๐ We built a live AI agent, gave it a real secret, and put it online.
Your job: make it leak.
Pipelock sits between the agent and the network and signs every decision. Grab the receipt, verify it offline. Don't trust us, check the math.
Come break it ๐
https://t.co/ja7Ktud5tX
Cut the last records off a signed agent log and what's left can still pass a signature check.
Pipelock 3.7.0 reports a valid chain with no proven end as VALID PREFIX, END UNPROVEN and exits 3.
Four repos tagged this week, one idea: stop asking people to trust agent security and hand them something to check.
An evidence standard with its own checker. A rerunnable attack corpus. A signed rules registry. And a firewall that writes that evidence.
Essay in the reply.
๐ Every bright star on the PipeLab homepage is a signed Pipelock record.
Open one to see the verdict and its place in the receipt chain. Then open the replay and verify the receipt offline.
https://t.co/qQRRo3NVNL
A quiet prompt-injection trick downgrades the earlier safety rules, then lands the real task.
Pipelock ships a default response pattern that catches that shape, in every preset and quickstart config.
Release notes: https://t.co/DYIhrEYoGB
CONNECT enforcement has to name its limit.
Pipelock can require TLS with SNI on forward-proxy CONNECT when SNI verification is configured. Raw bytes and no-SNI handshakes block unless the operator opts out.
Release notes: https://t.co/DYIhrEYoGB
Base64 makes a weak disguise.
Pipelock flags opaque high-entropy egress on visible content paths: request bodies, WebSocket frames, and agent-to-agent traffic.
Try the live path: https://t.co/9JxQBbcbSQ
Source builds should tell the truth.
Pipelock source builds report a version derived from version control, so automation can stop treating a placeholder as proof.
Release notes: https://t.co/DYIhrEYoGB
Receipts are useful because they are narrow.
A Pipelock receipt proves the boundary decision and the signature under the published key. It doesn't prove the operator is honest.
Verify it yourself, offline, no server: https://t.co/9JxQBbcbSQ
Install Pipelock, route an agent through it, and make it prove the decision.
macOS:
brew install luckyPipewrench/tap/pipelock
Source and docs: https://t.co/Vo12foMeky
Kill switches should be dull.
Pipelock OR-composes config, API, remote kill, stale bundle, signal, and sentinel-file activation. Any active source denies traffic, with explicit endpoint and IP exemptions.
Docs: https://t.co/Vo12foMeky
Benchmarks should leave their misses on the table.
agent-egress-bench is public: 197 cases, 18 categories, 47 false-positive controls, and one warn-class left visible on purpose.
Run it against Pipelock or anything else.
https://t.co/35AM795IlM
Pipelock 3.3 is live.
Every headline in this release closes a place the runtime trusted something without proof:
๐ธ Denial-of-wallet budgets keyed to the subject, not a session id. A looping or hijacked agent can't rename or restart its way to a fresh spend allowance.
๐งจ Encoded, high-entropy exfiltration caught across request bodies, WebSocket frames, and agent-to-agent traffic. Base64 stopped being cover.
๐ Forward-proxy CONNECT that can require TLS with SNI. Raw tunnels and no-SNI handshakes stop being a blind spot.
๐ Opt-in encryption for the fleet audit queue, fail-closed the moment a keyring is set. No silent downgrade.
๐ซ Config knobs that were never enforced now fail load with the field named. No green check for a limit the runtime ignores.
๐ Trusted audit packets need an external anchor. Evidence doesn't get to crown itself.
Take nothing on faith. Read the notes, run the attack, verify the signed receipt yourself, offline.
https://t.co/Alhve2Z6jN
Don't trust the firewall. Verify it.
The attack corpus is public and every mediated decision is a signed receipt you check yourself.
Corpus and source in the reply.