the saffron mask guy

@teaaddictaby

I lead a very boring life. I waste my time wisely. I can solve everybody's problems except my own.

Joined August 2020

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the saffron mask guy @teaaddictaby

about 9 hours ago

@jazz_agre02 Then eliminate the 99% and grow the 1%

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Yadu

@Yaduvam

about 1 month ago

Tejas

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prathosh A P

@prathoshap

1 day ago

A 15-year-old dream has come true today. I started a PhD with the dream of creating a system that chants any Sanskrit shloka perfectly. And here I am opening sourcing 𝐕𝐚𝐠𝐝𝐡𝐞𝐧𝐮 - 𝐀 𝐯ṛ𝐭𝐭𝐚 (𝐦𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐫) 𝐚𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐞 ś𝐥𝐨𝐤𝐚-𝐭𝐨-𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐞𝐱𝐭-𝐭𝐨-𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐞𝐜𝐡 (TTS) 𝐬𝐲𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐦 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐒𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐤𝐫𝐢𝐭. This is the world's first vrutta-aware, open-source TTS for Sanskrit Chanting.

360

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the saffron mask guy @teaaddictaby

6 days ago

@ShreeHistory This is incredible!!!

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Circuit 🇩🇪 🇧🇷🏴󠁧󠁢󠁥󠁮󠁧󠁿🇵🇹⚽

@being_circuit3

#ProudRandi looks like rajpal yadav. lives like Ryan Gosling. Metro tales.. .. . . . Rishabh pant, the office & The weeknd ❤

