ce trésor devrait être mis sous gaz inerte, plan incliné à 15°, hygrométrie 55%.
au lieu de ça, des guignols lui font traverser la manche pour un évènement dont personne ne se souviendra dans 10 ans, à part comme un benchmark de ce qu'il ne faut jamais faire.
Voir Jean-Luc Mélenchon et la gauche insoumise se pavaner à Avignon en hurlant que « le budget de la culture n'est pas assez élevé » est la plus belle performance théâtrale de l'été.
Ayant bossé 15 ans comme ingénieur du son sur ces plateaux, je connais l'envers du décor. Et vous n'êtes pas prêts.
Avignon, ce sont deux mondes étanches : le ON et le OFF.
Le ON, c'est l'aristocratie d'État. Des compagnies invitées, payées par l'impôt pour venir. Qu'elles soient géniales ou ringardes, leur budget est garanti par le ministère de la Culture. Zéro risque financier.
Le OFF, c'est le capitalisme le plus sauvage déguisé en fête populaire.
Pour les propriétaires de théâtres privés locaux, c’est le jackpot absolu. Ils font leur chiffre d'affaires annuel en 3 semaines. Une salle se loue entre 5 000 et 15 000 € le créneau d'une heure trente pour le mois. Les bailleurs y font défiler jusqu'à 10 spectacles différents par jour. Les compagnies ont exactement 15 minutes pour monter leur décor et 15 minutes pour tout démonter sous 40 degrés.
Des centaines de petites compagnies indépendantes s’endettent à hauteur de 20 000 ou 30 000 € pour s’offrir ce créneau d'une heure. Elles croient au mérite. Elles espèrent se faire remarquer par un « programmateur » de théâtre public pour décrocher une tournée.
Sauf que les dés sont pipés depuis le départ.
La majorité des directeurs artistiques des scènes subventionnées ont déjà bouclé leur programmation bien avant d'avoir posé le pied en gare TGV. Le reste se joue au copinage pur : l'ami de l'ami de l'ami. On s'échange et on se refile des artistes entre structures amies pour justifier les subventions croisées.
Pendant que les comédiens se ruinent et jouent devant des salles vides, ces directeurs s'offrent trois semaines de vacances dorées sous le soleil du Midi. Tout est pris en charge par le budget de fonctionnement de leurs théâtres municipaux ou nationaux : trains, restos, et Airbnb surévalués passés en notes de frais.
Le système vit de l'exploitation pure : des techniciens payés au lance-pierre et des artistes précarisés, tous maintenus sous perfusion grâce au régime de l'intermittence, lui-même financé par les cotisations des actifs du secteur privé.
Rajouter du budget public, comme le réclame LFI, ne sauvera aucun artiste indépendant. Cela financera simplement des bouteilles de rosé supplémentaires pour cette aristocratie de fonctionnaires de la culture qui s'auto-congratule sur votre dos.
Allez-vous continuer à croire que la culture d'État défend la création, ou allez-vous enfin ouvrir les yeux sur ce cartel de rentiers ?
Billions of people around the world are poor. They don’t sell their daughters to be raped by old men. BBC is disgusting for covering this with empathy.
Je donne 2000€ par mois pour mon appartement a une nana de mon âge qui ne travaille pas à qui les parents ont acheté cet appartement, en plus de payer l'énorme retraite de la cours des comptes de sa mère dont elle héritera.
Je suis littéralement un serf féodal.
Parce que ces des bâtiments qui sont l'apogée d'une hubris technique que pas grand monde ne comprend. Historiquement un bâtiment classique concentrait 80 % de sa valeur dans sa structure. La génération des Grands Projets mitterrandiens a voulu inverser cette équation. La valeur
Je suis mort, les phénotypes de fou. L’équipe de France basco-neanderthalienne contre l’Angleterre Picto-germanique.
César et Tibère se tapaient contre eux lors de la conquête des gaules, de la germanie et de l’Angleterre
A Day 3 recap of the war (with focus on Iranian strategic narrative):
🔹CENTCOM confirms that U.S. strikes on Iranian missile bases used B-1 bombers. The U.S. is trying to dismantle Iran’s fortified underground missile facilities.
🔹Iranian reports suggest Tehran has rejected multiple mediation attempts. Tehran’s apparent assessment is that it can sustain high-intensity conflict for 60-90 days, making early ceasefire acceptance strategically disadvantageous.
🔹Ali Larijani explicitly framed the war as a contest of endurance, stating Iran – unlike the United States – is prepared for a prolonged conflict. The objective appears to be altering Washington’s cost-benefit calculations over time.
🔹Iranian strategic discourse increasingly describes the conflict as a “war without rules” or a “game without red lines,” signaling deliberate unpredictability intended to reshape deterrence dynamics after leadership decapitation failed to halt Iran’s response.
🔹A related concept emerging in Iranian messaging is operating “one level above” adversary actions, i.e., delivering escalatory responses even to indirect threats in order to redefine escalation thresholds.
🔹This logic appears reflected in Iranian strikes toward British facilities in Cyprus, interpreted domestically as retaliation for London allowing U.S. access to Diego Garcia despite not joining offensive operations.
🔹One of the most consequential developments was the loss of three U.S. F-15 aircraft, initially claimed by Iran as shootdowns but later attributed to friendly fire from Kuwaiti air defenses, highlighting the growing risks of coalition battlefield congestion.
🔹Analysts close to Iranian security circles describe a layered missile strategy: first targeting radar systems, then launching low-cost drones and missiles to exhaust air-defense interceptors before deploying advanced weapons later.
