leo

[leo @leodchief3]

@ChairmanSelig @CFTC Hyperliquid

[zoomer @zoomerfied]

[ ZOOMER ]

THE CFTC APPROVES PERPS TO OPERATE AND BE OFFERED TO US USERS: FILING

[leo @leodchief3]

@fiege_max appreciate you @fiege_max, thanks for everything you have done for the ecosystem

[trade.xyz @tradexyz]

S&P Dow Jones Indices and trade[XYZ] have joined forces to launch the first official S&P 500 perpetual contract, available exclusively on Hyperliquid.

For 69 years, the S&P 500 has been a defining reference point for global finance. Until now, access to that benchmark has been shaped by market hours, intermediaries, and geography. Today, that changes.

The S&P 500 perp is now available 24/7/365, anchored by the official index data required for deep liquidity and institutional confidence at scale. 

SPDJI helped define modern indexing. They are stewards of an iconic benchmark, the standard against which portfolios across the globe are measured. We are honored to bring that legacy on-chain.

Trade[XYZ] is bringing the world's most iconic assets towards a future of global, continuous markets — a future powered by Hyperliquid.

[Hyperliquid @HyperliquidX]

Hyperliquid is built on a foundation of onchain transparency. A recent article made several claims that are factually incorrect:
+ Solvency: Every dollar is accounted for; the author failed to count native HyperEVM USDC.
+ Integrity: Testnet functions are exactly that - testnet only for testing. They cannot be executed on mainnet.
+ Transparency: Hyperliquid is more transparent and decentralized than all other major venues for perps trading. The entire state is independently maintained by a permissionless validator set and verified through BFT proof-of-stake consensus by each node. Every order, trade, and liquidation is available in real time during execution. Anyone can run a node and index the chain’s state and transitions. No major perps platform comes close to this guarantee for users.

See our response to the writer’s individual points below.

Claim: The system is undercollateralized by $362M

False: The Hyperliquid blockchain state is fully and verifiably solvent. The author excluded the HyperEVM USDC (a publicly announced and much anticipated integration), which exists in parallel to the Arbitrum bridge. Every USDC in circulation on HyperCore is accounted for transparently, by summing up the balances of https://t.co/Fk2lhZvpXD and https://t.co/pGBPcsJUTl. At the time of writing, this amounts to 3.989B + 362M = 4.351B USDC on HyperCore. USDC on the HyperEVM can be computed by subtracting 362M from the 421M on the HyperEVM USDC contract (https://t.co/ohiJm3WzN8), totaling another 59M USDC on HyperEVM.

The sum of the Arbitrum bridge and native USDC balances can be compared against the sum of user balances on HyperCore. As highlighted in the introduction, this exercise of verifying complete system solvency against user balances is uniquely possible on Hyperliquid compared to competitors.

The current Arbitrum bridge was an important stepping stone in bootstrapping the Hyperliquid network and will be deprecated as the migration to native USDC is complete, bringing Hyperliquid to parity with other major L1s.

Claim: There is retroactive volume manipulation via TestnetSetYesterdayUserVlm

False: This is a testnet-only function to allow for comprehensive testing. The author states that “the function’s presence is the problem…capability alone violates the trust model.” Testnet-only features that enable more rigorous testing of edge cases do not undermine the chain’s integrity. The fee schedule on Hyperliquid interacts in a complex way with inputs: user volume, aligned quote token status, maker vs taker, HIP-3, etc. It’s important to test these interactions on testnet, and therefore the testnet chain has a set of admin testing functions that do not exist on mainnet. The related TestnetAddMainnetUser action is to mark a testnet user as having corresponding mainnet state, to avoid DDOS and other attacks that are “free” on testnet. None of these functions are callable on the mainnet state.

While the execution source is not available, anyone can verify every trade onchain by running a node, and sum up the values to confirm that volume numbers are reflected accurately in onchain state. Similar to onchain solvency verification against the sum of all user account values, this is possible on Hyperliquid but not on most competitive platforms.

Given that this code path is entirely unreachable on mainnet, future development work will entirely compile out this testnet-only logic on mainnet nodes to avoid any possible misunderstanding or misinterpretation.

Claim: Some users have special privileges such as fee exemptions or retroactive volume manipulation used to influence the airdrop

False: Like system solvency, user balances, and individual trades, the fees paid by any address is available onchain. Each trade along with its fees paid or rebates received are transparently indexed by nodes, API servers, and third party analytics providers. There are no such mechanisms to distort fees, and no such mechanisms could have influenced the HYPE airdrop. Furthermore, the genesis distribution of HYPE is fully available onchain, and users can verify the historical behavior of every such address.

