Yan Van De Velde

₿TCTC | Capital Markets
Here to exchange ideas, test assumptions & learn.
$MSTR | $ASST | $MPJPY | $SLE

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

Good question. My view is both will do well. The more interesting question is which delivers more upside and over what period.

Everyone talks about the fastest horse. I think it depends which section of the track we're on.

Base size is part of the handicap weight. What matters is the rate of capital deployment relative to that base, the amplification, and the value that ultimately accrues to each common share. SUPA's early advantage is that its funding capacity needn't be proportionately smaller just because its asset base is. 2,100 BTC sitting under ~$3.4bn of warrant capacity and a $210m first-loss junior preferred is a very different ratio to the parent's.

As SUPA grows, that percentage-growth advantage should moderate. But its contribution to Metaplanet becomes increasingly meaningful. The engine that initially moves SUPA far more than the parent can eventually become a substantial driver of the parent itself.

Then layer in Metaplanet's own preferred financing, income strategy and other accumulation channels. Those engines come online at different times and can reinforce each other.

Some horses have one principal engine. Metaplanet has the potential to combine several, including ownership of SUPA.

So I favour SUPA's relative performance earlier and Metaplanet's broader compounding later. It's a sequencing thesis, not a permanent winner-versus-loser argument.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

@UncleDividends I suspect the buyback discussion will become irrelevant before too long as the pieces come together. For now, I’d rather see Metaplanet focus on execution. The ones taking advantage of the discount should be us.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

Yeah, I genuinely don’t get it. To me the wider Metaplanet ecosystem is by far the most interesting thing being built in this space. What baffles me is watching shareholders relentlessly trash a company they still claim to own.

There’s far too much emotion and sentiment driving the conversation, while the fundamentals get overlooked. I’d welcome anyone testing the investment thesis on the actual mechanics and economics of the business rather than personalities.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

@OdysseusBTC_ @jonwillbanks @Metaplanet Precisely and I’d love to see Superplanet factored into that comparison too. Same framework, same assumptions. Let’s see what the numbers tell us. That’s a far more interesting discussion.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

@swissBTCmaxi @UncleDividends Interesting analogy. Fellow sailor myself, although I’m in the process of selling mine to buy more BTC treasuries… (hopefully to buy me a bigger one one later)

Regarding Metaplanet, don’t forget it’s got a supply ship currently sitting in the shipyard waiting to be launched….

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

Fair question and I’d like to see the dates too. I value your analysis because you actually do the work, even when I respectfully disagree. Unfortunately, the replies show how quickly constructive scrutiny turns into emotional pile-on and clown show.

These guys are building something incredibly ambitious under a microscope. Five years from now, I suspect we’ll care far more about whether the machine worked than whether every individual decision was perfect.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

@gerovich Every new disclosure makes the scale and sophistication of what they’re building a little clearer. These guys are operating on another level.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

100% agree. The hard part for me now is deciding where the marginal dollar goes $SUPA or 3350.

$SUPA has the advantage of that tiny starting base. If even a few of these engines fire, the potential BTC/share growth from that base is enormous.

But 3350 at ~0.84x mNAV is equally compelling. You’re buying the existing BTC at a discount, getting Metaplanet’s own optionality, and whatever value $SUPA creates ultimately accrues back to Metaplanet through its controlling stake.

I’ve tried modelling both, but with this many interacting capital engines it gets complicated very quickly.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

@UncleDividends Thanks Uncle Dividends, appreciate it. Credit to @gerovich, @DylanLeClair and the team for building it. There's a lot of optionality in the structure and we'll only know the playbook once they start using it. This is just my attempt at fitting the pieces together.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

Thanks Daniela, appreciate that. My portfolio weighted holdings are currently MSTR 51%, Strive 32%, Metaplanet 10% and SLE/SUPA 7%.

I see Metaplanet and Superplanet as complementary. Metaplanet is the more established vehicle, while SUPA gives me exposure to the next iteration of the model in the U.S, with a much broader capital toolkit and smaller starting float. Looking forward to seeing how the two develop alongside each other.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

I’ve been thinking about where Bitcoin treasury preferreds go from here, particularly after watching $STRC & $SATA operate through real market stress, with Metaplanet’s planned U.S. platform Superplanet ($SLE → $SUPA) still ahead.

