meerec @meerec - Twitter Profile

meerec @meerec

over 1 year ago

@BillAckman https://t.co/xHTTkYlGNJ

Erik Townsend 🛢️

@ErikSTownsend

over 1 year ago

It's truly astonishing how badly the media fail to accurately report almost anything pertaining to aviation. While the full details of the fatal accident at Reagan National won't be known until a full NTSB investigation is released, the gist of what happened should be clear to any pilot or controller listening to the ATC audio. First, all the nonsense about the helicopter "flying dark" and turning off its ADS-B Out for sake of flying stealth is 100% bullshit. The helicopter was squawking Mode C, making it clearly visible (including altitude data) on the controller's radar screen. The most likely explanation for why the helicopter was not transmitting ADS-B is that it probably wasn't equipped with ADS-B. If it was so equipped and the pilot failed to turn it on, that mistake had little to do with the accident outcome. The controller pointed out the CRJ to the helicopter pilot, but he did a very poor job of doing so by not being sufficiently precise about the location and direction of flight of the CRJ. The helicopter pilot reported the CRJ traffic in sight, but given the outcome, it's almost certain that the helicopter pilot was looking at a different airplane he thought was the CRJ the controller was talking about. So the helicopter pilot confidently agreed to maintain visual separation on another airplane that was probably far enough away to leave the helicopter pilot certain that it didn't warrant great attention or concern. As the two aircraft on collison courses got closer to one another, the controller saw that the situation didn't jibe with the helicopter pilot's prior commitment to maintain visual separation, and asked the helicopter pilot, "Do you see the CRJ?" That was a serious lapse of compotence, and a repeat of the controller's prior mistake of being insufficiently specific about his traffic call. The controller should have said "PAT TWO FIVE, TRAFFIC ALERT. YOUR CRJ TRAFFIC NOW ELEVEN TO TWELVE O'CLOCK FOR LESS THAN A MILE, DESCENDING THROUGH YOUR ALTITTUDE ON FINAL FOR RUNWAY 33. CONFIRM YOU HAVE THAT TRAFFIC IN SIGHT?" Had the controller been specific in issuing his traffic call, the helicopter pilot would have realized he was looking at the wrong airplane previously, and could have taken evasive action. But because the helicopter pilot believed some other airplane he was looking at was the CRJ, he confidently responded in the affirmative that he saw the CRJ traffic, without much concern. Seconds later the two aircraft collided and everyone died. What's already near-certain is that the CRJ crew bore no blame. As the landing traffic they had the right of way and it was the helicopter pilot who had agreed to maintain visual separation on them. Blame can only be assessed accurately after the final NTSB investigation, but the early indications are that both the controller and the helicopter pilot share blame for this outcome, with the controller probably having most of the blame. The traffic calls were insufficiently specific, especially in such busy airspace where it's easy to mis-identify the wrong aircraft in response to a traffic call, as appears to have happened here. The controller had a clear picture on his radar screen showing the imminent collison or near-miss, and he correctly realized the need to reconfirm that the helicopter (callsign PAT 25) saw the CRJ. But rather than issuing a "Traffic Alert", an elevated urgency traffic call, the controller nonchalantly asked "Do you see the CRJ", without providing any context that what he saw on his radar screen seemed to indicate a too-close-for-comfort crossing situation developing. The helicopter pilot bears some of the blame too. The original traffic call pointing out the CRJ was vague with respect to the exact location and direction of flight of the inbound CRJ. It sounds like the helicopter pilot visually identified another aircraft on final to a different runway, and assumed it was the CRJ. That mistake definitely contributed to the fatal outcome, but in my opinion it's a lot more understandable than the controller's several more severe errors. Now let's talk about the REAL problem here. The incentives are structured so that both pilots and controllers are constantly thinking about how to shed legal responsibility rather than working together to prevent horrible outcomes like this one. Controllers very frequently pressure pilots to "report the traffic in sight", because once the pilot reports traffic in sight, the controller can then instruct the pilot to "Maintain visual separation from that aircraft". This basically transfers liability for a bad outcome from the controller to the pilot, and controllers are constantly looking for every opportunity to do that. Pilots flying at night just see lights glowing in the sky. They don't have labels saying "This is a CRJ". You just see the other guy's landing or recognition lights, and it's the controller's description of the other aircraft's position and direction of flight that you use to make sure you're looking at the right airplane. Why the hell wouldn't any sane pilot be much more cautious and never report "Traffic in sight" in reply to a traffic advisory unless and until they were absolutely certain they were looking at the correct aircraft? Because pilots literally get penalized for that. If you respond to a traffic call in busy airspace with "Negative contact", the controller can be expected (understandably given the liability rules) to "cover his own ass first" by issuing an instruction to steer WAY clear to avoid any possible liability on the controller's part. Pilots know that when we don't promptly report "traffic in sight" we're likely to get vectored in a way that could add 10 minutes of flight time. That's hundreds to thousands of dollars in a jet, and your chief pilot won't be happy if you are the pilot who's over-cautious to the point of incurring such financial burdens for the aircraft operator. In closing, it's WAY TOO EARLY to confidently assign blame here. If the CRJ pliots did ANYTHING wrong, I've seen no evidence of that. The controller definitely performed very badly with his imprecise traffic calls, and the helicopter pilot probably shares some of the blame too. But only the NTSB investigation will reach a conclusive determination of cause and blame for this tragedy.

