Dr @ShashiTharoor, the speeches may have been dignified. The process was not constitutional. Gravitas of tone cannot cure a defect of form.
Article 324(5) allows a Chief Election Commissioner to be removed only as a Supreme Court judge is: by Parliament, after inquiry into proved misbehaviour or incapacity. The opposition tried that route this year. The presiding officers of both Houses declined to admit the notices. That decision can be contested. What cannot be done is to lose on the constitutional track, stage a substitute “impeachment” at a party president’s residence, and call it the exercise of a constitutional right.
Protest is a right. Free speech is a right. A self-convened tribunal pronouncing a verdict on a constitutional functionary is neither. It is political theatre in a borrowed robe.
The accused was absent. No evidence was tested. The verdict was known before the first speech, since the event was billed as a curtain raiser for a rally. When prosecution, jury and audience are the same people, sober speeches do not make it a trial. Your own praise assesses the oratory, not the proof.
Nor were avenues of dissent blocked. The event was held, televised and amplified, and a Ramlila Maidan rally followed. A denied venue is an administrative grievance, not silenced dissent. Allegations of electoral fraud have real forums: sworn affidavits, election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, and the Supreme Court. Grave charges belong where they can be cross-examined.
The deeper cost falls on the umpire. Criticise the Election Commission, audit it, reform the 2023 appointment law. But brand the referee a criminal before any competent finding, and voters learn that results are legitimate only when their side wins. That lesson will not spare the opposition’s own victories.
In constitutional affairs, “unprecedented” is not a compliment. If the evidence exists, the Constitution offers a courtroom and a Parliament. A drawing room is neither.
The Air Chief Marshal has served the nation with distinction and the Service will rightly honour him as it has honoured every Chief before him. What deserves reflection is the volume of public commentary that now surrounds senior officers in uniform. A Chief is selected because he has earned it; many of his predecessors fought wars, carried great responsibility and retired quietly, with no campaign of praise or criticism in their wake. Uniformed leadership is not a popularity contest, and a Chief is not a "people's man" in the political sense; he belongs to the Service and to the nation, not to any constituency. When an officer's career, personal life and conduct become material for social media, both admirers and those with agendas pull him into a public arena he never chose and cannot answer back from. The public is entitled to know who has taken over and who has handed over command. Beyond that, the record of an officer's service is best left where it has always been kept: in the Service and in the quiet respect of those who served alongside him.
@cash19701@nnojha@ajaishukla Your disagreement doesn't really matter. Don't know your credentials. Please lay off. Don't jump into this uninvited and ill-informed.
you cannot have it both ways. If strategy is incoherent and the commander must "take his call", he is no longer confining himself to military issues. He is setting national objectives, which is precisely what he is not mandated to do. A general who fills a political vacuum on his own is not being decisive. He is overstepping.
Commanders take their call every day, at the level that is theirs: plans, tactics, risk, men and machines. No call on the ground can conjure squadrons that were never sanctioned, equipment that was never procured, or an end-state that was never defined. Those decisions are made years earlier, in Delhi, not in the field.
Nor is pointing out a lack of direction "cribbing". Telling the government, on record and before the decision, what can and cannot be achieved with what has been given is the commander's professional duty. Silence in that room is not loyalty. It is dereliction.
We learnt this the hard way in 1962, when commanders were pushed into a policy they were not equipped to execute and then carried the blame for it. Accountability without authority is not accountability. It is scapegoating.
The gravest flaw in this argument is judging military leadership without examining the quality of national strategy.
Gallant majors do not necessarily become hesitant generals; strategic command demands more than tactical courage. A major may capture a hill; a general must assess whether it advances national objectives and at what strategic cost.
War is not aggression for its own sake; it is the use of force to achieve political objectives. In India's nuclearised neighbourhood, restraint can reflect strategic wisdom, just as excessive caution can betray indecision.
The crucial question is: who defines the objectives, provides the means and accepts responsibility when these do not align?
