سمرقند

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

Among the principles for establishing the relied-upon (muʿtamad) position of the Māturīdī school are the following:

1. The view must conform to the foundational principles (uṣūl) of the school.

For example, ilhām (inspiration) and kashf (unveiling) are not considered valid proofs according to the consensus of the majority. However, some later scholars treated them as authoritative or relied upon them in their theological discussions. Accordingly, any theological position that is based solely—or fundamentally—upon ilhām or kashf is not the relied-upon position of the school.

2. The view must be the one most consistent with the foundational principles of the school.

For example, the majority of the Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs agreed upon the doctrine of rational moral goodness and evil (al-taḥsīn wa'l-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqliyyān), although they differed regarding its precise formulation and some of its subsidiary implications. Thus, some held that reason does not obligate the knowledge of God nor gratitude to the Bestower of blessings. However, the view that is more consistent with the doctrine of rational moral goodness and evil—and likewise with the explicit statements of the Imām al-Aʿẓam—is that both are rationally obligatory, as has been explained in its proper place. Accordingly, the position that they are rationally obligatory is the relied-upon position of the school.

3. The view must conform to the explicit statements of the Imām al-Aʿẓam and the early scholars of Transoxiana (Mā Warāʾ al-Nahr).

For example, our scholar Imām Ibn al-Humām claimed that there is no explicit statement in the words of the Imām al-Aʿẓam or the early authorities before Imām al-Hudā al-Māturīdī affirming the eternity of the active attributes (al-ṣifāt al-fiʿliyyah). He therefore preferred the Ashʿarī position, and a small number of later scholars followed him in this. However, this claim was refuted by his student, the ḥāfiẓ Ibn Quṭlūbughā in Sharḥ al-Musāyarah; by Mullā ʿAlī al-Qārī in Sharḥ al-Fiqh al-Akbar; by Shaykh al-Islām Shihāb al-Dīn al-Marjānī in his works; by Imām Kamāl al-Dīn al-Bayāḍī in Ishārāt al-Marām—all of whom are from our school—as well as, in detail, by the Ashʿarī scholar Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-Gharsī. They established that this was indeed the position of the Imām al-Aʿẓam and of the early authorities before Imām al-Hudā al-Māturīdī. Accordingly, the position of Imām Ibn al-Humām is not the relied-upon position of the school.

4. The view must be that of the majority of the later verifying scholars (muḥaqqiqūn - the post-Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī period) in determining the school's doctrine, where the statements or opinions of the early scholars are divergent, open to multiple interpretations, or absent altogether.

This criterion is difficult to apply because it requires extensive familiarity with the writings of the later Ḥanafī-Māturīdī verifying scholars, who are numerous; their works are dispersed across different lands, written in multiple languages, many of them remain in manuscript form, in addition to various other difficulties.

For example, the later verifying scholars differed regarding the objects of attachment (taʿalluqāt) of the attribute of takwīn (bringing-into-being). The majority held that these attachments are originated (ḥādithah). Accordingly, this is the relied-upon position of the school.

5. The view must not be one influenced by, or dependent upon, scholars of other schools and theological traditions when determining the doctrine of the school.

For example, some later scholars held that the divine attributes are contingent (mumkinah) due to their being influenced by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and those who followed him. Others rejected this position, despite differing among themselves on related matters. Accordingly, the doctrine of the contingency of the divine attributes is not the relied-upon position of the school.

6. The view must not be merely a harmonizing or conciliatory formulation between the Māturīdī school and other schools or traditions.

For example, Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī sought to reconcile many different schools and traditions throughout his works. Accordingly, it is not valid to rely upon his writings alone when determining the authoritative doctrine of the Māturīdī school.

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

[on imām aḥmad's boycott of ahl ra'y]

‘Abd Allāh al-‘Afrī in the introduction of Kitāb al-Nawādir of the Imām Muʿallā ibn Manṣūr al-Rāzī al-Ḥanafī [d. 826 CE] records:

"Imam al-Ṭūfī al-Ḥanbalī, in his commentary on Mukhtaṣar al-Rawḍah, explicitly recorded Imam Aḥmad's retraction of his position regarding Ahl al-Raʾy and he made a remarkably fine statement — it is fitting that we quote it here in full. He said: "The summary of the matter is that he certainly did not oppose the Sunnah out of stubbornness. Rather, whenever he differed from it, he did so through independent reasoning, based upon clear arguments and sound, evident proofs. His arguments are available among the people, and his opponents are rarely able to answer them fairly. If he was mistaken, he receives one reward, and if he was correct, he receives two rewards. Those who criticize him are either envious or ignorant of the proper scope of independent reasoning. The last authentic position reported from Imām Aḥmad—may God have mercy upon him—was that he spoke well of him and praised him. Abū al-Ward, one of our scholars, mentioned this in his book Uṣūl al-Dīn. God Most High knows best what is correct.

