Mriya Report

Mriya Report is hosted by volunteers. We broadcast the news from Ukraine, interviews and analysis. Our aim is to increase awareness.

[Mriya Report @MriyaReport]

Coming up: 🇺🇦🎙️Cyber and News Update - Chris Windley and Leon https://t.co/7DIwNSnjup

[Axel L. Jacob @BalticSnowTiger]

🇺🇦⚔️Whilst Crimea is the key to victory, the Donbas is the question of this war. The substance is right and worth saying; the framing is not. Western analysis has not failed to explain the fortress belt. It has explained it repeatedly, and in more detail than a paragraph allows.

⚡️ISW set out the case on 8 August 2025, a week before Alaska: ceding the belt hands Russia what it could not take in more than a decade, with no guarantee the fighting stops. Its dedicated study of the belt, and its April 2026 special report, mapped the ground behind it — eighteen mid-sized towns within 100 km, the Lozova–Izium corridor with few water obstacles, and Russia across the Siverskyi Donets. The Economist and the Atlantic Council ran the same argument in August 2025; the US Helsinki Commission briefed it in April; ISW's standing assessment is that taking the belt by force would cost Russia at least two to three more years. Kyiv's refusal, and European support for it, rest on exactly this reading. Many of us have stated it.

@Sulkhan Two corrections. Russia does not need the belt to be 100 km from Kharkiv; it has held ground on the city's northern approaches since May 2024. What the belt covers is the southern approach through Izium and Lozova and, more consequentially, the axes to Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia. And "no wall in between" overstates it. The ground to the west is thinner in towns, roads and river lines, which is precisely ISW's point, but rear lines have been under construction since 2024, whatever their quality. Thinner is the problem; absent is not the claim.

"The starting line of 2029" is a fair rhetorical point but rather an unknowable date.

The case for the belt does not need to be made against Western expertise. It has been made with it.
@general_ben @ChuckPfarrer @WarintheFuture @AlGGDirect @cwindley

[Alan Brewer @AlGGDirect]

Listen and consider, especially if you are American. Trump and his personal special envoys Witkoff and Kushner are not peace makers but rather complicit with Putin, an indicted war criminal.
https://t.co/jvT7rUgZlB

[Nico Lange @nicolange_]

Außer Spesen nichts gewesen: Witkoff und Kushner in Moskau und Kyjiw

Kyjiw und Moskau hatten vor allem taktische Gründe, eine Wiederaufnahme des Format Witkoff-Kushner-Formats wieder anzuregen.

Kyjiw muss konstruktive Stimmung gegenüber Trump aufrechterhalten, vor allem, um an nur aus den USA erhältliche Patriot-Lenkflugkörper gegen russische ballistische Raketen zu kommen.

Moskau setzt weiter darauf, seine Normalierungsagenda mit Trump zulasten der Ukraine und der Europäer voranzutreiben und die USA und möglicherweise auch die Europäer letztlich dazu zu bringen, die Ukrainer zur Annahme der russischen Bedingungen zu drängen.

In der Sache sind die wesentlichen Konfliktpunkte für die Gespräche lange bekannt und weiter unverändert.

Moskau erweckt gegenüber den USA kontrafaktisch den Eindruck, ein russischer militärischer Sieg sei unausweichlich und ein schnelles Einlenken der Ukraine für diese noch die beste Möglichkeit, um überhaupt irgendwas zu retten. Moskau will die kampflose Übergabe des restlichen Donbass und damit des ukrainischen Festungsgürtels bei Kramatorsk und Slowjansk, um überhaupt in ernsthafte Gespräche einzusteigen, während derer Russland weiter militärisch angreifen will. Ein Waffenstillstand ist aus russischer Perspektive erst nach einer umfangreichen Gesamteinigung möglich, die aus einem sehr umfangreichen Forderungskatalog besteht, der auch Verfassungsänderungen der Ukraine und Forderungen an europäische NATO-Mitglieder enthält.

