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theprepperguy
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@joekent16jan19 https://t.co/KfCWSvwILI
For over 30 YEARS, Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly warned Congress, the UN and the world that Iran is on the verge of developing nuclear weapons.
1992: 3–5 years away.
1995: 5–7 years.
2009: 1–2 years.
2012: Months away.
2015: Warned of nuclear breakout within weeks.
But this isn’t the first time Netanyahu has promoted a nuclear threat.
In September 2002, he told the US Congress there was “no question whatsoever” that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons.
He supported removing Saddam from power.
Iraq’s alleged active nuclear weapons programme was subsequently found not to exist.
Now consider the intelligence.
In 2015, leaked Mossad documents revealed that Israel’s own intelligence agency had assessed in 2012 that Iran was not undertaking the activity necessary to produce nuclear weapons, despite Netanyahu’s alarming presentation to the UN.
In March 2025, US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified that American intelligence continued to assess Iran was NOT building a nuclear weapon and that its leadership had NOT authorised restarting its suspended weapons programme.
And here’s something else history tells us.
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy confronted Israel over its nuclear programme at Dimona.
Kennedy demanded regular inspections and warned that continued American support could be seriously jeopardised without reliable information about Israel’s nuclear intentions.
Today, Israel is widely understood to possess nuclear weapons, refuses to officially acknowledge them and remains OUTSIDE the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Iran, meanwhile, is a signatory.
American law, including the Symington and Glenn Amendments, restricts military assistance in specified nuclear proliferation circumstances.
Yet Israel continues receiving billions in American military assistance, raising legitimate questions about how those laws are applied.
Meanwhile, successive Israeli governments have sought American military backing against Iran.
George W. Bush — refused.
Barack Obama — refused.
Joe Biden — refused to join an offensive.
Donald Trump — authorised US strikes.
Four presidents. Decades of nuclear warnings. Iraq’s nonexistent WMD programme. Conflicting intelligence assessments. And a nuclear-armed Israel that has never joined the NPT.
The question is not simply whether Iran could develop nuclear weapons.
It’s why Israel’s nuclear arsenal receives such different treatment, and why repeated claims about imminent nuclear threats have been used to argue for military action.
#Iran #Israel #Netanyahu #JFK #Mossad #Iraq #NuclearWeapons
For over 30 YEARS, Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly warned Congress, the UN and the world that Iran is on the verge of developing nuclear weapons.
1992: 3–5 years away.
1995: 5–7 years.
2009: 1–2 years.
2012: Months away.
2015: Warned of nuclear breakout within weeks.
But this isn’t the first time Netanyahu has promoted a nuclear threat.
In September 2002, he told the US Congress there was “no question whatsoever” that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons.
He supported removing Saddam from power.
Iraq’s alleged active nuclear weapons programme was subsequently found not to exist.
Now consider the intelligence.
In 2015, leaked Mossad documents revealed that Israel’s own intelligence agency had assessed in 2012 that Iran was not undertaking the activity necessary to produce nuclear weapons, despite Netanyahu’s alarming presentation to the UN.
In March 2025, US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified that American intelligence continued to assess Iran was NOT building a nuclear weapon and that its leadership had NOT authorised restarting its suspended weapons programme.
And here’s something else history tells us.
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy confronted Israel over its nuclear programme at Dimona.
Kennedy demanded regular inspections and warned that continued American support could be seriously jeopardised without reliable information about Israel’s nuclear intentions.
Today, Israel is widely understood to possess nuclear weapons, refuses to officially acknowledge them and remains OUTSIDE the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Iran, meanwhile, is a signatory.
American law, including the Symington and Glenn Amendments, restricts military assistance in specified nuclear proliferation circumstances.
Yet Israel continues receiving billions in American military assistance, raising legitimate questions about how those laws are applied.
Meanwhile, successive Israeli governments have sought American military backing against Iran.
George W. Bush — refused.
Barack Obama — refused.
Joe Biden — refused to join an offensive.
Donald Trump — authorised US strikes.
Four presidents. Decades of nuclear warnings. Iraq’s nonexistent WMD programme. Conflicting intelligence assessments. And a nuclear-armed Israel that has never joined the NPT.
The question is not simply whether Iran could develop nuclear weapons.
It’s why Israel’s nuclear arsenal receives such different treatment, and why repeated claims about imminent nuclear threats have been used to argue for military action.