Among ahl al-ra'y were leading imāms, great ḥadīth masters, outstanding scholars, and expert critics, such as the two companions, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī. Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn—whose status in memorization, transmission, and religious integrity is well known—used to say:

“I do not believe that a Muslim should study the legal opinions of al-Shāfiʿī. Studying the legal opinions of Abū Ḥanīfah is more beloved to me.”

Imam al-Ḥāfiẓ Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd al-Qaṭṭān said:"We do not lie before God: we have not heard any legal opinion better than that of Abū Ḥanīfah, and we have adopted most of his opinions."

Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn said concerning the imām of the ḥadīth masters, Wakīʿ ibn al-Jarrāḥ: “I have never seen anyone like Wakīʿ, and he used to issue legal rulings according to the opinions of Abū Ḥanīfah.”

On the basis of what has preceded, criticizing any narrator merely because he followed the approach of ra'y is something that deserves to be completely disregarded. When this is combined with the agreement of the ḥadīth masters concerning the imām’s uprightness and precision, there is even greater reason to overlook the matter entirely, both generally and in detail. The critical statements exchanged between contemporaries should be folded away and not transmitted.

In sum: The people of knowledge went beyond the statement of Imam Aḥmad and agreed in their unanimous praise of his [Abū Ḥanīfah's] leadership and gave him precedence in transmission and [legal] discernment alike — as Ibn Ḥibbān mentioned him among the "trustworthy" — and he was among the more rigorous critics —and al-Dāraquṭnī authenticated him, and Ibn Mānjuwayh [counted him] among the narrators of Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim."

—Kitāb al-Nawādir, 1.43-44

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

[dying in the state of love]

Shaykh ʿAbd al-Aḥad al-Nūrī al-Sīwāsī [d. 1651 CE] writes:

In Jamʿ al-Jawāmiʿ, it is reported with an authentic chain of transmission that the Prophet—may God bless him and grant him peace—said: "Whoever falls deeply in love, remains chaste, and then dies, dies as a martyr.”

The commentator—may God have mercy upon him—said:

“This contains an allusion to a report that we transmitted from Saʿīd ibn ʿUbādah: ‘Whoever dies because of love is among the people of martyrdom.’"

—Ḥujjat al-Wadād, 1.5

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

Imām ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Kharbūṭī [d. 1903 CE] said:

"This is because affirming an effect is meaningful only when that power has some real involvement. Once that involvement is removed, there is no difference between the existence of an effective power and the existence of a non-effective power.

Similarly, it may be said that there is no real difference between the Ashʿarī doctrine and pure compulsion, even though an outward difference exists: the Ashʿarī affirms that the servant possesses an abstract power, whereas the Jabriyyah deny that the servant possesses any power at all.

In reality, however, there is no difference between the complete absence of power and the existence of power without any effect. Power is affirmed precisely for the sake of an effect; therefore, once its effect is denied, there is no difference between its existence and its nonexistence."

—Al-Simṭ al-ʿAbqari fi Sharḥ al-ʿAqd al-Jawhari, 1.51

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

[on the acts of God, exalted is He]

Imām Muḥammad al-Izmīrī [d. 1752 CE] said:

Nothing is obligatory upon God, exalted is He, from kindness (luṭf), what is most fitting (aṣlaḥ), reward for obedience, or punishment for disobedience, nor compensation for suffering. Rather, if He rewards, it is out of His grace and in accordance with His promise; and if He punishes, it is by His justice and in accordance with His warning.

There is no ugliness attributed to Him in His action, nor is anything ascribed to His wisdom of injustice or wrongdoing. God does what He wills and rules as He wishes, and His acts are not made contingent upon [external] purposes — rather, He safeguards wisdom and [human] benefits in all His acts and rulings, out of grace, not obligation.