Die Ukraine ist seit März 2025 zu einem bedingungslosen Waffenstillstand bereit und sieht einen Waffenstillstand als Voraussetzung für alle weiteren Gespräche an. Territoriale Fragen sind aus ukrainischer Perspektive nur auf der Ebene direkter Verhandlungen zwischen Selenskjy und Putin zu klären. Die Ukraine besteht auf gemeinsamer Kontrolle des Atomkraftwerks Enerhodar bei Saporischschja durch die Ukraine und die USA und hat unterschiedliche Vorschläge für eine künftige Verwaltung des Donbass gemacht – von internationaler Kontrolle oder „Sonderwirtschaftszone“ bis hin zu geteiltem Management. Kyjiw braucht außerdem Hilfe mit Blick auf die kommenden russischen Winterangriffe gegen Städte und Infrastrukturen und setzt auf gemeinsamen höheren Druck der Amerikaner und Europäer auf Russland.

Die neue Mission von Witkoff und Kushner nach Moskau und erstmalig überhaupt nach Kyjiw bestand im Wesentlichen darin, freundlich zu sein und sich die Positionen beider Seiten anzuhören. Durch diese Gesprächen gibt es keine neuen Lösungsansätze und keine Annäherung der Positionen.

In Kyjiw nahmen am zweiten Teil der Gespräche zudem wie zuletzt in Genf die außenpolitischen Chefberater aus Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien teil.

Russland und die Ukraine bemühten sich jeweils darum, die vermeintlichen Vermittler zu loben, große Gastfreundschaft und protokollarische Wertschätzung auszudrücken und sich offen für weitere Treffen zu zeigen. Gleichzeitig gehen beide Seiten im Hintergrund davon aus, dass keine schnelle Annäherung möglich ist und dass der Krieg ins Jahr 2027 weitergehen wird.

[Kyrylo Budanov @Kyrylo_Budanov]

Дорогі воїни-розвідники, побратими і посестри!

ГУР — це родина назавжди для кожного, хто мав честь стати до цих лав.
Який шлях ми б не обрали, які б посади не обіймали в майбутньому — наші серця назавжди будуть разом.

Я вітаю всіх співробітників Головного управління розвідки з професійним святом і дякую кожному, хто допомагає роботі.

Вже 34 роки ГУР стоїть на варті безпеки України, а за час повномасштабної війни ви стали однією з найсильніших опор української державності та свободи.

Я бажаю вам сталевого духу і міцної руки, надійного друга поряд, який прикриє спину. Завдання, які виконує ГУР — це найскладніші завдання з існуючих, і розвідник завжди має бути готовим їх виконати.

Подвиги наших полеглих побратимів назавжди залишаться в нашій памʼяті й стануть прикладом для нових поколінь. Будьмо гідними їхнього чину!

І кожен з нас має памʼятати про честь організації і ніколи не дозволяти ганьбити її.

Зі святом вас, найсильніші люди найміцнішої країни!

Ми єдині! Слава ГУР і слава Україні!

[Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський @ZelenskyyUa]

Today, Russia struck the media and journalists. An attack drone hit the building of the We Are Ukraine TV channel, which is part of the United News telethon. It happened in broad daylight – while journalists were live on air. The building was partially destroyed. All necessary services are working at the site. State Emergency Service personnel have already extinguished the fire. As of now, five people have been reported injured. Unfortunately, that number may still rise.

“Shaheds” against the media mark a new chapter in Russia’s degradation, and Europe and the world must certainly respond to this. Not a single strike against Ukraine and Ukrainians – against life itself – can be left unpunished. Russia must be stopped, and this is possible only through joint efforts.

[Mick Ryan, AM @WarintheFuture]

“We made significant progress in moscow.” Steve Witkoff.

Putin: “sure you did…”

[Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | @ChuckPfarrer]

HULIAIPOLE: Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Huliaipole direction on 6–7 SEP but did not advance. Russian tactics remain small infantry groups plus radio-controlled drones; fiber-optic systems are less effective due to trees and terrain.