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History इतिहास 🇺🇲🛕 🚀

@ShreeHistory

7 days ago

How Britain Engineered History’s Greatest Financial Heist By @shreehistory I. The Stroke of Midnight At the stroke of midnight on August 14, 1947, as the world watched the Union Jack descend over New Delhi and the saffron, white, and green of a new nation unfurl, history recorded a triumph of self-determination. The British Empire, exhausted by war and weakened by the inexorable tide of nationalism, was relinquishing its crown jewel. The romanticized narrative of the 20th century tells us that Britain granted India its freedom, an act of political magnanimity marking the end of colonial dominion. But beneath the pageantry of lowering flags, the soaring rhetoric of Jawaharlal Nehru’s "Tryst with Destiny," and the chaotic tragedy of Partition, a very different kind of transfer was taking place. It was not a transfer of political power, but of financial liability. In the quiet, wood-paneled chambers of the British Treasury and the Reserve Bank of India, a ledger was being closed. To the accountants and chancellors in London, Indian independence was less a geopolitical retreat and more a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, a meticulously orchestrated maneuver by which Britain effectively declared independence from its own creditor. The colonizer owed the colonized a staggering fortune. And the colonizer was broke. II. The First Extraction and the Silencing To understand the audacity of the financial maneuvering of 1947, one must look back to the blueprint drafted three decades earlier, during the First World War. The great financial heist of the mid-century was not an anomaly; it was the perfection of a formula born in the trenches of Europe, paid for in the fields of Bengal. When the First World War erupted in 1914, Britain found itself in desperate need of men, material, and money. It turned to its empire. India was coerced into contributing hundreds of millions of pounds to the British war effort, alongside the lives of over a million Indian soldiers. To finance this, the British Raj effectively commandeered India’s export earnings and heavily increased taxation, flooding the domestic economy with paper currency while draining its physical gold reserves. Britain abandoned the gold standard, but India was forced to maintain it, absorbing the inflationary shock. By the war's end, the economic strain on the Indian populace was immense. Prices of essential goods had skyrocketed, and the returns on the capital extracted for the war were nowhere to be seen. As the Indian public began to realize the scale of this economic theft, dissent began to boil. Nationalist leaders pointed to the economic drain, exposing the arithmetic of imperial exploitation. London’s response was not to remedy the extraction, but to legislate silence. In 1919, the British government passed the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, widely known as the Rowlatt Act. The Act allowed for the incarceration of suspects without trial and curbed the free press, specifically targeting the dissemination of seditious materials, which in practice meant anyone explaining how the British were bankrupting the country. When protests erupted against this silencing, the British military responded with the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar, killing hundreds of unarmed civilians. The message was unequivocal: the colony would pay, and it would suffer in silence. The economic truth was to be suppressed by force. It was a precedent that would prove vital 28 years later, when the sums involved would be exponentially larger. III. The Blank Check of World War II By the time the Second World War began, the British Empire was already financially strained. The defense of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the British Isles required capital that London simply did not possess. Once again, the British turned to the vast, seemingly bottomless reservoir of the Indian economy. To fund the massive mobilization of troops, the provisioning of armies, and the purchase of raw materials, the British Raj essentially wrote itself a blank check against the Indian taxpayer. India was declared a "non-self-governing territory" contributing to the war effort, but instead of paying India in hard currency for the goods and labor extracted, Britain credited the Reserve Bank of India with pounds sterling. These were not transferable funds; they were essentially IOUs, piling up in London as "Sterling Balances." The human cost of this capital extraction was catastrophic. The most visceral manifestation of this economic drain was the Bengal Famine of 1943. While the British Treasury accumulated sterling balances, the diversion of grain and the financial extraction policies led to the starvation of an estimated two to three million people in Bengal. The Indian taxpayer was literally funding the survival of the British Empire with their lives and their livelihoods. By 1945, the sheer scale of this extraction was breathtaking. Britain owed India roughly £1.3 billion. To comprehend the magnitude of this sum, one must view it not through the lens of modern consumer inflation, but as a share of the economy. In 1947, £1.3 billion represented roughly 13.5 percent of Britain’s entire Gross Domestic Product. If the British Treasury were forced to write a check for that proportion of its economy today, it would need to find approximately £350 billion. It was a sum so massive that paying it in full would have instantly bankrupted post-war Britain, a nation that was, at that very moment, surviving on American Marshall Plan aid and rationed bread. The colonizer owed the colonized. And the colonizer had no