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meerec retweeted

Erik Townsend 🛢️

@ErikSTownsend

over 1 year ago

It's truly astonishing how badly the media fail to accurately report almost anything pertaining to aviation. While the full details of the fatal accident at Reagan National won't be known until a full NTSB investigation is released, the gist of what happened should be clear to any pilot or controller listening to the ATC audio. First, all the nonsense about the helicopter "flying dark" and turning off its ADS-B Out for sake of flying stealth is 100% bullshit. The helicopter was squawking Mode C, making it clearly visible (including altitude data) on the controller's radar screen. The most likely explanation for why the helicopter was not transmitting ADS-B is that it probably wasn't equipped with ADS-B. If it was so equipped and the pilot failed to turn it on, that mistake had little to do with the accident outcome. The controller pointed out the CRJ to the helicopter pilot, but he did a very poor job of doing so by not being sufficiently precise about the location and direction of flight of the CRJ. The helicopter pilot reported the CRJ traffic in sight, but given the outcome, it's almost certain that the helicopter pilot was looking at a different airplane he thought was the CRJ the controller was talking about. So the helicopter pilot confidently agreed to maintain visual separation on another airplane that was probably far enough away to leave the helicopter pilot certain that it didn't warrant great attention or concern. As the two aircraft on collison courses got closer to one another, the controller saw that the situation didn't jibe with the helicopter pilot's prior commitment to maintain visual separation, and asked the helicopter pilot, "Do you see the CRJ?" That was a serious lapse of compotence, and a repeat of the controller's prior mistake of being insufficiently specific about his traffic call. The controller should have said "PAT TWO FIVE, TRAFFIC ALERT. YOUR CRJ TRAFFIC NOW ELEVEN TO TWELVE O'CLOCK FOR LESS THAN A MILE, DESCENDING THROUGH YOUR ALTITTUDE ON FINAL FOR RUNWAY 33. CONFIRM YOU HAVE THAT TRAFFIC IN SIGHT?" Had the controller been specific in issuing his traffic call, the helicopter pilot would have realized he was looking at the wrong airplane previously, and could have taken evasive action. But because the helicopter pilot believed some other airplane he was looking at was the CRJ, he confidently responded in the affirmative that he saw the CRJ traffic, without much concern. Seconds later the two aircraft collided and everyone died. What's already near-certain is that the CRJ crew bore no blame. As the landing traffic they had the right of way and it was the helicopter pilot who had agreed to maintain visual separation on them. Blame can only be assessed accurately after the final NTSB investigation, but the early indications are that both the controller and the helicopter pilot share blame for this outcome, with the controller probably having most of the blame. The traffic calls were insufficiently specific, especially in such busy airspace where it's easy to mis-identify the wrong aircraft in response to a traffic call, as appears to have happened here. The controller had a clear picture on his radar screen showing the imminent collison or near-miss, and he correctly realized the need to reconfirm that the helicopter (callsign PAT 25) saw the CRJ. But rather than issuing a "Traffic Alert", an elevated urgency traffic call, the controller nonchalantly asked "Do you see the CRJ", without providing any context that what he saw on his radar screen seemed to indicate a too-close-for-comfort crossing situation developing. The helicopter pilot bears some of the blame too. The original traffic call pointing out the CRJ was vague with respect