x x

[x x @noacircle_scam]

@CoinDesk @Cointelegraph @cryptopay @cryptopay, you have gone too far to hide this?? Why??

@actionfrauduk @NCA_UK @TheFCA, you should look at both the content and the dubious false representations made disguising who is running the show.

[x x @noacircle_scam]

15.11.2017, 16:41:42] Linda: Roman, anything.
[15.11.2017, 16:41:55] Linda: She would rather shut us down than lose her position
[15.11.2017, 16:42:03] +****- **888*** - : Bear - with me
[15.11.2017, 16:42:04] +****- **888*** - : We are all busy with this issue

[x x @noacircle_scam]

[15.11.2017, 16:40:24] Linda: Because your Central Bank just blew the brains of our regulator. And CySEC was getting nervous, and they told our person that she would not risk her seat

https://t.co/YUsi1P0Gn8

[x x @noacircle_scam]

15.11.2017, 16:40:47] Linda: There have not yet been such requests. And that even so quickly your Central Bank to respond.
[15.11.2017, 16:41:12] Roman Shpakov: Because the bonuses are paid for.

[x x @noacircle_scam]

https://t.co/HoKJ7qnwkX

[x x @noacircle_scam]

The post tags@actionfrauduk,@NCA_UK, and@TheFCA, indicating a call for regulatory or law enforcement agencies to investigate Cryptopay for potential fraudulent activities or misrepresentations.

[x x @noacircle_scam]

Cryptopay is being accused of hiding information, as suggested by the mention of "gone too far to hide this" in the X post, which implies there might be transparency issues or undisclosed actions by Cryptopay.

[x x @noacircle_scam]

@CoinDesk @Cointelegraph @cryptopay @cryptopay, you have gone too far to hide this?? Why??

@actionfrauduk @NCA_UK @TheFCA, you should look at both the content and the dubious false representations made disguising who is running the show.

[x x @noacircle_scam]

https://t.co/BvJKRzaJQP

[x x @noacircle_scam]

Ivanka just published Unraveling the QBF Scam: The Role of Linda Athanasiadou (also known as Kovalenko/Athanasidu)… https://t.co/0s3Jn3MdgV

[x x @noacircle_scam]

@TheFCA @actionfrauduk @UKSFO

[x x @noacircle_scam]

Ivanka just published Urgent Public Appeal for Fraud Victims of London Block Exchange (LBX) Launch Pay, MoonSystems and… https://t.co/XGy33jzKNs

[x x @noacircle_scam]

Ivanka just published Urgent Public Appeal for Fraud Victims of London Block Exchange (LBX) Launch Pay, MoonSystems and… https://t.co/XGy33jzKNs

[x x @noacircle_scam]

How Organised criminals from the QBF and Noa Circle stole, laundered 7 b... https://t.co/vTxsVQCf9C via @YouTube

[x x @noacircle_scam]

🔍 We need your help! Linda Athanasiadou, a leader of the QBF criminal or... https://t.co/sdqU0JODp0 via @YouTube

[Michalakis (Mike) CHRISTOFI @mixalakix]

It's heartbreaking to see others endure the pain I've long suffered and repeatedly reported, yet I was ignored; however, it’s even worse to realise the situation has been deteriorating rather than improving.

@actionfrauduk, @ThamesVP, @TheFCA, @financialombuds, @NCA_UK, @NCA_UKFIU, @UKSFO, @metpoliceuk @MetCC - It is imperative that you address the urgency at hand, restore law and order, ensure justice, and hold everyone accountable.

Actual change isn't about finding blame but holding those responsible accountable and ensuring those protecting us have the proper training, support, and rewards.

Only when knowledge, expertise, ethics, and mutual respect are restored can we dream of hope and a better, fairer and more prosperous future again!

#TimeForChange #JusticeMatters #Accountability #itStartsWithAccepting

[Ivanka T @IvankaTSQ]

🔍 @TheFCA, we're seeking clarity on EI00059 Operation Dixon. Could you please shed light on why this investigation was silenced?

Transparency is key in these matters.

🚨 @metpoliceuk, @actionfrauduk, we urge a thorough re-examination of all LBX-related cases. Collaborative efforts with @TheFCA, @financialombuds, @UKSFO, @NCA_UKFIU, and @NCA_UK could be vital in uncovering such a sophisticated crime, getting to the truth and ensuring justice.

