Reading recent exchanges with promoters of #BallotMarkingDevices & noticing how effective @Kasparov63 advice is: If the facts are simple just keep repeating them. #HandMarkedPaperBallots are widely available for most voters (via mail). They're Covid safe and not hackable.
@Kasparov63 Like this: Ballot marking devices have an essential security flaw. Like all computers they can be hacked, misprogrammed, misconfigured, misused. Printed ballots from machines can’t be trusted as expressions of voter intent, so no audit or recount can detect cheating.
Get the skinny on what's in the unsealed documents in Georgia’s long running lawsuit aimed at throwing out universal use Ballot Marking Devices on @TheBradBlog
Federal Judge Unseals Expert Report on GA Voting System, Revealing Horrific Vulnerabilities: Today's #BradCast
Guest: Richard DeMillo (@rad_atl) of Georgia Tech; Also: MI's failed SoS candidate, GOP chair sanctioned for election suit
FULL STORY, LISTEN: https://t.co/e9R47lM6GG
Georgia Tech’s School of Cybersecurity and Privacy invites applications to access the newly established Election Security Research Facility (ESRF), intended to be the most comprehensive research resource for election technologies and other democracy-affirming institutions.
14/ And learn why electronically marked paper ballots cannot assure the will of the people.
By Appel, @philipbstark and @rad_atl
https://t.co/kIgxqQnZX3
Is it time to withdraw from whatever Twitter is becoming? Just today: Trolling, bots, links to media “stories” promising new bombshell reveals about Nancy Pelosi, vaguely worded threats and Musk hasn’t even fully lifted the bans on problem accounts yet. Not a good trajectory.
Well. that didn't take long: my family already already targeted not for their tweets or mine but for their fact-based MSM journalism. Even modest guardrails already down | Twitter's Content Moderation Team Reportedly Unable to Work Amid Musk Takeover https://t.co/A6fOxIx5v9
@heidergarcia Thanks for these points, but they have been extensively argued in a series of technical articles and reports (for a telegraphic summary see https://t.co/0LaOLQPAne) The bottom line is (1) there will be many unverified ballots cast regardless & (2) there is no known way out.
In the wake of GA's voting system breach, Dr. Andrew Appel's short article about BMDs is worth rereading!
It's written for us laymen, to help us understand why BMDs don't produce quality elections.
⬇️
https://t.co/0hOPtOhUDq
@TxSaving@duncanbuell OK, maybe someone else will find this amusing, but it's clearly a waste of time with you. He was an expert designated by a federal court to conduct experiments under strict conditions. The results were sealed for AEO under PO. OK or not OK is not a meaningful question.
I dont know why Ben is replying to me but since he did, let me say this is nonsense. It contradicts everything vendors/SOS claimed for 20 years about secret security methods. Oh and it does lower the bar for discovering vulnerabilities. Not fatal but doesnt inspire confidence.
@MarilynRMarks1@rad_atl As I explained in the thread, that aspect matters little. Change credentials, move on. Access to the software, even for months by many people, is not a serious issue.
@TxSaving@duncanbuell Ummm....Halderman was appointed by a federal court to analyze the system. The court sealed the code and restricted access under a protective order. Not even the plaintiffs in the lawsuit had access. Other people could have petitioned litigants but apparently didn’t.
@benadida Open source is no silver bullet. Your insistence for example that voter verification occurs at a sufficient rate to mitigate risk of outcome changing has nothing to so with open source. It does make ZT impossible though.
@benadida That has nothing to do with it. These breaches demonstrate vulnerabilities that were previously dismissed by SOS. EG demonstrate feasibility of threat models like insider threats and sec ops. The time between breach & recognition of vulnerabilities present new attack surfaces.