@FragmentsValue It’s also fascinating that the major Japanese tire companies seem able to earn acceptable returns while Goodyear continues to struggle. At some point it becomes hard to blame the industry rather than the execution.
Ironically, companies are often trading at their highest valuations when cash flow is strongest, which is also when shareholders are usually pushing hardest for capital returns. It’s easy to criticize buyback timing after the fact, but the incentives shaping those decisions are worth understanding too.
@Rytetz29@TeddyGambino@MarriedSanchari Ranger has been fairly active on the M&A front. Interesting that Jeff Gendell owns a decent chunk of $RNGR through $IESC
@ai_analyst_ir The move from a ¥32 to ¥57 dividend is pretty striking given the growth outlook. Do you see that as management signaling confidence in the durability of earnings, or simply that the business is becoming more cash generative than it can reinvest internally?
Japan has attracted a deep group of activist, engaged and value-oriented investors. Yet their portfolios rarely overlap. Of 636 companies in the initial dataset, only 44 were held by more than one tracked investor.
Who owns Japan’s value:
https://t.co/D8RBqxXGcM
Agree the DGD setup looks increasingly favorable into 4Q. What caught my attention is JPM’s 3Q low-CI RD margin proxy averaged ~$3.74/gal vs. $2.70 in 2Q, with the improvement broad-based across tallow, corn oil and SBO. Given DAR’s lagged realization, that would seem to give 4Q a pretty strong starting point even before considering any further move in spot margins.
The key question to me is how much of that translates into realized DGD EBITDA/gal after hedges, feedstock mix and timing. If realized margins merely hold around normalized 2Q levels, rather than falling as current estimates seem to imply, the earnings curve still looks too low. Any thought on this?
Repaying my debt to Japan: Stephen Schwarzman (1)
Japanese capital saved what is now the world's largest alternative asset manager
https://t.co/f0AkFBjs5G
@rubicon59 That’s helpful. What do you think makes OneCareer structurally better? Stronger network effects, better monetization, or just much better execution?
Agree. My DGD model has EBITDA/gal at ~$1.90 in Q3, ~$2.25 in Q4 and normalizing to ~$1.55 in ’27. Even at that normalized level, ~1.2bn gallons = ~$1.86bn DGD EBITDA, or ~$930mm to DAR. Meanwhile net debt should approach ~$3bn by YE26 and management is now openly discussing a potential dividend after deleveraging. Seems like the market is pricing the 2H26 cash flow as a temporary windfall rather than focusing on the post-deleveraging earnings/capital return profile.
Working through the Japanese market company by company has changed how I think about “cheap.” Net cash is common. Low multiples are common. What is much rarer is evidence that management is changing how capital is allocated. A few early observations:
https://t.co/BplxShgPgA
@iBladesi@yenoms Makes sense. On the delisting point, do you view the primary downside as loss of liquidity / forced selling, or do you think there’s a meaningful change in economic value once they’re OTC? And do you expect Aquarian to leave them outstanding indefinitely?
@iBladesi@yenoms@iBladesi@yenoms Curious how you’re underwriting the holdco asset coverage. The parent carries the insurance subs at $9.7B under equity method; I get preferred par coverage breaking at 48% of carrying value. What makes you comfortable on the realizable value of the sub equity?