Generals must offer frank advice and exercise sound judgement. But political leadership determines national objectives, while military professionals advise on feasibility and execute lawful decisions. No commander can compensate for incoherent strategy or inadequate capabilities through courage alone.
A leadership deficit cannot be diagnosed simply because generals do not act. A strategic deficit emerges when political objectives, military capabilities and intended outcomes are disconnected.
India needs decisive commanders and a national security establishment that translates military professionalism into strategic advantage. That is where leadership must be tested and accountability must begin.
Respectfully, “who decides” is not an administrative detail; it is the central strategic question. The authority to allocate air power determines whether it is employed to meet a theatre commander’s immediate objectives or conserved and concentrated to achieve the national military objective across theatres. That distinction can decide the outcome of a campaign, particularly when scarce air assets must be apportioned between competing fronts.
The question is not whether an air component under a Theatre Commander or air staff under the CDS can make the right decisions. Of course they can. The question is whether the proposed command architecture guarantees the same freedom to reallocate air power nationally when the priorities of individual theatres conflict.
A theatre commander is understandably accountable for his theatre. The Air Chief must consider the entire air campaign. These are different responsibilities, and assuming they will always produce identical priorities is not a doctrinal argument.
Nor is Operation Sindoor an argument against the IAF’s position. The CAS has cited it precisely because centralised allocation and timely reallocation under a joint architecture proved decisive. The pertinent question is how to preserve that proven capability within the new structure.
And yes, systems evolve; mistakes are inevitable in any major reform. But in war, mistakes in command architecture can carry consequences that no subsequent organisational learning can reverse. We should not confuse adaptability with avoidable operational risk.
The IAF is not asking for immunity from reform. It is asking that the reform be designed around the employment of air power, rather than expecting air power to conform to an organisational template. If the proposed model can demonstrably preserve centralised control, cross-theatre flexibility and rapid execution, let the doctrine and war-gaming establish that case.
Jointness is the objective. Theatreisation is a means; not an article of faith.
With respect, the argument assumes that changing the command structure leaves the operational equation largely unchanged. That is precisely what needs closer examination.
Basing aircraft at different locations is not the same as permanently allocating combat power to geographical theatres. Air power derives much of its value from the ability to concentrate effects where the situation demands, even across theatre boundaries. With limited squadrons and a two-front contingency, this is an operational consideration, not merely an institutional concern.
Nor is the question simply whether the CDS or the Air Chief makes the final decision. It is about the decision-making framework, the competing priorities of theatre commanders, and who can reallocate scarce air assets when one theatre's immediate requirements conflict with national-level priorities.
Operation Sindoor, as the CAS has pointed out, demonstrated the value of centralised allocation and timely reallocation of critical resources within a joint architecture. That experience should inform theatreisation, not be overlooked in the rush to implement it.
The IAF is not arguing against jointness; it is questioning whether a geographically compartmentalised command structure is necessarily the best way to achieve it. The distinction matters.
A phased transition, with clearly defined authority for asset allocation, operational control and cross-theatre tasking, is worth exploring. But a five-year timeline cannot, by itself, resolve the underlying doctrinal question.
The objective should not be to protect any service's turf, nor to transfer authority for the sake of reform. It should be to build a genuinely joint system in which theatre commanders can fight their battles effectively while national-level air power remains available to serve the larger war effort. That is a professional concern deserving debate, not dismissal as a plea for the status quo.
Two go-arounds do not constitute an aviation incident, let alone evidence that something is wrong at Delhi Airport.
From an aviation safety standpoint, a go-around is a standard, predefined manoeuvre integral to normal flight operations. An unstable approach, changing wind conditions, wind shear, runway occupancy or traffic sequencing may necessitate discontinuing an approach.
A go-around is not a failure to land; it is a deliberate safety decision. Pilots are trained to discontinue an approach whenever the required safety criteria are not met, rather than continue an approach that could compromise safety.