to the exact location and direction of flight of the inbound CRJ. It sounds like the helicopter pilot visually identified another aircraft on final to a different runway, and assumed it was the CRJ. That mistake definitely contributed to the fatal outcome, but in my opinion it's a lot more understandable than the controller's several more severe errors. Now let's talk about the REAL problem here. The incentives are structured so that both pilots and controllers are constantly thinking about how to shed legal responsibility rather than working together to prevent horrible outcomes like this one. Controllers very frequently pressure pilots to "report the traffic in sight", because once the pilot reports traffic in sight, the controller can then instruct the pilot to "Maintain visual separation from that aircraft". This basically transfers liability for a bad outcome from the controller to the pilot, and controllers are constantly looking for every opportunity to do that. Pilots flying at night just see lights glowing in the sky. They don't have labels saying "This is a CRJ". You just see the other guy's landing or recognition lights, and it's the controller's description of the other aircraft's position and direction of flight that you use to make sure you're looking at the right airplane. Why the hell wouldn't any sane pilot be much more cautious and never report "Traffic in sight" in reply to a traffic advisory unless and until they were absolutely certain they were looking at the correct aircraft? Because pilots literally get penalized for that. If you respond to a traffic call in busy airspace with "Negative contact", the controller can be expected (understandably given the liability rules) to "cover his own ass first" by issuing an instruction to steer WAY clear to avoid any possible liability on the controller's part. Pilots know that when we don't promptly report "traffic in sight" we're likely to get vectored in a way that could add 10 minutes of flight time. That's hundreds to thousands of dollars in a jet, and your chief pilot won't be happy if you are the pilot who's over-cautious to the point of incurring such financial burdens for the aircraft operator. In closing, it's WAY TOO EARLY to confidently assign blame here. If the CRJ pliots did ANYTHING wrong, I've seen no evidence of that. The controller definitely performed very badly with his imprecise traffic calls, and the helicopter pilot probably shares some of the blame too. But only the NTSB investigation will reach a conclusive determination of cause and blame for this tragedy.

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meerec @meerec

over 1 year ago

Really? True?

ELON CLIPS

@ElonClipsX

over 1 year ago

Elon Musk: Most civilizations collapsed because of low birth rates. “What ended most civilizations was a low birth rate. An extended period of prosperity seems to cause birth rates to plummet. It's somewhat counterintuitive. When a society is under stress, birth rates increase. If you look at ancient Rome, the birth rates were super high when they were fighting the Carthaginians, and Rome's very life was at stake, birth rates were all-time high. After they defeated Carthage and ruled the Mediterranean, the birth rates plummeted to such a degree that Julius Caesar even tried to pass laws in 50 BC or something like that to give an incentive for any Roman citizen that would have a second or third child. So, they were having birth rate issues in 50 BC, which is pretty wild. That was also true of basically every civilization throughout history. How do you avoid this birth rate collapse, the prosperity trap? I don't have a great answer for that. Except, I think we can at least bring it to conscious awareness that we need to continue as a civilization. No humans, no humanity.” Philadelphia, October 18, 2024