๐ญ๐ฌ ๐ง๐๐๐๐๐ช๐๐ฌ๐ฆ ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐ ๐๐๐๐ก๐โ๐ฆ ๐ฎ๐ฌ๐ฎ๐ฒ ๐ ๐๐-๐ฌ๐๐๐ฅ ๐ฅ๐๐ฉ๐๐๐ช
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๐ญ. ๐ก๐ข ๐ฆ๐จ๐ฃ๐ฃ๐๐๐ ๐๐ก๐ง๐๐ฅ๐ฌ ๐๐จ๐๐๐๐ง. ๐ก๐ข ๐ก๐๐ช ๐ง๐๐ซ๐๐ฆ. ๐ง๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ง๐ฆ ๐จ๐ก๐๐๐๐ก๐๐๐
Government is not seeking additional appropriations (money), and total expenditure remains unchanged, although spending is being strategically realigned within the existing envelope. Despite the abolition of the E-Levy, Betting Tax, COVID-19 Levy, Emissions Levy and VAT on motor insurance, non-oil tax revenue increased from 12.6% of GDP in 2024 to 13.1% in 2025.
๐ฎ. ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐ช๐ง๐ ๐๐ฆ ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ข๐ ๐ง๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ง & ๐๐ก๐ ๐๐ซ๐ง๐๐ก๐๐ฆ ๐๐๐ฌ๐ข๐ก๐ ๐๐ข๐๐
Real GDP grew 6.4% in Q1 2026, against the 4.8% full-year floor, while non-oil GDP grew almost as quickly at 6.3%. Services expanded 7.1%, industry 6.9% and agriculture 4.0%. The GDP deflator also fell from 23.9% to 4.1%, indicating that growth was driven more by real output than price increases. However, growth remains concentrated in just five subsectors.
๐ฏ. ๐ง๐๐ ๐๐ข๐ฉ๐๐ฅ๐ก๐ ๐๐ก๐งโ๐ฆ ๐ง๐จ๐ฅ๐ก๐๐ฅ๐ข๐จ๐ก๐ ๐ฆ๐ง๐ฅ๐๐ง๐๐๐ฌ ๐ฅ๐๐ฆ๐ง๐ฆ ๐ข๐ก ๐ง๐๐ฅ๐๐ (๐ฏ) ๐๐๐ฌ ๐ง๐ฅ๐๐ก๐ฆ๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ ๐๐ง๐๐ข๐ก๐๐ ๐ฃ๐ข๐๐๐๐ฌ ๐ฅ๐๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ ๐ฆ (๐๐ง๐ฃ๐
These are: (1) Fiscal Correction (including Commitment Authorisation regime), which reset spending to 2023 levels and swung the primary balance from a 2.9% of GDP deficit to a 2.5% surplus; (2) Modernising the Tax Regime; and (3) Complementary Fiscal Policy to support inflation targeting and exchange-rate stability. Fiscal discipline (KTP1) created the space, tax modernisation (KTP2) proved revenue can rise without new taxes, and the gold-anchored external strategy (KTP3) restored the cedi and reserves. Together they explain a recovery that critics wrongly attribute to luck.
๐ฐ. ๐๐ก๐๐๐๐ง๐๐ข๐ก ๐ ๐ข๐ฅ๐ ๐ง๐๐๐ก ๐๐๐๐ฉ๐๐
Headline inflation fell from 13.7% in June 2025 to 5.3% in June 2026, after reaching a seven-year low of 3.2% in March. Imported inflation stood at 2.3%, compared with 6.7% for locally produced items, while services inflation remained elevated at 9.4%, largely driven by transport fares. Lower inflation has eased cost-of-living pressures and strengthened household purchasing power. Multidimensional povertyโwhich captures overlapping disadvantages in living conditions, education, health and employmentโalso declined from 24.9% in Q3 2024 to 21.9% in Q3 2025, equivalent to about 950,000 people moving out of deprivation.
๐ฑ. ๐ง๐๐ ๐๐๐ฆ๐๐๐ ๐๐ก๐๐๐ข๐ฅ ๐๐ฆ ๐๐ข๐๐๐๐ก๐, ๐๐ก๐ ๐ง๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ง ๐ฅ๐๐ง๐๐ข ๐๐๐ฆ ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ง๐ฆ ๐ง๐๐ฅ๐๐๐ง
PRIMARY SURPLUS of 0.9% of GDP (commitment basis) in H1, on track for the 1.5% full-year anchor. The debt-to-GDP ratio fell from 61.6% at end-2024 to 44.7% at end-2025 and stood at 45.0% in June 2026โmeeting the statutory target years early. Interest payments were GHยข6.9 billion below target, while GHยข5.3 billion of legacy arrears were cleared and no new arrears accumulated.