The correct course of action is to go around, reassess the situation and attempt another approach when conditions permit. This is precisely how established procedures and safety margins are designed to work.
Two consecutive go-arounds do not, by themselves, establish an airport safety issue or an abnormal event. Without verified operational information, drawing conclusions is premature.
In aviation, exercising a safety procedure should inspire confidence, not trigger speculation and unnecessary alarm.
@GauravT71548031 , a needed corrective. Having read both threads, the honest view is that @JaidevJamwal has written the cost ledger and you have written the dividend ledger. Both are true. A view from someone who flew fighters but never the Sukhoi.
@JaidevJamwal 's numbers are hard to argue with, and most of them come from the government's own answers in Parliament. Engine failures, single-engine recoveries, FBW groundings, availability stuck near 50 per cent for over a decade: that happened, and the people who kept those jets flying know it better than any of us.
Look closely at what he blames, though: a "pot-pourri of incompatible systems forced into a single platform". That is exactly what you are crediting. The pain and the gain are the same decision. India chose to put its own mission computers at the centre of a Russian airframe carrying French, Israeli and other kit. That choice caused years of reboots and integration headaches and it is also why the Sukhoi carries BrahMos-A and why Astra and Rudram were proven from it first. A platform you can't get inside is a platform you can't arm with your own weapons. The tuition was expensive, but India owns the education.
On "what was the alternative" question, the calendar matters. The deal was signed in 1996. Pokhran came in 1998, along with sanctions. A Western-sourced heavy fighter fleet would have been hit far harder than delays in Russian spares. Even the stopgap Su-30Ks Jaidev mentions were eventually traded back for MKIs, so that money wasn't simply lost.
Tactically, the aircraft was never meant to win a one-on-one beauty contest. Its value is persistence, reach and payload: a CAP held far out over the IOR, deep strike on long legs, and a big radar quarterbacking lighter fighters inside an AEW&C and datalink network. Over our distances, on two fronts, loiter time is combat power.
Where Jaidev lands his best punch, and where we should all agree, is sustainment. Availability only moved when a Defence Minister intervened personally. The MLU still hasn't started more than two decades into service. That isn't a design flaw. It is an institutional one, shared by the IAF, MoD, HAL and the OEM.
That is also the lesson for the Mk1A. Buying or building the jet is the easy part. Owning the integration and funding the upkeep is what decides whether a fleet is worth the money.
Value for money? Yes, but paid in instalments of pain. And the bill for the upgrade is still unpaid.
Delicious piece. Only the Norwegians could turn "well" into a weapon of mass deliberation.
A prize founded by a dynamite merchant, run by five people with wet shoes, still shows more moral clarity than most capitals with nuclear arsenals. Alfred bought his redemption with a will. Some are now trying to buy theirs with a press release.
In aviation we say the pilot who keeps announcing what a brilliant landing he's about to make is the one to worry about. The good ones just land. Justice Pillay spent fifty years landing, without once reaching for the PA.
The committee didn't need to say no. It only said "well." Somewhere, a very powerful man is still waiting for the translation.
𝗖𝗢𝗠𝗠𝗔𝗡𝗗 𝗕𝗬 𝗗𝗘𝗦𝗜𝗚𝗡: 𝗛𝗢𝗪 𝗔𝗜𝗥 𝗙𝗢𝗥𝗖𝗘𝗦 𝗚𝗥𝗢𝗪 𝗖𝗛𝗜𝗘𝗙𝗦
On 31 Oct, Air Marshal Ashutosh Dixit becomes India’s 29th Chief of the Air Staff; proof that great leaders aren’t found, they’re built, one posting at a time. https://t.co/CR54nGudEF
Well put. The Foxbat years showed that height and speed once bought near-impunity, and the IAF was right to let satellites take that role. The layer between 20 and 100 km is no longer empty sky, though. HAPS, stratospheric balloons, hypersonic glide vehicles and future spaceplanes will turn it into contested terrain, and our northern neighbour is investing there with intent. Having seen the S-400 up close during its field evaluation trials, I would add that denying near space depends as much on persistent sensing, tracking and a clear kill chain as on the interceptor itself. We need an owner for this domain, a doctrine to go with it, and test ranges where DRDO, industry and the Services can fail fast and learn. Your question deserves a serious answer, and soon.
