老蛮频道bei

江湖随缘, 帅气长存.

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@HotmailfromSH @cz_binance 因为doctor的一个点赞了解了下这个人, 这早期的操作, 用石涛说画的描述“ 出入截, 入如揭”, 是911几个毫无犹豫的人起飞15分钟内就劫机, 唯一落在空地上的人是起飞40分钟后才动手. “我知道我是对的”

[纽约时报中文网 @nytchinese]

比尔·盖茨：科技行业刻意淡化人工智能风险。盖茨警告，人工智能对就业和人类生命构成了严重威胁，紧急应对这些风险应该成为“全球头等大事”。如果不加以解决，大规模失业将不可避免。科技行业刻意淡化这些威胁，因为牵涉到巨大的利益。https://t.co/eTEjpBeI2s

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

suppressing wages may be good for those who do it, but bad for the system as a whole, and so it only "works" when a very few countries do it and the rest don't notice. - that's cheat

[Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis]

Financial Times: "Thailand’s household debt stands at 86 per cent of GDP, the highest among upper middle-income countries in the world, according to HSBC, with consumers using loans to fund daily expenses amid slowing economic and wage growth."

Thailand seems to be an extreme case of what has become a global problem, but I wonder if this is really a demographic problem so much as a global trade problem. Thailand has a very high manufacturing share of GDP, roughly 24% of its GDP, versus a global average of around 16%, and in order to remain "competitive", it cannot allow wages to rise too much given that global competitiveness has mostly become a function of low wages relative to productivity.

The problem with low wages relative to productivity, of course, is that it results in low domestic demand relative to production, and the only way to make up for it is either to run trade surpluses that force the low demand onto trade partners, or to increase household debt, which works temporarily to boost demand but increases financial fragility.

I would argue that as long as we have a global trading system that rewards countries that suppress wage growth relative to productivity growth, this problem isn't going away. This is what Michael Kalecki explained: suppressing wages may be good for those who do it, but bad for the system as a whole, and so it only "works" when a very few countries do it and the rest don't notice. The problem, as Joan Robinson warned, is that eventually everyone notices it, and trade breaks down.

The word needs faster growth in workers' wages, not more debt to make up for it, but in an unevenly globalized world, no country can afford to let wages rise too quickly because the benefits accrue mainly to those of its trade partners who keep wage growth below productivity growth.

This is something labor unions everywhere should be more worried and more vociferous about. Wage growth is sluggish not because businesses are evil but because our system punishes manufacturers in countries that allow wage growth to keep pace with productivity growth.

Just look at Germany. When it suppressed wage growth in the 2003-05 reforms, it became the most competitive manufacturer in the world, but during the past 5-10 years, as wages once again caught up, its manufacturers lost much of that competitiveness. Germany was heavily rewarded for doing the wrong thing, and then got punished for reversing it.

This is a terrible global incentive structure, and it affects manufacturing countries like Thailand. The only way Thailand can reduce household debt without slowing the economy either is to raise wages or to run surpluses, but it can't raise wages without making its manufacturers less competitive.
https://t.co/d0qLrYZDlK

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

朱镕基干了啥 early-2000s banking cleanup was not that China found a way to eliminate the costs of resolving bad debt. It was that it found a politically acceptable way to hide those costs.

[Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis]

"China’s banking crisis in the 2000s was resolved by transferring the costs to households through financial repression—a decision that recapitalized the banks while exacerbating the structural imbalances that continue to shape the Chinese economy today."

As Chinese debt continues to surge, and as Beijing increasingly tries (so far unsuccessfully) to rein it in, it is worth remembering how China managed its last major debt cleanup, from 2002 to 2011, and what the consequences were for the economy. I discuss this in my latest piece for the Carnegie Endowment.
https://t.co/umeEjG3nH4

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@michaelxpettis I have a question, professor, regarding the solution of selling assets, how could it be effective without the foundation of judiciary system and its independency, wouldn't it be another repeat of selling of late 1990s, or Chinese stock market.

