Whenever you encounter an unnecessary insult embedded in an argument, remember that it serves no purpose in rational discourse and merely reveals the speaker’s attempt to compensate for a perceived threat.
The dread that arises from the inadequacy of purely rationalist deductions gives rise to a psychological phenomenon in which anarchists—both anarcho-capitalists and communists—invariably cope with their lack of argument by turning to derision. This derision functions as a
Supposedly pro-capitalist “Objectivists” led by neoconservative Peter Schwartz & sundry cohorts at the Ayn Rand Institute, who hated Reagan and have long trashed the GOP while plumping for Democrats, by now are to the left of long-time Democrat strategist James Carville. JC today says vote GOP because Dems have welcomed socialists; PS says vote only for Dems cuz unlike Republicans they are “anti-authoritarian” cuz they now welcome not only Socialists but Islamists.
Everything this guy says as an attack against Oism can be applied to himself but he doesnt gaf. He is a charlatan who had hours longs discussion with Grok that amount to “well i just dont grant Oism and prefer Kantism.” FUCK OFF
“Importantly, in Objectivism evil isn’t a mystical concept. It simply means highly immoral. In that regard, both Kant and his influence can be viewed as evil.”
No one cares. Objectivists aren’t entitled to objectively valid moral judgments. Just their own idiosyncratic opinions.
"If analyzing Andrew Tate's case isn't part of your value hierarchy, your status as an Objectivist is called into question."
This isn't just virtue signaling, it's special pleading. Countless cases threaten individual rights, yet the Tate brothers' is treated as the one that
He overlooks the fact that an AI's agreement isn't independent evidence. Ironically, he closes the discussion by denouncing dogma, having just treated Grok's assimilation of his framework as validation of what he already believed.
If I push back on an AI using Framework A and have it evaluate Framework B (which is mutually exclusive with A) through Framework A's lens, I can get it to produce the same critique against Framework B as well.
@KirillMagidson inanimate objects. I am talking about men with volitional free will. For example, a person can theoretically choose differently among trivial options under identical circumstances, because it is an unimportant decision and is rooted in his nature to initiate a new chain of events
Yes. Assuming there is an issue, you can either dispute a premise or show that the form of the argument is invalid. But when Zulu says the law of causality follows from the law of identity, 'follows' is not meant in the technical, logical sense of deductive entailment. It is a
An inference is invalid if the premises can all be true while the conclusion is false.
The counterexample is an entity whose nature is such that, in circumstances C, either action A or action B is metaphysically possible, with neither uniquely necessitated by its nature and the circumstances. Such a nature is perfectly definite and non-contradictory; nothing about it violates the law of identity.
Therefore, the derivation of deterministic causality from identity is invalid.
Zulu reads this as rejecting one of his premises. But that is precisely the point: with an invalid inference, I can grant the premises and reject the conclusion. If he wants to rule out my countermodel, he needs an additional premise saying that a complete nature and circumstances necessitate one unique action, which is the deterministic thesis he was supposed to derive.
@KirillMagidson If, under the same circumstances, several actions were possible, incompatible outcomes would have to derive from incompatible (contradictory) aspects of the entity's nature." Here, Peikoff is grounding the capacity to act in the entity's nature. Still, this passage addresses
@KirillMagidson No. That is not a concession because man’s volitional conceptual consciousness is part of his nature. It is the nature of his consciousness.
@KirillMagidson Okay, this clarifies it. (Provided a brief answer in other response.)
Volition is a capacity of consciousness by which a conscious agent initiates a causal chain through choice.
@KirillMagidson I am not changing the terminology. You are. I am telling you what concepts our words denote in our framework.
If you are asking why an entity acts according to its nature, all else being equal, it is because of the law of identity: to be is to be something. Axioms r irreducible.
@KirillMagidson What exactly are you referring to as indeterminate? Still, your account is still captured by the idea that an individual has the volition and free will to choose between alternatives.
@KirillMagidson That is not what corollary means in the technical sense it is being used by Oist. In this context, it means something is a natural consequence.
You cannot ask for proof of axioms. Axioms (and their corollaries) are the preconditions of proof.
@KirillMagidson The Oist position is merely that an entity's capacity to act is determined by its identity as the thing it is. "In circumstances C, the entity's nature may permit either A or B." Yes: a balloon can float, or it can be filled with sand and drop. The passage affirms the very thing