With due respect, the comment misses the point the Air Cmde is making. Nobody is objecting to anyone practising their faith. Millions of devout Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and Christians live by their theology and are entirely at home in a constitutional republic. The distinction is between personal faith and political theology: a belief system that treats religious doctrine as the basis for organising the state and rejects the constitutional order itself.
That is precisely the critique of Hindutva too, and fair enough. But consistency demands that the same yardstick be applied to political Islamism. You cannot call aversion to one politico-religious ideology secular and scrutiny of the other bias. Secularism that only cuts one way is not secularism.
The post is not about a community. It is about one individual's stated positions, in his own words, including his public speeches on cutting off the Northeast, which are on record and form part of the case against him. Pointing that out is not prejudice; it is reading what he said.
And calling the Air Cmde biased doesn't answer any of his arguments. It just changes the subject.
This isn’t engineering. This is what happens when common sense is denied entry at the gate. 😂
A socket is too high? Lower it? No, far too straightforward.
Instead, raise the washing machine, build a platform, strap it down, and turn a plug-point problem into a structural-engineering project.
Extension cord: ₹500.
MES solution: priceless.
Because at MES, even a short cable can trigger a full-scale infrastructure project.
𝗔𝗜𝗥 𝗣𝗢𝗪𝗘𝗥'𝗦 𝗡𝗘𝗪 𝗖𝗨𝗥𝗥𝗘𝗡𝗖𝗬
Op Sindoor proved it: the network, not the numbers, now decides the fight. An aircraft is only as sharp as the sensors feeding it. https://t.co/o7ss8WdTsT
Since 9/11, cockpit entry has been strengthened. : armoured doors, screening, marshals. When the threat is one of the two pilots, those defences protect him, not us. Germanwings taught us this in 2015, and we only patched it.
The door is the heart of it. A pilot inside can deny entry to the cabin. Capt Machchhar, badly wounded, stayed conscious long enough to release it. Had he blacked out, nobody could have got in. There is and emergency entry code available with lead cabin crew but for that she needs to know the need if entering the cockpit.
On the knife, caution. We do not yet know what the weapon was or how it got on board. Crew in Dubai are screened like passengers, so the easy assumption that he smuggled a knife through may well be wrong. The cockpit already carries a crash axe by regulation. If the weapon came from inside the aircraft, no checkpoint anywhere could have stopped it. Screening keeps threats out of the aeroplane; a pilot is already inside the circle of trust.
To be honest about the outcome too: a conscious victim, brave passengers, off-duty pilots on board. Take away any one and we would be counting the dead. That is luck, not a safety system.
If the cause is mental illness, the fix is a culture where pilots can speak up without losing their careers.
If it is ideology, it is a vetting failure. Different problems, different cures.
And to those pushing single-pilot cockpits: here one pilot turned rogue, and the other saved everyone.
On motive, wait for the investigators. On the Captain, no waiting is needed.
Salute to Capt Smit Machchhar.
According to reports, at FL340 aboard flydubai FZ1073, he was stabbed by his first officer and kept fighting for the aircraft as it dropped over 17,000 ft in under two minutes. Off-duty pilots, cabin crew and passengers then restrained the attacker, and the aircraft landed safely at Tabuk. All 180 on board survived.
Three lessons from the flight deck:
The reinforced door stops threats from outside, not inside.
The outcome hinged on qualified pilots happening to be on board. Luck is not a safety system.
Fitness for duty and peer support deserve the same rigour as checkrides.
Wishing the captain a full recovery. India should be proud of him.
#FZ1073 #AviationSafety #flydubai