intention of paying in full. IV. The Safety Valve and the Negotiation Facing the prospect of domestic economic collapse, the British government executed an audacious maneuver. The transfer of power in 1947 was not merely a political act; it was a financial release valve. There is a historical curiosity, often unspoken in popular narratives, that complicates the story of India’s independence. The Indian National Congress (INC), the primary vehicle of Indian nationalism and independence, was not born from a grassroots peasant uprising, but was initially floated by a British colonial official, Allan Octavian Hume, in 1885. Historians have long debated the "safety valve" theory: the idea that Hume and the Viceroy engineered the creation of the INC to provide a controlled, institutional outlet for the rising frustrations of the Western-educated Indian elite, preventing a violent, uncontrollable rebellion. While the INC evolved into a formidable force for independence under Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru, the institutional DNA of the organization was steeped in British legal and political frameworks. When it came time to negotiate the financial settlement of 1947, the lingering effects of this "safety valve" dynamic became apparent. The negotiations over the Sterling Balances were brutal, conducted behind closed doors by the British Labour government’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, and the Indian delegation led by Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Britain argued that a sudden withdrawal of £1.3 billion would crash the pound sterling, bankrupt the Sterling Area, and trigger a global financial crisis. The threat was explicit: if India demanded its money, the ensuing chaos would ensure India received nothing. India was in a state of profound vulnerability. The subcontinent was engulfed in the horrific trauma of Partition; millions of refugees were on the move, and the new government was struggling to establish basic administrative continuity. In this moment of existential crisis, the Indian leadership accepted terms that effectively castrated its own wealth. The 1947 agreement dictated that the vast majority of the £1.3 billion would be "blocked." Only a fraction was immediately released; the remaining £1.15 billion was locked in London, to be doled out in agonizingly slow installments over a decade or more. Worse, the agreement stipulated that these blocked balances would earn little to no interest. By accepting this compromise, the post-colonial government effectively agreed to a structural haircut on the asset, surrendering the real-time economic utility of the money to save the British economy from default. The safety valve had, once again, operated exactly as designed. V. The Alchemy of Devaluation With India's massive claim successfully trapped in the vaults of the Bank of England, Britain weaponized the only tool it had left: the currency itself. Having forced India to accept deferred payments, Britain engineered a stealth default through the alchemy of foreign exchange. On September 18, 1949, just over two years after Indian independence, the British government unilaterally announced a massive devaluation of the pound sterling. The pound’s value against the US dollar was slashed overnight from $4.03 to $2.80, a devaluation of 30.5 percent. Because India’s sterling balances were, by the very terms of the 1947 agreement, denominated in pounds, this overnight maneuver was an economic earthquake. It instantly vaporized almost one-third of the purchasing power of the money owed to India. If India wanted to use those sterling balances to buy American machinery, Canadian wheat, or Swiss capital goods, they would find that nearly a third of their money had vanished into the ether. Britain, on the other hand, enjoyed a sudden, massive windfall. The real value of the debt owed to India was slashed by a third with the stroke of a pen. India was bound by the Sterling Area agreement and had to devalue the rupee proportionately, tying its currency to the declining fortunes of the British pound and further devastating its import capacity. It was a financial ambush, executed with the cold precision of an actuary. VI. The Central Bank’s Quiet Payout As if this financial evisceration was not sufficient, the final insult was administered at the very heart of India’s financial system. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the nation's central bank, had been established in 1935 under British colonial rule as a privately owned entity. Its shareholders were a mix of private banks, financiers, and investors, a group that included substantial British and colonial-era capital. Just after independence, the Indian government recognized the strategic necessity of nationalizing the central bank. The RBI (Transfer to Public Ownership) Act was passed in 1948, and the bank was officially nationalized on January 1, 1949. The terms of this nationalization reveal a profound asymmetry in the post-colonial transition. When the Indian government took ownership of the RBI, it did not simply seize the assets. It compensated the private shareholders handsomely. Under Section 4 of the 1948 Act, the compensation was calculated not at a discounted state rate but based on the average market price of the shares on the Bombay Stock Exchange during the months preceding the Act. Because RBI shares, with a face value of one hundred rupees, were trading at a premium of roughly fifty percent on the open market, the total payout from the Indian exchequer to the 500,000 private shares was approximately 7.5 crores. But the generosity of the settlement did not end with a cash buyout. Under Section 4(2) of the Act, the shareholders were given the option to