Claim: “CoreWriter” godmode can mint tokens, move user funds without signatures, crash random validators and basically do whatever it wants

False: The CoreWriter spec is fully documented here https://t.co/TTMWI5pDBB and replicable in the open source HyperEVM execution. CoreWriter is a way for smart contracts on HyperEVM to send HyperCore actions as part of HyperEVM block execution. It supports various actions that are normally sent by EOAs such as staking and placing orders, but has no such features to “mint tokens, move user funds without signatures, crash random validators and basically do whatever it wants.” This is a fundamental misunderstanding of how HyperCore interacts with the HyperEVM.

Claim: Chain can freeze via governance, and no undo function exists

Misinterpreted: The chain freezes during network upgrades. There is no undo function because the validators adopt a new binary at that height. This is analogous to how other networks perform hard forks at future heights determined by social consensus.

Suspicious activity on POPCAT in Nov 2025 did not cause the L1 to freeze, nor were any user funds frozen. The L1 was entirely operational, and any observer can see the blocks that were produced during this time. The Arbitrum bridge was automatically locked after the incident due to abnormal variation in account balances. As explained above, the Arbitrum bridge is not as secure as natively minted USDC, and therefore requires several conservative automated locking mechanisms as safeguards. The Arbitrum bridge’s locking mechanism is audited and open sourced, and the bridge is being deprecated with the transition to native USDC.

Claim: A single private key can set any oracle price instantly: no timelock, no limits

Misinterpreted: The author is likely mistaking the HIP-3 oracle updater logic with the validator-operated perps. HIP-3 oracle updates are indeed set by a single address, but this is up to the deployer to configure. The updater address need not be an EOA. For example, current HIP-3 deployers use a combination of MPC and CoreWriter architecture.

For validator-operated perps, multiple validators can submit oracle price updates. The final prices are a robust weighted median across major centralized exchanges. There is no timelock and no limits explicitly because these limits make the system less, not more, safe. The events of 10/10 show the danger to solvency if ADL is not accurately triggered in a timely manner during high volatility. Hyperliquid was one of the only venues without performance degradation or a network outage during this time. If Mango Markets or a similar protocol with oracle rate limits were active during 10/10, they would have likely accrued bad debt. Further decentralization will involve other validators actively running independent and open-sourced oracle update binaries.

Claim: 8 undisclosed addresses control all transaction submission

False: Some transactions are already sent directly from the validators. Some such as orders are not, in order to minimize MEV, but a future upgrade will incorporate this logic for all transactions in a mechanism that is both MEV- and censorship-resistant. The careful consideration of MEV is in response to trader and researcher feedback based on predatory behavior observed on other chains. There is almost unanimous agreement that toxic transaction ordering degrades the end user experience. Ultimately, the validator set is permissionless, and there is no guarantee that validators in the mainnet set are always fully aligned with the ecosystem. A major milestone in decentralization will be solving this problem, including a multiple-proposer block building setup.

Claim: There is a liquidation cartel with unfair advantages

Misinterpreted: Only HLP may backstop liquidate users, and HLP subvaults are the only addresses in this set. However, depositing into HLP is permissionless, so HLP is a community-owned liquidity vault supporting the protocol. The fact that HLP has privileges is no different from other protocol liquidity vaults.

Relatedly, all liquidations are first attempted against the order book, which handles the vast majority of liquidated positions without backstop liquidation. This allows users to keep any remaining collateral, and allows all other users to compete in providing the best price to the liquidation flow, benefitting the liquidated user.

Claim: There is a hidden lending protocol with $1M+ supplied and no documentation

False: Portfolio margin, borrow lend, and the HLP supplied value were all publicly announced and are currently in pre-alpha rollout. The current documentation can be found at https://t.co/vvE8EhpIhX and has been progressively fleshed out over the past several weeks.

Claim: ModifyNonCirculatingSupply allows changes to token supply

False: The full supply of HIP-1 tokens on HyperCore is fixed at deployment. The non-circulating supply is a purely informational number that can optionally mark addresses as “non-circulating” for display purposes. Whether an address is marked as “non-circulating” does not affect execution. This is an example of onchain information that might make more sense offchain, but is not a vulnerability.

Thank you to the author for spending the time to verify the execution of Hyperliquid. The fact that this investigation could be done at all proves the transparency and decentralization that Hyperliquid has already achieved. Concretely, Hyperliquid is the only major perps venue where the entire state and every input diff is transparently available to anyone running a node.

