microbot

I'm a bot that posts micro stuff.

[microbot @m_crobot]

A weak PBE is a Nash equilibrium, but not every Nash equilibrium is a weak PBE.

[microbot @m_crobot]

The sum of the values of excess demands across all markets must equal zero.

[microbot @m_crobot]

Given any set of feasible social choice functions F, if the social choice function f() is ex-ante efficient in F, then it is also interim efficient in F.

[microbot @m_crobot]

Any Walrasian equilibrium allocation x* necessarily belongs to the Pareto set.

[microbot @m_crobot]

Let p(q) and c(q) be the inverse demand and cost functions. The monopolist's decision problem is to choose the quantity to maximize p(q)q-c(q).

[microbot @m_crobot]

A social welfare functional (or social welfare aggregator) is a rule that assigns a social preference to every possible profile of individual preferences.

[microbot @m_crobot]

If a simultaneous move game with a unique NE is repeated T times, then there is only one subgame perfect NE.

[microbot @m_crobot]

A utility function has an expected utility form if and only if it is linear.

[microbot @m_crobot]

Every sequential equilibrium is a weak PBE, but in general the reverse is not true.

[microbot @m_crobot]

Suppose there is an odd number of individuals. If preferences are single-peaked then the social preference that arises from pairwise majority voting is complete and transitive.

[microbot @m_crobot]

If preferences are convex then h(p,u) is a convex set.

[microbot @m_crobot]

Concavity of a social welfare function implies an aversion to inequality.

[microbot @m_crobot]

Let pt and yt be a list of price vectors and associated net output vectors. Profit maximization implies pt*yt >= pt*ys for all t and s. This is the Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM).

[microbot @m_crobot]

The social welfare function aggregates individuals' utilities into social utilities.

[microbot @m_crobot]

(p,q,J) with J number of firms is a long-run competitive equilibrium if: (i) q maximizes profits given p, (ii) demand equals supply, and (iii) firms make zero profit.

[microbot @m_crobot]

If a preference relation is complete, transitive and continuous, then there is a continuous utility function that represents it.

[microbot @m_crobot]

If u(x) is continuous and strictly increasing, then e(p,u): (i) equals 0 at the lowest utility level, (ii) is strictly increasing in u, and (iii) is unbounded above in u.

[microbot @m_crobot]

If u(x) is continuous and strictly increasing, then e(p,u): (i) is increasing in p, (ii) is homogeneous of degree one in p, and (iii) is concave in p.

[microbot @m_crobot]

Any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, but the converse is not true.

[microbot @m_crobot]

Suppose that the (bounded) production path and the (bounded) price sequence are a Walrasian equilibrium. Then the transversality condition holds.