#Iran #Israel #Netanyahu #JFK #Mossad #Iraq #NuclearWeapons
@MarioNawfal You forgot this 👇
@Jenny_1884 You can’t have wealthy people without poor people
@Osint613 850 without radar because rare earth isn’t available to them 🤣🤣🤣
Sadiq Khan calling Brexit the greatest act of economic self-harm is rich coming from a man whose own leadership has been disastrous for London.
Under his watch, Londoners have faced rising costs, ULEZ expansion, persistent knife crime and a worsening housing affordability crisis.
Perhaps Khan should concentrate on fixing the city he’s been running since 2016 before lecturing the rest of the country about economic failure.
Brexit wasn’t the worst thing to happen to London. Sadiq Khan was.
#SadiqKhan #KhanOut #Brexit #London #ULEZ #KnifeCrime #HousingCrisis #LabourFailings
The world (or at least X) is waking up to the truth, read the comments 🤣👇
Bucha. It was a genocide, recognized by everyone. They buried hundreds of people. They tortured people. We found the grave. There were, I believe, around 500 people. When we liberated those towns near Kyiv, there emerged this, you know, this kind of hatred for the Russians, right at that moment. Not even at the moment when they started the full-scale war. Back then nobody understood what it really was yet. People understood what this war was and what Putin did personally when we found those mass graves of tortured adults, children. I mean they didn't just kill them, they tortured and killed them.
When we liberated Bucha, I said, bring every journalist here. Don't touch anything, just bring the journalists. The whole world simply has to see this. Imagine finding a mass grave in the U.S. or in Britain, God forbid, with 500 tortured people, adults, kids, dogs, animals shot dead. I mean, they held hunting sprees there from military vehicles. People were running, they were shooting, just hunting, playing games. They literally just played with people, like slavery. So how, after this, can you listen to Putin? And how, after this, can you forgive?
From The Diary of a CEO podcast with Steven Bartlett. (2/3)
🧵 NATO IS A PAPER TIGER — 1/5
For months we have heard increasingly confident language from European and NATO leaders about confronting Russia, defeating Russia, preparing for war with Russia and massively expanding military power.
The rhetoric is extraordinary.
But there is a much simpler question that rarely gets asked:
What could NATO actually put into a conventional war against Russia TODAY — and how long could it keep fighting?
Because on paper NATO looks overwhelming.
Millions of military personnel.
Thousands of aircraft.
Enormous combined defence budgets.
Hundreds of F-35s.
Patriot.
THAAD.
Aegis.
Two British aircraft carriers.
Eleven American carriers.
Some of the most technologically sophisticated weapons ever built.
An economy vastly larger than Russia's.
Look at those headline figures and the conclusion seems obvious:
Russia couldn't possibly compete with NATO.
Except wars aren't fought with headline figures.
They're fought with the fraction of those figures that can actually turn up, work, shoot, survive and be replaced.
So throughout this analysis I'm going to apply a very simple test:
REAL COMBAT POWER =
equipment that actually works
× personnel who can actually deploy it
× ammunition available
× surviving infrastructure
× logistics
× replacement capacity
× coalition participation
× political authorisation.
Apply those filters and NATO's apparent advantage begins shrinking remarkably quickly.
And before somebody says it:
YES, AMERICA IS INCLUDED.
But I'm not going to count the entire US military as though every American soldier, aircraft, carrier and missile scattered around the planet magically teleports to Poland on Day One.
America has commitments in Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.
More importantly, the recent war with Iran has given us something extremely valuable:
a real-world stress test.
We no longer need to guess how quickly an advanced Western military might expend its precision weapons and missile interceptors in a serious missile war.
We've just watched it happen.
And the results should make European politicians considerably less relaxed about threatening a confrontation with Russia.
HEADLINE TROOP NUMBERS ARE NOT ARMIES THAT CAN FIGHT
France has roughly 200,000 military personnel.
That sounds formidable.
But France's demonstrated short-notice contribution for NATO's eastern theatre is measured in the thousands, not hundreds of thousands.
France has been working towards being able to deploy a division of roughly 20,000–25,000 personnel, with the larger capability itself an objective rather than something that magically appears because France employs 200,000 military personnel.
Germany similarly has roughly 180,000+ active personnel.
Yet Germany's objective of fielding two fully equipped combat divisions remains something being built towards.
Britain is another useful example.
The regular British Army is roughly 70,000.