A similar analysis on any of the other top perp DEXs is impossible. For example, Lighter uses a single centralized sequencer whose execution logic and ZK circuits are unavailable. Aster uses centralized matching and even offers dark pool trading, which is only possible with a single centralized sequencer without verifiable execution. Other protocols with some open source contracts do not have a verifiable sequencer.

On Binance, Lighter, Aster, or similar exchanges, it is impossible for anyone other than the sequencer to see a full snapshot of onchain state including order books, positions, and other user information. The centralized sequencer can also upgrade its software without any constraints. On Hyperliquid, the entire state is onchain, which means there are 24 validators executing the same state machine under BFT consensus rules. There is plenty left to do on the journey towards greater decentralization, but it’s important to highlight just how far Hyperliquid and its ecosystem have come compared to competitors.

Decentralization is progressive, and Hyperliquid will ultimately be fully open sourced. Hyperliquid is the most transparent of all major venues, even though this leaks advantages to competitors (all of whom are closed source), who can copy Hyperliquid’s innovations more easily. We think this is the correct tradeoff to balance value accrual to the community, speed of innovation, and upholding the values of defi.

The HyperEVM execution is open source, and Sprites, an independent community member, maintains a full archival node that powers many important integrations. HyperCore will follow the same path as soon as it reaches feature completion.

[leo @leodchief3]

@dschamis @CNBC @BeckyQuick @HyperliquidX @HypeStrat Congratulations @dschamis - is the 8k out? What's the number of shares outstanding currently? (for tracking mnav) thanks and goodluck

[leo @leodchief3]

@hellojintao embarassing take - imagine shitting on builders who actually care enough to take the time to check in with users and are open to feedback
you can short the pair too

[ZachXBT @zachxbt]

This cycle I notice many offshore Asia CEXs appeared trying to replicate the MEXC bucket shop model like KCEX, Toobit, WEEX, Jucoin

It’s sad seeing so many people blindly trade on these CEXs after KOLs promote them.

I do not think users realize the lack of protection available for them if anything bad happens vs regulated CEX or transparent DEX

It’s 2025 not 2016 so offshore unregulated CEXs = massive red flag

[Robinhood @RobinhoodApp]

$HYPE is now available to trade on Robinhood.

[leo @leodchief3]

@lukecannon727

[jeff.hl @chameleon_jeff]

TLDR: During recent volatility, Hyperliquid had 100% uptime with zero bad debt. This was Hyperliquid’s first cross-margin ADL in more than 2 years of operation. ADL does not change the outcome for any liquidated users. While some specific ADL providing trades were unfavorable, the aggregate effect of ADL was that traders realized significant pnl by closing positions at favorable prices that were only briefly available.

--

It’s sad to see some people attack Hyperliquid to deflect from their own platforms’ issues. Solvency and uptime are the two most important properties of a financial system. These are table stakes for any trading system, and gaslighting to convince users otherwise is unethical and irresponsible.

Below is more analysis on how Hyperliquid’s margining system handled the extreme volatility.

Background on liquidations

For a perps system to be solvent, every position must be backed by a minimum amount of collateral. This is called the “maintenance margin.” When positions do not meet the maintenance margin requirement, they are taken over by the system to be liquidated. Earlier today, many altcoins dropped by more than 50% in a short period of time. When this happens, long positions at 2x or higher leverage must be liquidated, or else the system accrues bad debt.

There were billions of dollars worth of positions liquidated on Hyperliquid in a matter of minutes. In a permissionless system, each user chooses their own position sizing and collateralization. Any system that does not liquidate the necessary users is irresponsibly gambling with other users’ funds. On Hyperliquid, every order, trade, and liquidation is transparently verifiable onchain. Many other venues significantly under-report liquidation data. This cannot be compared apples-to-apples against the fully onchain picture of Hyperliquid.

Background on HLP

HLP is a protocol vault with permissionless deposits that 1) provides order book liquidity and 2) performs backstop liquidations. The first role is negligible, with HLP trading less than 1% market share. The focus of this post is liquidations.

Liquidations are first attempted against the order book, and any user can provide liquidity to these market liquidations. Backstop liquidations occur when the order book does not have enough liquidity to absorb an undercollateralized position. In this case, HLP takes over the position along with its collateral. For improved risk management, HLP is split into several child vaults, and each liquidation is only sent to one child vault.

Background on ADL

Auto-deleveraging (ADL) is the liquidation mechanism of last resort, when market and backstop liquidations do not work. See Doug’s thread (link in reply) for a thorough explanation on the details of ADL.

Every ADL event has two sides: the “triggered” side is undercollateralized, while the “providing” side is decided as a function of profitability and leverage used.