[Axel L. Jacob @BalticSnowTiger]

📜🇺🇸🇺🇦Rajan Menon, writing from Ukraine, cuts through both Russian triumphalism & Western wishful thinking.
Russia has been reduced to glacial gains at an appalling price. Yet Ukraine's dwindling stock of Patriot interceptors gives Putin a dangerous winter opening that his army could not create on the battlefield. Those stocks must be replenished — now — and the launchers hunted.
Putin has repeatedly underestimated Ukraine, as have too many of its allies. We must ensure that he has done so again. Essential reading.
https://t.co/Obsgyhcg4b
@AlGGDirect @CaolanReports @ChuckPfarrer

[Mriya Report @MriyaReport]

Coming up: 🇺🇦🎙️Cyber and News Update - Chris Windley and Leon https://t.co/vvl91nhJ2R

[Chris Windley Cyber Evangelist @cwindley]

Check out the latest article in my newsletter: Mriya Report — 4 September 2026
From the Black Sea to the Baltic: Could Ukraine Help Europe Deny Russia Naval Freedom? https://t.co/oeZKS38IjE via @LinkedIn @MriyaReport @UK_CYBERSEC @BalticSnowTiger

[WarTranslated @wartranslated]

Multiple Russian regions are under massive drone attacks right now. Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Lipetsk, Ryazan, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea hit at once.

[Kateryna Lisunova @KaterynaLis]

‼️UA SANCTIONS ENVOY ON THE LATEST STATEMENT OF SCOTT BESSENT: targeting Russian oil refineries means that there is more crude oil for the (U.S.) export. But again, if someone wants to decrease the instability of the global oil market, then you just go to Moscow and say them to stop the aggression.

—————————————————

KATERYNA LISUNOVA: Scott Bessent, the treasury secretary, said that supposedly the fact that Ukraine is targeting Russian oil refineries is also impacting the situation with gas in United States. So why would United States support the sanctions on oil, if partially, a treasury secretary is criticizing Ukraine for pressuring Russia?

VLADYSLAV VLASIUK: Well, I've seen already a lot of criticism of this statement, and I can understand very well why. The basic figures, would suggest otherwise. That first of all the mere fact of targeting Russian oil refineries mean effectively that there is more crude oil for the (U.S.) export. And basically this is it. But again, if someone wants to decrease the instability of the global oil market, then you just go to Moscow and say them to stop the aggression. I think this is would be the best way to stop any difficulties in the global oil markets.

Vladyslav Vlasiuk, the Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy of Ukraine on Thu, Sep 3, 2026 in Washing ton DC.

[Institute for the Study of War @TheStudyofWar]

Key Takeaway: Russian forces continued to suffer a high casualty rate in August 2026 for the second month in a row, paying an increasingly high price for limited battlefield gains. ⬇️

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 1 that Russian forces suffered 42,020 casualties in August 2026 — the second month in a row that Russian forces suffered over 40,000 casualties in a single month.

Russian forces suffered an average of 340 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized or infiltrated and 465 casualties per square kilometer seized in August 2026.

Russia’s current force generation system based on volunteer recruitment continues to struggle to recruit enough soldiers to replace current losses, and it remains unclear how long Russian forces will be able to sustain their current footpace offensive tempo at their current loss rate without some form of mobilization.

[Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | @ChuckPfarrer]

JOIN US: My Kyiv Post colleague Dr Jason Smart @officejjsmart and me, Navy SEAL @ChuckPfarrer. As Russian air defenses struggle with severe ammunition shortages, defending rear assets like Novorossaisk leaves critical frontlines completely exposed. YT link below:

[Axel L. Jacob @BalticSnowTiger]

🇸🇪🇫🇮Yes, Sweden’s Gripen fighters will soon patrol Finland’s eastern frontier, while Swedish warships operate in the adjacent maritime risk areas, following a Finnish request for military support.