That does not mean Britain can put 70,000 soldiers into sustained combat against Russia.
A traditional maximum-effort British deployment might be around 30,000, but even that doesn't mean 30,000 can remain permanently at the front.
For every formation continuously deployed, other personnel are:
training;
recovering;
maintaining equipment;
moving supplies;
providing medical support;
or preparing to replace it.
A crude three-to-one rotation immediately turns a 30,000 maximum deployment into something closer to 10,000 continuously sustainable personnel, before examining how many are actually close-combat troops.
Italy illustrates the same distinction.
Its contribution to Steadfast Dart 2026 was roughly 3,000 Army personnel.
That isn't Italy's theoretical maximum.
But it is evidence of something much more useful than the number printed beside “Italian Armed Forces” on Wikipedia:
what actually deployed.
NATO itself recognises this problem.
Its Force Model broadly aims at approximately:
100,000 troops available within 10 days
another ~200,000 within roughly 10–30 days
and progressively larger forces over 30–180 days.
That sounds impressive until you notice what it means.
The world's supposedly overwhelmingly superior military alliance does not have its entire paper army available on Day One.
Mobilisation takes time.
National governments have to release forces.
Equipment has to work.
Units have to move.
Ports and railways have to function.
Fuel has to arrive.
Ammunition has to follow.
And Russia gets a vote in every one of those processes.
RUSSIA STARTS FROM A VERY DIFFERENT POSITION
Russia's armed forces have now been authorised at roughly 1.51 million servicemen.
More importantly, Russia already maintains several hundred thousand personnel in and around the Ukrainian theatre.
Exact figures vary and should not be treated as gospel.
Russian claims have put the number around 700,000.
Other intelligence assessments have produced ranges broadly around 600,000–700,000.
The exact number matters less than the strategic reality:
Russia already has an enormous land force operating in the theatre where a NATO-Russia continental war would occur.
It doesn't need to build the institutional machinery for a major European land war from scratch.
It's already fighting one.
It's already mobilising.
Already recruiting.
Already replacing equipment.
Already moving ammunition.
Already repairing vehicles.
Already adapting tactics.
Already operating drones and electronic warfare at enormous scale.
Already manufacturing weapons while those weapons are being consumed.
That does NOT mean Russia is invincible.
It isn't.
Nor does it mean NATO couldn't ultimately mobilise vastly greater resources.
It could.
But “could eventually mobilise” and “can fight tonight” are completely different measurements.
AND RUSSIAN LOSSES ACTUALLY DEMONSTRATE SOMETHING IMPORTANT
Casualty figures in this war are politically weaponised, so I don't simply accept Ukrainian or Russian government numbers.
Independent Russian-record-based work by Mediazona and Meduza has nevertheless estimated Russian military deaths in the hundreds of thousands.
That is an appalling human cost.
But militarily it demonstrates something uncomfortable:
Russia has absorbed enormous losses and still maintains a huge army in the field.
That is force regeneration.
A military isn't measured solely by whether it suffers casualties.
In a prolonged war the critical question becomes:
Can it replace them faster than its combat power collapses?
For several years Russia has demonstrated that it can replace enough personnel and equipment to continue fighting.
That matters far more in a long war than the number of tanks or soldiers somebody had on a spreadsheet on Day One.
THEN THERE IS COMBAT EXPERIENCE
European NATO forces contain excellent professional soldiers.
Many have combat experience from Iraq, Afghanistan and other operations.
But those wars were not remotely comparable with the industrial battlefield that has developed in Ukraine.
Russia now has years of institutional experience fighting under:
mass drone surveillance;
constant electronic warfare;
GPS disruption;
artillery saturation;
ballistic and cruise missile attack;
FPV drone attack;
rapid tactical adaptation;
camouflage and deception;
large-scale mine warfare;
and contested airspace.
Europe has observers, instructors, exercises and Ukrainian lessons.
Russia has learned many of those lessons by having formations destroyed when it got them wrong.
That is a brutal form of institutional learning.
SO ALREADY THE FIRST HEADLINE NUMBER FALLS APART
The relevant comparison isn't:
“NATO has X million troops and Russia has Y million.”
It is:
How many properly equipped combat formations can each side put into the relevant theatre immediately?
Then:
How many after 10 days?
30 days?
Six months?
One year?
And:
How quickly can losses be replaced?
That's the methodology I'm going to use throughout this thread.