He leads astray whom He wills and turns away from faith whom He wills, and guides whom He wills — because He created creation devoid of faith and disbelief, then commanded them to have faith and forbade them from disbelief. So whoever disbelieves does so by his own choice, and whoever believes does so by his own choice, and He created them and their choice, exalted is He.

—Matn al-ʿAqāʾid al-Jadīdah, 1.161

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

A man came and placed before Abū Ḥanīfah, at the entrance of the mosque in Kūfah, some honey mixed with nabīdh. Then he began calling out: "Who will buy so many ratls of this for one dirham?"

Since Abū Ḥanīfah had held nabīdh to be lawful, when he heard the man calling out, he said: "My good man, what you have done is improper."

The man replied, "But you declared it lawful."

Abū Ḥanīfah answered, "You are right. Likewise, it is lawful for your father to have intercourse with your mother in the middle of the marketplace—but doing so would still be indecent."

— Ḥadāʾiq al-Azhār 1.19

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

[did the prophet rebuke imam ali?]

cited report: ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (may Allah be pleased with him) reported that one night the Messenger of Allah ﷺ came to the house of ʿAlī and Fāṭimah, the Prophet's daughter (peace be upon her), and said, "Will you two not pray?" (i.e., the voluntary night prayer). ʿAlī replied, "O Messenger of Allah, our souls are in the Hand of Allah; if He wills to awaken us, He will awaken us." Upon hearing this, the Prophet ﷺ turned away without saying anything further. As he departed, ʿAlī heard him striking his thigh and reciting the verse: "But man is, more than anything else, most given to disputation." (Qur'an 18:54). The report is narrated by ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and is authentic, recorded by Sahih al-Bukhari (no. 1127), and also by Sahih Muslim, Sunan al-Nasa'i, Musnad Ahmad, and Musnad al-Bazzar.

Imām Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī [d. 933 CE] said:

"We then examined the Messenger of Allah's ﷺ recitation of the verse: "But man is, more than anything else, most given to disputation." (Qur'an 18:54)

after ʿAlī said to him what he said—as has been related from him in this ḥadīth—and asked ourselves: Was the Prophet's recitation of this verse prompted by his disapproval of what ʿAlī had said, or was it for some other reason?

We found that when the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and his companions slept through the dawn prayer until the sun had risen over them—after Bilāl had said to him during the night, "I will wake you"—the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said to him: "What became of what you said, O Bilāl?"

Bilāl replied: "The One who seized my soul is the very One who seized your soul."

The Messenger of Allah ﷺ did not censure him for saying this. We have already cited this ḥadīth with its chain of transmission earlier in this book.

From this, we understood that what the Prophet ﷺ reacted to when he recited: "But man is, more than anything else, most given to disputation,"

at the time ʿAlī said to him what we have mentioned in this ḥadīth, was not because he disapproved of what ʿAlī had said. Indeed, how could he disapprove of it when it was true?

Rather, his recitation of the verse was an expression of his admiration for ʿAlī's reply. For the Prophet ﷺ had only said to ʿAlī and to his daughter (peace be upon them): "Will you two not pray?"

intending thereby that they should obtain their share of the night prayer, and that they should not allow sleep or anything else to distract them from it. Thereupon ʿAlī replied: "Our souls are only in the Hand of Allah; He awakens them whenever He wills."

That is to say: We did not refrain from what you called us to and encouraged us toward—which is certainly better for us than what we were doing—out of our own choice. Rather, we were overcome by something against which we possessed no power of resistance. For nothing befalls us from Allah, the Mighty and Majestic, except that it occurs by the decree of Allah, in Whose Hand our souls are, and whose decree we are unable to repel from ourselves.

Thus, this statement of ʿAlī (peace be upon him) constituted the finest possible answer to what the Prophet ﷺ had addressed to him and to his wife, as mentioned in this ḥadīth. The Prophet ﷺ admired this response from ʿAlī.

Furthermore, the Qur'ānic verse that he recited indicates that a person's disputation (jadal) may at times consist of the finest and most excellent speech he can utter, and may even be something worthy of praise.

And Allah is the One from whom we seek success."

