Succ Supreme 🧦

Israeli, Jew, Left Social Democrat, Fan of Cooperation, Utilitarian, Happiness stan

He/Him

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@A1exL_ @RyanGeddie Doesn't Raz speak explicitly against neutrality? Isn't he sorta THE perfectionist Liberal?

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@sigmahamster2 Is there anything in principal preventing the state setting up multiple independant SOEs that can compete against eachother/engage in economic relations with eachother each individually trying to maximize some notion of profits?

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern seems this principle could do just fine in assigning a moral status for each action. When doing so it'll have to take into account contrary sources of utility from the action (pleasure of the serial killer and death of the victim) but it's not clear what the problem is.

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern Why does it undermine? Most reasonable moral theories have values which come into conflict. It's not clear why this is a problem.

I'm not sure what you mean exactly by intramoral assignment? Under utilitarianism the correct action is the one that creates the greatest utility. It

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern rickety bridge. All of these considerations seem to flow rather naturally from utilitarianism, I don't really understand the problem.

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern and unproblematic. This is similar to other considerations in utilitarianism like ignorance. If a person has a preference for something but lacks relevant information such that they might be better off (ex post) by not satisfying their preferences. Like Mill's example of the

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern can be properly understood as a combination of 3 distinct substantive theories: Consequentialis, Hedonism, Aggregationism. It's not simply the vacuousness of having morality be describable by some choice function or other.

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern disutility of it and it remains immoral. No clear infinite regress there is the positive of his preference for the murder and the negative of the victim's preference to not be murdered and one outweighs the other and we're done. As for emptiness I raised that utilitarianism

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern understand of it which is very little) would indeed preclude utilitarianism and likely preclude preferences/pleasure being morally significant. But that would rather weaken your argument if we must accept Christian Morality to be convinced by it, no?

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern problem for utilitarianism from the existence of people with immoral preferences. As for your point on temperance I remain confused still, does this position of yours assume some sort of Christian perspective? If so then sure I suppose Chrisitian morality (from what I

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern pleasure/preferences.

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern account of its strong seemingly necessary association with pain. Even without these arguments all we would demonstrate is that there's something that matters besides pleasre/preferences that can atleast sometimes override them. It would not show that morality is totally besides

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern of the sort that simply exclude preferences/pleasure from morality entirely. A theory that would just completely exclude welfare from having any relevance to morality would infact be a rather odd one, and I'd say rather unpopular among philosophers.

[Succ Supreme 🧦 @manorbros1]

@EiratheIntern critiques of utilitarianism be they in the form of problematic examples (Surgeon, Sherif, Experience Machine, Utility Monster, RC, etc) or General Points (Seperateness of Persons, Inability to know/Non existence of long term/counterfactual consequences, etc) are not