Whilst today’s published decision is news, it is neither a sudden strategic departure nor an especially exciting moment. Rather, it is a sober nod to reality by two characteristically cool, calm and collected nations—and their militaries.

It is the continuation and operational deepening of existing Swedish–Finnish cooperation on territorial defence, air and maritime surveillance, reinforcement and counter-drone operations within NATO’s expanded northern framework, most recently formalised through the inauguration of NATO’s Forward Land Forces Finland (FLF Finland) in June.

Swedish Gripen and naval units will now contribute directly to the surveillance and protection of Finnish territory, while Swedish Army counter-UAS units may follow if required during the autumn. This goes beyond anti-drone training: it is the progressive construction of a joint operational capability.

Nor is the benefit one-sided. Finland gains additional platforms, surveillance capacity and operational depth in defending NATO’s exceptionally long frontier with Russia; Sweden gains equally valuable experience operating in Finland’s demanding northern and eastern theatre, integrating command, sensors and forces with its closest military partner.

Norway completes the northern picture. It is a declared contributor to FLF Finland, while Cold Response 26 rehearsed the large-scale movement of Swedish forces into northern Finland with Norwegian participation. At the western end of the same theatre, the Finnmark Brigade patrols Norway’s 198-kilometre border with Russia and is being expanded with artillery, air defence and communications capable of coordinating fires with aircraft and ships. Together, these forces cover a strategic continuum extending from the Barents and Norwegian Sea approaches through Finnmark and Lapland to the Gulf of Finland—not three separate national strips.

The air integration is already routine rather than aspirational. Norwegian F-35As, Swedish Gripens and Finnish F/A-18 Hornets conduct almost weekly cross-border training and have repeatedly operated together under common Nordic planning and command. The Nordic Division established at Bodø in 2025 is explicitly charged with developing the four Nordic air forces’ ability to operate as a single force with day-zero readiness. The Swedish decision should therefore be understood as another operational layer within an emerging Nordic defence system, rather than merely bilateral assistance sent to Finland.

Notably, for today's 'news' Sweden is already the framework nation for FLF Finland, whose core is a Swedish battalion-sized battlegroup of roughly 600 soldiers based at Boden and held ready for rapid movement into Finland. That arrangement was announced and extensively reported well before today’s decision.

The present air, maritime and possible counter-UAS contribution is therefore the logical next step after the decisions, exercises and force integration of the past 12–18 months—not an improvised response to a sudden emergency.

The official Swedish announcement itself calls the move a deepening of a “longstanding defence cooperation” and expressly places it in support of NATO deterrence and defence:

Swedish Ministry of Defence
https://t.co/mHvetGOL4j
See also the Finnish Government on FLF Finland:
https://t.co/lW4XtIaj5r
And the slightly more excited, though still characteristically sober, SVT report:
https://t.co/Dirji5fMZu

Just follow the links if you are interested in
the Norwegian commitment to FLF Finland https://t.co/faKtj8XDsD
the Cold Response 26 joint statement https://t.co/p5P1jTN7VH,
the Norwegian Nordic Division account https://t.co/Z6c8xGr8IZ ... and the Finnish Air Force’s confirmation that trilateral cross-border training occurs almost every week https://t.co/JONXMAAeUI

@stakmaskin @ChuckPfarrer @John_ForemanCBE @gregbagwell @officejjsmart @cwindley @DrChrisParry

[Axel L. Jacob @BalticSnowTiger]

🇺🇦 Russia's missile lines: 120% of plan. Ukraine: 1% of US Patriot stock. No new shield before mid-2027. The lever that scales is the counter-launch campaign: Flamingo, Neptune, Liutyi, FP-1 and deep-strike drone mass. Hit the archer, not the arrow. https://t.co/OtEMeqJXeI

[Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | @ChuckPfarrer]

https://t.co/gLBy7TgJiM

[Mriya Report @MriyaReport]

https://t.co/YeZFifjv7i

[Mriya Report @MriyaReport]

https://t.co/PAGGYrt2Ti