Soledad Balayan

Titular en @maureinmob Analizo datos #realestate #tasaciones. Cofundadora del ROI. Hablo de #libros de negocios en @neuramedia @utditella y @alt_MBA alumni

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

Un profesor de Yale analizó las recomendaciones de 50 libros más vendidos de finanzas personales y los comparó con los mejores papers de economía sobre el tema.
La tabla con los resultados:

[Road Show @RoadShowOk]

🏙️ Real Estate: ¿vuelven las oportunidades en departamentos usados?

@PabloWende entrevista a @SoleBalayan experta en el mercado inmobiliario sobre precios y tendencias.

🎧Escuchá la entrevista y suscribite al canal para más economía e inversiones
https://t.co/LjdfnsRULy

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

Cada vez que leas que cayeron o subieron los precios de los inmuebles, hacete estas preguntas:

🔘 de qué SEGMENTO de mercado se habla (usado, a estrenar o del pozo)
Esto es clave: en este momento el gap de precio entre usado estrenar y pozo es muy amplio.

🔘 sobre qué valores se habla: precio de PUBLICACION o de CIERRE?

🔘 la variación es con respecto a CUANDO?

🔘 hablan del precio del m2 o precio promedio de venta?

🔘 el cambio de precio es en términos nominales o REALES? (ajustado o no por inflación de USA)

🔘 cuál es la FUENTE/Metodología del estudio?

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

Muchas gracias!

[Teddy Trader @trader_teddy]

Aquí les dejamos el @Cafe_Macondo de ayer con @solebalayan versión @YouTube.

CC: @LaninMZ @santoroydonoso

https://t.co/zMhtHCJOwT

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

🆕 Escrituras en Provincia de Buenos Aires abril 2026

📶  escrituras:  9.999 (-18 % i.a.)
🏡  hipotecas:  1.023 ( -52% i.a.)
Los créditos representaron un 10% de las ventas
Fuente: Colegio de Escribanos de Pcia. de BA
La serie y link a la fuente ➡️ https://t.co/Iqz3bphuJV

[Teddy Trader @trader_teddy]

Escuchando a la amiga @solebalayan con @PabloWende.
Ayer @Cafe_Macondo hoy Pablo y a la Bolsa.

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

sos un capo @juligurfinkiel

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

"Hoy creo que las ideas valen más que la ejecución" dice @juligurfinkiel
interesante!

https://t.co/jpaGGpGuxv

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

@santivende en 2002, muchos con dinero en corralito compraron propiedades a muy buen precio.

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

🆕 Escrituras CABA de abril 2026
📶  escrituras 5.472  (0% i.a.)
🏡  hipotecas: 609  (-49% i.a.) representan el 11% de las operaciones
Valor promedio de escrituración en U$S 111.857 (-3% i.a.)

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

Este es el diagrama que les comentaba sobre el proceso de gestión completo de un alquiler, desde la tasación hasta la entrega de llaves
@trader_teddy y @santoroydonoso

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

En un rato hablando del mercado inmobiliario por acá con @trader_teddy y @santoroydonoso

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

@intialpert gracias

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

En un rato hablando del mercado inmobiliario por acá con @trader_teddy y @santoroydonoso

[Teddy Trader @trader_teddy]

https://t.co/QJ2TUYb7VA

[Teddy Trader @trader_teddy]

A pones esos despertadores!!!
Mañana programa imperdible con @santoroydonoso y la amiga de la casa @solebalayan.

[Teddy Trader @trader_teddy]

#CafeMacondo Martes 26/05
(Con @LaninMZ acompañando desde algún lugar de la galaxia.)

✔️8:00 Musiquita
✔️8:30 Noticias y variedades con @santoroydonoso
✔️9:00 Nos acompaña @solebalayan!!!

Los esperamos en directo por @XSpaces y luego en @YouTube y @Spotify (Canal Cafe Macondo)
CC:@Cafe_Macondo

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

Comparto mi paso por #pulsofinanciero junto a @GuillermoLabord @fbbarragan y Santiago Escobar
https://t.co/v1z6lKt6om

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

@jpmarino79 muy buen resumen.
creo que acá hay un error:
🔹 El crédito hipotecario explica parte del fenómeno: 70% de los préstamos desde 2023 fueron para propiedades nuevas.

serían las usadas y no las nuevas las que concentraron el crédito, no?

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

@Cronistacom @GuillermoLabord @fbbarragan Gracias a todos por la invitación!

[El Cronista @Cronistacom]

¡Arranca #PulsoFinanciero! Hoy viene @solebalayan.