take their compensation in Government of India promissory notes bearing a guaranteed interest rate of three percent per annum. This was a staggering mechanism of financial alchemy. The British and colonial-era investors were effectively allowed to convert their equity in India's central bank into risk-free sovereign debt backed by the newly independent Indian taxpayer. They could hold these 3 percent government papers and collect a perpetual stream of interest, ensuring that the extraction of wealth from the subcontinent continued long after the political transfer of power. The juxtaposition is staggering, bordering on the absurd. Private shareholders of India’s central bank were paid out in full, at peak market valuations, and handed guaranteed interest-bearing bonds. Meanwhile, the Indian public, who had already paid for Britain’s survival in two world wars through forced extraction and inflation, was left holding devalued, blocked IOUs that had just lost a third of their value in the currency markets. The private investors were made whole. The Indian public was made paupers. VII. The Durgapur Paradigm: The Empire Strikes Back The long shadow of this financial subjugation played out in the subsequent decades, dictating the trajectory of the newly independent nation’s development. By the late 1950s, India had launched its Second Five-Year Plan, an ambitious push to industrialize. But the country was facing a severe balance-of-payments crisis. The sterling balances had been largely drawn down to pay for essential imports, and the country was running out of foreign exchange. India needed to build three major steel plants to fuel its industrialization. The Soviet Union stepped in to fund the Bhilai Steel Plant; West Germany funded the Rourkela plant. Britain, eager to maintain its commercial foothold, wanted the contract for the Durgapur Steel Plant. Rather than releasing any lingering goodwill or acknowledging the massive debt still technically being dribbled out, Britain offered a new arrangement. In 1958, the UK government extended a fresh £100 million loan, a "new" line of sterling credit, to India. This was not a repayment of the wartime debt; it was fresh financing. The British government essentially told India: We will lend you this new money, but you must use it to buy British goods. The money flowed straight back into the pockets of a British consortium of steelmakers, subsidizing the post-war British heavy engineering industry. The Indian taxpayer, who had already funded the British war machine, was now taking on new debt to buy British machinery, because the money they were originally owed had been blocked, devalued, and structurally dismantled. The cycle of financial dependency had been perfectly preserved. VIII. Amnesia and the True Cost of the Union Jack Today, the historical amnesia surrounding these events is profound. The narrative of 1947 is frozen in the amber of political triumph: the lowering of the flag, the end of empire, the dawn of a new era. Mainstream histories focus on the geopolitical maneuvering, the tragedy of Partition, and the drafting of a constitution. The great financial heist remains obscured in the shadows of central bank archives and Treasury minutes. The Indian population has been kept largely in the dark about the arithmetic of their own subjugation. The textbooks speak of the political transfer of power, but rarely of the transfer of financial liability. The £350 billion equivalent that was extracted, blocked, devalued, and systematically stripped of its value is a phantom limb in the national memory. When the viceroys departed, Britain did not just walk away from the subcontinent; it walked away from an invoice it could not afford to pay. It declared independence from its own empire. Through a masterclass in financial engineering, leveraging the Rowlatt-era instinct for suppression, the "safety valve" of institutional compromise by a party supposedly fought for freedom and did deals behind the doors, the blunt instrument of currency devaluation, and the quiet payouts of risk-free bonds to colonial shareholders, Britain managed to offload the cost of its own survival onto the very people it had colonized. Independence was not a gift. It was a getaway car. And the true price of the Union Jack's descent was paid not by the British taxpayer, but by the millions of Indians whose sweat and starvation funded an empire, only to be handed a worthless IOU in return. References and Further Reading Bhattacharya, S. (1997). The Colonial State and the Monetary System in India. Oxford University Press. Bhowani, B. R. (1965). India's Sterling Balances. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff Papers, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-42. Chandavarkar, A. (1989). The Imperial Bank of India and the Reserve Bank of India: A Study in Central Banking Transition. Oxford University Press. Datta, B. (1949). The Devaluation of the Rupee. The Indian Economic Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-12. Hume, A. O. (1885). The Indian National Congress: A Retrospect. Keynes, J. M. (1946). The Balance of Payments of the United Kingdom. Mukerjee, M. (2010). Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II. Basic Books. Reserve Bank of India. (1948). The Reserve Bank of India (Transfer to Public Ownership) Act, 1948. RBI Historical Archives. Sarkar, S. (1989). Modern India: 1885-1947. Macmillan. Tomlinson, B. R. (1979). The Political Economy of the Raj 1914–1947: The Economics of Decolonization in India. Macmillan. (All rights reserved. You must get written permission if you want to republish) Twitter users can share, repost, like, comment but please provide attribution to @shreehistory who did all this research.

