No, the ICE agent isn't "kneeling on his neck".
Yes, yes, ICE is the modern gestapo, a bunch of thugs operating without accountability.
What I'm arguing is that you cannot "see" what's happening here. You think you clearly see the ICE agent kneeling on his neck like with George Floyd, but you don't.
What you see here is the approved, trained technique of kneeling OVER the neck. The difference is that the weight is still mostly on the other leg, and on the heels. The knee is extended over the neck to prevent the target from being able to lift their head, but the weight is not on the neck, it's on the heels and other leg.
You can watch the agent leading up to this point, where the ICE agent is carefully placing his foot in the right position, so that the weight stays on his back heels and other leg, then extends his knee over the target's neck.
This technique is extensively trained for and approved, and is included in most training manuals.
That's why you know Chauvin's claim of using his training is false. His weight was on Floyds neck, not on his other leg or heels. He was definitely NOT trained to do this. The two procedures are different for exact the reasons shown, that one can injure the person, and the other simply immobilizes them without injury.
The point of this tweet isn't to defend or attack Chuavin or ICE, but to point out that you and I can see the same videos but see completely different things, and that some education is important.
BREAKING: ICE just broke Minnesota law detaining an American Citizen and kneeing on his neck, which was outlawed after the George Floyd murder.
Trump wants this to keep escalating so that he can continue to consolidate more and more power within the federal government. The more power he has the more he can screw up the 2026 election.
That's like saying if you think a bridge over a river is unsafe, you should build your own bridge.
FFmpeg's code is unsafe, no matter how many bugs you fix, it's vulnerable to a ton of yet-to-be-discovered bugs, because it's inherently unsafe code. Just because I point this out doesn't mean I should rewrite the entire codebase.
FFmpeg's complaints are invalid.
They don't care about writing secure code. They don't care that somebody can send you a video file that takes control of your machine.
They are like every other "vendor" of software that doesn't care about the security of their code and who looks for reasons to pretend the vuln finders are the bad guys. The person finding a vulnerability in your code isn't the one who created it.
I say this as somebody who has analyzed many bugs in FFmpeg. The code is inherently broken and unfixable.
For example, one bug I looked at allocated a buffer in one library, using one algorithm to calculate its size, and then filled in the buffer in another library, using a completely different algorithm to calculate its size.
Obviously, there was a size mismatch.
The fix isn't to change the calculations to come up with the same size, but to carry bounds information with the buffer, so that the code filling in the buffer knows the buffer size, and can check it against an accidental overflow.
Since these were different libraries, this requires a change in the API -- something no outside vuln researcher can do, something only a core maintainer can do. FFmpeg cannot be fixed without a major redesign of its API to carry bounds information.
FFmpeg code is neither secure nor securable because they don't care ab out security. Google's vuln researchers didn't create this problem.
FFmpeg has 1 person generating insecure code faster than 1000 vuln researchers can keep up pointing out problems.
FFMPEG had one of the most valid crash outs in infosec history IMO. There's a huge elephant in the room when it comes to the fact that cybersecurity is extremely unbalanced. You have like 1,000 people pointing at problems for every 1 person fixing them.
Vulnerability research is extremely important, but it's become somewhat of a marketing stunt. First with fuzzers, and now with LLMs. It's a lot of "look what my new toy can do" rather than earnest attempts at actually fixing security problem.
What Google did to open source developers was especially egregious. They're a $3.6 trillion dollar company, who spent billions upon billions of dollars building a bot that points at problems really really fast, then they just dumped them all on a bunch of unpaid open source project maintainers to fix.
Then because of Google's 90 day disclosure policy, the maintainers have 90 days to fix the issues. After 90 days, Google goes public with the issues, making their project look bad if the vulnerability is yet to be fixed, and also potentially harming users if it gets exploited.
The 90 day policy was intended to give developers a reasonable amount of time to fix issues, while also applying some pressure with the threat of disclosure. Otherwise, you do get a bunch of goober ass vendors that will just ignore all security issues reported to them, then act completely surprised when their software gets hacked.
