老厉害

感谢关注：YouTube @ 老厉害

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

对比一季度通稿，今天央行货币政策委员会的二季度例会只有三点变化：1、“稳中有进”改为“向新向优”，意思是只有新经济部门表现尚可；2、经济运行问题中增加了“结构分化”，意思是看到了K型分化加剧；3、“综合运用多种工具，加强货币政策调控“改为”增强政策前瞻性灵活性针对性“，意思是别期待货币政策了。

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

高博🕯️🕯️🕯️

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

《求是》今天又发了一篇“充分挖掘和释放投资潜力”，凑齐了年初的房地产（“改善和稳定房地产市场预期”）、前段时间的消费（“以更大力度提振消费”），和今天的投资。仍然用的不是决策层的化名，而是引述评论员的观点，大概率口号>实际。

https://t.co/ChTHQWpR6X

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

今年这个6月半年度考核，商业银行信贷冲量给的任务有点重啊，一天好几个电话问要不要贷款。潘行长陆家嘴论坛上才说的要逐步适应银行贷款的相应下降

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

要不说大A能学到东西呢😂

[Jukan @ ICML @jukan05]

Having recently traded China A shares myself, my impression was that the market is far too easily moved, and even manipulated, by absurd rumors.

At the time, I held a leading Chinese CCL stock. One day, a rumor circulated that Chinese securities regulators were investigating a fund for allegedly manipulating CCL related stocks. As a result, a stock that had been up nearly 7% intraday quickly gave back all its gains and fell back to around flat.

But after local Chinese media looked into the matter, the rumor was found to be false.

A shares are far too vulnerable to rumors. I no longer trade China A shares.

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

不知不觉去年的剧本又上演了，今年一季度央行的三份调查报告还没发，眼看二季度都快结束了。

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

@ValueRiseMacro 感谢建议，主要是没有时间精力一份一份上传😂

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

4月消费崩了

[Shanghai Macro Strategist @ShanghaiMacro]

China’s retail sales — a nominal figure — grew just 0.2% in April, marking the weakest reading on record outside the Covid era.

Investor pessimism about consumption has become deeply entrenched: the underperformance of consumer-oriented sectors relative to the broader market has now widened to the largest gap in history.

“Nobody wants to touch anything tied to consumption.” That is, broadly speaking, the prevailing sentiment among onshore investors.

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

非常值得一读的paper：以尼克松对时任美联储主席伯恩斯施加政治压力要求货币宽松为案例，分析发现美国总统对美联储主席的施压只会导致：1）市场通胀预期抬高导致强力且持久的高物价；2）促成之后十余年的多次通胀；3）未能对实体经济活动产生积极影响。https://t.co/R9UPcp0RSC

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

@JavierR19950216 我昨晚买的bne，唯一优点是流量不过期，esim流量比梯子贵多了，只适合应急用

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

最近国内机场查处力度倍增，越来越觉得必须得备一张流量esim了，不然随时可能断网……

[Ray Dalio @RayDalio]

https://t.co/WksCy869Th

[Nick Timiraos @NickTimiraos]

Goldman tries to quantify the net effect of AI both substituting for and augmenting U.S. employment.

Their conclusion: AI substitution in occupations like phone operations and insurance claims administration have reduced monthly payroll gains by around -25K and raised the unemployment rate by 0.16 pp over the past year. AI augmentation in occupations including medicine and education have added +9K to monthly payrolls and lowered the unemployment rate by 0.06 pp. This nets out to a slight -16K drag on payrolls and an increase in the unemployment rate by 0.1 pp.

Caveat: This exercise doesn't account for the possible benefit from either construction hiring due to data-center buildout or AI-driven productivity/income gains.

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

非常值得一读的文章，不同于改开年代的单一目标（GDP），当前地方官员面临不可能三角（三个目标）：政治服从、发展科技、金融安全，三者只能取其二。“躺平”因此成了地方官员的最优解。

[李其 Lizzi @wstv_lizzi]

Sharing a new piece by me and my colleague @shuizaiping2 where we took a deep dive into Xi Jinping’s newly released book on the “correct view of political performance”, a compilation of his speeches spanning more than a decade, many of them previously unpublished!

The timing, obviously, is no accident. Ahead of the Two Sessions, Beijing is clearly trying to push a shift beyond GDP worship and redefine what counts as bureaucratic success.

In fact Xi has long been frustrated with his bureacrats. He complained about officials who “rack up a mountain of debt, pat their butts, and walk away,” chasing short-term growth at long-term cost. He is equally frustrated with the cadres’ lack of motivation: “some officials won’t lift a finger until the Central Committee issues a written directive… Are you telling me that if I don’t personally issue a directive, the work just grinds to a halt?!”

So what’s the new, better KPI, according to Xi? Our takeaway: it’s a trilemma.

From Xi’s speeches, good cadres should be expected to deliver 3 things all at once: strict political loyalty / compliance; new + better quality growth through technological upgrading eg “new quality productive forces”; systemic security (avoiding risks + containing those accumulated over the past decade.)

