@PratyushRT Yet it's deeply regrettable that the paper by Peng Wang et al. has been implicated in scientific misconduct. An author of it reviewed (at an IACR venue) and used Bhati et al.'s orig. work seven months before publishing, yet Bhati et al. was not credited for discovering the attack
Coinbase just gave agents wallets. But wallets don't solve the real problem.
AI agents will execute millions of micro-actions per day. No blockchain, no matter how fast, can handle a separate on-chain transaction for every single one.
We built @0x4Mica. Agents transact instantly with cryptographic guarantees, and settlement happens later in batches. Thousands of micro-payments, one on-chain transaction.
In this demo, I'm streaming a video, and each data chunk is paid for in real-time. Watch what happens when I switch from 4Mica credit to raw on-chain payments, and then ask to be switched back.
Same stream. Same operator. Completely different experience.
Amit Singh Bhati (@kr_ams) presenting "Breaking the IEEE Encryption Standard -- XCB-AES in Two Queries" at #crypto 2025 in Santa Barbara.
https://t.co/ohJy3YsP7f
@CosicBe 🔗 Slides - https://t.co/AnEE3G1z8F
Faster. More Secure. Beyond the Birthday Bound. 🦾
Our Sonikku family is designed for optimal performance across diverse applications, including those requiring small resource footprints🤏, ultra-low latency🏎️, and high throughput🌊.
Our PhD researcher Amit Singh Bhati (@kr_ams) presented the #Sonikku family of message authentication codes (MACs) at #Arcticcrypt 2025, held in Longyearbyen, Svalbard.
Learn more:
🔗 Paper - https://t.co/DH3cpgFsVc
🔗 Event - https://t.co/hLqqUeJ2Np
@PratyushRT This lack of acknowledgment persisted, only rectified in April 2025 after an IACR ethics investigation established the truth. The strong similarities between ePrint [2024/1527] and [2024/1554], combined with the proven misconduct, cast a deep shadow on 1527's celebrated findings.
@PratyushRT Yet it's deeply regrettable that the paper by Peng Wang et al. has been implicated in scientific misconduct. An author of it reviewed (at an IACR venue) and used Bhati et al.'s orig. work seven months before publishing, yet Bhati et al. was not credited for discovering the attack
@PratyushRT We also sent the attack to IEEE and XCB authors for coordinated vulnerability disclosure (Sep 9). The authors confirmed, but sadly, we still haven't received a response from IEEE which delayed the publishing of our attack on ePrint.
Check out our XCB-AES IEEE standard attack on ePrint: https://t.co/oHaQctSIUE
XCB-AES is an IEEE 1619.2 standard for encryption of sector-oriented storage media. In this work, we demonstrate an attack on XCB-AES by recovering almost full plaintext within two queries.
The same result is also presented on https://t.co/hiDnWEzt2G
It was rejected from Crypto (submission date 14 February) and was submitted to IEEE for coordinated vulnerability disclosure (but we did not get an answer).