@altfoxb Any idea what that board says in the background and what those green checks represent. I can see at least 3 PAF names in there including Azman’s.
Not pride, not arrogance, just a deep sense of satisfaction witnessing Pakistan Air Force evolve from an operational support arm into a regional powerhouse projecting Pakistan’s influence. Just as the Quaid envisioned.
Residents of Rawalpindi enjoying the Show by Pakistan Airforce F-16s as they escort the Iranian Foreign Minister to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Insane AURA 🔥🔥
These people are the funniest. Almost of all these morons who want Pakistan to fight wars which aren't ours (while opposing Pakistan's fight in wars which are ours) are always living in the "enemy lands". They don't want to fight "empire" with us, they want to cheer from Canada
@Yameiena Please spare us these disingenuous takes. That was Shah’s Iran (pre - islamic Revolution). In fact, it was actually Pakistan that was among the first countries to recognize the Islamic Revolution. So who's indebted to whom?
Alhamdulilah... the geopolitical rise of Pakistan since May has been phenomenal... Allah loves humility and dislikes vanity, so stay humble but feel very proud of being a Pakistani unless you were secretly hoping for the talks to fail due to personal hatred. Pakistan zindabad
Fully agree. Iran’s passive + active deterrence has tactical teeth through proxies and asymmetric moves, but it hasn’t shifted the U.S. risk calculus enough. Deterrence is about shaping expectations, not just showing capability. Sobering stuff
The situation points to a total erosion of deterrence. Iran’s doctrine is fusion of passive and active deterrence. Nevertheless, similar to 'strategic patience' this doctrine has failed to achieve the desired objectives despite success across several nodes.
Iran has demonstrated an ability to impose costs across the region. Iranian Axis and its asymmetric capabilities have enabled it to target high-value military assets, including those of the United States. These actions are tactically significant and, in some cases, operationally impressive. However, when assessed against the strategic thresholds that shape U.S. decision making, they fall short of creating a level of risk or consequence sufficient to deter counter-value strikes.
Basically, while Iran can impose pain, it has not yet convinced its adversaries that the cost of striking Iranian civilian infrastructure would outweigh the perceived benefits. This imbalance is critical. Deterrence is not simply about demonstrating capability it is about shaping the adversary’s expectations and risk calculations. At present, the gap between Iran’s demonstrated actions and the level of response required to influence U.S. thresholds remains wide.
If Iran is unable to recalibrate and establish a more credible form of deterrence in the near term, the likely trajectory is troubling. We could see a normalization and expansion of counter-value strikes, increasingly directed at civilian infrastructure within Iran.