#Accountability #Transparency #FinancialIntegrity

Initial Report on Axis Mundi Global Custody Ltd (AXIS), Formerly London Block Exchange (LBX)

Axis Mundi Global Custody Ltd (AXIS), formerly known as London Block Exchange (LBX), has been under intense scrutiny from the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) since late 2020. This came to the forefront with the recent leak of key documents, including an enforcement submissions document and the First Supervisory Notice.

Key Findings from the Leaks:

Regulatory Non-Compliance:
AXIS/LBX's failure to adhere to crucial financial regulations, particularly in managing client funds and maintaining accurate records, has been exposed through the leaked documents.

Financial Mismanagement and Potential Fraud:
The company displayed severe mismanagement, highlighted by discrepancies in handling client funds and failure to segregate these funds. The First Supervisory Notice issued in 2020 emphasized the severity of these concerns.

Evidence of Complex Fraud:
Further leaks, including internal emails and police reports, have surfaced, adding layers to the complexity of the fraud allegedly orchestrated by Dives. These leaks paint a picture of deception, with Dives accused of fabricating claims intended to damage, discredit, and financially harm his victims and obstruct their efforts to seek justice.

Manipulative Actions to Obstruct Justice:
The documents indicate that Dives employed complex and manipulative strategies to mislead investigative bodies, diverting attention from his actions, transforming allegations to implicate his victims, effectively reversing the focus from himself. His actions suggest an intent not only to defraud and misappropriate assets from victims but also to prevent them from accessing legal recourse.

Complicity of Professionals in London:
Evidently, various corrupt and greedy professionals in London assisted Mr. Dives in these actions. Their involvement was instrumental in closing pending investigations and facilitating his fraudulent activities, suggesting a broader network of complicity and ethical breaches in the professional community.

Misuse of Client Funds for Personal Gain
A particularly egregious aspect of the misconduct by Mr. Dives, as revealed in the leaked documents, is the misuse of client funds. Evidence suggests that Mr. Dives frequently diverted funds entrusted to LBX for personal use. This included funding his own business ventures, paying personal salaries, covering holiday expenses, and settling personal bills. Alarmingly, these actions were often masked under the guise of 'AML (Anti-Money Laundering) compliance' and other regulatory excuses, ostensibly to justify the misappropriation of these funds.

Implications for Victims
The allegations and evidence presented in the case of LBX have had far-reaching implications, inflicting significant damage on numerous victims. Many individuals have suffered not only financial losses but also emotional and psychological distress due to these fraudulent activities. This case serves as a stark reminder of the devastating impact that financial crimes can have on everyday people, shaking their trust in the financial system.

Appeal to Victims
We urge any victims of this scheme to come forward and share their experiences. If you have been affected by the actions of LBX and Mr Dives, we encourage you to contact the police or reach out to us at https://t.co/6qzvetHD4p. Your testimony could be crucial in bringing about justice and preventing further harm to others. We stand ready to support you in this process and ensure that your voice is heard.

LBX Leaked Documents
In our commitment to transparency and justice, all leaked documents related to this case will be made available to the public at https://t.co/6qzvetHD4p. This will be done after we have handed over the complete dossier to the police. We believe it is vital that the public has access to this information to fully understand the depth and breadth of the fraudulent activities perpetrated by LBX and its associates.

Enough Is Enough:
The leaked LBX and Dives documents unveil a disconcerting narrative of evasion, manipulation, and fraud. The complexity of these actions, involving misleading authorities and exploiting professional networks, raises serious questions about oversight and ethics in the financial sector. This case highlights the profound impact of such deceptive practices on the integrity of financial systems and the dire need for robust regulatory frameworks.