Sumate al vivo con @GuillermoLabord y @fbbarragan: https://t.co/XSjVimk6Z6

[Soledad Balayan @solebalayan]

"Tu cliente contrató un agente
Todo análisis de ventajas competitivas que hayas hecho asumía humanos del otro lado de la transacción. Ese supuesto se rompió este año. Esto es lo que significa para la empresa que dirigís.
En algún lugar de tu cartera de clientes, ahora mismo, un agente está leyendo el contrato que enviaste."

Salim Ismail

https://t.co/pGC1hGAsgI

[Jesús Fernández-Villaverde @JesusFerna7026]

Smartphones are not the explanation for the recent decline in fertility. Instead, they are an accelerator of deeper forces already at work.

Let’s start with the facts. Fertility is falling almost everywhere: in rich, middle-income, and poor countries; in secular and religious countries; and in countries with high and low levels of gender equality.

The decline accelerated around 2014. So, no country-specific explanation will work unless you are willing to believe that 200 distinct country-specific explanations arrived at roughly the same time.

Smartphones look like the obvious candidate: the first iPhone was released in 2007, and global adoption has been astonishingly fast.

Economists understand the first major decline in fertility in advanced economies, from 6 or 7 children per woman throughout most of human history to about 1.8, that occurred between the early 1800s and roughly 1970, well before smartphones. The main drivers were a sharp fall in child mortality (effective fertility was rarely above 3 and often close to 2) and the shift from a low-skill, rural agrarian economy to a high-skill, urban industrial one. We have quantitative models that fit these facts well.

Country-specific factors mattered too, of course. Proximity to low-fertility neighbors accelerated Hungary’s decline, while fragmented landowning structures accelerated France’s. But these were second-order mechanisms.

This is also why most economists long considered Paul Ehrlich’s doom scenarios implausible. We forecast that fertility in middle- and low-income economies would follow the same path as in the rich, probably faster, because reductions in child mortality reached India or Africa at lower income levels (medical technology is nearly universal, and most gains come from handwashing and cheap antibiotics, not Mayo Clinic-level care). Much of what we see in Africa or parts of Latin America today is still that old story.

But in the 1980s, a new pattern appeared. Japan and Italy fell below 1.8, the level we had thought was the new floor. By 1990, Japan was at 1.54 and Italy at 1.36.

This second fertility decline began in Japan and Italy earlier than elsewhere, driven by country-specific factors, but the underlying dynamics were widespread: secularization, an education arms race, expensive housing, the dissolution of old social networks, and the shift to a service economy in which women’s bargaining power within the household is higher. The U.S. lagged because secularization came later, suburban housing remained relatively cheap, and African American fertility was still high. U.S. demographic patterns are exceptional and skew how academics (most of whom are in the U.S.) and the New York Times see the world.

My best guess is that, without smartphones, Italy’s 2025 fertility rate would be about 1.24 rather than 1.14. I doubt anyone will document an effect larger than 0.1-0.2. Italy was at 1.19 in 1995, not far from today’s 1.14. The TFR is cyclical due to tempo effects, so I do not read too much into the rise between 1995 and 2007 or the decline from 1.27 in 2019 to 1.14 today. The direct effect of smartphones is not zero, but it is not, by itself, that large.

Where social media, in general, and smartphones, in particular, matter is in the diffusion of social norms. What would have taken 25 years now happens in 10. Social media are not the cause of fertility decline; modernity is. But they are a very fast accelerator.

That is why social media are a major part of the story behind Guatemala (yes, Guatemala) going from 3.8 children per woman in 2005 to 1.9 in 2025. Without them, Guatemala would also have reached 1.9, just 20 years later.

Modernity, in its current form, is incompatible with replacement-level fertility. By modernity, I do not mean capitalism: fertility fell earlier and faster in socialist economies than in market economies. Socialist Hungary fell below replacement in 1960, and socialist Czechoslovakia in 1966 (both experienced small, short-lived baby booms in the mid-1970s). By modernity, I mean a society organized around rational, large-scale systems and formalized knowledge.

Countries will not converge to the same fertility rate. East Asia is likely stuck near 1, possibly below, given its unbalanced gender norms and toxic education systems. Latin America faces the same gender problem plus weak growth prospects, so I expect something around 1.2. Northern Europe has more egalitarian family structures and might hold near 1.5. The very religious societies are probably the only ones that will sustain 1.8.

All of this could change with AI or changes in population composition. We will see. But on the current evidence, deep sub-replacement fertility is the “new new normal.” Unless we reorganize our societies, better learn to handle it as best we can.