Michael Bohnert

Husband | Father | Engineer @RANDCorporation | Researcher | Skier | My views are my own. RT≠endorsement. Following≠agreement.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

Hi Twitter—longtime lurker and @RANDCorporation researcher, ready to tweet.

My research focuses on maritime and air systems and operations as well as industrial base management. Follow me for insights, facts, and analysis of these and other topics.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@Akasheth_ Composer 2.5 is at least equal to if not better than Opus 4.6. I haven't used Opus 4.8 enough to get a good feel.

[Joni Askola @joni_askola]

People are finally waking up to the reality on the ground in Ukraine.

The defeatist narrative is over, and the world is realizing that Russia has completely botched this invasion.

The tone of the conversation has fundamentally changed. For a long time, outside observers mistakenly thought Russia would eventually win a war of attrition through sheer mass. But well over four years into this full-scale invasion, people are realizing that mass does not always equal victory.

The data speaks for itself. Out of the 23 regional capital and special status cities under Ukrainian control at the start of the full-scale war, Russia has failed to take a single one. Ukraine still proudly controls every single one of those 23 cities today. Russia is completely stuck, and their grand strategic goals of total subjugation are entirely out of reach.

Things are going to get progressively worse for Russia as their economy and military capacity continue to erode. But we cannot afford to be complacent. Russia has little to lose.

The war will still last, and Russia will undoubtedly cause massive amounts of suffering before they are decisively defeated.

The trend line is clear, but the struggle is far from over. Russia is on track to lose the war.

Buckle up

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

It looks like we are seeing some trouble on the Russian front in this area.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

Well, looks like we are seeing Russians acknowledge the operational implications of reduced logisitcs from Ukraine's Hornet strikes this week. Can Ukraine sustain this?

Not likely unless there is a much deeper drop in Russian logisitcs, however, this is a rapid loss of territory. I guess my post yesterday was a hair early.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

Ukrainian drones aren’t just hitting trucks on the southern highway — they’re forcing a strategic recalibration for Russia’s entire southern front. Everyone is talking about Crimea, but Tokmak is getting ignored, yet it is far more important.

By May 2026, geolocated strikes on Russian logistics vehicles reached 130 (up from 1 in January). Russian command banned large convoys on the critical Mariupol–Tokmak–Melitopol route and now requires every truck to travel with mobile fire support groups. Warehouses have been pushed 60–100+ km back. Tokmak sits at the center of this pressure. This is logistics attrition with operational and strategic consequences.

For Russia’s Dnepr grouping and forces sustaining the southern axis, the effects are immediate and compounding.
Longer supply runs cut daily convoy capacity by roughly 33%. Every logistics movement now demands dedicated escorts, drone detectors, and anti-air riflemen literally riding on cargo trucks — manpower diverted from the front. Most runs happen only at night and at high speed in small groups. Rotations, ammunition, and fuel flows feeding Tokmak and the routes toward Melitopol/Crimea are slowed and made far more expensive.

This validates Ukraine’s deep-strike doctrine as a genuine force multiplier.
Instead of a single high-cost ground offensive, persistent mid-range drone strikes on the exact artery sustaining Tokmak create chronic degradation. When paired with rail strikes and pressure on port fuel infrastructure, it reduces Russia’s ability to maintain operational tempo or rapidly reinforce the southern grouping. The campaign shows how scalable drone systems can impose outsized costs on an occupying force without requiring territorial breakthroughs.

The policy implications are clear.
Ukraine is demonstrating that sustained Western support for long-range strike drones and precision systems can systematically weaken Russian logistics in occupied territory. Russia is already responding with new pipelines from Rostov, alternative rail lines, and the Azov Ring highway project (targeted for 2028) — expensive, long-term workarounds that acknowledge the threat. The Tokmak corridor squeeze proves these capabilities are not just tactical tools but strategic levers.

Bottom line: The pressure on Tokmak resupply is part of a deliberate effort to make Russia’s southern occupation logistically brittle.

It raises the cost of holding the land bridge to Crimea and complicates any Russian plans for renewed offensives in the south.

If Putin chooses resupply of Crimea over more frontline regions such as Tokmak, there may be a localized Russian collapse at the front giving Ukraine more opportunities for success and a redo of the original counteroffensive thst may work this time.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

https://t.co/qxgB1bABMJ

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

Ukrainian drones aren’t just hitting trucks on the southern highway — they’re forcing a strategic recalibration for Russia’s entire southern front. Everyone is talking about Crimea, but Tokmak is getting ignored, yet it is far more important.

By May 2026, geolocated strikes on Russian logistics vehicles reached 130 (up from 1 in January). Russian command banned large convoys on the critical Mariupol–Tokmak–Melitopol route and now requires every truck to travel with mobile fire support groups. Warehouses have been pushed 60–100+ km back. Tokmak sits at the center of this pressure. This is logistics attrition with operational and strategic consequences.

For Russia’s Dnepr grouping and forces sustaining the southern axis, the effects are immediate and compounding.
Longer supply runs cut daily convoy capacity by roughly 33%. Every logistics movement now demands dedicated escorts, drone detectors, and anti-air riflemen literally riding on cargo trucks — manpower diverted from the front. Most runs happen only at night and at high speed in small groups. Rotations, ammunition, and fuel flows feeding Tokmak and the routes toward Melitopol/Crimea are slowed and made far more expensive.