🔹Iran’s continuous missile launches therefore appear designed less for immediate damage and more for attritional depletion of U.S. and Israeli defensive systems over time.
🔹Uncertainty over the size and dispersal of Iran’s advanced missile stockpiles may explain intensified U.S. and Israeli strikes against underground facilities and missile infrastructure.
🔹President Pezeshkian expanded emergency authorities across ministries and provincial administrations to ensure continuity of governance, deepening wartime decentralization already initiated before the conflict.
🔹Israel’s targeting pattern has become clearer: strikes now heavily focus on intelligence ministries, police headquarters, IRGC district bases, and internal security institutions, suggesting systematic erosion of regime coercive capacity.
🔹Parallel strikes against western border regions and Kurdistan province have fueled Iranian fears that external actors may seek to enable insurgent infiltration as an alternative to direct ground invasion.
🔹Iran has responded by striking areas in Iraqi Kurdistan while increasing pressure along its borders, indicating concern about a potential indirect ground dimension to the war.
🔹Iran-aligned Iraqi resistance factions – including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada – continue their operations on a limited scale, opening another attritional front against U.S. forces.
🔹Hezbollah formally confirmed its participation, firing rockets toward Haifa, though involvement remains limited due to degraded capabilities and domestic political constraints in Lebanon.
🔹Iranian sources claim prewar coordination between the Quds Force and regional partners defined phased entry into the conflict, suggesting activation of the “axis of resistance” is proceeding gradually rather than simultaneously.
🔹The IRGC has reportedly begun enforcing a de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, warning commercial vessels against transit and threatening missile strikes. This is a major escalation targeting global energy flows.
🔹Simultaneous attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure, including an Aramco facility near Ras Tanura and gas infrastructure in Qatar, indicate an effort to raise global energy prices and increase economic pressure on Washington.
🔹Iranian authorities signaled zero tolerance for dissent. IRGC intelligence warned that actions undermining stability during wartime would be treated as collaboration with the enemy, implying harsh internal repression.
🔹Negotiation signals remain contradictory. While Trump suggested a potential deal was possible, Larijani publicly rejected negotiations, reinforcing Tehran’s view that talks can occur only after strategic calculations shift.
🔹Iran’s sustained missile tempo against Israel appears designed to impose psychological as well as military pressure, keeping populations under prolonged shelter conditions while conserving firepower for a longer conflict.
🔹Overall, Day 3 shows the war evolving into simultaneous military, economic, psychological, and regional escalation far beyond bilateral confrontation.
🔹The key question now is whether expanding proxy involvement and energy warfare will force external powers into deeper participation or instead accelerate pressure for negotiated containment.
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P.S: Not sure how long I can keep doing this!
Gang members earn below minimum wage—less than McDonald's workers—despite 25% chance of being killed.
Levitt & Venkatesh tracked a Chicago gang for 4 years. Leaders: $50k-$130k/year. Foot soldiers: below minimum wage.
Why stay? Tournament economics.
90% of American businesses still don’t use AI in production. That single number reframes this entire post.
An AI startup CEO wrote 5,000 words comparing AI to Covid in February 2020. His argument: he describes what he wants built in plain English, walks away for four hours, comes back to finished software. He says every white-collar job faces the same experience within 1-5 years. Millions of people are sharing it as a wake-up call.
The capability trend he’s describing is real. METR, the independent research org measuring AI task completion, shows the length of tasks AI handles autonomously has been doubling roughly every seven months. The models released in early February represent a genuine step change for coding work specifically. If you build software, you’ve felt this.
Here’s what the post skips entirely. Anthropic’s own economic research, published with Census Bureau data, shows AI adoption among US firms went from 3.7% in fall 2023 to 9.7% by August 2025. Two years of the fastest capability improvement in computing history, and fewer than one in ten businesses use AI in production. ISG’s 2025 enterprise study found only 31% of AI use cases reached full production. Lucidworks surveyed 1,600 AI leaders and found 71% of organizations have introduced generative AI, but only 6% have implemented agentic AI, the autonomous agent capability this post describes.
This tells you everything about where the bottleneck actually sits. It moved from “can AI do this task” to “can our organization deploy it.” That second bottleneck runs on procurement cycles, compliance reviews, data infrastructure buildouts, change management, and institutional trust. None of those compress the way model capabilities do.
The pattern repeats throughout technology history. ATMs deployed widely starting in the 1970s. The number of US bank tellers increased until 2007, three full decades later, because ATMs made branches cheaper to operate, which expanded total branch count. Electricity took 30 years to reshape manufacturing after the first power plants went live. Factories had to be physically redesigned around electric motors instead of steam-driven belt systems. The resistance wasn’t technological. It was architectural.
What makes this interesting for your career: the deployment gap is the opportunity. The Deloitte 2026 AI report found only 34% of companies are reimagining their business around AI. 83% of AI leaders report major concerns about generative AI implementation, an eightfold increase in two years. The organizational machinery moves at a fraction of the capability speed.
The people who gain the most from AI over the next three years aren’t the ones panicking about replacement timelines. They’re the ones who understand that slow enterprise adoption creates a massive window to become the person who actually knows how to use these tools. That window is real and valuable. It exists precisely because adoption is slow, which is the opposite of the premise driving the panic.
The capability curve is exponential. The deployment curve is logarithmic. The distance between those two lines is where the actual opportunity lives.
If France had grown like England after 1760, it would have 250 million people today — not 68 million. Instead, French women went from 4.5 children to 3.5 in just 40 years, a century before any other country.
It wasn't industrialization. It was secularization.