@Strategy @Strive @Metaplanet

The June dislocation exposed what I think is one of the remaining weaknesses.

Both sold off sharply, with Matt Cole describing it as a leveraged-liquidation event rather than deterioration in the underlying credit.

The important part was the feedback loop:

volatility → tighter financing/higher haircuts → deleveraging → forced selling → lower price → more volatility

Fundamentals don’t necessarily have to deteriorate for a preferred to become materially dislocated.

The current generation already has mechanisms creating gravity around $100:

frequent distributions + cash reserves + ROC + high/variable distributions

$SATA’s recovery to par shows that rates, reserves and time can work.

Could a dampener shorten that time?

Below-par issuer repurchases already exist. I’m not suggesting a new capital-allocation tool, but an evolution of those frameworks into a faster, pre-authorised dampener.

The problem is latency:

dislocation → decision → approvals/compliance → capital deployed

By then, volatility may already have propagated.

What if more of that architecture existed before the event?

Not a guaranteed $100 floor. Not unlimited support. Not something designed to fight fundamental repricing.

Instead, a pre-authorised, rules-based repurchase framework capable, where legally permitted, of becoming an intraday source of incremental liquidity.

Preferred repurchases sit outside the Rule 10b-18 safe harbor (being outside it doesn’t itself imply manipulation), while Regulation M can restrict purchases during a qualifying distribution.

Not always on. Always ready.

Capital limits, valuation methodology, solvency requirements and broker mandate are established beforehand.

Fair value could be calculated mechanically from a formula fixed in the plan, with observable triggers tapering or suspending buying as conditions deteriorate.

A pre-set Rule 10b5-1-style plan could reduce intraday management discretion and MNPI risk, without overriding Regulation M.

Execution could be constrained by one broker, participation limits, independent price discovery, confidential valuation limits and absolute liquidity/solvency limits.

The hierarchy:

LEGAL → SOLVENCY → VALUATION → MARKET TRIGGER → EXECUTION

Legal and solvency are hard gates. Fail either: no buying.

The existing approach is countercyclical capital allocation. The next iteration could make it executable at market speed.

And the dampener can potentially get paid for doing its job.

If a preferred trades below pre-established fair value during a liquidity event, issuer buying can provide liquidity while retiring its own perpetual preferred claim at an attractive price.

The broker isn’t told to restore $100. It absorbs a controlled proportion of selling when the rules and economics permit.

Structural repricing → rate mechanism. Temporary dislocation → dampener. Fundamental deterioration → preserve capital.

The objective isn’t to eliminate volatility. It’s to dampen temporary volatility before it becomes self-reinforcing.

Whether it works at scale remains unproven. A large liquidation event could require far more capital than expected.

If successful, lower volatility could broaden demand, deepen liquidity and potentially reduce required yield. Leverage must remain disciplined, otherwise the dampener could recreate the problem it was designed to solve.

Starting with ~2,100 BTC and contemplating future preferred issuance, Superplanet has the opportunity to build these lessons into the architecture from day one.

Does the next generation also need to engineer the dampener?

Not sure what I’m overlooking. Where does everyone else see the next evolution of these products going?

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

@financialcnspr This is exactly why I’m so interested in $SUPA. Broader capital toolkit, much smaller float, and all the lessons learned from Metaplanet. To me, the structure looks engineered around maximizing the reflexivity of the premium → capital → BTC/share flywheel.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

Small correction, the 381m Metaplanet warrants represent $3.3835bn of gross exercise proceeds at the initial strikes, not $1.14bn. There are also the separate 10m Evo warrants, adding another $42.75m at their initial strikes.

I think the more important part, though, is the other side of the equation. Warrant exercise brings capital in, but it also expands the common denominator. So the relevant question isn’t simply how much capital the warrants can provide, it’s what happens to BTC per common share at each exercise price relative to NAV/share at the time.

That’s where the different tranches can have very different economics for existing holders.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

@Sharp_On_Sats Been digging into exactly this. I went a bit further down the rabbit hole on how the warrants interact with the wider capital structure and put my thoughts together here. Keen to hear where you land on it

https://t.co/6q3wGdbLSo

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

Dissecting the warrants and wider capital structure behind $SUPA, where the dilution sits, where the optionality sits and how the pieces fit together.

$SLE $SUPA @Metaplanet @Superplanet https://t.co/B9oNaQu6UT

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

Dissecting the warrants and wider capital structure behind $SUPA, where the dilution sits, where the optionality sits and how the pieces fit together.