[x x @noacircle_scam]

Benjamin Martin Dives Disqualification Interview - The Cover up of the L... https://t.co/mhEDCJkqQs via @YouTube

[Ivanka T @IvankaTSQ]

Check out my blog post
https://t.co/LT20TbNTv8

[Ivanka T @IvankaTSQ]

Qbf https://t.co/znWXIMdaEy via @YouTube

[Ivanka T @IvankaTSQ]

Unpacking the QBF Fraud: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Indictment in t... https://t.co/TvSw5k3JRU via @YouTube

[Ivanka T @IvankaTSQ]

All text and references below are from the indictment in criminal case no. 12001450007000902 by the First Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, the Authorities and Regulators in the Republic of Cyprus have received substantial money or other monetary rewards from the Athanasiades (Apollon and Linda) and have since been turning a blind eye or, even worse, have been using the Russia/Ukraine conflict to cover up the serious crimes committed by the Athanasiades and continue to allow them to defraud investors and use Cyprus to launder millions of the stolen funds.

https://t.co/VWYRZh3VAB

Part of Linda Athanasiadou's indictment reads as follows:

Also, on a date and time not specified by the investigation but no later than 31 December 2013, Shpakov R.V., using his official position, initiated the criminal intent and involved Athanasiadou L. in the criminal association, assigning her a leading role in the second functionally separate structural subdivision of the criminal association, created on a date and time not specified by the investigation, but no later than 31 December 2013, the participants of which were located in various office premises in Moscow at an unspecified period, including from an unspecified time until 26 May 2021 at the following address: 8 Presnenskaya Naberezhnaya Embankment, Moscow, p. 1. 1.
Athanasiadou L., being aware of the general goals of the criminal association, with the aim of criminal enrichment, out of selfish motives, agreed to fulfil the criminal role assigned to her, thereby voluntarily joining the criminal association in the role of head of the second functionally separate structural subdivision of the criminal association, thereby entrusting Athanasiadou L. with the following duties:

- leadership of the second structural subdivision of the criminal organisation;

- seeking organisations, nominee managers, representatives acting under a power of attorney in the territory of foreign countries, as well as legal support of these organisations, including: "QB Capital CY LTD ("QB Capital CY LTD"); WLM LTD ("WLM LTD"); White Lake Management LTD ("White Lake Management LTD"); Simtelligence Company Limited ("Simtelligence Company Limited"); Argento Access SASAA.A RL ("Argento Access SA RL"); Constance Investment LTD ("Constance Investment LTD");
TCR International LTD ("TCR International LTD), the details of which were used in the production of standard sets of various types of fictitious contracts, agreements and accompanying documents purportedly indicative of legitimate activities, as well as for the crediting of funds received from clients to the accounts of these organisations;

- opening and maintaining accounts for both legal entities registered in the territory of the Russian Federation and non-residents used to embezzle funds, making transit transfers of funds received from citizens to accounts opened with credit institutions located in the territory of the Russian Federation and in various foreign countries, including Principality of Liechtenstein; Republic of Kosovo; Republic of Armenia; Republic of Turkey; Republic of South Africa; Cayman Islands; Republic of Vanuatu; Union of Comoros; United States of America; Republic of Poland; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

- Scheme operations with citizens' money, the ultimate goal of which was to withdraw money outside the Russian Federation, cash in, purchase immovable property and securities with the money stolen from citizens, and finance the construction of real estate;

- coordination and control over the actions of the participants of the second structural unit of the criminal association, as well as persons involved in the activities of this structural unit who are unaware of the illegal plan of the accomplices;

- ensuring the concealment of ongoing criminal activity by introducing new elements to disguise the true objectives of the participants in the criminal association with the knowledge and consent of the leaders of the criminal association;

- making decisions and giving appropriate instructions to participants of the criminal association on issues related to the distribution of stolen funds, as well as organising the distribution of criminal proceeds, including determining the amount of remuneration to persons unaware of the criminal intentions of accomplices, and financing the illegal mechanism;

- The implementation of measures to conceal offences and evade possible criminal or other liability by giving the appearance of legality to the illegal activity being carried out;

- taking measures to disguise the illegal activities of the criminal association in order to successfully and systematically operate in a manner that resulted in the stable receipt of illicit income, as well as to increase conspiracy measures to conceal the criminal activities of the criminal association from being exposed by law enforcement officers;

- performing other actions aimed at the smooth functioning of the criminal scheme of the criminal association.
The members of the separate structural subdivision of the criminal association led by Athanasiadou L. had the following responsibilities:

