Pekka Toveri

EU Parlamentin jäsen (EPP), kenraalimajuri evp.

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

"Saksa tyrmistyi pride-iskun epäillyn taustasta – ”Olen sanaton”"
Euroopan on opittava puolustamaan itseään paremmin. Vaikka Venäjä on akuutti uhka, jihadismi ei ole hävinnyt mihinkään.
https://t.co/dT7KoZQY4k

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

Puolustuspolitiikka | Suomi teki Nato-kokouksessa joukon salaisia sopimuksia: Selvitimme, mistä niissä on kyse
https://t.co/VqEFx51dBG

[NEXTA @nexta_tv]

⚠️ Iran-linked Telegram channels threaten Ukraine with missile strikes following Zelensky's statement

After the Ukrainian president announced a successful strike on a vessel transporting military cargo between Russia and Iran, several Iran-linked Telegram channels began publishing threats against Ukraine.

The channels are calling for retaliatory strikes using Iranian ballistic missiles.

[Jay in Kyiv @JayinKyiv]

Russia's fuel crisis is now triggering an agricultural crisis, as grain is ripening and falling tk the ground while farmers have no diesel with which to operate harvesting equipment.

In cases where farmers can afford diesel, the high prices make it unprofitable to harvest grain that itself is falling in price.

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

Tiedustelu | Viranomaiset varoittavat: Venäläistoimija yrittää murtautua sähköposteihin
https://t.co/JbvenRe3hR

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

Heh.

[EUvsDisinfo @EUvsDisinfo]

While Russian officials continue to show a remarkable interest in how the EU applies its laws, in 2024, a Russian court fined Google a staggering 2 undecillion rubles, a number with 36 zeros which far exceeds the value of the entire global economy.

Kirill Dmitriev has yet to comment on that decision.

[Natalka @NatalkaKyiv]

What does this mean???

Did they elect a new Putin or not?🤔

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

Musk is an idiot, not strategist.

[🪖MilitaryNewsUA🇺🇦 @front_ukrainian]

❗️Elon Musk, in an interview with The Economist, expressed hope for a quick peace agreement between Kyiv and Moscow, noting that the front in Ukraine has barely moved for two or three years. He emphasized that Russia will not withdraw its troops, so the war can only end through concessions to Moscow. “Many people say that Russia must completely withdraw its troops, but that is unrealistic. We need to be pragmatic… I’m not pro-Russian, just pragmatic. Otherwise, people will keep dying for years without achieving anything,” Musk said.

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

Hyvä ketju Vanhaselta. Wildberries on menettänyt jo noin kolmanneksen varastokapasiteetistaan ja vaikutukset sen liiketoimintaan ovat massiivisia. Puhumattakaan vaikutuksista firmsn noin 80 miljoonalle asiakkaalle.

[Henri Vanhanen @HenriVanhanen]

1. Ukraina osuu jälleen ja Pietarissa palaa. 🚨

Kolmas isku Wildberries varastoihin viikon sisällä ei ole enää yksittäinen operaatio. Tämä on systemaattinen Ukrainan pommituskampanja, johon Venäjä ei selvästikään ollut valmistautunut ja josta tulossa Kremlille uusi päänsärky.

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

"Venäläinen tv-kanava räätälöi Putinille uutislähetyksiä, joita kansa ei edes nähnyt."
Moni on sanonut että Putin elää kuplassa, johon hänelle ei tuoda huonoja uutisia. Mutta jossain vaiheessa kupla puhkeaa...
https://t.co/p5Vvbef8j3

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

Hyvin sanottu. Väite että Naton leviäminen aiheutti Ukrainan sodan on Putinin vale, jota yllättävän moni Suomessakin toistaa. Pääosin tosin suomettumisen ajan veteraaneja jotka eivät halua myöntää tulleensa venäläisten huijaamiksi...ja monta kertaa peräkkäin.

[Sulkhan Metreveli @Sulkhan]

‘NATO expansion caused this war.’ Four years in, I still hear it weekly from people who should know better.

Let me end this argument properly.

Putin watched Finland join NATO — doubling his NATO border overnight — and moved troops away from it. No invasion. No hysteria. A shrug.

So the border was never the threat. What, then, was?

Look at what he actually attacked, every time: Georgia after it chose democracy in 2003. Ukraine after it chose democracy in 2014. Not NATO members. Candidates for freedom.

