Meanwhile, we struggle to even keep saves compatible across updates on the same engine lol.
Big props to these wizards @ Ludeon Studios.