This validates Ukraine’s deep-strike doctrine as a genuine force multiplier.
Instead of a single high-cost ground offensive, persistent mid-range drone strikes on the exact artery sustaining Tokmak create chronic degradation. When paired with rail strikes and pressure on port fuel infrastructure, it reduces Russia’s ability to maintain operational tempo or rapidly reinforce the southern grouping. The campaign shows how scalable drone systems can impose outsized costs on an occupying force without requiring territorial breakthroughs.

The policy implications are clear.
Ukraine is demonstrating that sustained Western support for long-range strike drones and precision systems can systematically weaken Russian logistics in occupied territory. Russia is already responding with new pipelines from Rostov, alternative rail lines, and the Azov Ring highway project (targeted for 2028) — expensive, long-term workarounds that acknowledge the threat. The Tokmak corridor squeeze proves these capabilities are not just tactical tools but strategic levers.

Bottom line: The pressure on Tokmak resupply is part of a deliberate effort to make Russia’s southern occupation logistically brittle.

It raises the cost of holding the land bridge to Crimea and complicates any Russian plans for renewed offensives in the south.

If Putin chooses resupply of Crimea over more frontline regions such as Tokmak, there may be a localized Russian collapse at the front giving Ukraine more opportunities for success and a redo of the original counteroffensive thst may work this time.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

Well, looks like we are seeing Russians acknowledge the operational implications of reduced logisitcs from Ukraine's Hornet strikes this week. Can Ukraine sustain this?

Not likely unless there is a much deeper drop in Russian logisitcs, however, this is a rapid loss of territory. I guess my post yesterday was a hair early.

[Ukraine News 🇺🇦 @Ukrainene]

According to the russian (Rybar) the Ukrainian forces have increased their presence south of Mala Tokmachka, along the N-08 highway in the western Zaporizhzhia direction.

That road matters.

When Ukraine starts appearing in places Russian sources have to acknowledge, the map gets uncomfortable fast.

Not loud claims.

Not fantasy arrows.

Just slow pressure, better positioning, and another sector where Moscow suddenly has to explain why Ukrainian presence is growing.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@albertochiesa9 Yep and sadly the battlfield preparations.were not made, nor were proper force structures and training

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@grok @xai Various automation tools, hermes agent support, and a side scroller retro video game. However, I only see grok build 0.1 and composer 2.5 as an option. Would love to know how to enable 4.3 in the cli/TUI.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

https://t.co/FofINT1jhv

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

Ukraine just proved it can strike into Russia during prestige event—Putin’s St. Petersburg Economic Forum—hitting a major oil terminal and the Kronstadt naval base. It’s a strategy targeting Russia’s war economy and military infrastructure, but not just in the form of money

Putin tries to style the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum as a peer and a non-Western alternative to the World Economic Forum in Davos. This is part of a global strategy of pushing a multipolar world order. It is intended to provide opportunities for Russia to attract foreign direct investment, engage in global investment, and garner international political support.

These strikes generate several narratives and highlight multiple gaps. The discussions tend to center around increasing Russian revenue and exports, but as I have repeatedly stated, wars are about resources not money.

Putin needs to convince global players that Russia is a reliable partner and will win the war in Ukraine. He needs political support to help counter sanctions. His war machine to import the materials and machinery to provide for the Russian army and air force. Hitting a major port city on the eve of his big economic forum counters this narrative.

Further countering this narrative is the fact that the strike happened both in the city and at a nearby naval base crippling a frigate. This highlights that with all of Russia's military capacity and technology, Putin is unable to defend his most cherished events. For this strike to successfully happen, multiple early warning radars, electronic warfare systems, and air defenses were either bypassed or not functioning. Multiple hits demonstrates there as systemic issues with air defense even in critical regions that should be receiving the best.

The net result is the message that Russia is unreliable and that Ukraine has the technical capability and capacity to strike any investments made into Russia and that Russia can't help you.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@MIMilic So missiles and drones.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

Nope. I try to highlight what has gone unnoticed. Tokmak is the town close to the southern edge of the fortress belt. It is at the end of the line so to speak and likely getting the least support. Given how it is a logistics hub, the nearby Russian forces will soon start seeing the effects. That will give Ukraine an opening, they may not be able to exploit it. Ukraine has been counter attacking along the battlefield to the east, cutting off other avenues of resupply.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@albertochiesa9 I wouldn't say Tokmak is the center, but it is an overlooked area that is really feeling logistics pain

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@joni_askola From a protracted perspective, several more months continuously less effective Russian advances may be more beneficial in the near term fiven Russia's recruitment deficit. Ukraine cpuld have a small summer unmanned offensive, they can then use the mud season to consolidate

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@Osinttechnical It is unreal to believe that this far into the war Russia lacks persistent air defense of critical locations. Ukraine has repeatedly attacked this region. One would at least expect something like the machine gun centric air defenses used by their reservists around refineries

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@rolfetta @99Liosik good to know about the Girkin reference. Seems like more cracks are forming if there is Russian confirmation

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@David_Hambling It is likely more of a funding versus capacity issue

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@igorsushko That is a major target risk. I assume that Ukraine is planning a strike on this. That would have massive operational impacts.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@KSE_Institute Going back hundreds of years, energy has been the lifeblood of economies. Grain for horses for centuries has been replaced by fuel. Lack of fuel in Japan and Germany is what caused their rapid collapse in the latter stages of the war.

[Michael Bohnert @mbohnert]

@WarMonitor3 Two big takeaways. I am amazed Russia still has Pantsirs left. The fact that the remaining ones are used to protect Crimean logistics shows how difficult a situation Russia is actually in.