— Sharḥ Mushkil al-Āthār 12.224-225

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

Imām Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī [d. 1310 CE] writes:

"Your only guardian is Allah, His Messenger, and those who believe—those who establish the prayer and give the alms while they are bowing." (Qur'an 5:55)

It has been said that this [verse] was revealed concerning ʿAlī, may Allāh be pleased with him, when a beggar asked him [for charity] while he was bowing in his prayer, so he threw his ring to him—as though it had been loose upon his little finger—so that he was not burdened with much effort in removing it, of a kind that would invalidate his prayer. And it came in the wording of the plural, even though the cause behind it was a single individual, as an encouragement to people to emulate the like of his action, so that they might attain the like of his reward.

And the verse indicates the permissibility of giving charity during the prayer, and that a minor action does not invalidate the prayer.

— Madārik al-Tanzīl; relevant verse

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

Imām al-Zamakhsharī [d. 1144 CE] writes:

"Your only guardian is Allah, His Messenger, and those who believe—those who establish the prayer and give the alms while they are bowing." (Qur'an 5:55)

It has also been said that it is a circumstantial clause describing those who give zakāh—meaning, they give it while in the state of bowing during prayer. And [it is said that] this [verse] was revealed concerning ʿAlī—may Allāh ennoble his countenance—when a beggar asked him [for charity] while he was bowing in his prayer, so he threw his ring to him, as it had apparently been loose upon his little finger, so that he was not burdened with much effort in removing it—effort of a kind that would invalidate a prayer of its like.

If you should ask: How is it correct for this to apply to ʿAlī, may Allāh be pleased with him, when the wording is in the plural?

I would say: It was expressed in the wording of the plural, even though the cause behind it was a single man, so that people would be encouraged to emulate his action and thereby attain the like of his reward, and so as to draw attention to the fact that it is obligatory for the disposition (sajiyyah) of the believers to be at this utmost degree of eagerness for righteousness, charity, and looking after the poor—such that if some matter [of charity] befalls them that admits of no delay while they are in prayer, they would not postpone it until they finish it.

— Al-Kashshāf; relevant verse.

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

Imām Abū Bakr al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ al-Ḥanafī [d. 981 CE] notes:

"Hishām related that he asked Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī regarding nabīdh—that of which a large quantity intoxicates.

He replied: "It is more beloved to me that I not drink it, but I do not declare it unlawful.""

— Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Ṭaḥāwī 6.358

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

[moral uprightness and music/songs]

Imām ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Kāsānī al-Ḥanafī [d. 1191 CE] writes:

"As for the singer (al-mughannī): if people gather around him for the sake of moral corruption (fisq) because of his voice, then he has no probity, even if he himself does not drink [wine]—because he is a ringleader of the corrupt (raʾs al-fasaqah). But if he does that [singing] by himself, to dispel loneliness/desolation (li-dafʿ al-waḥshah), his probity does not lapse, because there is no harm in that—for listening [to music/sound] is among the things that soften hearts, but moral corruption through it is not permissible/possible.

As for the one who plays some instrument of amusement/entertainment (malāhī): one must look into it [further]—if it is not something regarded as objectionable/disreputable (mustashna'), like the reed-pipe (qaṣab) and the tambourine (duff) and the like, there is no harm in it, and his probity does not lapse. But if it is something regarded as objectionable, like the lute ('ūd) and the like, his probity lapses, because it is not permissible in any respect whatsoever (bi-wajhin min al-wujūh).""

— Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ fī Tartīb al-Sharāʾiʿ 6.269

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

Ibn al-Humām [d. 1457 CE] notes in his work Fatḥ al-Qadīr:

"It has also been said: listening is not disliked for people if it occurs at a wedding or wedding banquet, even if it involves singing, since it is a kind specific to weddings by textual sanction. The answer, then, is that singing to make oneself hear and to ward off loneliness is [a matter of] disagreement among the scholars. Some of them said: it is not disliked; rather, what is disliked is only that which is done as a path toward frivolity/vanity, as evidenced by the fact that Anas ibn Mālik (may God be pleased with him) entered upon his brother al-Barā' ibn Mālik, and [al-Barā'] was among the ascetic Companions, and he was singing — and Shams al-A'imma al-Sarakhsī (may God have mercy on him) adopted this position."

—Fatḥ al-Qadīr, 7.409

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

@IbneKhan01 Yes, it seems there was an editing mistake on my end. the name should have been "ʿAbd al-ʿAlī Muḥammad ibn Niẓām al-Dīn al-Laknahwī Baḥr al-ʿUlūm".

