turtlehare

是兔子不是兔子 是龜不是龜

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

未來幾個月有重要的事情需要處理，因此將會停止更新一陣子，大概到明年夏末才有可能重新連載。這週我就把之前幾個不成一篇的想法放在這邊，替今年的2020年代風雲做一個小結。
https://t.co/1LnfW2bptO

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

@shadydoorags Technically, Anng's initial escape was partly to escape his duties as an avatar and the dogma of the air. However, in the end, he not only fulfilled his duties as an avatar but also conformed to the dogma of the air.

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

It's worth noting that the Western far-right's "worship" of Islam is usually not because they want to bring in Muslim immigrants, but because Islam does contain elements that align with their ideology. This is similar to Denmark being the European country most aligned with the Trump administration on immigration policy, yet this doesn't prevent Denmark from being one of the most anti-American countries in Europe.

[Zhongjing Liu | 劉仲敬 @LiuZhongjing]

美洲島

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

@RichardHanania @LemmyKilmi35258 What about bringing large LHC immigrants? For example, the British left-wing media certainly has excellent content, but when they try to rationalize the damage caused by the foreign LHC population, even the best intellect and writing become more ridiculous and pathetic.

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

@ChrisO_wiki @Mr_Andrew_Fox I believe that political forces attempting to introduce large-scale, low-trust immigrants are not qualified to accuse RFUK of undermining public trust.

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

@RisewireDaily A person whose father is possessed by a spirit is still human, because in rare cases of spirit possession, the physical effects appear to be non-hereditary; avatars are the best example of this.

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

@Fortune__ai @RisewireDaily Obviously, he could choose to continue running away, just like a normal air monk, but as an avatar, he cannot simply be an air monk.

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

@RichardHanania On the contrary, Richard is wildly wrong on this point. Most non-EU immigrants are approved by the Labour Party (which, according to Richard, is an EHC party), and it is precisely those anti-populist parties that bring in large numbers of low-quality immigrants.

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

It's unlikely, because denying intelligence is a core theoretical foundation of the modern left. Many left-wing scholars who support intelligence (such as Peter Singer) have ultimately admitted that the left is essentially based on belief rather than evidence. In fact, very few scientists would continue to classify themselves as politically left (or even liberal) after publicly acknowledging racial differences in IQ.

[マタラ•ワイト@Minister of Riding Duel of Pakkak Republic @MataWhite913]

支那特��左趣對政治的理解還是一如既往的胎教肄業，我們正常人通常會把抹除身份認同的強制同化政策稱作極右翼，而不是把反對這種政策，試圖回復原狀的人稱作極右翼。

無非就是困在皇漢沙文的羅網走不出來，只好用那貧瘠的知識與自己都不求甚解的左逼術語來組織語言。

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

@heisola13 I believe Roku's regret stemmed largely from his failure to recognize Sozin's genocidal tendencies rather than his expansionist tendencies. Taking part of a vast empire is one thing, but completely annihilating an entire race is quite another.

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

這就是為什麼2028國民黨沒上後，中國的極和統就會爛尾的原因之一，到2032年時，��便中國仍然存在，其資源也已經無法維持藍白兩黨的運作了，因為到那時台灣的總GDP很有可能已經是中國實質總GDP的數倍。趕走美國搞快速和統的窗口期不會超過2030年。

[印和闐 @Priest46Osiris]

20260530 越來越沒價值的中概股

2016 VS 2021 VS 2026

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

@RisewireDaily @e_fosa08 Some of Air people did escape the comet massacre, but these survivors were killed by the Fire Nation in the following years .If Anng hadn't been frozen, he could have more easily searched for and protected the survivors, making the reconstruction of Air Clan culture much easier.

[🍉𝗦𝗲𝗯𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝕂𝕐𝕆 🌿 @Seb_c_vm3]

漫游錄也不是首次，以前狂洗中國敘事，現假藉台灣出發，本質卻是華國那套殖民競爭。
核心沒變，我覺得沒什麼好捧，老招。不需看仿寫，我電腦裡有江山樓菜譜、台灣料理老資料、真實台灣人日記。
台灣人不需另一套華國幻想，換樣貌假裝日本人，嘴巴依舊騙日本殖民壞壞，兩個中國演過一堆了。

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

但美國不想打，所以實際上的結果就是美國撤離伊朗，伊朗持續保持戒嚴狀態，美伊片面宣布自己勝利，而整個戰爭不了了之，而伊朗世俗派成為最大輸家，經此一役伊朗世俗社會的形式將會就此解體，現在從伊朗大學畢業的年輕人將會是最後一批仍然傾向於世俗主義的知識份子。

[印和闐 @Priest46Osiris]

20260528 如果我是伊朗革命衛隊

很多朋友以為伊朗被美國打成這樣，一定很想停戰，趕緊把停戰條約簽一簽，先把經濟秩序恢復再說？是啦，對伊朗政府或者是伊朗這個國家來說，這個邏輯是合理的。

然而，對伊斯蘭革命衛隊來說，不是這樣；對不同地方的革命衛隊首腦來說，更不是這樣。

首先，停戰後網路服務會恢復，人民知道的越多，繼續騙的難度越大，如果能繼續斷網，什麼都是我說了算。所謂我說了算是整個區域我說了算，伊朗總統或是中央司令都不算。戰時我是A咖，停戰我是C咖。