The pattern is perfect and the conclusion is simple: Putin fears NATO membership far less than he fears a functioning post-Soviet democracy next door — because missiles threaten his military, but an example threatens his throne.

This week proved it again. Ukrainians argued with their government in the streets, and the government listened. Every Russian saw it.

That — not Article 5 — is what keeps him awake.

He didn’t invade to stop NATO. He invaded to stop a mirror.

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

6% briteistä on valmiita vapaaehtoisesti puolustamaan maataan aseellista hyökkäystä vastaan, 14% jos käsketään. Vaikka 38% piti hyökkäystä mahdollisena seuraavan 10 vuoden aikana.
Rakenna siinä sitten vahvaa puolustusta...

https://t.co/z2LOXN3egY

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

Kova väite. Mielenkiintoista nähdä tuleeko vahvistusta.

[🪖MilitaryNewsUA🇺🇦 @front_ukrainian]

❗️As part of a cyber operation, the OSINT community InformNapalm, together with Ukrainian specialists, remotely hacked the air defense systems of the “BARS Moscow” training ground, where Russians were training to counter Ukrainian UAVs.

The hackers gained access to the combat operation algorithms and were also able to interfere with the work of one of the crews. As a result, that crew today shot down its own Su-57, mistaking it for a drone.

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

@hiilinen No, eipä ole sosiaalidemokraatitkaan juurikaan profiloituneet turvallisuusviranomaisten resurssien takaajina.

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

"Venäjä käyttää Suomen datakeskuksia vakoiluun."
Tyypillinen tilanne. Toimiala kehittyy vauhdilla, rikollinen käyttö kasvaa, lainsäädäntö laahaa perässä ja viranomaisille ei anneta resursseja valvontaan ja tutkimiseen. Mikä voisi mennä vikaan?
https://t.co/GNvnH1XCyl

[Terje Helland @terjehelland]

🇬🇪Georgia's ruling party, @GeorgianDream41 (GD), is staging a show trial to imprison the leaders of every major opposition party at once. It is called the "sabotage case".
Sentences run up to 15 years. The outcome is predetermined.
‼️We must act before the verdicts land.
1/17

[Anton Gerashchenko @Gerashchenko_en]

Russian propagandist Dugin openly says that Russia needs a mobilization and that Putin must make the decision to go through with it.

A new large-scale mobilization campaign in Russia in the fall of 2026 has not yet been announced. However, the likelihood that mobilization will be announced in late September or October is very high. It is clear that the Russian authorities will not announce this in advance so as not to trigger a mass exodus and a decline in loyalty on the eve of the parliamentary elections. If the campaign is being prepared, it will logically be concealed until the administrative system is ready and opportunities to leave the country are as limited as possible.

Therefore, it's necessary to see whether Russia's individual actions are coming together into a unified mobilization configuration.

◾️ First, independent Russian media outlets with sources in regional administrations and the military recruitment system report that a new mobilization is being discussed at various levels of government. October (after the State Duma elections) is cited as a possible date.

◾️ Second, Russia is facing an increasingly severe shortage of manpower. Regions are increasing payments to contract soldiers and expanding recruitment among debtors, prisoners, the unemployed, foreigners, and socially vulnerable groups. At the same time, recruitment numbers are declining, while the need for monthly replenishment is estimated at tens of thousands of people. This means that the voluntary-monetary model is approaching its limits.

◾️ Third, military enlistment offices are not just updating their databases. Since the beginning of 2026, reports have been coming in from various regions that mobilization orders are being affixed to military ID cards during summonses, ostensibly for "data update." Such an order predetermines where a person must report on their own once mobilization measures are in effect.

◾️ Fourth, the state has established an e-infrastructure that it did not have in September 2022. A summons is considered served once it is entered into the registry, and a travel ban can take effect as soon as it is uploaded, regardless of whether the citizen has seen it. If a person fails to appear, the system allows for additional restrictions to be imposed. This means that the Kremlin no longer needs to publicly announce a general border closure: it is sufficient to simultaneously enter the required number of people into the registry and forward the data to the border service.

◾️ Fifth, one of the potential ways for circumventing Russian control has already been closed. Belarus has confirmed that Russians prohibited from leaving Russia due to a military summons will not be able to leave Belarusian territory either. Thus, the restriction effectively applies to both countries.

◾️ Sixth, the tightening of border control, consultations with neighboring countries on closing borders to Russians, changes to transport links, and growing interest among Russians in leaving Russia coincide with the worsening of military conscription.

