@22TrevorBingham newton changed nothing except some calculations made more sense
einstein changed nothing until radioactivity from 1880 caught up in 1942
Greeks and Chinese Engineering centuries ahead
AGI won't discover anything we don't already know just give better explanations
even when a payment is offshore, banks obey US sanctions because the penalty is exclusion from dollar clearing. That is the real weapon. Washington does not need to physically intercept every transaction. It only needs to make major banks decide the customer, country, or commodity flow is not worth the risk.
Property is not possession.
Property is socially recognized exclusion.
Labor may create a moral claim.
It does not by itself create property.
Property begins when a community decides which claims count, where their boundaries lie, who must respect them, who may transfer them, and what costs they may impose on others.
Locke’s error is converting that political-institutional settlement into a natural fact.
@leanyaritai https://t.co/MFnt5CIRCv
Yeah don't do that
Mindmap then TOC then load into LLMs and ask questions
I never found exercise problems useful just certify rule-following inside an already-stabilized frame.
@niplav_site@johnloeber nope just structure and
A Synopsis of Elementary Results in Pure and Applied Mathematics Written by George Shoobridge Carr and published in the 1880s, this massive compilation contains over 5,000 theorems and formulas stated plainly without deep explanations.
It is neither inflation nor a price-level adjustment.
It is a valuation-funded bottleneck-rent transfer.
AI capex is different. It is a capital-market narrative converting into narrow real-resource command:
future AI rents get capitalized today
→ equity/credit permission expands
→ hyperscalers order scarce infrastructure
→ bottleneck suppliers raise prices / margins
→ suppliers book revenue
→ market treats revenue as validation
→ more future rents get capitalized
the price move is embedded in a reflexive investment loop.
treats three focussed ETFs as if they are clean country thermometers. They are not.
China-origin production value
→ rerouted through ASEAN / Mexico / China+1 assembly
→ shows up as non-China trade flow
→ gets capitalized into non-China equity wrappers
→ leaves MCHI looking weak
The chart does not show Korea beating China as an economy.
It shows public-market capital rewarding AI-linked export chokepoints and penalizing China’s equity-governance/policy wrapper.
China may own production scale; Korea and Taiwan own more investable bottleneck exposure.
US power = finance + software + military + dollar collateral.
China power = production + infrastructure + cost-down scale + industrial ecosystems.
GDP compares size.
PPP GDP matters because it says China has enormous real domestic production scale. Nominal GDP matters because it says the US still commands more dollar-priced financial and import power.
But neither directly measures the decisive object: who can produce, bottleneck, absorb, finance, and weaponize the marginal unit of strategic capacity.
1953
better techniques → fewer workers per unit
higher productivity → cheaper manufactured goods
rising incomes → more spending share moves to services
durable goods saturation → demand share matures
healthcare/education/finance/government/software expand → GDP denominator shifts
1960 rise of the tigers europe manufacturing peaks
1970s–1990s:
Asian Tigers rise
electronics/textiles/shipbuilding/steel/autos become globally contested
1980 China industrializes the west export their production to China
game over
BlackRock built the machine that made public beta cheap.
Now it must monetize what public beta cannot price: illiquidity, opacity, access, and complexity.
That is not fraud. It is the next fee frontier.
The risk is that the fee frontier becomes the next liquidity gate.
public liquidity at public-market prices
private illiquidity at private-market fees
“the US absolutely dominates Western Europe” is overexported. The US dominates the map visually because it has many small municipal plants and unusually decentralized local government. Western Europe often uses larger regional systems serving denser populations. A larger population per plant is not automatically worse; it can mean a more centralized network. The OECD’s wastewater-treatment indicator is explicitly about share of population connected to treatment plants, not plant density, and the European Environment Agency reports 81% of the EU population connected to at least secondary wastewater treatment as of its 2024 indicator update.
Japan is also being misread if judged only by plant dots. Japan has extensive sewerage plus decentralized johkasou on-site treatment systems. An ADB Institute case study notes Japanese sewerage coverage rose to 79.7% by 2020, and johkasou fills part of the non-sewered gap. So “Japan has sparse wastewater coverage” is not a safe conclusion from this map.
China is mixed. The map underplays China’s recent urban buildout: one recent study states China’s city and county sewage treatment rates exceeded 97% and 95% in 2020, while another 2025 Nature Portfolio paper cites UN-Water data giving China’s domestic pollution treatment rate at 62%, with rural treatment much lower than urban. So the right statement is not “China has sparse coverage”; it is China has strong urban wastewater buildout but a large rural/collection/treatment-quality gap.
India is the cleaner case for your claim. Indian urban sewage generation has been reported around 72,368 MLD, with installed/operational capacity far below generation and actual treatment around 28% in cited CPCB-era summaries. That is exactly where skylines can badly mislead: high-rise districts can coexist with weak sewerage, untreated discharge, and large public-health externalities.
Inequality (as measured by things like house-size Gini coefficients) often coexists with durable, complex societies rather than directly causing their collapse.
But excessive extraction by elites pushing beyond sustainable levels does erode resilience, leading to fragility where the system can't maintain order, defense, or basic functions.
@jwsuth The Millennium Problems then resolve not by vanishing the boundary, but by understanding why its surviving classes dictate the global behavior.
https://t.co/hgxVcZmbTr
The West’s position is structurally like a renter behind on rent who keeps blaming the landlord’s accounting.
Renter = deficit West
Landlord/supplier = surplus Asia/China
Rent arrears = trade/current-account deficits
Credit card = dollar system + sovereign debt + asset markets
Cheap goods = subsidized living standard
Excuse = “your currency is too cheap”
Missing repair = earn more / produce more / consume less / refinance honestly
The renter has a valid complaint if the landlord is manipulating the lease, underpricing competitors, or using unfair leverage.
But the renter is still behind because his own income/spending structure is broken.
@jwsuth https://t.co/46Bev6mx8n
The problem is not the tools. It is the proof structure. maths still evades RH
Mathematics keeps applying incremental improvements inside the same basin:
Stronger analytic estimates
Better zero-free regions
More powerful explicit formulas
@Sagar_kr_Maity The ratio is sourced by the fact that the proton and electron are two different stable closure types with different retention thresholds. The Standard Model records those thresholds; it does not derive their common source.