—BarakAllahu feekum.

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

Niẓām al-Dīn al-Laknawī, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm [d. 1810 CE] writes:

(So for the Ashʿariyya) — the followers of Shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, who is counted among the People of the Sunna — these two are (revelational: it is He who makes) the act (qualified by them alone), with nothing further, no wisdom or aptitude belonging to the act itself. (Thus whatever He commands) is good, (and whatever He forbids is bad — and were the command reversed, the matter would be reversed): that is, were the Lawgiver to command what is bad, then what is good would become bad, and conversely.

(Whereas for us) — the Māturīdiyya, the Sufis, and the majority of the People of the Sunna and the Community — (as also for the Muʿtazila, they are rational), that is, they do not depend upon revelation. (But for us) — that is, for the later Māturīdīs, goodness and badness (does not entail a ruling) from God, glorified be He, (upon the servant); rather (it makes it obligatory that the ruling be deserved from the Wise One, who does not prefer the less-preponderant). So the Lawgiver is God, exalted be He, and the disclosing agent is revelation.

—Fawātiḥ al-Raḥamūt bi-Sharḥ Musallam al-Thubūt, 2.23

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

[on the superiority of humans to angels]

Imām Rabbānī Shaykh Aḥmad al-Fārūqī al-Sirhindī [d. 1624 CE] said:

To Mirza Manuchihr, on Condolence, Counsel, and Making Good Use of Youth

May God prolong his life, exalt his rank, and keep this fortunate and honored servant in pleasant circumstances. May the sorrow that has befallen him pass, and may it be replaced in the best possible way.

Youth is the season of desire and heedlessness, but it is also the season for acquiring knowledge and performing good works. A good deed carried out at this age, while strong desires and selfish inclinations are present, has far greater merit, worth, and importance than a deed performed at another time. This is because the presence of an obstacle brings hardship and trial, whereas the absence of an obstacle means freedom from disturbance and difficulty.

For this reason, the obedience of human beings is superior to that of angels: human obedience is joined with resistance, struggle, and the overcoming of obstacles, while the angels’ obedience faces no such opposition. Likewise, a traveler’s true worth is known when enemies and hindrances prevail; even a small movement made at such a time has many times the merit and value of a much greater movement made when no such difficulties exist.

It is well known that passion and vain desire are the two enemies of God—the lower self and Satan—while acting according to the radiant Sacred Law is pleasing to the Most Merciful. To please the Master’s enemies and anger the Master, who is the giver of every blessing, is far removed from wisdom and intelligence.

God, Glorious and Exalted, is the One who grants success.

—Maktūbāt al-Imām Rabbānī, 3.51

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

[On Nabīdhs (Fermented Drinks)]

Imām al-Qudūrī [d. 1037 CE] writes:

We have already explained Abū Ḥanīfah's position regarding nabīdhs. As for the opinion of Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad, their view was that if cooked nabīdh remains unspoiled for ten days or more, then it is prohibited (ḥarām); but if it spoils, then it is permissible (mubāḥ), even if it has become strong (ishtadda).

Then Abū Yūsuf retracted this opinion and adopted the view of Abū Ḥanīfah. His retraction was transmitted by Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan, Bishr ibn al-Walīd, and Muʿallā.

As for Muḥammad, it is reported that he suspended judgment on the matter, saying: "I neither declare it prohibited nor declare it permissible."

Al-Ḥasan also narrated from Abū Ḥanīfah concerning the nabīdh made from figs, millet, wheat, and barley, that when it becomes strong (ishtadda), it is disliked (makrūh). [However, if someone were to drink from it until he became intoxicated, the prescribed ḥadd punishment would not be carried out upon him. All the transmitters from Abū Ḥanīfah unanimously agreed that this drink is not disliked,] and this is the correct view, because these substances are foods, and therefore the mere occurrence of "strength" (shiddah, i.e. fermentation/intensification) in them is not legally significant.

Muḥammad also mentioned in al-Aṣl concerning the nabīdh made from mulberries, figs, sugarcane, fānīdh (refined sugar), nāṭif (a sweet confection), qand (sugar candy), and rice, saying: "There is no harm in it." In another place he said: "There is no harm in the drink made from wheat and barley, which is then aged (yuʿattaq)." This is to be understood in accordance with what we have already explained."

— Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Karkhī 9.370-371

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

[The Person Compelled by Necessity to Drink Wine]

Imām Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ [d. 981 CE] said:

"There is disagreement concerning the person who is compelled by necessity to drink wine.

Saʿīd ibn Jubayr said: "An obedient person who is compelled by necessity to drink wine may drink it."

This is the opinion of all of our companions (i.e., the Ḥanafī jurists).

However, he is to drink only the amount by which he preserves the last remnant of his life (ramaq), since it relieves his thirst.

Al-Ḥārith al-ʿUklī and Makḥūl said: "He should not drink it, because it only increases his thirst."

Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī said: "He should not drink it, because it only increases his thirst and hunger."

Al-Shāfiʿī also said: "And because it causes the loss of reason."

Mālik said: "Necessity was mentioned only with respect to carrion (maytah), and it was not mentioned with respect to wine."

Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ said: As for the statement of those who claim that wine does not remove the necessity of thirst or hunger, it has no merit for two reasons.

The first is that it is well known from the nature of wine that, in a state of necessity, it preserves the remnant of life and quenches thirst. Indeed, among the People of the Covenant (ahl al-dhimmah), as has reached us, there are those who do not drink water for their entire lives, being content instead with drinking wine in its place. Thus, their claim contradicts what is plainly known and commonly observed regarding those who drink it.

The second is that if their assertion were true, then the proper response to the one asking about this issue would simply be to dismiss the question altogether and say: "Necessity requiring the drinking of wine never occurs."

As for al-Shāfiʿī's statement concerning the loss of reason, it has no relevance whatsoever to the issue under discussion, because he was being asked about a small quantity that does not cause intoxication or loss of reason, when a person is compelled by necessity to consume it.

As for Mālik's statement that: "Necessity was mentioned only regarding carrion and was not mentioned regarding wine,"

the answer is that in some Qur'anic verses, necessity is indeed mentioned in connection with carrion and the other foods listed alongside it; but in other verses it is mentioned with respect to all prohibited things generally.

This is His saying, Exalted is He:

"He has already explained to you in detail what He has forbidden to you, except what you are compelled by necessity to consume." (Qur'an 6:119)

God has already explained to us the prohibition of wine in several places in His Book, including His saying:

"They ask you about wine and gambling. Say: 'In them is great sin...'" (Qur'an 2:219)

and His saying:

"Say: My Lord has only forbidden shameful deeds, whether open or concealed, and sin..." (Qur'an 7:33)

and His saying:

"Indeed, wine, gambling, sacrificial stones, and divining arrows are but filth from the work of Satan, so avoid them." (Qur'an 5:90)

All of these verses establish the prohibition of wine.

The necessity mentioned in the verse comprehends all prohibited things. Its specific mention in connection with carrion and the things conjoined with it does not prevent us from applying the general wording of the other verse to all prohibited matters.

Furthermore, the rationale for permitting carrion is that a person preserves his life by eating it when he fears death if he refrains from doing so. Since this same rationale exists with respect to all other prohibited things, it necessarily follows that their ruling should be the same as that of carrion whenever the same necessity exists, because the legal cause (necessity) is present.

And God knows best."

— Aḥkām al-Qurʾān 1.324-325

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

Imām Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Humām [d. 1457 CE] writes:

"In my view, the Muʿtazilah's statement that substances (jawāhir) possess an established existence (thubūt) and fixedness (taqarrur) in the state of nonexistence must be interpreted in this sense—namely, their being established and fixed in the Divine Knowledge.

For it is far-fetched to suppose that rational scholars, who devote themselves to the investigation of subtle and intricate questions, would speak of something that has no intelligible meaning or conceivable basis."

— al-Musāyarah fī ʿIlm al-Kalām 1.144

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

[Does Faith (Īmān) Increase and Decrease?]

Imām Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah al-Thānī al-Bukhārī [d. 1346 CE] writes:

"According to us (the Māturīdīs), no. According to those who regard deeds as an essential constituent (rukn) of faith, yes. Thus, the disagreement is merely verbal (lafẓī).

The Qur'ānic verses that indicate an increase refer to that composite meaning (i.e., faith understood as comprising belief, confession, and deeds), not to assent (taṣdīq) itself.

