🚨 Office Properties Income Trust Emerges from Chapter 11
$OPI Office Properties Income Trust has successfully completed its financial restructuring and officially emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Following confirmation by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, the restructuring significantly deleverages the company’s balance sheet and establishes a more flexible capital structure for its national 17.1M SF office portfolio.
📊 Key Capital Structure & Debt Changes
* OPI has reduced its total debt burden by approximately $714 million, leaving a post-restructuring balance sheet of $1.7 billion in debt.
* All previously outstanding common shares have been canceled. The company emerges with approximately 22 million newly issued common shares, a significant portion of which are now owned by pre-petition noteholders, including affiliates of Helix Partners Management LP and Redwood Capital Management, LLC.
* Trade and operational creditors will receive payment in full. Other unsecured noteholders received new common shares, warrants, and rights to participate in a $35 million equity rights offering.
* OPI’s $425 million revolving credit facility has been amended and restated (bearing interest at 9.1%). Its $300 million of 9.0% Senior Secured Notes due 2029 and $177 million of mortgage debt have been reinstated.
* Holders of 3.25% Senior Secured Notes due 2027 received ~$385 million of new 8.375% senior secured notes due December 2029 (with structured principal payments through maturity).
* Holders of 9.0% Senior Secured Notes due September 2029 received ~$420 million of new 10.0% senior secured notes due June 2031 plus new common shares.
👔 Corporate Governance & Management
* OPI has formed a new Board of Directors comprised of seasoned global real estate executives. Jonathan Heller (Founder & CEO of Helix Partners Management LP) will serve as Chairman of the Board.
* The RMR Group will continue to manage OPI post-emergence under new 5-year business and property management agreements. Yael Duffy will continue as President & CEO, and Brian Donley remains as CFO.
* OPI’s newly issued common shares are expected to begin trading today, June 18, 2026, on the Nasdaq under the ticker “OPI.”
https://t.co/87Qb7quWcM
$STRC in freefall. Hate this product and the company but went long @ $83 for a trade. Plenty of asset coverage. MSTR really needs to step in and buy this thing in the open market but they're idiots so will probably do something stupid instead.
@dampedspring Bitcoin or MSTR. With MSTR being the better choice of the two currently. Shareholders won't love it but buying back at a big enough discount could be accretive overall
@jimdelisle@dampedspring@saylor My biggest fear is he takes the nuclear option and suspends dividends but I would think the first step would be to abandon the peg
🏨 The Hotel REIT Sector is Having a Moment, but Braemar’s Pivot is... Complicated.
$BHR Braemar Hotels & Resorts just shocked the market by scrapping its sale plans to pursue self-management instead. To pull this off, they need to break free from external adviser Ashford Inc.—a move carrying a massive $505 million in termination fees. Industry analysts from Baird and Truist have weighed in, and they offer two very different angles on what this means for the company and the broader hotel REIT market.
🔍 The Baird Perspective: "A Little Complicated & Highly Uncertain"
* Michael Bellisario, Senior Research Analyst at Baird (who advised Braemar's special committee), points out that transitioning to a self-managed, 6-to-8-property REIT is a massive uphill battle.
* To pay the $505M fees, Braemar has to sell off assets. However, almost all their remaining hotels carry heavy mortgage debt. Selling a recent 3-hotel portfolio for $437.5M only nets about $330M after debt. They have to keep selling just to cover the breakup fees.
* By selling off liquid assets like the Park Hyatt Beaver Creek or Ritz-Carlton Sarasota, Braemar is left with properties in highly challenged, negative-cash-flow, or lower-value markets like Beverly Hills, Chicago, and D.C.
* A smaller REIT means a higher cost of capital and intense geographic/concentration risks. Bellisario asks the ultimate question: Does the market even have an appetite for a "new," tiny hotel REIT when massive, proven competitors already exist?
☀️ The Truist Perspective: A "Sunny" Macro Outlook for Hotel REITs
* While Braemar faces idiosyncratic corporate drama, C. Patrick Scholes, Managing Director at Truist, notes that the broader hotel REIT sector is quietly experiencing an incredible run.
* Excluding post-recession bounces, hotel REITs have just seen some of the best stock performance in a six-month period that Scholes can recall.
* For the last couple of years, mid-single-digit GDP growth didn't translate to Revenue Per Available Room (RevPAR) growth. That decoupling is finally ending. Strong RevPAR growth against sticky costs means we might finally see margin expansion.
* Buyers have officially accepted the "higher-for-longer" interest rate environment. In fact, some fear rates might tick up, creating a renewed sense of urgency to close hotel deals now.
* Investors previously soured on management teams chasing dilutive "trophy" acquisitions. Now, REITs are listening—focusing on selling underperforming properties or paying out dividends, making the sector a highly attractive "out-of-favor" bet for investors.
The Bottom Line: Hotel REITs as a whole are checking a lot of positive boxes for investors right now. But for Braemar, hitting the "reset button" comes with angry shareholders, looming litigation, and a heavily leveraged balance sheet.
https://t.co/9dmI0pkGVB
Moody’s found that lenders pushed down in aggressive LMEs recovered 14¢ per $1 of claim when those companies later entered Chapter 11.
Senior lenders in bankruptcies without a prior creditor-on-creditor transaction recovered 57¢.
Recent fights around Serta, Trinseo, Saks and J.Crew show the issue in practice: LMEs can move collateral and extend runway, but if the company files later, the earlier creditor fight can shape recoveries.
Redwood Trust is marketing a $468.9 million MBS of primarily bank statement and debt service coverage ratio loans. And Annaly Capital Management is marketing a $340.0 million MBS of agency-eligible loans. https://t.co/UjDfosU7YF
🚨 Al Shams Investments Accuses Braemar Hotels & Resorts of "Self Dealing"
● Al Shams Investments Ltd. has criticized $BHR Braemar Hotels & Resorts Inc. over recent transactions that it said amount to "a brazen act of self-dealing".
● Last week, Braemar announced it will become a self-managed real estate investment trust and will buy out its contract with Ashford Inc. using proceeds from recent asset sales and future disposals.
● Al Shams said it will "pursue every available legal remedy" against Braemar's directors and plans to start a proxy challenge by opposing company-selected candidates and nominating its own.
“Al Shams Investments Ltd. warned you — repeatedly and unambiguously — not to act without shareholder consent...Instead, you have completed one of the most brazen acts of self-dealing we have ever witnessed in a public company.”
https://t.co/3cCadCfPDQ
BPS measures Bitcoin per common share before senior claims. CEBE BPS measures Bitcoin per common share after senior claims. CEBE is the conservative risk metric. BPS is the common equity growth metric. BTC Yield measures BPS execution.
@iBladesi@MikeJM65 These are truly odd issues. Equity/pref trades in line w peers but the BBs always trade somewhere between slightly and substantially worse. Maybe cause debt/equity looks high but idk. At least the yield curve is still makes sense rn.
@yenoms@BTA_0101 Wasn't aware these were qualified either. Pretty sweet deal all around. Kind of hard to handicap a credit rating for this though since the preferreds are below the guarantee.