Because exactly the same illusion appears when we move from troops to aircraft.
NATO possesses enormous numbers of aircraft.
But possessing an aircraft does not mean it is:
mission capable;
fully mission capable;
armed;
crewed;
based somewhere survivable;
supported by tankers and AWACS;
or capable of maintaining sortie rates after its runway, fuel storage and maintenance facilities start receiving missiles.
And that's where the numbers become considerably more uncomfortable.
The F-35 is a perfect example.
US fleetwide mission-capable rates have fallen dramatically — from roughly 67% in 2021 to about 44% in 2025, while fully mission-capable rates fell from around 38% to approximately 25%.
That doesn't mean European fleets necessarily have identical readiness rates.
It demonstrates why:
“NATO owns 100 aircraft”
does not mean:
“NATO has 100 combat aircraft available.”
Using those US fleetwide rates purely illustratively:
100 aircraft on paper
becomes roughly:
44 mission capable
and only:
25 fully mission capable.
And even that is before anybody attacks the airfield.
Which brings us to perhaps the biggest lesson of Iran.
The United States possessed overwhelming air and naval superiority.
Yet Iranian missiles still damaged US military infrastructure.
Satellite imagery verified damage or destruction to more than 200 structures or pieces of equipment across multiple US military sites.
That included the ecosystem that actually makes air power work:
hangars;
warehouses;
fuel infrastructure;
air-defence equipment;
communications;
radomes;
and aircraft.
Iran did not defeat the United States.
US operations continued.
That's not the point.
The point is that a much weaker opponent demonstrated that you don't necessarily have to shoot hundreds of fighters out of the sky.
Destroy the runway.
Hit the fuel.
Damage maintenance.
Blind the radar.
Hit the tanker.
Disrupt communications.
And perfectly intact aircraft start becoming very expensive ornaments.
Russia has substantially greater long-range strike capability than Iran.
So the correct question isn't:
“How many NATO aircraft exist?”
It is:
“How many sorties can NATO generate on Day 1, Day 7, Day 30 and Day 90 while its bases are themselves under sustained attack?”
That is a completely different calculation.
And in Part 2, I'll apply exactly the same test to NATO's supposedly overwhelming missile and air-defence advantage.
Because Iran has just provided an extraordinary real-world benchmark:
how quickly America actually fires Patriot and THAAD interceptors when its forces are genuinely under missile attack.
And once you compare that firing rate with:
how many interceptors NATO actually has;
how many European bases and logistical nodes need protecting;
the fact that one Patriot launch does NOT equal one successful interception;
and
how slowly those missiles are actually manufactured...
the word “stockpile” starts taking on a very different meaning.
🧵 CONTINUED — 2/5
#NATO #Russia #Ukraine #Geopolitics #Defence #MilitaryAnalysis
🧵 NATO IS A PAPER TIGER — 1/5
For months we have heard increasingly confident language from European and NATO leaders about confronting Russia, defeating Russia, preparing for war with Russia and massively expanding military power.
The rhetoric is extraordinary.
But there is a much simpler question that rarely gets asked:
What could NATO actually put into a conventional war against Russia TODAY — and how long could it keep fighting?
Because on paper NATO looks overwhelming.
Millions of military personnel.
Thousands of aircraft.
Enormous combined defence budgets.
Hundreds of F-35s.
Patriot.
THAAD.
Aegis.
Two British aircraft carriers.
Eleven American carriers.
Some of the most technologically sophisticated weapons ever built.
An economy vastly larger than Russia's.
Look at those headline figures and the conclusion seems obvious:
Russia couldn't possibly compete with NATO.
Except wars aren't fought with headline figures.
They're fought with the fraction of those figures that can actually turn up, work, shoot, survive and be replaced.
So throughout this analysis I'm going to apply a very simple test:
REAL COMBAT POWER =
equipment that actually works
× personnel who can actually deploy it
× ammunition available
× surviving infrastructure
× logistics
× replacement capacity
× coalition participation
× political authorisation.
Apply those filters and NATO's apparent advantage begins shrinking remarkably quickly.
And before somebody says it:
YES, AMERICA IS INCLUDED.
But I'm not going to count the entire US military as though every American soldier, aircraft, carrier and missile scattered around the planet magically teleports to Poland on Day One.
America has commitments in Europe, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.
More importantly, the recent war with Iran has given us something extremely valuable:
a real-world stress test.
