After years of reading, I'm finally going to start posting – straightforward views on PE dealmaking for "less than exciting" companies.
DM me if a lower-left quadrant B2B software company needs help, a lifeline, or an escape pod.
And yes - we pay generous finders fees ($$$).
Lenders shifting loans from cash pay to PIK is the beginning of a death spiral. If the company can't pay interest, it surely won't be able to retire the loan at maturity.
Recognize you are making a bet they will find a buyer later. Why not just find the buyer now?
MY ISSUES WITH PAY IN KIND INTEREST
(1) Let’s be clear: PIK INTEREST IS JUST “WE’LL PAY YOU LATER (MAYBE).” It’s not cash— it’s the borrower delaying payments while your loan balance quietly GROWS.
(2) In traditional credit markets, PIK = RED FLAG.
Only the weakest borrowers used it. You would only buy a PIK bond/loan if you LOVED the credit or were buying at a big discount.
(3) Private Credit shows up and says: “PIK is a feature, not a bug.”
PIK interest has been NORMALIZED which is good for borrowers, good for PC managers (bigger universe of borrowers) but bad for investors/lenders.
(4) I view EVERY PC DEAL AS A BRIDGE LOAN.
LBO or Pre-EBITDA SaaS .. Whatever it is — the borrower is in transition and hopefully trending UP so they can refi in 3-4 yrs .. longer than 5 yrs not good
(5) My IDEAL structure (which is not market) is:
• OID
• MONTHLY CASH INTEREST
• AMORTIZATION ASAP
Cash coupons = RETURN OF PRINCIPAL.
(6) Cash pay forces the borrower to FEEL THE PAIN OF DEBT IN REAL TIME and manage cashflow accordingly.
(7) Lenders are NEGATIVELY CONVEX (important)
Equity gets the upside. I get a coupon and hopefully principal. THE LENDER IS SHORT VOL.
So yes, I want CASH. TODAY.
(8) Every cash dollar I get LOWERS MY COST BASIS if things go sideways. PIK DOES THE OPPOSITE — IT INCREASES MY RISK.
(9) If a borrower can’t handle cash interest required given the risk of the loan, then give me WARRANTS.
If I’m taking EQUITY RISK, I want EQUITY UPSIDE.
Start With a Breakup
Every Private Equity Legend started the same way:
Buying carve-outs and take-privates of the mid-cap assets nobody wanted.
Blackstone with Transtar.
Silver Lake with Seagate.
Thoma Bravo with Prophet 21.
The Patterns:
1. Forced Sellers
Carve-outs and take-privates exist because someone else needs the cash, simplicity, or focus. You solve their problem; you get paid. (RCA/Gibson’s fire sale)
2. Complexity creates discounts
Conglomerate optics, tax frictions, or GAAP messiness often hide value. Structure (mergers, spins, stocks-for-assets) is the value unlock.
3. Bet on cash, not glamour
Pricing power + conversion beats “growth narrative.” (Conwood kept compounding while units faded.)
4. Finance the bottleneck.
If WC or capex is the choke, engineer the balance sheet (sale-leaseback, reserves, asset-based lines) so operations can run. (Gibson’s WC solved at closing.)
5. Narratives are cycles.
Buy when the story is broken. Exit when the same assets are called “core” again.
My take after buying ~200 companies – founders lie to themselves.
$ aside, you are selling to either (a) get out or (b) stay in. There is no (c)!
a: innovate again, do "it" your way
b: it's a job, do "it" the buyer's way
You can't want "a" and sell to a PE that expects "b".
We’ll talk more about this in coming weeks, but we’re quietly spinning up something within Gauntlet AI we’re calling “Gauntlet Ventures.”
Watching everyone buy mediocre AI tools and underutilize AI development is driving us crazy.
Few different angles we’ll try.
@amendandpretend I talk to our CEOs the same way I read CIMs: financials first.
3 statement financials and an ARR snowball is a high-resolution xray for the business.
Actually, I lied.
Now I upload the financials into my LLM du jour, deep dive there, then talk to the CEO.
@ejames_c Key difference: early cash distributions get investors to target IRR w/ lower beta.
Lenders win when we partner on broken companies. Our focus on cash gen v. growth means the borrower now pays off/down old loans quickly.
Yes, we are the best workout group on the planet.
I get asked this every time we buy a company for around 1x ARR. Easy answer: 1x is not a lowball, market sets the price. Longer answer requires a quick lesson in PE fundamentals (plus a pro trip).
Two types of PE firms:
• Buy‑to‑flip (Flippers): Enterprise value (EV) based exit valuation and timing - they talk EBITDA and “market multiples.”
• Built‑to‑last (Builders): EV based on sustainable cash generation; they talk “free cash flow.”