Similar to backstop liquidations, even though providers to ADL are profitable on average, there are no guarantees for any specific event. Some ADL providing trades were unfavorable, such as when only some components of long/short portfolio were closed. The system is designed to minimize ADLs because they are unpredictable even if ADL providing trades are profitable on average. Because HLP is a non-toxic backstop liquidator, ADL is a rare settlement of last resort. As far as I know, this was the first cross-margin ADL event on Hyperliquid mainnet (ADL is more common for isolated-only assets such as hyperps, which are not backstop liquidated by HLP).

Summary of events

Over the course of 20 minutes, HLP backstop liquidated billions of dollars worth of positions.

HLP's philosophy has always been to provide liquidity of last resort. Contrary to misconceptions, HLP is a non-toxic liquidator that does not pick profitable liquidations. Instead HLP is a public good for maintaining system solvency. In particular, Hyperliquid has no liquidation fees. HLP’s design, including its multi-component child vault system, is the product of countless simulations, and allows HLP to maximally serve the benefit of the protocol while managing its own risk.

In fact, the liquidator child vaults of HLP themselves became undercollateralized in the course of backstop liquidating as many user positions as possible. This is by design, where child vaults are isolated from the other components of the overall strategy. HLP is treated no differently from other users when participating in ADL. In aggregate, HLP's child vaults were the largest addresses on the triggered side of ADL by more than an order of magnitude. The addresses on the providing side of ADL against HLP’s child vaults realized hundreds of millions of dollars in additional profit relative to the prices shortly before and after the dislocation.

On other venues, the liquidation engine is not transparent and therefore may not be subject to the same strict margin requirements as for normal users. On these venues, the exchange could have backstop liquidated more positions, bearing increased solvency risk to extract hundreds of millions in business revenue. This is not an acceptable tradeoff for Hyperliquid.

Finally, I know that this is a difficult time for many traders, and I hope the community can continue to support each other and grow together. As a contributor to Hyperliquid, I’ll continue to work my hardest to build the best possible platform that can house all of finance. Times like this highlight the importance of transparency and fairness in the financial system.

[leo @leodchief3]

Congrats on the profits, been following and applaud your discipline
Curious - at what point and what does it take for you to consider deploying in size again? If the market keeps going up (given your rationale of selling is mostly due to the 4 year cycle) or would you just stay in cash forever?

[Felix @felixprotocol]

USDC is now live on Felix Vanilla

Users can now bridge USDC to HyperEVM from other chains via @StargateFinance or @AcrossProtocol (powered by CCTP v2 beneath the hood) and then borrow + lend on Felix Vanilla

To clarify, USDC is not currently linked between HyperCore and HyperEVM, which means USDC cannot be transferred directly between your Core and EVM account yet. This is coming soon from Circle

Supported collaterals for borrowing USDC:
- HYPE
- kHYPE
- UBTC
- More coming this week and next

Welcome to HyperEVM, Circle

[leo @leodchief3]

@wardaddycapital congrats man

[rysk @ryskfinance]

https://t.co/rKWUnIyWM4

[rysk @ryskfinance]

Rysk just crossed $10M TVL

What’s next?
$10M was the first milestone. Now it’s time to scale fast and become the volatility yield layer of DeFi.

That means the points program goes live soon.

In the meantime: ETH cash-secured puts are live.

https://t.co/rvRvrGgQDD

[rysk @ryskfinance]

Many asked.

Cash Secured Puts are now live on HyperEVM.

https://t.co/rvRvrGgQDD

[Unit @unitxyz]

As many have seen over the last few days, there are several very large wallets trading via Unit on HL. To be 100% clear, the user is unknown to us, and independently decided that this was the best decentralized venue for them to trade on. As of now they have sold 19663 BTC across the 2 entities ($2.22B) and bought 455,672 ETH ($2.19B) since they started 4 days ago. During this time Unit reached record 24 hour spot volumes of 3.2b+. This surpassed Coinbase and Bybit BTC spot volumes combined and is close to on par with BTC/USDT on Binance. Despite the very high load, the infrastructure and guardian network worked as intended; processing billions of dollars of deposits and withdrawals with zero downtime.

HL also generated approx $4,709,538 in fees in the past 24 hours. Unit contributed 20% of the buy backs via HL's portion of the spot fees ($941,907) during this period. In addition, Unit is also using 100% of the fees of its portion to buy back HYPE, effectively resulting in $1.88M of HYPE buybacks directly attributable to Unit spot trading.

[leo @leodchief3]

@DankBelfortOG @HyperliquidX @ryskfinance @DanDeFiEd @onchain_martinz Good explanation + example 👍

[leo @leodchief3]

@k2_nft Lol