The unidentified co-conspirators sought and provided legal support in the territory of foreign countries for organisations, managers, and representatives acting under a power of attorney, including: "QB Capital CY LTD; WLM LTD; White Lake Management LTD; Simtelligence Company Limited; Argento Access Es.A.A RL ("Argento Access SA RL"); Constance Investment LTD ("Constance Investment LTD"); TCR International
LTD ("TCR International LTD), preparation of various documents on behalf of these organisations, allegedly testifying to their legitimate activities, as well as the documents necessary for the crediting of funds received from clients and the subsequent implementation of schematic transactions with funds for the withdrawal of funds outside the Russian Federation; cashing in of funds received from citizens, acquisition of real estate and securities at the expense of funds stolen from citizens; financing the construction of real estate....
...

Linda and Apollon Athanasiadou had many personal and professional connections in Cyprus, both in the financial sector, the law firm and the regulator.
Moreover, they had greater expertise and knowledge of the operating environment of local jurisdiction companies in the international financial markets. In addition, Apollon Athanasiadou is a relative of the President of Cyprus (as of 2013 and after). NOA provided full financial and legal support to R.V. Shpakov's Cypriot and later other foreign companies, reporting to regulators and conducting audits. Apollo
was the CEO of NOA, Linda was also an employee (representative) of the company. Linda Athanasiadou also performed orders on behalf of R.V. Shpakov in the banks servicing his company. Linda had the necessary keys, access to the "bank - client" of the companies "QB CAPITAL CY LTD", "QB CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LTD", "QB Financial Servicec" for herself and other persons, and other necessary documents
to perform the actions assigned by R.V. Shpakov. According to Linda, when making transfers, she always provided the banks with the client's contracts with both the Cypriot company and the Russian-licensed company to confirm the legality of the activity. As a result of an agreement between R.V. Shpakov and Linda, QBF Investment (later renamed Constance) was established in 2014. Its founder was R.V. Shpakov, its
head (general director) was Linda Athanasiadou and she carried out all financial and economic activities of Constance. Constance's financial operations were not related to those of Shpakov's previous companies, it was subject to different terms and conditions, had different products and services, and attracted new clients, including Russian clients. During this period, the Russian company's main focus was foreign markets. Two contracts were concluded with the client: with a Russian organisation and with a foreign organisation. On the Russian side, the contract was concluded with QB Finance LLC (since 2016 - QBIF LLC) - Asset Management Assignment (Trust Management Agreement), or Consultancy Management Agreement; the second contract with the client - Agreement on Providing Access to the International Securities
Market, which was concluded on behalf of the foreign organisation (before 2013 it was Duntonse, afer 2013 - QB CAPITAL CY LTD). The funds were transferred directly under the second contract to the settlement account of the organisation "Duntonse", opened in "Piraeus" bank in Cyprus. Then, the clients' funds were transferred: in the case of "Duntonse" - to the accounts of the top brokers, in particular, other companies of the "Freedom Finance" group, as well as "LEK Securities" and other brokers, and they already carried out operations on the exchange trading accounts, and in the case of "QB CAPITAL CY LTD" - to the accounts of "Duntonse" and other brokers. This whole scheme was signalled to the clients at the conclusion of the contract. Clients were given receipts and cash receipts/expenditure vouchers from the foreign organisation with which the client had a contract. Withdrawals were made to the clients' current accounts. The system of settlement with the client was as follows: money was transferred directly from individuals and legal entities to the Duntonse account, then oral and written orders were carried out, both from clients and portfolio managers of Kubi Finance under the direction of R.V. Shpakov to execute transactions on trading accounts. Every month clients received reports from "Duntonse" on the results of financial transactions and depending on their desire, could request either partial or full withdrawal of funds, or make pre - investment. When clients' funds were transferred to the accounts of Duntonse and then QB Capital CY LTD, some portion was accurately channelled to the trading accounts of the top brokers and transactions were executed. Prior to 2015, a portion of more than 50 per cent of client funds was directed to the top brokers' accounts, and afer 2015, less than 50 per cent was directed to the top brokers' accounts.
However, the reports provided to the client included the full amount invested (funds credited). A company with a licence (Qubey Finance, then IK QBF LLC) used foreign trading accounts to make trading transactions with client funds. Securities, according to the agreement, were to be purchased and registered by internal accounting for the client, with no confirmation of the trades executed, as the pool was managed, i.e. the totality of accumulated client funds, internally divided into large trading strategies. In
2011 - 2014...