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

debt resolution requires losses to be allocated, whether explicitly or implicitly. Beijing chose to allocate those losses primarily to households through financial repression. That decision successfully recapitalized the banking system, but it also depressed household income···

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

朱镕基的遗产 What had initially been a mechanism for recapitalizing the banking system eventually became a mechanism for generating another debt problem.

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

朱镕基的遗产 What had initially been a mechanism for recapitalizing the banking system eventually became a mechanism for generating another debt problem.

[Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis]

"China’s banking crisis in the 2000s was resolved by transferring the costs to households through financial repression—a decision that recapitalized the banks while exacerbating the structural imbalances that continue to shape the Chinese economy today."

As Chinese debt continues to surge, and as Beijing increasingly tries (so far unsuccessfully) to rein it in, it is worth remembering how China managed its last major debt cleanup, from 2002 to 2011, and what the consequences were for the economy. I discuss this in my latest piece for the Carnegie Endowment.
https://t.co/umeEjG3nH4

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

1980s, 中国消费还有65 to 68%of GDP. 1990s 消费跌, 2000年 it still represented 63.9 percent of GDP. 2000年之后不升反降, 到2010, 跌倒 49.4 % of GDP, 迄今为止任何主要经济体最低的消费力. 黄金10年20年, 谁得利

[Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis]

"China’s banking crisis in the 2000s was resolved by transferring the costs to households through financial repression—a decision that recapitalized the banks while exacerbating the structural imbalances that continue to shape the Chinese economy today."

As Chinese debt continues to surge, and as Beijing increasingly tries (so far unsuccessfully) to rein it in, it is worth remembering how China managed its last major debt cleanup, from 2002 to 2011, and what the consequences were for the economy. I discuss this in my latest piece for the Carnegie Endowment.
https://t.co/umeEjG3nH4

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

什么叫“化债”, 国家把债转(慢慢转, 不声张地转)给households , 叫“化债”. 也叫monetary measures.

[Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis]

"China’s banking crisis in the 2000s was resolved by transferring the costs to households through financial repression—a decision that recapitalized the banks while exacerbating the structural imbalances that continue to shape the Chinese economy today."

As Chinese debt continues to surge, and as Beijing increasingly tries (so far unsuccessfully) to rein it in, it is worth remembering how China managed its last major debt cleanup, from 2002 to 2011, and what the consequences were for the economy. I discuss this in my latest piece for the Carnegie Endowment.
https://t.co/umeEjG3nH4

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@HotmailfromSH 你对我的百般注解，并不构成万分之一的我，却是一览无遗的你自己。

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@vivianwubeijing 怎么明星打官司都找这个张起淮, 这个律师在苏享茂哥哥一定要把毒妻判刑的坚持下, 还背对办公桌双手撑着一副成功派头, 说, 你要不要和翟欣欣谈谈拿钱, 我现在就可以跟翟欣欣的律师联系... 显得自己牛死了. 这种对当事人不付出情感, 一开始就不奔着“无罪辩护” 去做最大, 套着“ 成功”演技和不细品

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

能让人如沐春风的能力

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@HotmailfromSH 因为没有自己, 自然和世界的链接是囫囵吞枣. 中老年(灵魂得跟上, 不然是登)才懂爱, 会爱

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@HotmailfromSH 身体穿着成年老年的皮囊, 灵魂被卡在某个点, 或者都没带. 读再多史, 最终做了来俊臣赵高蔡京. 江儿子那面圣的一握手, 不就是穿着破棉袄的老农民握毛的感激涕零么, 照出的奴才灵魂,纵使家财万贯

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@vivianwubeijing 下场啊, 目的是告诉那热血, 我挺你, 那帮蛆不是你的扫射目标. 所以, 狠狠骂回去, 但是完全不伤你情绪, 就是伤嗓子

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@HotmailfromSH 是的, 同感

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@HotmailfromSH 博主灵魂有趣啊

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@zhu0588 gay的情商很高

[老蛮频道bei @laomanmissing]

@zhu0588 毛就看得出, 所以看着一方拜周的, 气不打一出来, 这帮蠢货