WHITE HOUSE CYBER SHAKEUP: @JenGriffinFNC reports the White House Cyber Director is stepping down as JPMorgan, Visa, and Mastercard confirm a vendor data leak, the EU battles an AI cyberattack, the NSA's classified network stays down for Day 3, and CISA nominee Michael LoSapio clashes with senators.
As someone who frequently posts about Iranian missile bases, I can honestly say that I don't understand the reasoning behind this investigation.
A. Iran is a predominantly arid country (except for the region near the Caspian coast), so it's hardly surprising that it has built a large number of dams. Just last year, the country experienced a severe water crisis.
B. I can barely find any examples of missile bases deliberately constructed near dams.
C. Correlation does not necessarily imply causation. Both missile bases and dams benefit from similar topographical conditions. Mountainous terrain is well suited for dam construction, while also providing natural concealment and protection for missile bases. Therefore, it wouldn't be surprising to find a missile base in the vicinity of a dam, without there necessarily being any direct connection between the two.
Boeing and the Navy are preparing to send the MQ-25 to Pax River within weeks for key tests ahead of going to the boat next year.
Also next year, the MQ-25 is set to undergo work for receiving fuel. Plus, talks of what might come next (💣?)
https://t.co/ElTqPRb034
In many respects the Flamingo resembles cruise missiles from the early Cold War era. It obviously packages poorly and is not practical for a very broad range of applications. But Ukraine can build it, and it is increasingly getting the job done.
@AtomicCoyote61 Giangreco addresses it in "The Hokkaido Myth" - see here: https://t.co/OUDaP5ZKib
Assuming the Soviets could get forces ashore at Rumori - and they would have been hard-pressed by conventional attacks, let alone the Kamikaze threat - they'd be in for an extremely rough time.
During a review of satellite imagery of Iran's Esfahan Province, I identified a previously undisclosed underground facility of unusually large scale, located approximately 50 km north of the city of Esfahan
The facility is located within a strategically significant location near the main highway connecting Tehran and Esfahan.
The complex features five tunnel entrances, divided into two sections.
Construction began in January 2026, with activity accelerating following Operation Epic Fury.
At this stage, it remains unclear what its intended purpose might be.
The sheer scale of the construction activity makes the site's development clearly visible even in Sentinel-2 satellite imagery, despite its relatively low spatial resolution.
The policy on the land boundary between the two countries has not changed. The United States reaffirms its support for the 1899 Arbitral Award that determined the land boundary between Venezuela and Guyana, which should be respected unless or until a new boundary is set by a competent legal body or with the consent of both parties.
US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth was seen running with US military personnel at Lago Circulo Militar during his visit to Venezuela, just outside the gates to Fuerte Tiuna with the defence ministry building visible in the background
#Venezuela
@star_excelsior@mhmiranusa I think that they dont expect it to succeed by itself (regardless of whether they announced it or not), so the real intention is the threat of retaliation against ME energy facilities. And as a threat it needs to be communicated
BREAKING: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague has ruled that Myanmar committed genocide against its Rohingya Muslim minority, marking the first time in the court’s history that a state has been found directly responsible for committing genocide. The landmark ruling passed by a 9-6 vote.
Daily Ukraine map thread for Thursday 19th November 2026
A couple of small Ukrainian advances marked over the past few days, including at Vesele in the Velyka Novosilka direction, and in the Borivska Andriivka direction, south of Kupiansk. Small gains, but worth recording.
Some HIMARS strikes were also observed inside Russia, in the Valuyki and Kursk directions, targeting reported troop concentrations. Ukraine continues to demonstrate that the border offers no particular sanctuary.
Meanwhile, Russian logistics are undergoing a rather unwelcome rearrangement. With the Kerch road bridge out of action, traffic is being pushed increasingly onto the land corridor via the M-14 and M-18 roads through occupied southern Ukraine. This is becoming a very target-rich environment, with numerous Ukrainian mid-range strikes observed against traffic and infrastructure along the route.
High-resolution imagery from @GarbuzYe provides an excellent look at the damage to the Kerch Bridge, including the latest strikes against the railway section. The railway remains somewhat operational, although it has now been repeatedly targeted and disrupted.
The real achievement is forcing Russian logistics onto a much more exposed and readily interdictable supply corridor. Russia can repair bridges, reroute traffic and improvise alternatives, but every additional kilometre of vulnerable road and every predictable convoy presents another opportunity for Ukraine.
Key geolocations follow:
✈️🇷🇺 I have gathered and analysed all the known Russian military aircraft losses (combat and non-combat) in the period from September 29, 2026 to November 19, 2026.
The conclusions:
▪️ In that period, the Russians lost at least 17 airframes - 13 in combat and 4 in non-combat incidents; 13 of them were fixed-wing, while 4 were helicopters. These figures represent a floor based on satellite imagery, video, official acknowledgements, and open-source tracking (including Russian milbloggers); some additional damage or unconfirmed losses may exist. The mix of combat and non-combat attrition is notable because both pathways remove hard-to-replace modern platforms from the inventory.
▪️ October 2026 stood out as one of the worst months of the war for Russian aviation: ~10 tactical aviation assets (7 Su-34, 1 Su-30SM, 1 Su-35S, 1 Su-57) + 2 Mil Mi-8 helicopters lost. This is the third-highest monthly total since February 2022, after March 2022 and June 2025. The concentration of losses on relatively modern, post-2010 airframes - rather than older Soviet-era types - made the impact more significant for frontline glide-bomb and multi-role capacity;
▪️ The period shows two overlapping pressures on Russian military aviation. First, Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities (Neptune cruise missiles and one-way attack drones) repeatedly hit air bases hundreds of kilometres inside Russia, destroying modern Su-34s used for glide-bomb missions while they were parked in the open or lightly protected. These strikes exploited gaps in airbase air defence and protective measures, forcing Russian planners to weigh the risk of further base attacks against the operational cost of dispersing or relocating aircraft farther from the front. Second, non-combat losses (Tu-95 engine failures, Su-30SM training crash, Su-57 engine-start fire, An-12 technical crash, possible friendly-fire Ka-52, Mi-8 and MiG-31) point to maintenance burdens, high sortie rates, possible quality/fuel issues, and risk during C-UAS operations.
▪️ Ukrainian intelligence assessed ~22 new Su-34s delivered in the prior year; October’s confirmed Su-34 losses alone equated to roughly a third of that output. Against a fleet estimated in the low-to-mid 140s, and with annual production still constrained, sustained monthly losses at even a fraction of the October rate would outpace replenishment and gradually reduce the number of aircraft available for high-tempo glide-bomb missions. The combination of combat and non-combat attrition therefore represents a meaningful, if incremental, constraint on Russian tactical aviation capacity.
🇬🇧🇳🇴🇺🇦The UK and Norway will jointly invest over £100 million in the construction of two advanced fast attack craft for the Ukrainian Navy.
The 30-metre vessels will be built in the UK and equipped with advanced air defence systems, missile armaments and self-defence systems.
The funding will be split equally between the two countries under the Maritime Capability Coalition.