As a EU citizen, I'm really worried that the EU will disappear and be technology irrelevant.
It's one thing to not be able to produce the latest tech, but it's another thing to also cut yourself off from the latest tech because you have bureaucrats unable to understand a thing.
Our statement on the UK governmentâs demand that all content on all devices sold or used in the country be scanned, on the presumption of nudity, using a dystopian combination of age verification and content scanning. This proposal will not safeguard children. It endangers us all.
https://t.co/VdWe9uhi8p
EU-Kommission plant eine neue, weit umfassendere Verordnung. 15 EU-Staaten fordern mindestens 12 Monate Speicherpflicht â nicht nur fĂŒr Provider, sondern auch fĂŒr:
Messenger (Signal, WhatsApp, Threema) VPN-Dienste Gaming-Plattformen Kryptobörsen https://t.co/cPFZjYVUBP
With your support, an @EP_EPRS briefing urging MEPs to regulate VPNs "to protect children" got 2.5M views on X â and was confronted with a Community Note citing research: 82% use VPNs for protection, not to bypass age checks.
A clear message: reconsider how EU taxpayer funds are spent on the next research. Donât attack privacy and human rights tools.
Thank you everyone for your voice.
Be ready and defend your privacy as a human right. Every day. đ§Ą
This week so far....
đ” Bluesky started asking for Age Verification
đ€ Chrome started downloading AI to your computer without asking
đȘđș The EU floated banning VPNs
đșđž Utah anti-VPN law went live
@WhyTHnot@okdoc9@jon_delorraine Mouais.
DPI mĂȘme la chine n'arrive pas Ă bloquer parfaitement les VPN. Les sites qui blackisent les VPN ca coute trop cher aux sites (payer les listes d'IPs) ; blocage des proto, lĂ encore la chine elle mĂȘme galĂšre. BGP poisonning; RPKI ou solution de contournement (proxy, tor)
The @EU_Commission has released an update to patch out the issues I raised last week, v2026.04-2 (https://t.co/twlSbndQ0e)
Honestly, I don't know if I should laugh or cry.
Let's review each one:
1. On-device data: database and settings encrypted at rest, with keys protected by the deviceâs hardware-backed key store.
Sounds great, until you look closer.
They introduced https://t.co/9ejV5P6lqE:security-crypto, deprecated in 2025. Also https://t.co/9ejV5P6lqE.crypto.EncryptedSharedPreferences, deprecated in 2025. Finally, https://t.co/9ejV5P6lqE.crypto.MasterKeys, which were deprecated in 2020.
3 deprecated dependencies introduced following criticism over weak security. These weren't left over and missed during an update... they've added them now to "harden security". Remember, this isn't an isolated app. It's intended to lay the foundation for many production applications; all using deprecated security libraries from the outset.
Worse, they already correctly use KeystoreController in their codebase. The correct answer already existed and they still got it wrong.
2. Runtime: the app checks device integrity on startup and refuses to run on rooted or jailbroken devices. Production deployments should complement it with stronger device-attestation mechanisms appropriate to their infrastructure and compliance requirements.
They check for su, check package manager for root apps, run "which su" and checks if it's a custom ROM.
Paths:
/system/bin/su
/system/xbin/su
/sbin/su
/system/su
/data/local/su
/data/local/bin/su
/data/local/xbin/su
/system/app/Superuser.apk
/system/app/SuperSU.apk
Great... in 2015. These are all trivially bypassed in 2026.
3. Passport onboarding: more stable scanning; the passport photo is stored privately and deleted as soon as itâs no longer needed.
They're still not encrypted, so I'm not sure what "privately" means - but they are deleted correctly now.
4. PIN: stricter rules block easy-to-guess PINs; PINs are salted and hashed, never stored in plain form.
They salt correctly (a true CSPRNG), then use PBKDF2-SHA256 - which is outdated and only recommended where FIPS compliance is required, which doesn't apply here.
To make matters worse, they use just 210,000 iterations.
For those of a NISTy disposition, you're likely already shaking your head. 210,000 seems oddly specific.
It is. It's the @owasp minimum for PBKDF2-SHA512, not SHA256. Right number, wrong algorithm. In reality, OWASP recommended 600,000 iterations as a minimum in 2023.
Worse still, 600,000 is the baseline minimum for passwords, not PINs with 1 million permutations. You could use 1B iterations, you're not measurably increasing security when there are so few attempts required to break it. At the very least, use a modern hash with reasonable brute-force resistance against a 2026 threat model.
All this... cited as a "first hardening step". Again, utter security theatre.
None of this negates my fundamental point. This isn't fixable through code - it's fundamentally ill-conceived and poorly implemented.