.....

One of
the managers of the Cypriot company "NOA CIRCLE" Athanasiadou Linda was aware of the situation and participated in the process of organisation of financial flows, transfers, legal support, preparation of necessary documents, reporting to banks, etc., including Borzenkov's money. According to her, Shpakov R.V. did not allocate timely financing of the required amounts for the transfers to Borzenkov on the required dates. Also from Pakhomov's words he (Munayev Z.V.) knows that he (Pakhomov V.S.) kept a part of client
contracts and documents. The documents were kept at his place of residence in a flat in St. Petersburg, as well as in a flat in Moscow: these were contracts (or part of them) concerning clients in St. Petersburg. Pakhomov V.S. could have also kept customer contracts of other branches, as customer contracts were taken from branches, but with tower. 1, residential apartments of the Capital City Tower, north block, apartment number and floor he does not know. Pakhomov V.S. was directly involved in supervising the company's issues with the Central Bank of Russia and law enforcement agencies,
for which he received additional remuneration from Shpakov R.V. In general, Pakhomov V.S.'s awareness of the work of Qube Finance LLC in Russia and abroad is quite high, in private matters with Shpakov R.V. and his assignments, as well as in solving issues with
various government agencies. During his work in the company he (Z.V. Munayev) had a corporate phone "IPhone XS Max" IMEI 357287094420629, a corporate SIM card with the number 9031004184 was installed in it, this phone was intended for his personal use.

He and sometimes Shpakov R.V. used the phone in cases of correspondence with Cyprus and for negotiations with Linda, in those cases when he wanted to communicate information from his (Munayev Z.V.) phone, allegedly on his behalf. Shpakov R.V. also
conducted some personal correspondence from his phone, which he (Shpakov R.V.), as he said, deleted aferwards. Afer presenting a copy of the protocol of examination of items (documents) dated 20.12.2020, he explains the following: in the correspondence
dated 12.03.2018 for the period of time from 09:19:34 to 17:47:04 from the mobile application "WhatsApp" between him and the lawyer of the company Rossieva Evgenia Anatolievna, with mobile phone number (+7985 - 173 - 43 - 21) it was about the purchase of the company, which was necessary for the procedure of re - signing contracts with Clients in connection with the liquidation of "QB Capital CY LTD", to other companies, which subsequently were "Simtelligence Company Limited" and "White Lake Management Ltd". At first, for this purpose the company "Big City" was found, which was abandoned, and another organisation was found - "Yurmaster" LLC, the head of which was a nominee in the interests of Shpakov R.V. different frequency. As for the client contracts of clients in Moscow, they were kept on behalf of R.V. Shpakov by the responsible employee Ekaterina Gramza at the following address: Moscow, Presnenskaya Naberezhnaya, 8 p. 1, residential apartments in the tower. 1, residential apartments of the Capital City Tower, north block, apartment number and floor he does not know...

....

Evgenia Rossieva could have approached Marianna about
finding candidates for the role of nominee directors. "Ds" for cash. In the
correspondence from the mobile app for 14.03.2018, 14:26:37 and 14.03.2018, 14:27:41, the abbreviation "kep" was used to refer to "QB Capital CY LTD", the abbreviation "IC"
referred to QB Investment Company Ltd. In this correspondence it is about sending
letters to clients about liquidation of "QB Capital CY LTD" and re - signing contracts to other organisations, so that they understand that the procedure is legal, it is not bankruptcy, not a "scam", but a process of renewal of infrastructure and jurisdiction. Talking about "unpaid invoices" - he does not know what kind of invoices we are talking about, but he believes that Evgeniya Rossieva did not want the presence of such
information to provoke negativity on the part of Clients, so that various unnecessary thoughts and logical chains would not arise. There were never any direct payments between "QB Capital CY LTD" and IK QBIF LLC, and there should not have been according to the initial installation. "We wrote everywhere" - referring to QB Capital CY LTD's responses to enquiries from the Central Bank. "Frolov signed" - apparently referring to notifications to Clients. In the fragment of correspondence for 15.03.2018 for the period of time from 22:56:50 to 15.03.2018, 22:56:58, the phrase "Noa candidate" indicates that at that time there was a recruitment of employees in the Russian organisation "NOA" - a law firm being established to provide services to external clients. The plan was to create a Russian firm with the name "NOA", a project of Linda Athanasiadou. "NOA candidates" - those wishing to be employed, were also partly lawyers or had contacts with law firms. There is such a business practice that even if they are not employed, there remain potential business relationships with some of them. As a result, the Russian NOA organisation was established in 2020 and Alexander Nepomnyashchy was appointed as its director. The Russian NOA had its own separate
line of business related to Russian services for new Russian clients. The Russian "NOA" did not overlap with the previous lines of business of the Cyprus "NOA CIRCLE" mentioned earlier in the interrogations. In the fragment of correspondence for the period from 16.03.2018 in the time period from 12:41:27 to 18:48:22 it is about the search for a nominal (front) director to the organisation "BigCity".

