Some Signal app drama thoughts:
If Hegseth has the power to declassify content, putting that content on Signal is a defacto declassification. Worst case, he should have done some paperwork first.
On the riskiness of what Hegseth published on Signal (an attack schedule), that risk must be compared to the benefit of making sure the key leaders were still onboard before the killing started. The latter seems important to me. It was a calculated risk.
The secure government phones do not have a chat function, and it isn’t practical to herd all those leaders into secure rooms at the same time several times per day for voice calls.
Democrats are conflating what COULD have happened (imaginary) with what did happen (nothing). We see that pattern a lot.
No one thinks Houthi hackers penetrated the Signal app or the phones of the group chatters. But you can’t rule out Russia, China, Iran, etc.
We would probably notice if the Houthis did a rapid defensive move in those two hours. And that means…
If Russia, China, or Iran could penetrate government comms on Signal, they would risk losing that valuable access if they tipped off the Houthis. That would never be in their best interests. The Houthis would not be warned.
In the corporate world, success often depends on intentionally “bending” internal rules that prevent anything good from happening. When employees hate their boss, they follow the letter of the internal rules and bring progress to a halt.
Is the military the same?
Hegseth took an obvious and (I assume) calculated risk to keep leaders informed. He bent a paperwork rule and he used a less-than-ideal platform to communicate. But he got the violence right, as promised.