China’s dependence on imported oil has long hovered around 70%, with a large share sourced from the Middle East. Most of this supply must pass through the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. If the United States were to cut off China’s energy supply in the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Malacca, the impact on China’s industrial system and war potential would be devastating.
The United States’ ultimate strategic advantage lies in its 11 carrier strike groups that control the world’s major sea lanes. By contrast, the Chinese navy remains primarily an “anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)” force and is not yet capable of protecting its energy lifelines across the global commons. The U.S. also holds tangible “conventional cards” in its dominance over foundational technological ecosystems (such as export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment), its hegemony in the global financial system (e.g., SWIFT settlement dominance), and its tightening network of military alliances in the Indo-Pacific (such as the U.S.–Japan–India–Australia framework and AUKUS). In these areas, China is still largely in a defensive and reactive posture rather than achieving comprehensive superiority.
The rise of the United States was built upon the natural “moats” of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as the absence of strong adversaries to its north and south (Canada and Mexico). As early as the 19th century, it established absolute dominance in the Americas through the Monroe Doctrine, enabling it to project power globally without strategic distraction.
China, on the other hand, has 14 land neighbors and complex maritime disputes. Its periphery includes not only nuclear powers such as Russia and India, but also close U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea. Any use of force in one direction (for example, the Taiwan Strait or southern Tibet) could easily trigger chain reactions, potentially leading to multi-front strategic encirclement. Historically, facing multiple adversaries simultaneously (such as the frontier crises in the late Qing dynasty) has proven highly destructive. Therefore, China’s current “restraint” is essentially a strategic choice to avoid repeating the historical downfall of land-based powers engaged in multi-front wars before achieving overwhelming strength.
Public discourse claiming that “China already possesses absolute strength” is highly dangerous. If the public widely believes that China is powerful enough to ignore any sanctions, then any future compromise or concession made by the government in diplomacy or territorial disputes—based on realist considerations—may trigger strong feelings of betrayal and frustration. This, in turn, could pressure policymakers into making irrational and aggressive decisions.
A truly intelligent strategy is precisely what you described: recognizing one’s own limitations while objectively assessing the strength of the opponent. In reality, China’s leadership is far more clear-headed than such online narratives. They are well aware of the gap with the United States in core foundational technologies and global power projection capabilities. This is why they consistently emphasize “peaceful development” and “non-hegemony” on the international stage—rational choices grounded in current capabilities.