Enjay

That Guy

[𖣂JIK𖣂 @OS3992]

Men's mental awareness month

It’s okay to be vulnerable.

I don’t care if you’re a man or a woman—you’re human. You’ve got a heart, and it wasn’t built to hold in all that pain.

Let it out. Cry if you need to. Scream if you have to. Just don’t bottle it up, because it’ll eat you alive from the inside.

Take care of your mind. Take care of your soul. Nobody else will do it for you.

You matter.

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[Sizwe SikaMusi @SizweLo]

South Africans have been subsidising Europe’s luxury car pricing model for decades now.

Luxury European car brands like BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Audi have always been seen as high-status in South Africa. But sales of these cars have dropped by 68% since 2014, raising questions about why they’re still so expensive when fewer people are buying them.

A clear indicator of the price differences lies in the pricing of identical models across different regions.

Consider the BMW 330i (2025 model). It costs $45 000 (approx. R850 000 including taxes) in the United States and R1 035 000 in South Africa.

The Mercedes-Benz C200 sells for roughly R780 000 in Germany but upwards of R961 000 in South Africa.

These figures show that South African consumers are paying a significant premium, not merely due to import duties and taxes, but as part of a deliberate pricing structure that treats the SA market as high-margin. (These numbers look exponentially worse for South African buyers when you adjust for Purchasing Power Parity, which we won’t get into here.)

According to automotive analyst Gugu Mhlongo, “South Africa’s automotive market has become a captive pricing zone, where prestige pricing meets low elasticity of demand. The brand loyalty and perceived status of ownership have, for decades, allowed manufacturers to charge more without pushback.”

In simple terms, South Africa’s car market has become a place where luxury brands can charge high prices without worrying about losing customers—even when those prices are unfair. This status-based pricing has created an environment where price is detached from production or shipping costs.

Economists like Dr Themba Moyo argue that these pricing dynamics mirror colonial-era extractive economics—where global brands extract value from high-status segments in developing markets without reinvesting locally.

Luxury carmakers often justify the price premium by pointing to higher logistical, operational, and compliance costs in South Africa. BMW South Africa, for instance, argues that prices reflect “local operating conditions, including taxes, dealer infrastructure, and customer service expectations.”

However, as the local economy contracts and competition grows, these justifications are getting boring.

The numbers are clear: In 2014, premium brands like Audi, BMW, Mini, and Mercedes-Benz, collectively sold over 74000 vehicles in South Africa. By 2024, that number had dropped to just under 24000—a 68% decline.📉
Mercedes-Benz saw an 82% reduction, Audi 70%, and BMW/Mini 50%.

The problem has gotten so bad that Audi South Africa is begging for support from the government, blaming falling sales, tough economic conditions, and cheap imported cars. The same companies that used to charge premium prices are now fighting to survive in a market that’s changing fast.

At the same time, Chinese and other Asian brands—like Haval, Chery, and Kia—have gained good market share with technologically superior, price-accessible models.

This European-style pricing strategy is not confined to automobiles. Luxury fashion, tech, and cosmetic brands often charge far more in South Africa than in their home or North American markets. A Chanel No. 5 bottle, for example, can cost up to 40% more in Johannesburg than in Paris.

These patterns suggest South Africa has served as a ‘prestige pricing buffer’ for brands seeking to balance global profit margins.

South Africans are becoming more cost-conscious, especially with economic stagnation, high unemployment, and rising living costs. The new middle class is broke and less concerned with buying for status.

Chinese manufacturers have capitalised on this with stylish, well-equipped products that offer better warranties, modern tech, and significantly lower price tags.

The Europeans don’t have too many choices. They might have to drop their prices or start selling directly online instead of through dealerships to save money.

Whatever happens, things are changing. So, either the prices come down or people will stop buying these overpriced cars altogether.

The Germans argue that the South African pricing model provides better after-sales service, prestige, and superior resale value. While this was historically true, the declining brand loyalty and growing trust in Asian after-sales service are eroding this advantage. South Africans still want to drive Beemers and Benzes, but not at these prices though.

In summation, for decades, South Africans have unknowingly subsidised European luxury car pricing strategies, paying more than their global counterparts while receiving diminishing relative value.

But as money gets tighter and buyers want more for their cash, South Africa’s luxury car market is in trouble. These brands must either change or fail. One thing is clear—people won’t keep paying sky-high prices just for a fancy badge much longer. No, Sir.

[Sizwe SikaMusi @SizweLo]

At university, our economics lecturer, who shall remain anonymous, taught us that South Africa had deindustrialised and its economy had become concentrated in the financial sector because it had “matured”—and this was inevitable. Over the years, I’ve since learned that this was some weapons-grade bullshit.

In a paper titled Deindustrialisation and Financialisation: Two Sides of the Same Coin? Professor Imad Moosa debunks the idea that deindustrialisation is a “natural evolution” of advanced economies.