But when you're a small team, non-profit, or a solo developer, and you have a trillion dollar company's AI just blasting you with infinite problems to fix (each coming with a 90 countdown & a threat), that becomes extremely untenable. They're essentially inadvertently blackmailing developers into becoming unpaid interns.
Then on top of that, Google profits unimaginable amounts of money from the use of open source code. They use FFMPEG's code extensively across several highly-profitable products, meanwhile FFMPEG's developers work for free. There's no reason Google couldn't have donated money, engineers, AI tokens, or something towards fixing the problems. They can more than afford it.
I don't think Google has any malicious intent at all, it's just that the whole incentive structure behind vulnerability research is completely whack. All the glory goes to people who find issues, not those who fix them, so there's not a whole lot of interest in helping with fixes. Some vulnerability researchers will submit fixes with their reports, but most don't.
Honestly, in 2026 cybersecurity basically just feels like the equivalent of 50,000 people following the housecleaner around yelling "you missed a spot". Abysmally little effort has gone into anything outside of pointing out vulnerabilities.
@yawaramin@JosephV04824396@shstalwart That's why it's unreasonable to expect outsiders to "contribute" by fixing vulns. They can't. Just because I can point out this bridge has a hole in the middle that needs to be fixed doesn't mean I'm able to fix it.
@yawaramin@JosephV04824396@shstalwart There is a range at how vulnerable such things are.
FFmpeg is at the far end. The code is the worst example of critical infrastructure code. It's like building bridges out of sticks instead of concrete and steel.
@yawaramin@JosephV04824396@shstalwart If it's "critical infrastructure" code, then it shouldn't be passing around naked pointers in the API. Other critical infrastructure code solves this problem.
They were complaining about vulns, how Google wasn't contributing enough to fix the vulns they discovered.
Their dangerous code is unfixable. There is no way to make structural reforms, but instead must rely upon wack-a-mole to fix bugs that shouldn't have been possible in the first place.
It's like responding to critics that a bridge is dangerous and about to fall down by complaining it's critical infrastructure and therefore beyond criticism.
There is no way to contribute to fixing the fundamental problems with the code. Wack-a-mole fixing the latest bugs, without addressing the underlying issue, is pointless.
It's like saying that I can't criticize a rival sports team without contributing to it.
Everyone needs to know that FFmpeg is inherently unsafe and unfixable, and that it should never be used outside a sandbox. It's pointless for them to fix vulns since there are a ton of unfixed vulns remaining.
The highly classified network that the National Security Agency uses for its internal communications is down, according to six people familiar with the matter.
At this point there is no evidence of a cyberattack, sources said. CNN has asked the National Security Agency for comment. https://t.co/bUJ5TEtBxY
@HistoryBoomer Also, I'm annoyed that "everything's gone pear-shaped" seems perfectly normal to me, I've seen it a lot, but I have no idea what it means.
@HistoryBoomer When I was in fifth grade, I called the janitor "queer".
Because you see, I'd been reading The Hobbit and A Wrinkle In Time, where the authors used "queer" a lot to mean "strange".
The janitor was amusing kids by acting strange, so I said "you are so queer".
He got very angry.
When the story hits the news (FAA network goes down) suddenly we'll see all sorts of other government networks going down. This doesn't mean there's a rash of failures in government networks, but a rash of reporting on something that is suddenly "newsworthy" that wasn't before.
We break: The highly classified network that the National Security Agency uses for its internal communications is down, according to five people familiar with the matter.
The network, called NSA Net, allows employees to communicate classified information internally. At this point there is no evidence of a cyberattack, sources said.
As the agency works to understand the scope of the problem, it has enacted staggered arrivals for personnel, the sources said.
CNN has asked the National Security Agency for comment.
https://t.co/UM7iALU0wF
@friend_candid It's not wrong for end-users. They need to know that FFmpeg is unsafe at any speed and cannot be run outside a sandbox.
Nobody is obligating them to fix the vulns, least of all those who publish vulns.
@shstalwart@yawaramin I'm not demanding they fix their vulns. I don't care if they fix their vulns.
I think you believe that disclosing a vuln is a demand to fix it. This is not true.