Most buyout firms are flippers:
• Bet on selling higher later
• Funding and ops focused at driving exit value.
• Huge returns when it works, especially when levered.
• Hidden secret: they don’t control the outcome. Market shifts can blow up terminal value (AI crushing SaaS multiples, increased interest rates), and bad things happen if company is not sold before debt matures (the greater fool theory at work).
We are builders:
• We create value for customers and generate cash for ourselves while doing so.
• We control the outcome.
• We decouple future growth investment decisions from EV of the as-is company. It’s a different set of decisions… great if it pencils out for long‑term cash generation; otherwise we skip it and don’t chase hype.
Why we win at 1x:
We win 1x deals because we play a different game. Flippers won’t bid without a clear path to a big exit; we bid whenever we see a path to durable cash generation. Very different lenses.
My soapbox:
The entire ecosystem is mesmerized by the flippers: entrepreneurs, VC, PE, bankers, lenders, blogosphere, everybody. Sometimes I feel like Neo in the matrix, seeing something completely different than everybody else: ignore the exit and focus on the cash flows.
Paying 1x for a company and running it “rule of 20” for 10 years only yields a 15% IRR.
• But, most buyers target better than 15% returns (we do), especially because of the execution risk.
• And, transforming a broken business into even a “rule of 20” (with durable cash generation) is harder, costlier, and slower than you think.
• Luckily (for the seller), we are experts at this transformation.
Pro tip: Know what the business is worth to the existing owners (never sells). Upload the achievable forecast into an LLM and ask for the present value of the cash flows with no terminal value. I wish more sellers and bankers spent 30 sec and did this (it’s not hard, see the image below).
Conclusion: Rewire your worldview, 1x is not a lowball.
Forced sale: Why? Because they were out of money, equity wasn’t writing more checks, and were in default with their lender. We were the high bidder at less than 1x rev.
How the fuck are they the highest bidder at less than 1x rev. Someone let me hold a billion for a sec.
@Jaisumersingh Conservatism. We plan to run it forever (even beyond year 10), but what if we don't? Lots can change in 10 years and we aren't willing to bet now that the company will for sure still have value then.
Imagine a product that does customer surveys to collect customer intent.
Old way - process centric code to implement a survey, analytics after the fact.
AI way - AI phone call to user (or other touchpoint) that gets n seconds or m questions to directly elicit customer intent.
Sneak peek into how we are going to fix the imploding B2B software company we just bought. Bonus advice for CEOs of lower-left software businesses (spoiler - take the advice and your business will be worth more).
Context:
• 8-figure ARR, flat top-line, run at 20% loss
• 2 products. Product A is 2/3 of revenue at 100% retention, Product B is 1/3 at 70%.
• They were spending 40% of revenue on S&M and R&D aimed at NEW products and NEW customers.
• Forced sale: Why? Because they were out of money, equity wasn’t writing more checks, and were in default with their lender. We were the high bidder at less than 1x rev.
Plan:
• Stop spending for new, unsigned customers! Cut the luxury 40% S&M and R&D spend and immediately get to +20% profit.
• Fix the unsexy Product B business! Value here is not the tech, it’s actual recurring revenue contracts with real customers.
• Our plan is to invest 10% of revenue doing literally whatever it takes to deliver value against each of the Product B contracts for each of those customers. AI makes this easy, for example: high-value low-cost customer-specific services, completely replace Product B with a shiny AI-native variant (no, not a copilot), but DO NOT change the product market fit.
• Immediate result: cash generating business with a solid top line that customers are happier with…can grow earnings from here.
Advice:
• This for lower-left company CEOs (all you hyper-growth startup CEOs can ignore this…for now)
• First and foremost: build a base budget that assumes no spend on new customers/products. You now have money to spend… and If it still loses money, well, “Houston, you have a problem.”
• Embrace the fact that your best asset is your recurring revenue customer contracts. Use cash gen to amp up value delivery against ALL those contracts (especially on the boring products). Be creative and drive REAL customer value.
• AI pivots should be a full 360°. Reboot your product as AI-native but don’t change product market fit, else you’ll have to sell your customers all over again…fight the urge to chase the adjacent value prop (no partial pivots!).
• Maybe invest excess in new customers, but only after you get over 100% retention (will post a thread on the failed IRR economics of new customers later).
• Remember, generating cash is MUCH better than burning cash.
• Strap in before you start…this isn’t easy and often requires a total culture reset.
@dror_sharon Don't change product-market fit. The existing customers originally subscribed to the software for a reason - keep the reason and deliver on the value. Too many buyers decide that they are going to do a sexy product pivot, which in my experience, customers don't actually want.
@stefantheard Oh, it's most definitely not easy. Why I ended my post with "Strap in before you start…this isn’t easy and often requires a total culture reset."
Keep at it, its worth building these muscles.