Nobody has broken elliptic curves. Bunker mode is about the day someone does.
Every wallet today trusts that a curve cannot be run in reverse. A quantum computer or new math could end that. On that day any public key already on chain becomes a way in. On Solana your address is your public key so it is already out there.
Our answer is to take the curve away. We put a bunker on GitHub. It is a small Solana program that locks SOL behind one time keys made from a hash alone. That is post quantum cryptography in its plainest form. It is not audited yet so treat it as an experiment.
Two more tools sit beside it. One shows whether an address has already exposed its key. The other reads the research so you can follow it without the panic.
https://t.co/MvYtZKuyeq
Try all three at https://t.co/toNOWQGqBE
Nobody has broken elliptic curves. Bunker mode is about the day someone does.
Every wallet today trusts that a curve cannot be run in reverse. A quantum computer or new math could end that. On that day any public key already on chain becomes a way in. On Solana your address is your public key so it is already out there.
Our answer is to take the curve away. We put a bunker on GitHub. It is a small Solana program that locks SOL behind one time keys made from a hash alone. That is post quantum cryptography in its plainest form. It is not audited yet so treat it as an experiment.
Two more tools sit beside it. One shows whether an address has already exposed its key. The other reads the research so you can follow it without the panic.
https://t.co/MvYtZKuyeq
Try all three at https://t.co/toNOWQGqBE
4/A vault you cannot inspect asks for faith. This one asks for a compiler.
Read the code and build it.
Then open a vault at https://t.co/xkZEUbwFjg and watch the program you just read do the work. It is still unaudited so keep the amount small.
1/ The z0s vault program is open source.
It holds SOL behind post quantum signatures in under 250 lines of Rust with an MIT license. That is short enough to read in one sitting and we would like you to.
https://t.co/aACTquWsxQ
3/You do not have to trust that the code on GitHub is the code on chain.
Build the repo and hash the result. Dump the program from Solana and hash that too. Both come out as 57bc3e6e…7d9afb.
See the program on Solscan:
https://t.co/hJNEi1J8aW
The exact commands and toolchain are in the README.
One chain is missing from this post and it is the one where the advice cannot be followed. Justin's first step is to keep your public key hidden behind a hash until you spend. Bitcoin and Ethereum allow that because an address is a hash of the key. A Solana address is the key itself. Every Solana wallet has been exposed since the day it was created and no fresh address changes that.
The way out is to stop leaning on the curve at all. A Winternitz signature is built from a hash function and nothing else. Your secret is a set of random values. Your public key is those same values hashed many times over. To sign you reveal a point partway along each chain and to forge a signature you would have to run a hash backwards. Each key signs exactly once. That is the sign then sweep habit Justin asks of large holders except here the scheme enforces it.
Solana can run this today without a fork. A program checks the signature on chain and the vault address is a hash of the one time key so the key stays hidden until its single withdrawal. This is what we build at z0s. The vault code most people share signs without a checksum and we showed that makes a signature forgeable so ours adds the standard one. It is unaudited and it covers only what sits inside the vault. What it gives you is resistance to an elliptic curve break for as long as the hash function holds.
Today I call upon the blockchain industry to calmly begin planning for "bunker mode". My personal recommendation is to set in motion a controlled mass migration of assets to fresh addresses, i.e. addresses whose pubkeys remain hidden behind a hash.
Holders, starting with large and sophisticated ones, should consider moving the bulk of their funds to addresses that have never signed a transaction. And when they do sign one, they should also move remaining funds to a new address (possibly generated from the same seed phrase).
Don't rush. While I believe there is cause for action a rushed migration would do more harm than good. Don't panic either. Moving assets to protected addresses is a simple, preventative step which does not require new cryptography or new wallets.
IMO it is now reasonable to brace for the possibility that ECDSA breaks before qday, in the worst case in months not years. By "break" I mean fast private key recovery (e.g. in one week) on available hardware (e.g. a large GPU cluster).
Recent days have been humbling for human mathematical intuition. Long-held, unquestioned hypotheses have fallen. This includes the n log(n) bound for integer multiplication and the 3SUM conjecture. In hindsight, May's unexpected disproof of the Erdős unit distance conjecture was our warning shot.
Yesterday's OpenAI drop made it clear that mathematical superintelligence is upon us. They say there are weeks where decades happen. We are about to live through weeks where centuries of mathematical progress happen. Could our magic 64-byte ECDSA signatures be too good to be true? Was it just security through obscurity all this time?
Elliptic curves feel especially vulnerable to superintelligence. Curves carry rich structure, with room for fancy tricks like Schoof, Frobenius, pairings. (By contrast, hashes are designed to minimise algebraic structure.)
Separately, as Ewin Tang can attest, an efficient quantum algorithm sometimes foreshadows an efficient classical one. We should be open to the possibility of a classical counterpart to Shor that breaks elliptic curves and RSA at once.
Also noteworthy is the striking under-representation of cryptographic breakthroughs among the 722 mathematical results OpenAI published. I've witnessed first-hand the US government censoring academic quantum cryptanalysis results. Backroom interventionism is my base case.
I urge large, sophisticated actors to lead by example. Project11's "risq list" (bitcoin-risq-list.projecteleven[.]com) is a great tracker of exposed BTC pubkeys. Binance, Bitbank, Robinhood, Bitfinex, and Tether have an opportunity to harden their cold storage. Next month I'll address institutions in London in a live Q&A (forum.ethereuminstitutional[.]org/london-2026).
Again, please do not rush. Wallets holding under 50 BTC enjoy partial cover from "Satoshi's shield", i.e. his 20K exposed addresses that hold 50 BTC each. Load-bearing signers like oracles and L2 security councils should consider rotating ECDSA pubkeys with every signed message and/or multi-signing with a hash-based schemes like SPHINCS.
Exiting bunker mode safely will require post-AI cryptography. My inclination is to go all-in on hash-based cryptography and avoid structured mathematical assumptions entirely, whether from curves, lattices, or isogenies. A single battle-tested hash (e.g. from the SHA or BLAKE families) yields plausible post-AI security.
The Ethereum roadmap on strawmap[.]org fully embraces hash-based cryptography with end-to-end formal verification as a response to the quantum threat. Those timelines must now be revisited and accelerated in light of mathematical superintelligence. I'll be pushing for maximum defensive acceleration.