However, for foreign companies he advised him to contact Dmitry Lepeshkin, who is aware of the activities and specific work processes of both Constance Investment and Noa. "Constance Investment was established by the organisation Aspard, whose owner is Shpakov R.V. The activities of NOA were managed
by Apollo, the activities of Constance Investment were managed by Linda Athanasiadou. Dmitry Lepeshkin was aware of the activities of both of these
organisations, but he did not make significant decisions. Andreas is one of Linda's employees (foreign back office). Various contractual options were discussed with A.S. Golubev, which he explained above. There were contracts concluded with Clients only on behalf of "White Lake Management Ltd" with cash transfers directly to this organisation; when two contracts were concluded, on behalf of "White Lake
Management Ltd" and "Simtelligence Company Limited", cash transfers were made by Clients to "Simtelligence Company Limited", which was recognised as an agent in the contract with "White Lake Management Ltd". Cash transfers from customers could only take place to credit the account of Simtelligence Company Limited, while non - cash transfers could be made to both organisations. In the fragment of correspondence with the contact "Ruslan Spinka" dated 24.10.2019 for the period of time from 13:42:58 to
23:53:16 in the mentioned fragment, he was written to by an acquaintance about a client who cannot withdraw money, and he forwarded the issue to the Sales Department to Ruslan Spinka, as he himself did not deal with the DP (Sales Department).
....

However, despite this circumstance, the defendant QBIEFF Investment Company LTD entered into a contract with the plaintiff in 2015, i.e. during the period
when QB Capital CY LTD was no longer filing statutory accounts. In addition, QB Capital CY LTD had no legal grounds to engage in the type of activity related to the performance of transactions with securities, as this type of activity is subject to compulsory licensing
under the legislation of the Republic of Cyprus, and QB Capital CY LTD does not have a statutory licence from the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC). These circumstances are substantiated in detail and stated in the legal opinion of the law firm
ANTIS TRIANTAFYLLIDES & SONS LLC, the opinion of the international law firm "Dentons", as well as directly notarised extract from a specialised website, confirming the absence of a statutory licence for QB Capital CY LTD. Consequently, the defendant
QBIEFF Investment Company Ltd. could not knowingly fulfil its obligations under Agreements No. 2004 and No. 2070 with the plaintiff, as QB Capital CY LTD did not have the right to engage in this type of activity due to the lack of a licence. Also QB Capital CY
LTD is not located at its official place of business, which is confirmed by the affidavitpresented in the case materials (affidavit sworn in the Supreme Court of Nicosia of the Republic of Cyprus, according to which, there are no signs indicating the physical presence of the company QB Capital CY LTD at the address of location). The Court notes that the defendant QBIEFF Investment Company Ltd. could not have been unaware of the alleged violations of the law committed by QB Capital CY LTD due to the clear indications of affiliation of QBIEFF Investment Company Ltd. and QB Capital CY LTD, established in the course of the proceedings. The signs of affiliation are expressed in the fact that both companies operate under the abbreviation (brand) "QB". On behalf of both companies (both from "Investment Company "QBIEFF" LLC and from QB Capital CY LTD) with the plaintiff Stepanov S.V., contracts were signed by the same person - Munaev Zelimkhan Visaitovich, who according to the data of the Unified State Register of Legal Entities owns 6% in the authorised capital of "QB GROUP" LLC (OGRN 1107746391532), which is the only participant (founder) of the defendant "Investment Company "QBIEFF" LLC. In addition, according to the response to the court request received from the Joint Stock Company "Regional Network Information Centre" both domain names https://t.co/sEDOW0bZqO (the domain name of the Respondent LLC "Investment Company "QBIEFF", which is reflected directly in Contracts No. 2004 and No. 2070 with
the Complainant) and https://t.co/u77dPOFQcR (domain name QB Capital CY LTD) is registered to the same individual - Roman Valerievich Shpakov, who according to the data of the Unified State Register of Legal Entities owns 88% in the authorised capital of "QB GROUP" LLC (OGRN 1107746391532), which is the sole participant (founder) of the Respondent "QBIEFF Investment Company" LLC.
...