$SLE $SUPA @Metaplanet @Superplanet https://t.co/B9oNaQu6UT

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

But isn’t that somewhat contradictory? The smaller share base is part of what gives Strive its amplification, yet warrant exercises are expanding that base at the strike rather than the prevailing high-mNAV market price. At a high mNAV I’d actually prefer accretive ATM issuance. The warrants are progressively eroding some of the very torque you’re pointing to.

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

Daily dividends certainly seem to help, the difference in volatility between $SATA and $STRC is interesting. But I still think there’s another layer of evolution here. Buybacks are part of the answer, but in their current form there’s too much latency. Can that mechanism be engineered to respond at market speed? I wrote out some thoughts on this yesterday, keen to hear where you think it breaks.

https://t.co/jGZpXNDmUt

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

I’ve been thinking about where Bitcoin treasury preferreds go from here, particularly after watching $STRC & $SATA operate through real market stress, with Metaplanet’s planned U.S. platform Superplanet ($SLE → $SUPA) still ahead.

@Strategy @Strive @Metaplanet

The June dislocation exposed what I think is one of the remaining weaknesses.

Both sold off sharply, with Matt Cole describing it as a leveraged-liquidation event rather than deterioration in the underlying credit.

The important part was the feedback loop:

volatility → tighter financing/higher haircuts → deleveraging → forced selling → lower price → more volatility

Fundamentals don’t necessarily have to deteriorate for a preferred to become materially dislocated.

The current generation already has mechanisms creating gravity around $100:

frequent distributions + cash reserves + ROC + high/variable distributions

$SATA’s recovery to par shows that rates, reserves and time can work.

Could a dampener shorten that time?

Below-par issuer repurchases already exist. I’m not suggesting a new capital-allocation tool, but an evolution of those frameworks into a faster, pre-authorised dampener.

The problem is latency:

dislocation → decision → approvals/compliance → capital deployed

By then, volatility may already have propagated.

What if more of that architecture existed before the event?

Not a guaranteed $100 floor. Not unlimited support. Not something designed to fight fundamental repricing.

Instead, a pre-authorised, rules-based repurchase framework capable, where legally permitted, of becoming an intraday source of incremental liquidity.

Preferred repurchases sit outside the Rule 10b-18 safe harbor (being outside it doesn’t itself imply manipulation), while Regulation M can restrict purchases during a qualifying distribution.

Not always on. Always ready.

Capital limits, valuation methodology, solvency requirements and broker mandate are established beforehand.

Fair value could be calculated mechanically from a formula fixed in the plan, with observable triggers tapering or suspending buying as conditions deteriorate.

A pre-set Rule 10b5-1-style plan could reduce intraday management discretion and MNPI risk, without overriding Regulation M.

Execution could be constrained by one broker, participation limits, independent price discovery, confidential valuation limits and absolute liquidity/solvency limits.

The hierarchy:

LEGAL → SOLVENCY → VALUATION → MARKET TRIGGER → EXECUTION

Legal and solvency are hard gates. Fail either: no buying.

The existing approach is countercyclical capital allocation. The next iteration could make it executable at market speed.

And the dampener can potentially get paid for doing its job.

If a preferred trades below pre-established fair value during a liquidity event, issuer buying can provide liquidity while retiring its own perpetual preferred claim at an attractive price.

The broker isn’t told to restore $100. It absorbs a controlled proportion of selling when the rules and economics permit.

Structural repricing → rate mechanism. Temporary dislocation → dampener. Fundamental deterioration → preserve capital.

The objective isn’t to eliminate volatility. It’s to dampen temporary volatility before it becomes self-reinforcing.

Whether it works at scale remains unproven. A large liquidation event could require far more capital than expected.

If successful, lower volatility could broaden demand, deepen liquidity and potentially reduce required yield. Leverage must remain disciplined, otherwise the dampener could recreate the problem it was designed to solve.

Starting with ~2,100 BTC and contemplating future preferred issuance, Superplanet has the opportunity to build these lessons into the architecture from day one.

Does the next generation also need to engineer the dampener?

Not sure what I’m overlooking. Where does everyone else see the next evolution of these products going?