Since the 1990s, the post-Apartheid State has liberalised capital flows, allowing profits to flee rather than reinvest domestically. Slashed tariffs, exposing local industries to premature foreign competition. Adopted inflation targeting, prioritising financial stability over industrial growth. Dismantled industrial policy, leaving the economy at the mercy of global markets.

The outcome? A hollowed-out industrial base, a bloated financial sector, and an economy where making money from money is more lucrative than making actual goods.

Let us be clear: South Africa did not “naturally” deindustrialise. This wasn’t an evolutionary phase of economic development. It wasn’t the inevitable march of progress from smoke and steel to massages with happy endings and EasyEquities portfolios. It was the result of deliberate policy choices.

South Africa’s deindustrialisation was the intentional dismantling of productive capacity, sacrificed on the altar of free markets, foreign investment, and financial “innovation.”

Deindustrialisation—presented as inevitable or even desirable—is, in fact, a politically driven phenomenon. And South Africa embraced it willingly, under the tutelage of post-Apartheid technocrats who mistook capital flows for development.

As I have argued elsewhere, financialisation is a product of public policy choices motivated by a race among the political elite to serve the financial oligarchy.

Since the 1990s, the South African State has liberalised capital accounts, cut tariffs, and adopted inflation-targeting as dogma. In the process, it castrated its industrial policy and ceded control of the economy to bankers, consultants, and asset managers where profits come from trading paper rather than making things and wages stagnate while executive compensation soars.

The result? An overgrown financial sector feasting on high returns while factories shut down, skills decline, and youth unemployment becomes a permanent feature of the economic landscape.

We now live in a country where prestige is measured not in what you build but in the size of your investment portfolio. Where manufacturing engineers retrain as financial analysts. Where, in Moosa’s biting sarcasm, “deindustrialisation involves the replacement of engineers with exotic dancers.”

This is not the rational unfolding of economic history—it’s the outcome of policy decisions favouring capital over labour, speculation over production, and short-term gains over national development.

The apologists will say, “There was no alternative.” They’ll point to the end of sanctions, to capital flight, to the pressures of globalisation. And, yet, countries like China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and South Korea found ways to industrialise amidst the same global turmoil.

These nations didn’t throw open the gates without first building local capacity. South Africa, by contrast, opened its markets and financial systems wide—before it had built an industrial foundation worth defending.

Meanwhile, our banks are among the most profitable in the world relative to GDP. But what do they finance? Consumption. Loans. Imports. Not factories. Not R&D. Not productive capacity. We are left with a lopsided economy where even domestic capital extracts profits without reinvesting in the real economy.

Financialisation has also warped corporate behaviour. Firms that once made things now chase profits through share buybacks, property portfolios, and offshore arbitrage. Engineers and technicians are retrained into pricing derivatives.

The result is a steady siphoning of talent, capital, and imagination out of the productive economy—and into the casino of global finance.

This is not just bad economics. It’s a betrayal of the post-Apartheid promise: a high-wage, industrialised economy built on dignity and inclusion. Instead, they built a fragile house of cards—dependent on imported goods, extractive finance, and the hope that the next ratings agency downgrade won’t hit too hard.

It’s time to stop pretending this is working.

South Africa needs more than another five-point plan or glossy investment conference. It needs a rupture—a decisive rejection of the financialised growth model and a return to strategic industrial policy grounded in the realities of our energy crisis, labour market, and global constraints. That means:

Addressing economic challenges effectively by curbing financial speculation and redirecting capital toward long-term investments that foster sustainable growth. This requires rebuilding the State’s capacity to coordinate and fund industrial development, ensuring that strategic sectors receive the necessary support.

The State must target crucial sectors of the economy to develop specific industries and move up the value chain (going from low-value activities to higher-value activities within the production and supply chain) by providing cheap loans and subsidies to manufacturing companies.

Investments should focus on labour-intensive industries with significant multiplier effects, such as nuclear technology, agroprocessing, and manufacturing, to create jobs and stimulate broader economic activity.

Additionally, education and vocational training systems must be reformed to align with the demands of a productive economy, equipping workers with relevant skills.

Finally, democratic control over key economic levers—including monetary policy, public finance, and industrial strategy—must be reasserted to ensure that economic decisions serve the public interest rather than narrow financial elites.

Financialisation and deindustrialisation are not twin curses that befell South Africa by accident. They are the legacy of a generation of technocrats who mistook deregulation for development and of political elites who outsourced their imagination to the markets.

So no, Professor who shall not be named—South Africa didn’t deindustrialise because it “matured.” It wasn’t nature. It was negligence. It was not evolution—it was ideology dressed up as inevitability.

As Prof Imad Moosa makes clear, this wasn’t a gentle economic transition but a full-scale policy-driven pivot from building things to betting on things. It was a country auctioning off its future for capital inflows and credit ratings.