However, despite this circumstance, the defendant QBIEFF Investment

Company LTD entered into a contract with the plaintiff in 2015, i.e. during the period when QB Capital CY LTD was no longer filing statutory accounts. In addition, QB Capital CY LTD had no legal grounds to engage in the type of activity related to the performance of transactions with securities, as this type of activity is subject to compulsory licensing under the legislation of the Republic of Cyprus, and QB Capital CY LTD does not have a statutory licence from the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC). These
circumstances are substantiated in detail and stated in the legal opinion of the law firm ANTIS TRIANTAFYLLIDES & SONS LLC, the opinion of the international law firm "Dentons", as well as directly notarised extract from a specialised website, confirming the absence of a statutory licence for QB Capital CY LTD. Consequently, the defendant QBIEFF Investment Company Ltd. could not knowingly fulfil its obligations under Agreements No. 2004 and No. 2070 with the plaintiff, as QB Capital CY LTD did not have the right to engage in this type of activity due to the lack of a licence. Also QB Capital CY LTD is not located at its official place of business, which is confirmed by the affidavit presented in the case materials (affidavit sworn in the Supreme Court of Nicosia of the Republic of Cyprus, according to which, there are no signs indicating the physical presence of the company QB Capital CY LTD at the address of location). The Court notes that the defendant QBIEFF Investment Company Ltd. could not have been unaware of the alleged violations of the law committed by QB Capital CY LTD due to the clear indications of affiliation of QBIEFF Investment Company Ltd. and QB Capital CY LTD,
established in the course of the proceedings. The signs of affiliation are expressed in the that both companies operate under the abbreviation (brand) "QB". On behalf of both companies (both from "Investment Company "QBIEFF" LLC and from QB Capital CY LTD) with the plaintiff Stepanov S.V., contracts were signed by the same person - Munaev Zelimkhan Visaitovich, who according to the data of the Unified State Register
of Legal Entities owns 6% in the authorised capital of "QB GROUP" LLC (OGRN 1107746391532), which is the only participant (founder) of the defendant "Investment
Company "QBIEFF" LLC. In addition, according to the response to the court request received from the Joint Stock Company "Regional Network Information Centre" both domain names https://t.co/sEDOW0bZqO (the domain name of the Respondent LLC "Investment Company "QBIEFF", which is reflected directly in Contracts No. 2004 and No. 2070 with the Complainant) and (domain name QB Capital CY LTD) is registered to the same individual - Roman Valerievich Shpakov, who, according to the data of the Unified State Register of Legal Entities owns 88% in the authorised capital of "QB GROUP" LLC
(OGRN 1107746391532), which is the Respondent infrastructure's sole participant (founder), mail servers and IP addresses. The court also takes into account the
conclusion of the specialist Cherepanov V.Y., possessing special knowledge in the field of economy and finance, who analysed the financial and economic side of the relations of the plaintiff Stepanov S.V. with the defendant Investment Company QBIEF LLC.
According to the submitted conclusion, in which the financial and economic substantiation is given, the trust management of monetary funds, as well as the performance of duties under the contract with Stepanov Sergey Vitalievich as an attorney on the part of the defendant, should be considered as unsatisfactory.

[x x @noacircle_scam]

@tushayking like in this instance:
👇🏽👇🏽👇🏽👇🏽
https://t.co/HZlG1EiJfX

[Ivanka T @IvankaTSQ]

📢 Public Appeal for Information🚨
​
We have strong reasons to believe that the individuals and companies mentioned below have been involved in serious organized criminal activities, defrauding millions of Euros from thousands of innocent people.