ShreeHistory's tweet photo. How Britain Engineered History’s Greatest Financial Heist

By @shreehistory

I. The Stroke of Midnight

At the stroke of midnight on August 14, 1947, as the world watched the Union Jack descend over New Delhi and the saffron, white, and green of a new nation unfurl, history recorded a triumph of self-determination. The British Empire, exhausted by war and weakened by the inexorable tide of nationalism, was relinquishing its crown jewel. The romanticized narrative of the 20th century tells us that Britain granted India its freedom, an act of political magnanimity marking the end of colonial dominion.

But beneath the pageantry of lowering flags, the soaring rhetoric of Jawaharlal Nehru’s "Tryst with Destiny," and the chaotic tragedy of Partition, a very different kind of transfer was taking place. It was not a transfer of political power, but of financial liability.

In the quiet, wood-paneled chambers of the British Treasury and the Reserve Bank of India, a ledger was being closed. To the accountants and chancellors in London, Indian independence was less a geopolitical retreat and more a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, a meticulously orchestrated maneuver by which Britain effectively declared independence from its own creditor.

The colonizer owed the colonized a staggering fortune. And the colonizer was broke.

II. The First Extraction and the Silencing

To understand the audacity of the financial maneuvering of 1947, one must look back to the blueprint drafted three decades earlier, during the First World War. The great financial heist of the mid-century was not an anomaly; it was the perfection of a formula born in the trenches of Europe, paid for in the fields of Bengal.

When the First World War erupted in 1914, Britain found itself in desperate need of men, material, and money. It turned to its empire. India was coerced into contributing hundreds of millions of pounds to the British war effort, alongside the lives of over a million Indian soldiers. To finance this, the British Raj effectively commandeered India’s export earnings and heavily increased taxation, flooding the domestic economy with paper currency while draining its physical gold reserves. Britain abandoned the gold standard, but India was forced to maintain it, absorbing the inflationary shock.

By the war's end, the economic strain on the Indian populace was immense. Prices of essential goods had skyrocketed, and the returns on the capital extracted for the war were nowhere to be seen. As the Indian public began to realize the scale of this economic theft, dissent began to boil. Nationalist leaders pointed to the economic drain, exposing the arithmetic of imperial exploitation.

London’s response was not to remedy the extraction, but to legislate silence. In 1919, the British government passed the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, widely known as the Rowlatt Act. The Act allowed for the incarceration of suspects without trial and curbed the free press, specifically targeting the dissemination of seditious materials, which in practice meant anyone explaining how the British were bankrupting the country. When protests erupted against this silencing, the British military responded with the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar, killing hundreds of unarmed civilians.

The message was unequivocal: the colony would pay, and it would suffer in silence. The economic truth was to be suppressed by force. It was a precedent that would prove vital 28 years later, when the sums involved would be exponentially larger.

III. The Blank Check of World War II

By the time the Second World War began, the British Empire was already financially strained. The defense of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the British Isles required capital that London simply did not possess. Once again, the British turned to the vast, seemingly bottomless reservoir of the Indian economy.

To fund the massive mobilization of troops, the provisioning of armies, and the purchase of raw materials, the British Raj essentially wrote itself a blank check against the Indian taxpayer. India was declared a "non-self-governing territory" contributing to the war effort, but instead of paying India in hard currency for the goods and labor extracted, Britain credited the Reserve Bank of India with pounds sterling. These were not transferable funds; they were essentially IOUs, piling up in London as "Sterling Balances."

The human cost of this capital extraction was catastrophic. The most visceral manifestation of this economic drain was the Bengal Famine of 1943. While the British Treasury accumulated sterling balances, the diversion of grain and the financial extraction policies led to the starvation of an estimated two to three million people in Bengal. The Indian taxpayer was literally funding the survival of the British Empire with their lives and their livelihoods.

By 1945, the sheer scale of this extraction was breathtaking. Britain owed India roughly £1.3 billion. To comprehend the magnitude of this sum, one must view it not through the lens of modern consumer inflation, but as a share of the economy. In 1947, £1.3 billion represented roughly 13.5 percent of Britain’s entire Gross Domestic Product. If the British Treasury were forced to write a check for that proportion of its economy today, it would need to find approximately £350 billion.

It was a sum so massive that paying it in full would have instantly bankrupted post-war Britain, a nation that was, at that very moment, surviving on American Marshall Plan aid and rationed bread. The colonizer owed the colonized. And the colonizer had no intention of paying in full.

IV. The Safety Valve and the Negotiation

Facing the prospect of domestic economic collapse, the British government executed an audacious maneuver. The transfer of power in 1947 was not merely a political act; it was a financial release valve.