Among these verses is His saying, Exalted is He:

"And when His verses are recited to them, they increase them in faith." (Qurʾān 8:2)

Here, faith (īmān) is intended in the sense of the whole composed of inward assent (taṣdīq), verbal confession (iqrār), and deeds (ʿamal).

It has also been said: If faith is intended to mean assent (taṣdīq), then it too increases and decreases, because it is firm conviction (al-iʿtiqād al-jāzim), and firm conviction itself admits of greater and lesser degrees, since certainty has levels ranging from the clearest self-evident truths to the most subtle theoretical conclusions. This is what the author of al-Ṣaḥāʾif stated.

I say: This applies only to certain knowledge (al-ʿilm al-yaqīnī). It has already been explained that certain knowledge is not itself faith, for a person who is absolutely certain of the existence of the Creator, yet says, "There is no creator of the universe," is nevertheless a disbeliever because of the denial (takdhīb) that this statement entails.

This is because the meaning of a declarative proposition (al-jumlah al-khabariyyah) is the attribution (isnād) of one thing to another, for language assigned this expression to convey precisely that meaning.

Denial (takdhīb) is the opposite of assent (taṣdīq). It is an act of the heart (fiʿl qalbī), not a quality (kayfiyyah) nor a passive impression (infiʿāl).

That is to say, knowledge (ʿilm) is either:

1. a psychological quality (kayfiyyah nafsāniyyah), or
2. a passive impression (infiʿāl), namely, the occurrence of a meaning within the intellect.

But the act of the heart is neither of these.

Rather, It is the voluntary affirmation of a predication (īqāʿ al-nisbah ikhtiyāran), which is the "speech of the soul" (kalām al-nafs), and this is called the "binding of the heart" (ʿaqd al-qalb).

That is, the voluntary affirmation of a predication is called the binding of the heart (ʿaqd al-qalb), and it is the speech of the soul (kalām al-nafs).

The distinction between knowledge (ʿilm) and the speech of the soul (kalām al-nafs) is clear."

— Sharḥ Taʿdīl al-ʿUlūm 1.420

[سمرقند @samarqandism]

Imām Abū al-Thanāʾ al-Lāmishī [d. 1145 CE] writes:

"According to the Ahl al-Sunnah, unlawfully acquired (ḥarām) wealth is sustenance (rizq). This is because, in the Arabic language, the word rizq is applied to nourishment, to the allotted provision (qūt), and also to property (milk). Nourishment and allotted provision may be either lawful (ḥalāl) or unlawful (ḥarām).

Moreover, we observe that some people consume nothing but unlawful food throughout the whole of their lives. It is impossible to say that such a person departed this world without ever having consumed God's sustenance—Exalted is He—and that God was never his Provider. Indeed, what statement could be more repugnant than the claim that a person left this world without ever eating the sustenance of God—Exalted is He?

The Muʿtazilah said: The unlawful is not sustenance (rizq)."

They said this because they restricted the meaning of rizq solely to ownership (milk). Accordingly, they maintain that one person may consume another's sustenance while that other person consumes his sustenance, since it is possible for one person to consume another's property, and vice versa.

We reply: There is no justification for restricting rizq exclusively to ownership. Among living creatures are those that are not capable of ownership, such as beasts and the like. Yet there is no doubt that they possess sustenance from God—Exalted is He.

Whoever confines rizq solely to ownership has thereby rendered void the meaning of God's statement:

"There is no creature on the earth except that its sustenance rests upon God." (Qur'an 11:6)

We seek God's protection from nullifying any part of the speech of God—Exalted is He.

Animals are not described as possessing ownership. Rather, what is intended by their sustenance is that by which they obtain nourishment.

Thus nourishment is rizq, because God—Exalted is He—is the One who nourishes us (mughadhdhīnā), that is, He creates the processes of nourishment and growth within our bodies. By creating these, He alone is distinguished, and the servant has no role whatsoever in bringing them about.

It is therefore impossible to restrict the designation rizq solely to ownership while excluding nourishment. Rather, the term applies to both, as has already been demonstrated.

This issue likewise belongs to the category of those previously discussed. For according to the Muʿtazilah, the servant has the power to consume that which God—Exalted is He—has made the sustenance of another, and thereby prevent that person's sustenance from reaching him.

According to us, however, he has no such power. And God is the Granter of success."

— Kitāb al-Tamhīd 1.106-107