We no longer need to guess how quickly an advanced Western military might expend its precision weapons and missile interceptors in a serious missile war.
We've just watched it happen.
And the results should make European politicians considerably less relaxed about threatening a confrontation with Russia.
HEADLINE TROOP NUMBERS ARE NOT ARMIES THAT CAN FIGHT
France has roughly 200,000 military personnel.
That sounds formidable.
But France's demonstrated short-notice contribution for NATO's eastern theatre is measured in the thousands, not hundreds of thousands.
France has been working towards being able to deploy a division of roughly 20,000–25,000 personnel, with the larger capability itself an objective rather than something that magically appears because France employs 200,000 military personnel.
Germany similarly has roughly 180,000+ active personnel.
Yet Germany's objective of fielding two fully equipped combat divisions remains something being built towards.
Britain is another useful example.
The regular British Army is roughly 70,000.
That does not mean Britain can put 70,000 soldiers into sustained combat against Russia.
A traditional maximum-effort British deployment might be around 30,000, but even that doesn't mean 30,000 can remain permanently at the front.
For every formation continuously deployed, other personnel are:
training;
recovering;
maintaining equipment;
moving supplies;
providing medical support;
or preparing to replace it.
A crude three-to-one rotation immediately turns a 30,000 maximum deployment into something closer to 10,000 continuously sustainable personnel, before examining how many are actually close-combat troops.
Italy illustrates the same distinction.
Its contribution to Steadfast Dart 2026 was roughly 3,000 Army personnel.
That isn't Italy's theoretical maximum.
But it is evidence of something much more useful than the number printed beside “Italian Armed Forces” on Wikipedia:
what actually deployed.
NATO itself recognises this problem.
Its Force Model broadly aims at approximately:
100,000 troops available within 10 days
another ~200,000 within roughly 10–30 days
and progressively larger forces over 30–180 days.
That sounds impressive until you notice what it means.
The world's supposedly overwhelmingly superior military alliance does not have its entire paper army available on Day One.
Mobilisation takes time.
National governments have to release forces.
Equipment has to work.
Units have to move.
Ports and railways have to function.
Fuel has to arrive.
Ammunition has to follow.
And Russia gets a vote in every one of those processes.
RUSSIA STARTS FROM A VERY DIFFERENT POSITION
Russia's armed forces have now been authorised at roughly 1.51 million servicemen.
More importantly, Russia already maintains several hundred thousand personnel in and around the Ukrainian theatre.
Exact figures vary and should not be treated as gospel.
Russian claims have put the number around 700,000.
Other intelligence assessments have produced ranges broadly around 600,000–700,000.
The exact number matters less than the strategic reality:
Russia already has an enormous land force operating in the theatre where a NATO-Russia continental war would occur.
It doesn't need to build the institutional machinery for a major European land war from scratch.
It's already fighting one.
It's already mobilising.
Already recruiting.
Already replacing equipment.
Already moving ammunition.
Already repairing vehicles.
Already adapting tactics.
Already operating drones and electronic warfare at enormous scale.
Already manufacturing weapons while those weapons are being consumed.
That does NOT mean Russia is invincible.
It isn't.
Nor does it mean NATO couldn't ultimately mobilise vastly greater resources.
It could.
But “could eventually mobilise” and “can fight tonight” are completely different measurements.
AND RUSSIAN LOSSES ACTUALLY DEMONSTRATE SOMETHING IMPORTANT
Casualty figures in this war are politically weaponised, so I don't simply accept Ukrainian or Russian government numbers.
Independent Russian-record-based work by Mediazona and Meduza has nevertheless estimated Russian military deaths in the hundreds of thousands.
That is an appalling human cost.
But militarily it demonstrates something uncomfortable:
Russia has absorbed enormous losses and still maintains a huge army in the field.
That is force regeneration.
A military isn't measured solely by whether it suffers casualties.
In a prolonged war the critical question becomes:
Can it replace them faster than its combat power collapses?
For several years Russia has demonstrated that it can replace enough personnel and equipment to continue fighting.
That matters far more in a long war than the number of tanks or soldiers somebody had on a spreadsheet on Day One.
THEN THERE IS COMBAT EXPERIENCE
European NATO forces contain excellent professional soldiers.
Many have combat experience from Iraq, Afghanistan and other operations.
But those wars were not remotely comparable with the industrial battlefield that has developed in Ukraine.