There is a historical curiosity, often unspoken in popular narratives, that complicates the story of India’s independence. The Indian National Congress (INC), the primary vehicle of Indian nationalism and independence, was not born from a grassroots peasant uprising, but was initially floated by a British colonial official, Allan Octavian Hume, in 1885. Historians have long debated the "safety valve" theory: the idea that Hume and the Viceroy engineered the creation of the INC to provide a controlled, institutional outlet for the rising frustrations of the Western-educated Indian elite, preventing a violent, uncontrollable rebellion.

While the INC evolved into a formidable force for independence under Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru, the institutional DNA of the organization was steeped in British legal and political frameworks. When it came time to negotiate the financial settlement of 1947, the lingering effects of this "safety valve" dynamic became apparent.

The negotiations over the Sterling Balances were brutal, conducted behind closed doors by the British Labour government’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, and the Indian delegation led by Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Britain argued that a sudden withdrawal of £1.3 billion would crash the pound sterling, bankrupt the Sterling Area, and trigger a global financial crisis. The threat was explicit: if India demanded its money, the ensuing chaos would ensure India received nothing.

India was in a state of profound vulnerability. The subcontinent was engulfed in the horrific trauma of Partition; millions of refugees were on the move, and the new government was struggling to establish basic administrative continuity. In this moment of existential crisis, the Indian leadership accepted terms that effectively castrated its own wealth.

The 1947 agreement dictated that the vast majority of the £1.3 billion would be "blocked." Only a fraction was immediately released; the remaining £1.15 billion was locked in London, to be doled out in agonizingly slow installments over a decade or more. Worse, the agreement stipulated that these blocked balances would earn little to no interest. By accepting this compromise, the post-colonial government effectively agreed to a structural haircut on the asset, surrendering the real-time economic utility of the money to save the British economy from default.

The safety valve had, once again, operated exactly as designed.

V. The Alchemy of Devaluation

With India's massive claim successfully trapped in the vaults of the Bank of England, Britain weaponized the only tool it had left: the currency itself.

Having forced India to accept deferred payments, Britain engineered a stealth default through the alchemy of foreign exchange. On September 18, 1949, just over two years after Indian independence, the British government unilaterally announced a massive devaluation of the pound sterling. The pound’s value against the US dollar was slashed overnight from $4.03 to $2.80, a devaluation of 30.5 percent.

Because India’s sterling balances were, by the very terms of the 1947 agreement, denominated in pounds, this overnight maneuver was an economic earthquake. It instantly vaporized almost one-third of the purchasing power of the money owed to India. If India wanted to use those sterling balances to buy American machinery, Canadian wheat, or Swiss capital goods, they would find that nearly a third of their money had vanished into the ether.

Britain, on the other hand, enjoyed a sudden, massive windfall. The real value of the debt owed to India was slashed by a third with the stroke of a pen. India was bound by the Sterling Area agreement and had to devalue the rupee proportionately, tying its currency to the declining fortunes of the British pound and further devastating its import capacity. It was a financial ambush, executed with the cold precision of an actuary.

VI. The Central Bank’s Quiet Payout

As if this financial evisceration was not sufficient, the final insult was administered at the very heart of India’s financial system.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the nation's central bank, had been established in 1935 under British colonial rule as a privately owned entity. Its shareholders were a mix of private banks, financiers, and investors, a group that included substantial British and colonial-era capital.

Just after independence, the Indian government recognized the strategic necessity of nationalizing the central bank. The RBI (Transfer to Public Ownership) Act was passed in 1948, and the bank was officially nationalized on January 1, 1949.