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

This ties into something I was thinking about from a slightly different angle yesterday, whether the next evolution of preferreds is less about adjusting the distribution and more about engineering better mechanisms around temporary market dislocations. I wrote out the idea here. Keen to get your thoughts, particularly where you think it breaks.

https://t.co/jGZpXNDmUt

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

I’ve been thinking about where Bitcoin treasury preferreds go from here, particularly after watching $STRC & $SATA operate through real market stress, with Metaplanet’s planned U.S. platform Superplanet ($SLE → $SUPA) still ahead.

@Strategy @Strive @Metaplanet

The June dislocation exposed what I think is one of the remaining weaknesses.

Both sold off sharply, with Matt Cole describing it as a leveraged-liquidation event rather than deterioration in the underlying credit.

The important part was the feedback loop:

volatility → tighter financing/higher haircuts → deleveraging → forced selling → lower price → more volatility

Fundamentals don’t necessarily have to deteriorate for a preferred to become materially dislocated.

The current generation already has mechanisms creating gravity around $100:

frequent distributions + cash reserves + ROC + high/variable distributions

$SATA’s recovery to par shows that rates, reserves and time can work.

Could a dampener shorten that time?

Below-par issuer repurchases already exist. I’m not suggesting a new capital-allocation tool, but an evolution of those frameworks into a faster, pre-authorised dampener.

The problem is latency:

dislocation → decision → approvals/compliance → capital deployed

By then, volatility may already have propagated.

What if more of that architecture existed before the event?

Not a guaranteed $100 floor. Not unlimited support. Not something designed to fight fundamental repricing.

Instead, a pre-authorised, rules-based repurchase framework capable, where legally permitted, of becoming an intraday source of incremental liquidity.

Preferred repurchases sit outside the Rule 10b-18 safe harbor (being outside it doesn’t itself imply manipulation), while Regulation M can restrict purchases during a qualifying distribution.

Not always on. Always ready.

Capital limits, valuation methodology, solvency requirements and broker mandate are established beforehand.

Fair value could be calculated mechanically from a formula fixed in the plan, with observable triggers tapering or suspending buying as conditions deteriorate.

A pre-set Rule 10b5-1-style plan could reduce intraday management discretion and MNPI risk, without overriding Regulation M.

Execution could be constrained by one broker, participation limits, independent price discovery, confidential valuation limits and absolute liquidity/solvency limits.

The hierarchy:

LEGAL → SOLVENCY → VALUATION → MARKET TRIGGER → EXECUTION

Legal and solvency are hard gates. Fail either: no buying.

The existing approach is countercyclical capital allocation. The next iteration could make it executable at market speed.

And the dampener can potentially get paid for doing its job.

If a preferred trades below pre-established fair value during a liquidity event, issuer buying can provide liquidity while retiring its own perpetual preferred claim at an attractive price.

The broker isn’t told to restore $100. It absorbs a controlled proportion of selling when the rules and economics permit.

Structural repricing → rate mechanism. Temporary dislocation → dampener. Fundamental deterioration → preserve capital.

The objective isn’t to eliminate volatility. It’s to dampen temporary volatility before it becomes self-reinforcing.

Whether it works at scale remains unproven. A large liquidation event could require far more capital than expected.

If successful, lower volatility could broaden demand, deepen liquidity and potentially reduce required yield. Leverage must remain disciplined, otherwise the dampener could recreate the problem it was designed to solve.

Starting with ~2,100 BTC and contemplating future preferred issuance, Superplanet has the opportunity to build these lessons into the architecture from day one.

Does the next generation also need to engineer the dampener?

Not sure what I’m overlooking. Where does everyone else see the next evolution of these products going?

[Yan Van De Velde @KeepitFrank_]

I think price probably chops around here until close, but broadly I think the market is still asleep to what this structure could become.

One point where I differ is the warrants. I’m not looking at the 381m through the traditional lens of a warrant holder simply trying to maximise intrinsic value. I don’t believe that’s their primary function here. Exercising deeply ITM warrants just to capture the spread could be highly dilutive to NAV/BTC per share.

My view is they’ll use the ATM when mNAV supports accretive issuance, and potentially exercise warrants when they actually need to expand the capital base to support growth of the preferred stack. In that framework, the warrants become more of a 10-year capital escalator than an automatic dilution schedule.

Could be wrong, but that’s why I’m not arriving at the same “limited upside” conclusion from the fully diluted warrant count alone.