Wittgenstein thinks some philosophical ‘positions’ are actually unintelligible, not really possible views to hold or think at all. He would probably think Cartesian dualism is such a position. I’m not very confident about that. But I do think solipsism would be such an example of a purported ‘position’ which philosophers sometimes pose as something which can be entertained, and then rejected. But the form of rejection will be itself confused, if it treats ‘solipsism’ as some position that can be said to be true or false.
It would take a whole essay to really justify the claim that only-the-subject-that-is-oneself-exists (solipsism) does not designate a real position. But the basic reason is that the whole idea of the ‘subject’ only makes sense when contrasted to the existence of things outside the subject. I strongly suspect this is true, but I still need to work out my thinking here further
🇧🇷Rapazinho-de-colar
🌎Bucco capensis
Conservação: Pouco Preocupante
O Rapazinho-de-colar é uma ave galbuliforme da família Bucconidae.
📷 Mathias Singer
A matemática também é subjetiva. Sistemas formais são apenas tinta no papel para auxiliar a memória e instruir construções mentais. Os matemáticos se entendem melhor porque lidam com a atividade humana mais pura, que surge da intuição comum do tempo