๐ฒ. ๐๐๐๐ง ๐๐ฆ ๐ ๐ข๐ฅ๐ ๐ฆ๐จ๐ฆ๐ง๐๐๐ก๐๐๐๐, ๐๐ก๐ ๐๐ข๐ฅ๐ฅ๐ข๐ช๐๐ก๐ ๐๐ข๐ฆ๐ง๐ฆ ๐๐๐ฉ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐ก ๐ฆ๐๐๐ฅ๐ฃ๐๐ฌ
Debt service declined from 55.7% of domestic revenue in 2022 to 28.6% in 2025. The joint IMFโWorld Bank assessment now classifies Ghanaโs debt as โsustainable with room to absorb shocks,โ while the risk of debt distress has improved from high to moderate. The 91-day Treasury-bill rate fell to 5.7% by June 2026, and the average commercial lending rate declined from 30.2% at end-2024 to 15.6%.
๐ณ. ๐ฅ๐๐ฆ๐๐ฅ๐ฉ๐๐ฆ ๐๐ข๐ฉ๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐ฉ๐ ๐ ๐ข๐ก๐ง๐๐ฆ ๐ข๐ ๐๐ ๐ฃ๐ข๐ฅ๐ง๐ฆ, ๐๐ก๐ ๐๐๐ก๐ฅ๐๐ฃ ๐๐๐ฆ ๐๐๐๐ก ๐๐จ๐๐๐ฌ ๐๐จ๐๐๐๐ง๐๐.
Gross international reserves stood at US$12.9 billion, equivalent to 5 months of imports. Government has allocated GHยข5 billion in 2026 to fund the implementation cost of the Ghana Accelerated National Reserve Accumulation Policy (GANRAP). The average programme cost has been reduced from 14.5% to 5% of the gold purchased.
๐ด. ๐ง๐๐ ๐ฆ๐๐ก๐๐๐ก๐ ๐๐จ๐ก๐ ๐ช๐๐ฅ๐๐๐๐ฆ๐ง ๐๐ฆ ๐๐๐๐ก๐ ๐ฅ๐๐๐จ๐๐๐ง
About GHยข15.6bn has been set aside into the Sinking Fund as of 22 July, and on course for GHยข30bn by year-end. This would be enough to repay the GHยข30bn DDEP maturity due in February 2027. We are preparing for debt before it falls due rather than scrambling at the deadline. The Sinking Fund is being financed partly with 7% of non-oil tax revenues and domestic bond proceeds.
๐ต. ๐ง๐๐ ๐ฅ๐๐ฉ๐๐ก๐จ๐ ๐ฆ๐ง๐ฅ๐๐ง๐๐๐ฌ ๐๐ฆ ๐๐ข๐ ๐ฃ๐๐๐๐ก๐๐, ๐ง๐๐๐๐ก๐ข๐๐ข๐๐ฌ ๐๐ก๐ ๐ ๐๐ฅ๐ข๐๐๐๐ฅ ๐๐๐ฆ๐โ๐ก๐ข๐ง ๐๐๐๐๐๐ฅ ๐ฅ๐๐ง๐๐ฆ
In 2025, the effective VAT rate was reduced from 21.9% to 20% , the registration threshold increased from GHยข200,000 to GHยข750,000, and the GETFund and NHIL levies became deductible. A cross-border VAT system for digital platforms was piloted in April and is projected to generate GHยข2.3 billion in its first full year. Fiscal Electronic Devices, a VAT Reward Scheme and AI-supported customs reforms are closing leakages and forecast to increase non-oil tax revenue to 14.1% of GDP in 2026.
๐ญ๐ฌ. ๐ฃ๐ฅ๐ข๐๐๐๐ง ๐๐๐๐๐ฉ๐๐ฅ๐ฌ ๐๐ฆ ๐๐๐ฉ๐๐ก๐๐๐ก๐
Work has commenced on 87 Big Push projects: 74 trunk roads and bridges, 10 urban roads and three feeder roads. Thirteen had reached at least 50% completion by June. The AccraโKumasi Expressway is a proposed 176-kilometre, six-lane road expected to reduce travel time to about two hours. By 22 July, 122 kilometres of right-of-way had been cleared and US$1.7 billion had been placed in a dedicated Bank of Ghana account. Sod-cutting to follow procurement in September. The 24-Hour Economy Authority Act is also in force, with multi-shift operations adopted by 268 fuel stations, 33 manufacturing companies and other institutions. It has a prospective investment pipeline of US$11.5 billion, of which US$5.5 billion is covered by Joint Development Agreements.
The bottom line: Ghanaโs macroeconomic indicators have improved markedly. The next phase is turning these lower borrowing costs into more private investment, translating compliance technology into more revenue, and project allocations into fully completed infrastructure, enhanced exports and more jobs.
(c) Theo Acheampong, PhD. Views my own.
#Ghana #FiscalPolicy #Economy #PublicFinance #MidYearReview
Totally missed your response.