Unless we abandon the fiction that markets know best, we will continue watching this house of cards collapse—one ratings downgrade, one shuttered factory, one jobless graduate at a time.

Reference: https://t.co/KN0CILY6Tc.

[Tebogo Thomas Mokwena🇻🇦 @TebogoTheScribe]

The US is treating South Africa like a threat. This is why.

Dudu Floyd Shivambu Apology Malema Royal AM Elon Trump Tucker US and Israel Amerikaners uBaba Flyod Xiaomi Adele Ndlozi Ashley Chidimma Sleek Nhlamulo MK Party Afriforum Winnie

[MDN NEWS @MDNnewss]

Lekau Sehoana is set to relaunch Drip next month, introducing a new sneaker named Likwidz 23, which will be available for purchase at TAPE.

[Kevín @KevOnStage]

What’s your favorite white people song?

[Marge Ntambi @margentambi]

Many African cultures are communal in nature

Therefore, effective customer acquisition often can't only be managed digitally

It requires community-based strategies

It'll take local networks and relationships to resonate, get people to try your product, and drive engagement

[Enjay @TheEnjay]

@Powerfm987 @Just6Official It's about time for this Grammy gents... no more Springbok delay. Eitherway, I'm humbled by the beautiful your journey so far... this would be the best way cap it off, especially this year. Keep breaking these barriers with your annointing. #afrovocalplay #aCompletesound

[Garden2 @Madam55940922]

How South Africans are watching rn #RSAvsENG #Springboks #RugbyWorldCup

[Chris Bakke @ChrisJBakke]

David Beckham is the last remaining investigative journalist

[Enjay @TheEnjay]

@HumansNoContext 126?

[#RotiQueen @TasneemMotara]

@GigaSizwe @Mlu__N2 Manufacture. From raw material to finished product. 11 companies all based at the economic zone are contracted by Ford to manufacture different components. Ford manufactures the engine and then assembles on receiving the parts from the 11 companies

[Tebogo•012 @OnlinePitori]

@Mlu__N2 I've worked for BMW, Ford and Toyota as a robot programmer, WE DO MANUFATURE. We assemble what we manufactured.

Check
Yanfeng
Thai Summit
MA automotive
Sodecia
Praga
Forecia/Forvia
Motherson
Venture
Adient
Ramsay
Automould, they all MANUFATURE for automotive.

[Alex Cohen @anothercohen]

I was laid off from Twitter today. I was the designer in charge of our new rebranding to X.

I learned so much in my 2.5 weeks at the company but I’m excited to see where I land next.

If you’re hiring a self taught, junior designer please DM me. Graphic design is my passion!

[Tom Gran @tommgran]

i’ve been struggling to put this into words for a while but i think a lot of this AI art craze comes down to these guys feeling the joy of being creative for the first time and mistaking it for something much deeper.

[Feral Uncle @80Atey]

@Am_Blujay Simbine though 👏🏾👏🏾👏🏾

[bdq1975 @bdq1975]

@DoctorUnique14 @Track_Gazette He has been every major finals since 2016. If there is a African sprinter in the World Finals, it’s Simbine

[The Instigator @Am_Blujay]

Name a 10/10 Album you have ever listened to !

[World of Statistics @stats_feed]

The best-selling cars by country in 2022:

🇦🇷 Argentina: Fiat Cronos (38,769)
🇦🇺 Australia: Toyota Hilux (64,391)
🇧🇷 Brazil: Fiat Strada (112,456)
🇨🇳 China: BYD Song Plus (459,424)
🇩🇰 Denmark: Peugeot 208 (3,920)
🇫🇷 France: Peugeot 208 (88,812)
🇩🇪 Germany: VW Golf (84,282)
🇮🇳 India: Maruti Wagon R (217,317)
🇮🇩 Indonesia: Daihatsu Gran Max (65,062)
🇮🇪 Ireland: Hyundai Tucson (6,444)
🇮🇹 Italy: Fiat Panda (105,384)
🇳🇱 Netherlands: Toyota Yaris (11,178)
🇳🇴 Norway: Tesla Model Y (17,356)
🇵🇱 Poland: Toyota Corolla (21,819)
🇵🇹 Portugal: Peugeot 2008 (6,001)
🇷🇺 Russia: Lada Granta (99,356)
🇪🇸 Spain: Hyundai Tucson (21,985)
🇸🇪 Sweden: Volvo XC 40 (14,252)
🇨🇭 Switzerland: Toyota Yaris (5,572)
🇹🇷 Turkey: Fiat Egea (68,779)
🇬🇧 UK: Nissan Qashqai (42,704)
🇺🇸 USA: Ford F-Series (653,957)

[Enjay @TheEnjay]

@CityPowerJhb @CityofJoburgZA I've had no electricity in Highlands North since Monday. I've been trying to get through on the call centre with no success. Please urgently assist