The terms of this nationalization reveal a profound asymmetry in the post-colonial transition. When the Indian government took ownership of the RBI, it did not simply seize the assets. It compensated the private shareholders handsomely. Under Section 4 of the 1948 Act, the compensation was calculated not at a discounted state rate but based on the average market price of the shares on the Bombay Stock Exchange during the months preceding the Act. Because RBI shares, with a face value of one hundred rupees, were trading at a premium of roughly fifty percent on the open market, the total payout from the Indian exchequer to the 500,000 private shares was approximately 7.5 crores.

But the generosity of the settlement did not end with a cash buyout. Under Section 4(2) of the Act, the shareholders were given the option to take their compensation in Government of India promissory notes bearing a guaranteed interest rate of three percent per annum. This was a staggering mechanism of financial alchemy. The British and colonial-era investors were effectively allowed to convert their equity in India's central bank into risk-free sovereign debt backed by the newly independent Indian taxpayer. They could hold these 3 percent government papers and collect a perpetual stream of interest, ensuring that the extraction of wealth from the subcontinent continued long after the political transfer of power.

The juxtaposition is staggering, bordering on the absurd. Private shareholders of India’s central bank were paid out in full, at peak market valuations, and handed guaranteed interest-bearing bonds. Meanwhile, the Indian public, who had already paid for Britain’s survival in two world wars through forced extraction and inflation, was left holding devalued, blocked IOUs that had just lost a third of their value in the currency markets.

The private investors were made whole. The Indian public was made paupers.

VII. The Durgapur Paradigm: The Empire Strikes Back

The long shadow of this financial subjugation played out in the subsequent decades, dictating the trajectory of the newly independent nation’s development.

By the late 1950s, India had launched its Second Five-Year Plan, an ambitious push to industrialize. But the country was facing a severe balance-of-payments crisis. The sterling balances had been largely drawn down to pay for essential imports, and the country was running out of foreign exchange. India needed to build three major steel plants to fuel its industrialization. The Soviet Union stepped in to fund the Bhilai Steel Plant; West Germany funded the Rourkela plant. Britain, eager to maintain its commercial foothold, wanted the contract for the Durgapur Steel Plant.

Rather than releasing any lingering goodwill or acknowledging the massive debt still technically being dribbled out, Britain offered a new arrangement. In 1958, the UK government extended a fresh £100 million loan, a "new" line of sterling credit, to India.

This was not a repayment of the wartime debt; it was fresh financing. The British government essentially told India: We will lend you this new money, but you must use it to buy British goods. The money flowed straight back into the pockets of a British consortium of steelmakers, subsidizing the post-war British heavy engineering industry.

The Indian taxpayer, who had already funded the British war machine, was now taking on new debt to buy British machinery, because the money they were originally owed had been blocked, devalued, and structurally dismantled. The cycle of financial dependency had been perfectly preserved.

VIII. Amnesia and the True Cost of the Union Jack

Today, the historical amnesia surrounding these events is profound. The narrative of 1947 is frozen in the amber of political triumph: the lowering of the flag, the end of empire, the dawn of a new era. Mainstream histories focus on the geopolitical maneuvering, the tragedy of Partition, and the drafting of a constitution. The great financial heist remains obscured in the shadows of central bank archives and Treasury minutes.

The Indian population has been kept largely in the dark about the arithmetic of their own subjugation. The textbooks speak of the political transfer of power, but rarely of the transfer of financial liability. The £350 billion equivalent that was extracted, blocked, devalued, and systematically stripped of its value is a phantom limb in the national memory.

When the viceroys departed, Britain did not just walk away from the subcontinent; it walked away from an invoice it could not afford to pay. It declared independence from its own empire. Through a masterclass in financial engineering, leveraging the Rowlatt-era instinct for suppression, the "safety valve" of institutional compromise by a party supposedly fought for freedom and did deals behind the doors, the blunt instrument of currency devaluation, and the quiet payouts of risk-free bonds to colonial shareholders, Britain managed to offload the cost of its own survival onto the very people it had colonized.

Independence was not a gift. It was a getaway car. And the true price of the Union Jack's descent was paid not by the British taxpayer, but by the millions of Indians whose sweat and starvation funded an empire, only to be handed a worthless IOU in return.