Russia now has years of institutional experience fighting under:
mass drone surveillance;
constant electronic warfare;
GPS disruption;
artillery saturation;
ballistic and cruise missile attack;
FPV drone attack;
rapid tactical adaptation;
camouflage and deception;
large-scale mine warfare;
and contested airspace.
Europe has observers, instructors, exercises and Ukrainian lessons.
Russia has learned many of those lessons by having formations destroyed when it got them wrong.
That is a brutal form of institutional learning.
SO ALREADY THE FIRST HEADLINE NUMBER FALLS APART
The relevant comparison isn't:
“NATO has X million troops and Russia has Y million.”
It is:
How many properly equipped combat formations can each side put into the relevant theatre immediately?
Then:
How many after 10 days?
30 days?
Six months?
One year?
And:
How quickly can losses be replaced?
That's the methodology I'm going to use throughout this thread.
Because exactly the same illusion appears when we move from troops to aircraft.
NATO possesses enormous numbers of aircraft.
But possessing an aircraft does not mean it is:
mission capable;
fully mission capable;
armed;
crewed;
based somewhere survivable;
supported by tankers and AWACS;
or capable of maintaining sortie rates after its runway, fuel storage and maintenance facilities start receiving missiles.
And that's where the numbers become considerably more uncomfortable.
The F-35 is a perfect example.
US fleetwide mission-capable rates have fallen dramatically — from roughly 67% in 2021 to about 44% in 2025, while fully mission-capable rates fell from around 38% to approximately 25%.
That doesn't mean European fleets necessarily have identical readiness rates.
It demonstrates why:
“NATO owns 100 aircraft”
does not mean:
“NATO has 100 combat aircraft available.”
Using those US fleetwide rates purely illustratively:
100 aircraft on paper
becomes roughly:
44 mission capable
and only:
25 fully mission capable.
And even that is before anybody attacks the airfield.
Which brings us to perhaps the biggest lesson of Iran.
The United States possessed overwhelming air and naval superiority.
Yet Iranian missiles still damaged US military infrastructure.
Satellite imagery verified damage or destruction to more than 200 structures or pieces of equipment across multiple US military sites.
That included the ecosystem that actually makes air power work:
hangars;
warehouses;
fuel infrastructure;
air-defence equipment;
communications;
radomes;
and aircraft.
Iran did not defeat the United States.
US operations continued.
That's not the point.
The point is that a much weaker opponent demonstrated that you don't necessarily have to shoot hundreds of fighters out of the sky.
Destroy the runway.
Hit the fuel.
Damage maintenance.
Blind the radar.
Hit the tanker.
Disrupt communications.
And perfectly intact aircraft start becoming very expensive ornaments.
Russia has substantially greater long-range strike capability than Iran.
So the correct question isn't:
“How many NATO aircraft exist?”
It is:
“How many sorties can NATO generate on Day 1, Day 7, Day 30 and Day 90 while its bases are themselves under sustained attack?”
That is a completely different calculation.
And in Part 2, I'll apply exactly the same test to NATO's supposedly overwhelming missile and air-defence advantage.
Because Iran has just provided an extraordinary real-world benchmark:
how quickly America actually fires Patriot and THAAD interceptors when its forces are genuinely under missile attack.
And once you compare that firing rate with:
how many interceptors NATO actually has;
how many European bases and logistical nodes need protecting;
the fact that one Patriot launch does NOT equal one successful interception;
and
how slowly those missiles are actually manufactured...
the word “stockpile” starts taking on a very different meaning.
🧵 CONTINUED — 2/5
#NATO #Russia #Ukraine #Geopolitics #Defence #MilitaryAnalysis
Germany has paid approximately $95 BILLION in compensation to victims of Nazi persecution since 1952, including Holocaust survivors, and continues to pay billions more in compensation and welfare support.
Meanwhile, Black Americans have never received a nationwide federal reparations programme for slavery.
Why is compensation recognised for one historical atrocity but still denied for another? 🤡
“Britain is back,” declares Wes Streeting.
Really? We’ve had to turn to a GERMAN defence company, Rheinmetall, to restore a manufacturing capability Britain lost 20 years ago.
245 gun barrels and 50 breeches a year, under foreign corporate ownership.
British soil doesn’t automatically mean British sovereignty.
This isn’t proof of industrial independence. It’s a reminder of how much we’ve lost.
#UKDefence #Rheinmetall #BritishIndustry
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