第二，不停戰，我只要躲在無辜人民之間，美國人就不敢炸我，我的人身安全反而有保障；停戰，那麻煩了，人民要問責，沒有外敵幫忙壓著，就是地區軍頭要面對人民的憤怒！

第三，不停戰，所有人有錢出錢，有力出力，自己的現金流量表都是淨流入；如果停戰，這裡有人要修房子，那邊有橋樑要修，所有的待處理事項，都是現金淨流出。現金持續流出，那我習慣的高生活水準如何維持？

第四，不停戰，就是幾個放無人機的山洞被炸而已，反正死的都是只能聽令的基層士兵，而且，他們就算死了，至大的真主會照顧他們；停戰了，萬一改朝換代，要被處理的就是自己。

因此，如果我統領著一批地方革命衛隊，維持繼續打仗的狀態，才是對我最舒適的狀態。正所謂一分抗美，兩分敷衍中央，七分壯大自己……

停戰嗎？從革命衛隊的角度看，不划算的。

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

1918年，所有所謂的不可改變的國際地圖、慣例都改變了。別以為未來兩年不會發生類似的事情。

[Andreas Tiedtke @atiedtke1]

Wer sich fragt, wie schnell sich Dinge ändern können:

Die Hohenzollern, die Habsburger, die Romanows oder die Ottomanen regierten über 300 bis 800 Jahre.

Über Nacht verschwanden sie 1918.

Niemand hätte am 8. November 1989 auch nur einen Cent darauf gewettet, dass die DDR am nächsten Tag faktisch verschwindet.

Soziale Prozesse sind extrem nicht-linear.

Nur weil es seit etwa 80 Jahren im „Westen“ relativ stabil war, heißt das nicht, dass das noch 3 weitere Monate so bleiben müsste.

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

其實就是一個後勤系統錯置的問題，現在中國大多數的後勤能量全部都用在台海做常規軍演，而用作陸防的資源衰竭的非常多，中國完全是在賭陸地邊界已經凝固，不可能發生改變。(當然習近平其實已經隱約注意到問題了，但是他還是因為中國主義的問題拒絕在台灣讓步，堅持賭國民黨極統��在2028選上)

[Zhongjing Liu | 劉仲敬 @LiuZhongjing]

這是後勤��題。
和田物流中心的補給紀錄，從2022年以後就全部關閉了。可想而知，補給一定非常困難。很可能物流已到極限，危機時刻也無法增加了。
西寧和崇州的紀錄還有，防秋輪值部隊的兵力明顯不足，野戰部隊的補給能力不到軍改前的五個師三個月，但物流是穩定的。所以，中國目前沒有能力發動1962年規模的戰役，大部分邊界需要裁撤部隊組成的邊防警隊看守，但在危機時刻增加補給和援兵的能力還有。#時與勢都在大蜀民國一邊

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

@paloma_datgirl I think the problem is that TLOK is too short to effectively depict Bolin's growth. If TLOK were a series with twenty episodes per season, we might have gotten a few episodes dedicated to Bolin.

[turtlehare @turtlehare184]

其實就是我之前提過的，中國最終會為了將資源集中於對付台灣而放棄資助俄羅斯與伊朗。

[Ken Cao-The China Crash Chronicle @Ken_LoveTW]

Xi Betrays Putin: China-Russia Relations Begin to Fracture as Moscow Faces Economic and Wartime Crisis.

For years, the world treated the China–Russia relationship as an unstoppable anti-Western alliance. The media constantly talked about a new authoritarian bloc challenging American power and reshaping the global order. But beneath the photo ops, summit declarations, and carefully choreographed diplomacy, the cracks are becoming increasingly visible.
Russia’s economic situation is deteriorating rapidly.

According to official Russian statistics, GDP contracted 1.8% in the first two months of the year. Manufacturing and industrial production both declined. More importantly, Russia’s oil and gas revenues reportedly collapsed by 50% year-over-year in January as sanctions, weak pricing power, and lost European markets continue to squeeze Moscow’s finances.

And unlike a normal economy, Russia is currently operating under wartime conditions. That distinction matters enormously.
For the past several years, military spending temporarily masked deeper structural weaknesses in the Russian economy. Massive defense orders created an artificial wartime growth cycle. But wartime stimulus has limits. Once energy revenues fall and inflation rises, the pressure on ordinary households intensifies very quickly.

This explains why Putin’s recent trip to Beijing was so important.
His real objective was not symbolic diplomacy. It was economic survival.
Putin desperately wants China to massively increase purchases of Russian oil and natural gas to compensate for the collapse of exports to Europe after the Ukraine war. The centerpiece of this strategy is the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline — a roughly 2,600-kilometer project crossing Mongolia into China that could deliver 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, equivalent to about 12% of China’s yearly gas demand.
For Moscow, this project is about keeping the Russian war machine financially alive. But Beijing’s response has been remarkably cautious.

Despite Putin’s visit, there was still no finalized agreement on the pipeline. Negotiations continue to drag on slowly. Xi Jinping reportedly expressed willingness to “accelerate talks,” but no substantive breakthrough occurred.
And then came the most uncomfortable signal for Moscow:
Xi reportedly indicated that China may substantially increase purchases of American oil.
From Russia’s perspective, this is close to a strategic betrayal.
Because Russia today depends heavily on China and India as replacement buyers for energy exports blocked from Western markets. If China shifts even part of its energy demand toward the United States, Russia loses one of its most critical financial lifelines.
This entire episode reveals a brutal reality about geopolitics:
There are no permanent friendships between great powers. Only permanent interests. And when economic survival is at stake, even so-called “iron brotherhoods” can begin to fracture very quickly.