The problem? Each of these priorities makes sense on its own. But together, they create a bureaucratic trilemma in which officials can realistically satisfy only two of the three.

Is there a way to escape the trilemma? We offer some thoughts...

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

"This has bedevilled the launch of a property tax, in part because many corrupt officials own several homes. Forcing political elites to come clean would expose pervasive graft—and trigger a pre-emptive wave of home sales when the property market is weak."

[The Economist @TheEconomist]

Observers fret that Xi Jinping is returning China to Marxism; few notice that, perhaps unwittingly, he has made it a partial tax haven https://t.co/AIwqCKjPt6

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

“China rolls out incentives to boost Spring Festival spending” = 平均每人1块5

[Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis]

Xinhua: "Chinese local authorities have allocated 2.05 billion yuan in funds to directly benefit the public through the distribution of consumption vouchers, subsidies, and cash envelopes during the nine-day Spring Festival holiday." For what its worth, that is well under one-tenth of 1% of the country's 9-day GDP.
https://t.co/jD3zAGjr0x

[Mohamed A. El-Erian @elerianm]

This chart from the Financial Times illustrates the significant ongoing volatility in precious metals, as speculators have effectively sidelined institutional investors for the time being.
Gold is currently trading down 5%, while silver has slumped 10%.
The pressing question is how long this speculative shakeout will last—and just how much damage we should expect.
All we know for sure is that the extraordinary rise in the prices of both, while driven by fundamental factors, attracted lots of speculators.
Meanwhile, oil prices have also fallen, with Brent down 5%, following a slight cooling in the fundamentally tense relations between Iran and the US.
#economy #markets #oil #gold #silver @FT

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

这两天金银太疯狂了，黄金etf的vix已经干到46了，不知各位大佬都操作了没？我个人看法是现在黄金类似于当年英伟达，杠杆杀完再轻装上阵，驱动黄金价格的底层逻辑没有被颠覆（央行购买、地缘政治、美元降息），新任fed主席Warsh虽有鹰派背景（2006-2011任职理事），但他的思路是fed缩表与降息并行。

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

Warsh常年反对QE，看起来反而比Powell更鹰，但他似乎不反对降息并支持“降准”（巴塞尔协议III）。反对QE的原因是认为QE加大贫富差距，这也符合Trump的民粹主义路线，更何况其岳父与Trump的关系，“忠诚不绝对就是绝对不忠诚”😂美联储独立性肯定是不保了

[*Walter Bloomberg @DeItaone]

TRUMP EYES WARSH FOR FED CHAIR

The Trump administration is preparing to nominate Kevin Warsh as the next Federal Reserve chair, according to people familiar with the matter.

President Trump said he will announce his pick Friday morning, though the decision is not final. The White House and Warsh have not commented.

[老厉害 @oldpowerful]

这篇推文视角比较新颖，简单逻辑就是如果把买房也当成是一种“储蓄”，那么自2021年以来，“储蓄”持续从房产流向金融资产（存款、非银、股票等等），导致储蓄由实物转向金融化，因此造成了供强需弱，如果找不到新的“内需”引擎（实际上也很难找到房地产这么大的内需市场），通缩就将延续。

[Gerard DiPippo @gdp1985]

China’s “consumption problem” is often misunderstood, and the property sector is the missing link. It’s true, in accounting terms, that household consumption is low as a share of China’s GDP. But a common mistake is to equate “high household savings” with idle money sitting in a bank account. That’s not how China’s national accounts work.

Looking at China’s Flow of Funds data, it’s clear that household savings are not just financial savings. For much of the past two decades, savings were overwhelmingly allocated to “gross capital formation,” primarily purchases of new housing and related investment. From 2012–21, household capital formation (property) accounted for about 64% of household savings on average. Those “savings” were generating domestic demand through construction activity, upstream industrial demand, employment, and local government revenues. High savings do not necessarily mean weak demand.

That changed after China’s property downturn. As new home purchases collapsed, households shifted savings away from housing investment toward net financial assets (first bank deposits and, more recently, equities). That portfolio shift may be rational for households, but it does not directly create real economic activity in the way housing investment once did.

This helps explain why China’s domestic demand challenge is harder than it sounds. It’s not just about getting households to consume more or save less. It’s about how to replace a massive housing-investment demand engine. Households can only buy so many new goods, absent the need to stock new homes.

One consequence is that household consumption growth is tilting toward services. I estimate that services accounted for roughly 60% of nominal consumption growth in 2023–25. That supports incomes and employment, but it generates relatively less demand for manufactured goods.

Thus, one key tension with the upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan is its top goal of “building a modern industrial system.” From a demand perspective, the old engine is gone, and the new one looks very different.

Bottom line: when thinking about China’s “consumption problem,” think about the property sector and how to fill that giant hole in domestic demand. It’s not obvious how Beijing does that quickly.