Pepe

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@JesusFerna7026 Además de la TFR por debajo de 2,2, es un país con muchos emigrantes. Principalmente en edad de tener hijos.
Creo que cada año que pase veremos bajadas en la tasa. Y como dices, en una generación van a tener un problema grave.
Difícil de gestionar.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@MrtnzAlvrz Jajajaja me ha llegado lo mismo.
48 transacciones para míseros 50pts.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@ale_neo_ En la entrevista le preguntan por el Sevilla...
Él mismo dice, con gracia, que iba a salir gente a decirle que está hablando todo el día del Sevilla.
¿Qué hace? ¿No responde a lo que le preguntan?
Por cierto, te recomiendo que la escuches, fue muy buena.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@victorlopez A nivel hotelero es la mejor noticia que podía recibir Sevilla.
Ayudará a que otras grandes firmas se interesen. Incluso podremos empujar por un aeropuerto mejor con conexiones directas con USA.
¿Tendrán altura de miras nuestros políticos locales?
Lo dudo seriamente.

[Santiago Calvo @SantiCalvo_Eco]

Estos días ha circulado mucho el informe de la AIReF sobre la regla de gasto de pensiones, pero casi nadie ha mirado su anexo demográfico. Y es lo más interesante: la propia AIReF se enmienda a sí misma y reconoce que llevaba años proyectando demasiado optimista la natalidad.

🧵Hilo con los datos más interesantes.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@AudioJal123 Los mayores de 50 piensan como ella…
Tienen en su cabeza el ideal de que son valientes que vienen a sacar su familia adelante. Dispuestos a hacer sacrificios que los españoles no vamos a hacer.
Una patraña…
Las consecuencias las sufrimos nosotros (y sus pisos seguirán subiendo)

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@_MARTINLUCIA @PEIRANO_SFC Y encima el cámara se pone a grabar a todo el mundo menos al que ha metido el gol (punto)

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@Pedromonago @barackchewaka @AngelaSalas17 En Nervión no lo queremos..

Nunca entenderé la pasión que tienen muchos sevillistas por Ramos (curiosamente son los mismos que odian a Monchi).

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@NewsReputation En 'siguiendo' => 'recientes', también te aparece gente que no sigues? Sería ya el fin de Twitter..

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@JaumeNaveira Se sabe cuándo son las primeras eliminatorias previas?

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@niporwifi No entiendo las basuras que le hace Hummel al Betis y los pepinos que le hace al Málaga.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@AlRodriguezGar Suicidio voluntario de nuestro país

[Pepe @pepebn_]

Con los datos actuales (80% de mujeres son madres en algún momento, un 20% nunca lo serán), la tasa de reemplazo de referencia debería ser de 2,6 y no 2,1 hijos por mujer.

Europa y Asia van camino de desaparecer (poblacionalmente hablando).

[Jesús Fernández-Villaverde @JesusFerna7026]

Replacement fertility in one chart: Even if 90% of women have children and average 2.2 each, we still fall short.

Why? The fertility rate of a population equals the product of the proportion of women who have children and the average number of children per mother.

That is, if 90% of women have children and the average number of children per mother is 2.2, the fertility rate of this population is 1.98.

This simple formula gives us the relationship between the proportion of mothers in a population and the average number of children per mother required to reach the replacement rate. As I explained two days ago (check my feed if you missed it), this replacement rate is 2.1 in Western countries, where sex selection and infant mortality are low.

The figure plots the result (if you are technical, this is called the iso-replacement curve). Obviously, if 100% of women become mothers, the average number of children per mother required to reach replacement is 2.1. If we move to 90%, this average rises to 2.33.

Notice that if we fall to 80%, the average increases substantially to 2.6. I selected 80% because it implies that one in five women never becomes a mother, close to what we now see in Japan and parts of Southern Europe. The current young cohorts in advanced economies seem to be on track to be well below 80%, but we will not know for sure for another 20 years or so.

Having an average of 2.6 children per mother requires many very large families. And modern societies are not organized for this to happen.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@SevillismoLibre Una maravilla! Pondría dinero (como nuestros abuelos con el primer RSP) para que se hiciera realidad.

Stop latas de sardinas.

[Jesús Fernández-Villaverde @JesusFerna7026]

Smartphones are not the explanation for the recent decline in fertility. Instead, they are an accelerator of deeper forces already at work.

Let’s start with the facts. Fertility is falling almost everywhere: in rich, middle-income, and poor countries; in secular and religious countries; and in countries with high and low levels of gender equality.

The decline accelerated around 2014. So, no country-specific explanation will work unless you are willing to believe that 200 distinct country-specific explanations arrived at roughly the same time.

