Q.: Why did I wait until 2023 to join Twitter? (More than one answer may be correct.)
1) Waiting for the Musk Era!
2) Procrastination.
3) Thought I might be too mild-mannered for Twitter.
4) Had to join in order to participate in a @LawAndGovernance program on Twitter Spaces.
(4/4) For those who are not (yet) ready to read a full-length law review article making this case, a short summary of it is available here: https://t.co/8vOH7JEraY.
(1/4) Now in print! My long-pending article on the major questions doctrine has been published at 112 Calif. L. Rev. 899 (2024), https://t.co/H2VmWyxRMu.
(3/4) The explanation for the MQD seems to be the Court’s feeling that an agency should not be able to take bold action unless Congress has been very clear in authorizing it. That ideological premise should play no part in what ought to be the neutral fabric of administrative law
Knowing that many would be upset about the demise of Chevron, Roberts would never have been tactless enough to rub it in by letting the case be known as “Relentless.”
Whether to call the case that overruled Chevron “Loper” or “Loper Bright” is the subject of a burning, or at least smoldering, debate. https://t.co/V6HMjwkOHK
Regardless, I differ from learned colleagues, including @ https://t.co/bNXlYC6Rih https://t.co/6ium1qzncs, who lament that the case was not captioned “Relentless.” https://t.co/gVI0ydIzTu
Just published on CNN: My thoughts on Loper Bright. It “may not be an occasion for alarm, but it is an occasion for regret that administrative law has lost something valuable.” https://t.co/vSGTrxXkUU
In this sense, Loper Bright does signal an upcoming regime of reduced deference, but its significance may to a great extent be symbolic or emblematic rather than causal. (5/5)
I was writing about judicial review of agency legal interpretations well before Chevron, and I observed firsthand what the doctrine was like in those days. (1/5) https://t.co/INL2vEqDiD
In this sense, Loper Bright does signal an upcoming regime of reduced deference, but its significance may to a great extent be symbolic or emblematic rather than causal. (5/5)
New amicus brief in SEC v. Jarkesy by Alan Morrison, @richardjpierce, and myself argues that (1) SEC ALJs may not be removed without cause, notwithstanding Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, and (2) SEC adjudication does not violate the 7th Amendment. https://t.co/ZbEAzH38EH
The dissent continues: "It may yield important benefits over jury trials in federal court, such as greater efficiency and expertise, transparency and reasoned decisionmaking, as well as uniformity, predictability, and greater political accountability.” (2/2)
The dissent in today’s Jarkesy decision (p. 37) cites the amicus brief of “Administrative Law Scholars” (Alan Morrison, @richardjpierce, and myself) for its recognition that “(t)here are good reasons for Congress to set up a scheme like the SEC’s.” (1/2)
@PrimeNewYork@rickhasen In cases that are tried in federal court only because the parties come from different states, state substantive law applies. Gasperini held that the NY law was substantive because it was intended to limit damage awards – effectively, a tort reform statute.