◾️ Seventh, the calendar follows a political logic. Before the election, it is not in the government's interest to stir up widespread anxiety. After the vote, the political cost drops sharply. That is why September may be the final month of administrative preparations, and October - a convenient time for mobilization.

The available indicators are sufficient to assess that the risk of a new mobilization this fall is high. It may not be called a mobilization. It could take the form of mass "data update," reservist assemblies, mobilization orders, forced enlistment, regional quotas, or phased travel restrictions. For someone who will ultimately be sent to war, the legal name of the mechanism will not matter.

What should those who do not want to participate in the war do:

🔹 Don't wait for an official mobilization announcement. Once a draft notice is entered into the electronic registry, the travel ban may take effect automatically. The moment when mobilization is publicly acknowledged may come only after opportunities to leave the country have effectively been closed off.

🔹 Leave in advance and only via legal routes. Belarus should not be viewed as a way to circumvent Russian restrictions, as the Belarusian border system may enforce Russia's travel bans.

🔹 Don't consider Europe as the primary relocation destination. Russian citizens will face visa restrictions there, stricter checks on the source of funds, banks' refusal to open or maintain accounts, difficulties with money transfers from Russia, and restrictions on transactions with Russian banks, payment and cryptocurrency services.

🔹 Use Central Asia primarily as a quick transit zone. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan may be options for an initial departure, temporary stay, and planning the next route. At the same time, these countries should not be considered guaranteed safe havens for deserters, anti-war activists, or people wanted by Russia, due to the cooperation between local law enforcement agencies and Moscow.

After the initial departure, potential relocation destinations may include:

▪️ countries in Latin America, specifically Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Mexico, or countries in Central America;

▪️ countries in South and Southeast Asia;

▪️ Türkiye as a temporary transport and relocation hub;

▪️ certain countries in the Middle East, Africa, or the Caribbean;

▪️ other countries where legal entry, long-term stay, study, work, or a residence permit are available.

A practical strategy should consist of two stages: first, a quick, legal departure through an accessible country in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Türkiye, or another open route; then, travel to a country in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, or another region where long-term legalization is possible.

Waiting for full documentary confirmation of mobilization in this situation means risking that the decision will be confirmed only after it will no longer be possible to cross the border.

[Проф. Преображенский @prof_preobr]

Вот момент сегодняшнего выступления Путина на совещании по экономике, очень наглядно показывающий, как ему подают ситуацию и как он сам её склонен видеть.

Путин сообщает, что с госбюджетом всё хорошо, и что в июне был профицит в 196 млрд. рублей.
А что о��щий дефицит госбюджета с начала года достиг 5,7 трлн. рублей, Путин не сообщает.
И что 197 млрд. - капля в море по сравнению с 5,7 трлн., Путин тоже не сообщает.
И что в июле рост дефицита возобновился, и по итогам месяца дыра в бюджете превысит 6 триллионов, Путин тоже не сообщает.
В его папочке и в его голове этого нет.
Там одни победы. Как обычно, вымышленные.

[Pekka Toveri @PToveri]

Vain 10 kilometriä ja saavutetaan Ukrainan linnoitusketju Donbassissa.... jonka takana on toinen, kolmas ja neljäs puolustuslinja, jäi ilmeisesti ajan puutteessa sanomatta.

[Visegrád 24 @visegrad24]

Speaker of the Russian Parliament Vyacheslav Volodin is urging Russians to be patient a little longer, claiming the war is about to end because there are “less than ten kilometers left to the main fortified areas where the Nazis are entrenched.”

Volodin also promises that tomorrow the fuel situation in the country will "radically change."

According to Volodin, victory is near, and fuel will soon flow like a river again in the country. For now, the main thing is to become “a pillar of support for the President.”

In May, Russian troops occupied 14 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, a record low for the entire full-scale war.

[Jürgen Nauditt 🇩🇪🇺🇦 @jurgen_nauditt]

Putin rules out "concessions" regarding Ukraine following failed talks with Trump – Bloomberg.

According to informed sources, the Kremlin has shifted its stance on a potential peaceful resolution. Putin reportedly no longer considers returning parts of the occupied territories to Ukraine and insists on gaining control over the entire Donetsk region.

Furthermore, the Kremlin intends to maintain the border areas of the Sumy and Kharkiv regions as "buffer zones."

And there are still total idiots in Western countries who believe it is possible to negotiate with Putin.