mac_amadeus

Visual Designer

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@bunburyoudoujp なんか悲しいこれ、、

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@indoneman シン・パデルだねwww

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@indoneman ソフトパワーも言うことですね、
アニメだったり、韓国ドラマだったりの影響は大きい気がします。自分もそうだったので

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@indoneman 逆にどうやってこうなるのか気になりますねw

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@MsMelChen I get that it’s less glamorous but it’s true we’re just much more forgiving when it comes to air conditioning. There are programs that encourages people to replace their air conditioners to something more contemporary as it’s easier on the electricity

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@MsMelChen No offence for i’m a massive fan of yours. I live and work in japan and I’ve never seen it. But tbf we’re allowed air conditioning, which is infinitely better i’d say.

[Samurai Warrior 🇯🇵 @SamuraiWarriorz]

Former Premier League champion and Japan icon Shinji Okazaki delivered a harsh criticism on Moriyasu’s approach and admitted he could not understand his substitutions:

Japan removed Doan and Nakamura, lost two key attacking outlets, brought on Sugawara despite his defensive limitations, and then surrendered the initiative to Brazil in a passive, park-the-bus collapse.

Former Premier League champion and Japan icon Shinji Okazaki delivered a harsh verdict on Moriyasu’s substitutions: remove Doan and Nakamura, bring on Sugawara, lose Japan’s attacking outlet, and invite Brazil to suffocate the team.

In his special commentary published by Sports Hochi @hochi_football, Okazaki said he could not understand the intention behind some of Moriyasu’s substitutions, especially the use of Sugawara in a supposedly defensive shift.

That decision did not simply change Japan’s defensive shape. It deprived the team of two attacking outlets who were crucial in linking defense to attack, carrying the ball forward, and giving Japan any real transition threat.

Japan’s first half vs Brazil was excellent. The pressing, compactness, control of Vinícius, and defensive speed were close to perfect. But once Brazil raised the tempo in the second half, Japan collapsed into a passive survival mode.

Okazaki said Japan dropped too deep, could no longer get out, and looked mentally overwhelmed. That is the most worrying part. The players’ faces looked different from anything we saw in the group stage. They looked psychologically drained, almost unable to shift even into first or second gear.

And this is where Moriyasu’s game management becomes very difficult to defend.

Subbing off Doan and Nakamura killed Japan’s attacking connection. They were two of Japan’s main outlets in this tournament. Once they left the pitch, Japan lost the ability to keep the ball, link midfield to attack, or press higher. The team was reduced to clearing, defending, and hoping Ayase Ueda could somehow hold up long balls by himself.

Okazaki wonders: if the intention was defensive stability, why Sugawara?
He is more of an attack-minded player than a defensive one, and in this specific context, he offered less than Doan at both ends of the pitch. That made him hardly the obvious choice to protect Japan from Brazil’s pressure.

If Moriyasu wanted to defend the right side, a more coherent move would have been Tsuyoshi Watanabe on for Doan, Watanabe as RB/RCB, Tomiyasu as RWB, and Ito pushed higher as the right attacking midfielder.

That would at least have given Japan defensive strength without completely destroying the right-side structure.

Instead, Japan lost both courage and attacking impetus.

Okazaki said Japan’s approach looked like they were aiming for extra time and penalties at 1–1. Against Brazil, that is an extremely dangerous mindset. You cannot defend for 30 minutes or more, invite wave after wave of Brazilian attacks, and expect to keep a clean sheet until penalties.

What made it even more frustrating was watching Morocco and Paraguay later that same day against the Netherlands and Germany, they had the courage to raise their gears. They did not simply retreat out of respect for the opponent. They tried to compete with intensity, aggression, and belief.

Had Japan been facing Morocco, they may have played with greater freedom, aggression, and belief.

Against Brazil, however, the weight of the opponent’s name seemed to shrink Japan’s courage and made them smaller.

Okazaki’s point was clear: Brazil pinned Japan back not only because of their quality, but because Japan became mentally passive. The fear and excessive respect made the mission easier for Brazil. Once Japan stopped stepping forward, Brazil could attack again and again until the winner came.

At 1–1, Japan needed a message from the bench:

“Step forward. Don’t be scared.”

Instead, the message felt like:

“Survive. Hold on. Reach penalties.”

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@GearoidReidy The best defence as proven by the first half was a good offence, not 我慢、、、

[Zealand @theoldzealand]

The only team that doesn’t think Japan can play with these teams is Japan

[Gearoid Reidy リーディー・ガロウド @GearoidReidy]

This. Japan needs to recognize how good it could be, instead of going “oh well we were never going to beat Brazil anyway”

[Gearoid Reidy リーディー・ガロウド @GearoidReidy]

Another tactical disasterclass by this man in a winnable knockout game, going ultra defensive against Brazil and hoping to absorb the pressure for 40+ mins, despite having one of the tournament’s best pressing teams.

He has failed his country once again by not properly platforming this wonderful set of players.

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@indoneman @shandya まさにそれです、、

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@indoneman @shandya わかる、、なんでも差別って言ってたら、いざ本物が来た時にはもう、オオカミ少年

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@GearoidReidy 🤣🤣🤣

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@Nerdrotics Welcome! I hope you enjoy your stay

[Melissa Chen @MsMelChen]

Amid the relentless tide of Ferrari Luce images saturating our feeds, may I offer a gentle palette cleanser....

A moment of aesthetic grace? A rebellion in defense of beauty and soul?

You'll have to go to Bali. There in Gianyar, you will find an artisanal workshop that handcrafts stunning aluminum replicas of iconic classic cars from the 1950s and 1960s.

Icons such as the Porsche 356/550, Mercedes-Benz 300 SL Gullwing, Aston Martin DB5 / DB4, Toyota 2000GT and the BMW 507

These are not cheap fiberglass kits or superficial replicas. They use hand formed aluminum body panels hammered over wooden bucks, often starting from digitized original drawings.

Every detail is fabricated in-house, including the bodywork, hinges, buttons, gauges, and interior trim. Many builds take over 10,000 hours of work.

The studio produces extremely limited runs (around 5 cars per year) with nearly everything made in-house by a small team of Balinese craftsmen.

[mac_amadeus @mac_amadeus]

@indoneman お疲れ様ですー
優しいお言葉ありがとうございます🙏
頑張ります〜