@jstein_star Public shares don't differentially compensate people who produced training data. In addition, if you're interested, here's an argument against compensating people who produced training data https://t.co/q18fHLbCGj
@Inframethod@dioscuri We can be conscious of beliefs and desires, but also we can be conscious of other states, like perceptual experiences and feelings. And we can also have unconscious beliefs and desires.
@dioscuri Sure, I just think consciousness is a red herring. The inside isn't "empty" when there are beliefs and desires without consciousness. A lot of literature is about unconscious beliefs and desires, after all.
@AndyMasley Another way to quantify is to consider optimal carbon tax, as a measure of the neg externality. If optimal carbon tax is 100-200 USD per ton, then you get 3b-6b in negative externalities in 2030. How that would compare to 2030 training/inference costs, and to social benefit?
@AndyMasley Maybe you've written about this and I've missed it, but one question is whether the environmental costs of AI will become much higher in 5-10 years based on extrapolation of data center building rates. Not about emissions per user but for the sector as a whole
@jankulveit@jankulveit
looking forward to reading this.
@LedermanHarvey
and I have a new paper on AI death that gives a theory of AI identity https://t.co/HjX9JLVc1x, we also cite a bunch of other papers in the intro that will interest you
@DruckerDaniel@LedermanHarvey another relevant causal feature of the blackout is that the pre-blackout slices cause the blackout slices. You're right that blackout slice properties may not cause post-blackout slices, but still there is a causal connection. pre-blackout slices also cause post-blackout
@DruckerDaniel@LedermanHarvey Interesting, we discuss resets in the paper (its called "forking"). Are you sure your intuitions are stable? What if I wave a wand and "reset" your brain to the exact state it was in 2 years ago. I think you die.
@DruckerDaniel@LedermanHarvey We also appeal to causal connections. The different session agents don't have causal dependence on one another. But maybe the blackout drunk person does have more causal connections between blackout time and non-blackout time (but does erasing the causal con change our judgment?)
@DruckerDaniel@LedermanHarvey We think psychological continuity does not have to exclusively involve memory; it can also involve personality, plan execution, and beliefs and desires. The blackout drunk lacks memory but may have the other stuff
@adriarm_@anilkseth@SussexUni@danwilliamsphil@dioscuri I think pain is connected to action dispositions in ways that block internal computations creating bad pain when the system doesn't act like its in pain. Such cases might be more like asymbolia or masochistic pain, where its no longer clear that the state is bad for you