We are actively seeking evidence and information related to the following individuals, listed alphabetically:
AMY ORIVEL
APOLLON ATHANASIADES
BENJAMIN MARTIN DIVES
KIRILL OLESHKO
LEPYOSHKIN DMITRY SERGEEVICH
LINDA ATHANASIADES
KSENIA TORRESS
PHILL RICHARD MILLO
ROMAN SHPAKOV
VANESSA CLAIRE HASTINGS

Additionally, we are interested in any information regarding the following companies, listed alphabetically:
AELIOUSCIRCLE
ARGENTO ACCESS
AXIS MUNDI GLOBAL CUSTODY
BIGGERFLIP
BLUE CORAL MANAGEMENT
CARGO CULT SOLUTIONS
CONSTANCE INVESTMENT
DEFIANT ASSETS
DEFIANT IDENTITY
DRACHENSBERG
ETHERTRADE
LACASA INTERNATIONAL
LBX
LONDON BLOCK EXCHANGE
LANGHAM PRIVATE WEALTH
LAUNCHPAY
MAGENTA
MAGENTA CORPORATE SERVICES
MOONSYSTEMS
NOA CIRCLE
OUTSAUCE
PALEOSOFT
QCCI
SOLARSTEINN
SIMTELLIGENCE IN HONG KONG
WHITE LAKE MANAGEMENT IN CAYMAN ISLANDS
WLM
QCF

Note:
Unless stated otherwise, the companies could have been in any jurisdiction. The main jurisdictions used based on information collected so far are the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the Cayman Islands, Dubai, Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands, Seychelles and Hong Kong SAR.

People affected by their actions are from around the world, especially from jurisdictions in conflict or with strict capital controls, including but not limited to Russia and Ukraine.

The individuals mentioned above, and companies were offering accounting, audit, or investment products to their customers. They held various licenses and were regulated in multiple jurisdictions. While they may have appeared legitimate and trustworthy to most people and regulators, in reality, they were conducting illicit activities, often without the knowledge of their customers.

Their dubious practices have not only affected their direct victims but have also been used to silence and destroy anyone who has been affected by them or hold information that could expose their scams.
​
If your name or company appears on this list, it could be due to the individuals mentioned above having stolen or misused your company or identity, as they have done with others. They may have acted as accountants/auditors or offered investment services in your name. In such cases, please contact us immediately. We have also observed instances where, without the knowledge or authorization of their clients, they have opened accounts in the names of their customers. These accounts may have been used for money laundering and other criminal activities.

🚨Your Information is Vital🚨

If you believe you have been affected, you can always contact the police, Action Fraud, financial regulators, and Ombudsmen. However, based on our research and the seven cases we have encountered so far, these entities often fail to take action and protect the victims, even when crimes are reported to them. More information on this will be published shortly.

If you, or someone you know, have any information, evidence, or experiences related to the parties mentioned above, we urge you to come forward. Please send us a contact message on this website. We are in the process of establishing a secure and anonymous method for you to share your information.

We understand the gravity of the situation and the potential risks involved. Many victims have been severely affected by their actions, with some facing financial ruin. Your courage in sharing information can bring justice to those affected.

Important:
This announcement was shared with the parties mentioned above before publication. However, no response from any of the said parties was received.

Together, we can expose the truth and ensure such fraudulent activities are curbed.

📢 Your Voice is the Catalyst for Change

EVEN THOUGH YOU HAVE BEEN IGNORED AND LET DOWN BY THOSE SUPPOSEDLY EXISTING TO PROTECT AND SUPPORT YOU, YOUR VOICE MATTERS!

Your information can be the beacon of hope in these dark times, and it has the potential to be the cornerstone for ushering in a new era of transparency, fairness, and integrity in the financial world.

To the police, criminal investigators, regulators, and other governmental authorities:

We extend an open invitation for collaboration. Please feel free to get in touch. We are willing to share all the information we have amassed thus far. However, it's imperative to understand that our independent investigation will persist relentlessly until justice is served and the rule of law prevails.

More on:
https://t.co/wjE3ECYegG