References and Further Reading

Bhattacharya, S. (1997). The Colonial State and the Monetary System in India. Oxford University Press.
Bhowani, B. R. (1965). India's Sterling Balances. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Staff Papers, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-42.
Chandavarkar, A. (1989). The Imperial Bank of India and the Reserve Bank of India: A Study in Central Banking Transition. Oxford University Press.
Datta, B. (1949). The Devaluation of the Rupee. The Indian Economic Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-12.
Hume, A. O. (1885). The Indian National Congress: A Retrospect.
Keynes, J. M. (1946). The Balance of Payments of the United Kingdom.
Mukerjee, M. (2010). Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II. Basic Books.
Reserve Bank of India. (1948). The Reserve Bank of India (Transfer to Public Ownership) Act, 1948. RBI Historical Archives.
Sarkar, S. (1989). Modern India: 1885-1947. Macmillan.
Tomlinson, B. R. (1979). The Political Economy of the Raj 1914–1947: The Economics of Decolonization in India. Macmillan.

(All rights reserved. You must get written permission if you want to republish)
Twitter users can share, repost, like, comment but please provide attribution to @shreehistory who did all this research.

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Modi ji tonight

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13 days ago

𝗛𝗼𝗿𝘀𝗲 𝗜𝗻 𝗦𝗶𝗻𝗱𝗵𝘂-𝗦𝗮𝗿𝗮𝘀𝘃𝗮𝘁ī 𝗖𝗶𝘃𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘇𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻: 𝗟𝗼𝘁𝗵𝗮𝗹 Lothal, a port town of this civilization, has yielded some of the finest evidences for the presence of Horse. There are two types of evidences: 1. Horse figurines 2. Horse Bone 𝐅𝐢𝐠𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬: Image 1, shows two Horse figurines(B & D) recovered from Phase A(2500 BC-1900 BC) of Lothal. The B one is a bit unclear though structurally represents a Horse. The D one is much clearer i.e. short stumpy tail, long body and raised neck. S.R. Rao in this same report mentions a third terracotta figurine "The third example consists of a disjointed head of a horse which must have been attached to the body.....The prick- ears and snout are characteristics of the horse." Image 2, shows a set of Zoomorphic gaming pieces from Phase A. Though it is slightly subjective, the marked piece(no.3) could possibly depict a Horse. 𝐇𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐞 𝐁𝐨𝐧𝐞: The faunal bones recovered from Lothal were examined by Zoologist Bhola Nath of the Zoological Survey of India. His analysis is attached in Vol.2 of S.R. Rao's report. He identified a 2nd right upper molar tooth as that of Eqqus caballus Linnaeus(the horse). The reasoning given is as follows: "𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 𝒕𝒐𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒅 𝒂𝒃𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒔 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒕 𝑳𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝑯𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒑𝒑𝒂𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅. 𝑻𝒉𝒆 𝒕𝒐𝒐𝒕𝒉 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑳𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒚 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝒕𝒉𝒂𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒎𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒏 𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒉𝒂𝒔 𝒑𝒍𝒊-𝒄𝒂𝒃𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒏 (𝒂 𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒏𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒃𝒂𝒔𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒑𝒖𝒓 𝒐𝒓 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒕𝒐𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒆) 𝒘𝒉𝒊𝒄𝒉 𝒊𝒔 𝒘𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒖𝒊𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒆𝒄𝒌 𝒕𝒆𝒆𝒕𝒉 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒆." Infact, Bhola Nath(see Image 3) has given measurements of this Lothal horse tooth with that of modern horse tooth. Note the similarities. See Image 4, no. 18-19 for the tooth specimen. Hence this one Sindhu-Sarasvatī site provided ample evidence for the presence of Horse. More such faunal horse remains were found in Mohenjo-Daro, Surkotada, Kalibangan, Harappa etc. more about them in another post. Reference : Lothal, a Harappan Port Town (1955-62), Dr. S.R. Rao, Volume 2.