Smartphones look like the obvious candidate: the first iPhone was released in 2007, and global adoption has been astonishingly fast.

Economists understand the first major decline in fertility in advanced economies, from 6 or 7 children per woman throughout most of human history to about 1.8, that occurred between the early 1800s and roughly 1970, well before smartphones. The main drivers were a sharp fall in child mortality (effective fertility was rarely above 3 and often close to 2) and the shift from a low-skill, rural agrarian economy to a high-skill, urban industrial one. We have quantitative models that fit these facts well.

Country-specific factors mattered too, of course. Proximity to low-fertility neighbors accelerated Hungary’s decline, while fragmented landowning structures accelerated France’s. But these were second-order mechanisms.

This is also why most economists long considered Paul Ehrlich’s doom scenarios implausible. We forecast that fertility in middle- and low-income economies would follow the same path as in the rich, probably faster, because reductions in child mortality reached India or Africa at lower income levels (medical technology is nearly universal, and most gains come from handwashing and cheap antibiotics, not Mayo Clinic-level care). Much of what we see in Africa or parts of Latin America today is still that old story.

But in the 1980s, a new pattern appeared. Japan and Italy fell below 1.8, the level we had thought was the new floor. By 1990, Japan was at 1.54 and Italy at 1.36.

This second fertility decline began in Japan and Italy earlier than elsewhere, driven by country-specific factors, but the underlying dynamics were widespread: secularization, an education arms race, expensive housing, the dissolution of old social networks, and the shift to a service economy in which women’s bargaining power within the household is higher. The U.S. lagged because secularization came later, suburban housing remained relatively cheap, and African American fertility was still high. U.S. demographic patterns are exceptional and skew how academics (most of whom are in the U.S.) and the New York Times see the world.

My best guess is that, without smartphones, Italy’s 2025 fertility rate would be about 1.24 rather than 1.14. I doubt anyone will document an effect larger than 0.1-0.2. Italy was at 1.19 in 1995, not far from today’s 1.14. The TFR is cyclical due to tempo effects, so I do not read too much into the rise between 1995 and 2007 or the decline from 1.27 in 2019 to 1.14 today. The direct effect of smartphones is not zero, but it is not, by itself, that large.

Where social media, in general, and smartphones, in particular, matter is in the diffusion of social norms. What would have taken 25 years now happens in 10. Social media are not the cause of fertility decline; modernity is. But they are a very fast accelerator.

That is why social media are a major part of the story behind Guatemala (yes, Guatemala) going from 3.8 children per woman in 2005 to 1.9 in 2025. Without them, Guatemala would also have reached 1.9, just 20 years later.

Modernity, in its current form, is incompatible with replacement-level fertility. By modernity, I do not mean capitalism: fertility fell earlier and faster in socialist economies than in market economies. Socialist Hungary fell below replacement in 1960, and socialist Czechoslovakia in 1966 (both experienced small, short-lived baby booms in the mid-1970s). By modernity, I mean a society organized around rational, large-scale systems and formalized knowledge.

Countries will not converge to the same fertility rate. East Asia is likely stuck near 1, possibly below, given its unbalanced gender norms and toxic education systems. Latin America faces the same gender problem plus weak growth prospects, so I expect something around 1.2. Northern Europe has more egalitarian family structures and might hold near 1.5. The very religious societies are probably the only ones that will sustain 1.8.

All of this could change with AI or changes in population composition. We will see. But on the current evidence, deep sub-replacement fertility is the “new new normal.” Unless we reorganize our societies, better learn to handle it as best we can.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@MrtnzAlvrz Más allá del impuesto de Sucesiones, han hecho muy poquito.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@Leggio_1903 @johnsixx256 @alemvelasco_ Totalmente.
Súmale la bandera del sol naciente y alguna que otra bandera de España.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

Queremos cerveza de nuevo en la grada!

[Julián Goombero 🍄‍🟫 @julian_calvero]

Cada litro de agua desperdiciado en crear esta obra de arte ha merecido la pena.

Lo único que puede y debe unir a absolutamente todas las aficiones de este país:

El odio a lo que han hecho con nuestro fútbol.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@Pedromonago @migquintana Se refiere principalmente a la plantilla y al club a todos los niveles. Al iniciar el programa lo puntualiza y explica mejor.
De hecho, en el programa menciona varias veces cómo ha sido el sevillismo el que se ha echado el equipo a la espalda y ha sacado adelante esta situación.

[Pepe @pepebn_]

@Rafaasfc75 Jajajajaja que la chupen y la sigan chupando