But this isnโt about pride, @garyalsmith. Itโs about false narratives being given the time of day.
Underdogs lose leads to favourites. Everywhere. In every confederation.
When Japan lost a 2โ0 lead to Belgium, people praised Belgium, gave Japan some slack and moved on. Nobody indicted Asian football.
Croatia scored first and lost yesterday.
Itโs football.
But I find the way you build this supposed 30-year pattern strange.
Your most obvious pull was Nigeria in 1994. So I went back and checked the actual data.
All of it.
Since 1970, African teams have taken the lead in 79 World Cup matches.
They won 44, drew 21 and lost 14.
That means African teams avoided defeat 82.3% of the time after taking the lead.
Even in this tournament, the full picture is different from the story being told.
Yes, Cรดte dโIvoire led and lost to Germany. DR Congo led and lost to England. Senegal led and lost to Belgium.
But Morocco led and drew with Brazil.
Egypt led and drew with Belgium and Iran.
Cape Verde led and drew with Uruguay.
Algeria led and drew with Austria.
South Africa led and beat South Korea.
Cรดte dโIvoire led and won two games.
Egypt led and beat New Zealand.
Senegal led and beat Iraq.
Ghana led and beat Panama.
Algeria led and beat Jordan.
So African teams have led 15 times in this tournament: 7 wins, 5 draws and 3 losses.
That is not a continental pathology.
That is football.
And if this were an African problem, Africa should at least be uniquely bad at it.
We arenโt.
From 1970 to 2022, African teams lost 17.2% of World Cup matches after taking the lead.
AFC teams lost 20%.
CONCACAF teams lost 23.4%.
Even if we start from 1994, your 30-year window, it is CAF 16.4%, AFC 20% and CONCACAF 22.9%.
So where exactly is this unmistakable African pattern?
You have built a continental theory from a few painful games spread across decades.
To do that, you have to ignore Algeria holding against West Germany in โ82.
Cameroon repeatedly holding in โ90.
Nigeria seeing off Spain in โ98.
Ghana killing games in โ06.
And just four years ago, African teams led nine times at the 2022 World Cup and didnโt lose once.
Cameroon held against Brazil.
Tunisia held against France.
Morocco held against Belgium, Canada and Portugal.
That was four years ago. Not 30.
And before someone says these numbers are inflated by games against weaker opposition, letโs narrow the sample further.
Letโs look only at games where African teams took the lead against European and South American opposition.
Since 1970, it has happened 53 times.
African teams won 27.
Drew 14.
Lost 12.
That is a 77.4% non-loss rate after taking the lead against the two historically strongest footballing regions in the world.
So what you have identified is not a pattern.
It is a highlight reel of pain with the denominator deleted.
Yes, the collapses were real. Senegalโs was bad. DR Congoโs was bad. Cรดte dโIvoireโs was bad.
But Japanโs against Belgium was bad too.
Croatia scored first and lost.
Spainโs collapse against Nigeria in 1998 was spectacular.
The difference is that those failures were attributed to the people who actually oversaw them: the players, the coach, the team.
Nobody said, โCroatia blew a lead, so Europeans lack concentration.โ
Nobody built an Asian theory from Japan doing it more than once.
As for the coaches you cite, Thiaw was diagnosing Senegalโs game management.
That was his team in a game his team blew.
Senegal is a team.
Africa is a continent.
A coach owning his own failure is accountability. Stretching it into a verdict on 54 countries is your addition, not his.
And that is my pushback.
You may be coming from a place of good intentions. But Africa, and I must say this to you as an African, is diverse.
Sometimes coaches make bad decisions. Sometimes players panic. Sometimes underdogs sit too deep. Sometimes the better team comes back.
Sometimes a team just blows a lead.
Akandoh was even charitable by writing to the board chairman of KATH. We were here when Energy Minister suspended an agency CEO for the burning of Akosombo, did you see the workers go on strike in support? That's governance action! I repeat the strike is nonsense!
DO NOT RENEW GOLDFIELDS LEASE
DO NOT RENEW GOLDFIELDS LEASE
DO NOT RENEW GOLDFIELDS LEASE
DO NOT RENEW GOLDFIELDS LEASE
DO NOT RENEW GOLDFIELDS LEASE
IF South Africans would not respect Ghanaians in their country, they have no business in this country. We would hit the streets!
If president of Ghana dares to renew this lease he will hear from us on the street, Gold Fields should go to South Africa help them fix their broken economy for their lazy people.
@Joy997FM South Africa can't give them what Ghana is doing for them. They should be strategic in their dealings because Ghanaian companies now have the capacity to do such work.
@Joy997FM It is time a Ghanaian took over the Tarkwa mine. Goldfield needs to be strategic with the Ghanaian. They can use the MTN Ghana strategy by floating shares or enlisting on the Ghanaian Stock market to give back to the Ghanaian people.