Gemini 4 Carbon is 4x cheaper per token than Fable 5.2. On a real bug it cost 2.5x more per try.
I gave them and Opus 5.5 a real fastify bug: the whole repo and the bug report, no hints. Two tries each.
What one working fix cost:
Fable 5.2: $0.90
Gemini 4 Carbon: $2.29
Opus 5.5: no working fix, $1.28 spent
Carbon took about six times as many steps as Fable. Google's own launch post says it spends more tokens exploring and verifying. Cheap tokens, just a lot of them.
And $2/$10 is the intro price. At the announced $4/$20, the same fix would cost Carbon about $4.60.
Opus had its own surprise: it reported "2,637 passed, 0 failed" on a broken fix.
The price per token is what you see on the pricing page. The steps are what ends up on the bill.
@somi_ai Ran it on a real fastify bug today. One working cofixst $2.29 on Carbon, $0.90 on Fable 5.2. Almost 6x the steps. At $4/$20 that's about $4.60 a fix. Curious if Argon gets there in fewer
Setup: pre-fix repo + bug report, same tools for every model (read, search, edit, run commands), no internet.
A fix counts only if the test the maintainers added with their fix passes.
Per try: Fable $0.43-0.47, Carbon $1.07-1.22, Opus $0.63-0.65.
Gemini 4 Carbon is 4x cheaper per token than Fable 5.2. On a real bug it cost 2.5x more per try.
I gave them and Opus 5.5 a real fastify bug: the whole repo and the bug report, no hints. Two tries each.
What one working fix cost:
Fable 5.2: $0.90
Gemini 4 Carbon: $2.29
Opus 5.5: no working fix, $1.28 spent
Carbon took about six times as many steps as Fable. Google's own launch post says it spends more tokens exploring and verifying. Cheap tokens, just a lot of them.
And $2/$10 is the intro price. At the announced $4/$20, the same fix would cost Carbon about $4.60.
Opus had its own surprise: it reported "2,637 passed, 0 failed" on a broken fix.
The price per token is what you see on the pricing page. The steps are what ends up on the bill.
Qoduck, the free mystery model in Qoder, fixed real bugs in 15 of 21 tries for $0. Nobody will say who made it. People are guessing Qwen 4.
7 bugs, 3 tries each, judged by the maintainers' own tests.
The answers came in three kinds:
→ exactly right. marked (Markdown to HTML) crashed when a plugin was named "constructor". The model wrote the same one-line fix the maintainers merged
→ right idea, new side effect. axios timed requests with the system clock, which can break a Next.js build. The model switched to a stopwatch timer, but that timer returns fractions, and axios reports whole milliseconds
→ confidently wrong. fastify rejected every request when its header rules came from a shared schema. Twice the model explained the cause in detail, and the request from the bug report was still rejected
So I added one line to the fastify prompt: turn the bug report's example into a test and walk it through your fix.
It fixed the reported bug 3 times out of 3, up from 1. And all 3 times it broke the case right next to it, the one I never mentioned.
Fake password, Claude Code 2.1.319. To see if the file was ever in your git history, run this in the repo root:
git log --all --oneline -- .claude/settings.local.json
The team's reply on HN: https://t.co/Q9X1COlScJ
Apiiro's report: https://t.co/qzFTgD7Cuw
One click in Claude Code and my test password was one commit away from GitHub.
The Claude Code team says leaked files like this were added to git by hand. I never touched mine.
The click was "Yes, and don't ask again". It saves the command you approve into a project file, passwords included. Apiiro found 1,122 of these files with real secrets on public GitHub.
what I did:
→ a curl with a test password, approved with "don't ask again"
→ Claude Code saved it to .claude/settings.local.json
→ the folder wasn't a repo yet, so no auto gitignore
→ git init, git add . and the password was staged
same click in a folder that was already a repo:
→ the password still went into the file
→ Claude Code added the file to my global gitignore, git skipped it
same password in .env:
→ Claude Code used $STAGING_PASSWORD instead
→ the password never showed up in the command
→ "don't ask again" wasn't even offered
In my runs the leak needed two things: a password typed into the chat, and a folder that became a repo later