Olivia
Online
@LauraLoomer Very true, unfortunately 🤷🏼
@Milajoy The Dems are not going to accept his claims until someone or someone’s are formally arrested and charged. 🤷🏼
@Milajoy All the above ☝🏻
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out.
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions.
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump.
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference.
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out.
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions.
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump.
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference.
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out.
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions.
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump.
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference.
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out.
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions.
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump.
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference.
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out.
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions.
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump.
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference.
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out.
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions.
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump.
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference.
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out.
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions.
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump.
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference.
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out.
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions.
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump.
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference.
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out. 
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions. 
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump. 
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference. 
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out. 
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions. 
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump. 
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference. 
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
“At the end of Trump’s first term (late 2020 into early 2021), there was significant tension over the Intelligence Community’s (IC) handling of foreign influence in the 2020 election, particularly regarding China vs. Russia. Trump and his appointees (like DNI John Ratcliffe) repeatedly highlighted China as a major threat trying to undermine him (e.g., to help Biden), while career analysts and the final declassified reports emphasized Russia as the primary active interferer favoring Trump, with China largely sitting it out. 
What Happened
• Trump admin pressure on China narrative: Officials like Ratcliffe, AG Barr, and others publicly stressed China as the bigger player in influence ops. Ratcliffe later argued the IC’s majority view understated Chinese efforts and created a false equivalence (or imbalance) with Russia. There were reports of delays in assessments, internal clashes, and accusations that analysts resisted or watered down China-focused conclusions. 
• IC output: The March 2021 declassified ODNI assessment (covering the period) concluded with high confidence that:
• Russia (Putin-authorized) ran influence ops to denigrate Biden, support Trump, and sow division.
• Iran tried to hurt Trump.
• China “considered but did not deploy” efforts to change the outcome. Beijing wanted stability and didn’t see enough upside in risking detection. A minority dissent (e.g., from the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber) saw more Chinese activity against Trump. 
• No foreign actor compromised voting infrastructure or altered votes per the IC. Voter data access by China/Iran was noted separately but not tied to outcome-changing interference. 
Ombudsman reviews and later accounts described politicization concerns “from above” (Trump appointees pushing China emphasis) and “from below” (analysts allegedly downplaying it or softening Russia language). Ratcliffe intervened on the final product to better reflect China threats. Assessments were delayed past deadlines amid the debate. “
@realjoshuareid We kinda knew this already. Trump had ordered an intelligence assessment at the end of his 1st term and they would not provide unless the narrative was changed from China being the culprit to Russia.
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