VR1552

[PEACE TV @TvTvpeace]

🇮🇷 VS : 🇺🇸🇮🇱 - Dominique de Villepin face à Darius Rochebin :

« Quand vous étiez petit, vous jouiez au soldat et visiblement, vous étiez plus du côté des cowboys que des indiens.»
NB : Et je pense que Dominique de Villepin s'est vraiment retenu de lui dire ce qu'il pensait !

[Idriss J. Aberkane Ph.D x3 @idrissaberkane]

On est quand même passés assez vite de « on va aider le brave peuple iranien » à « on va les renvoyer à l’Âge de Pierre » je trouve…

[Gérard Araud @GerardAraud]

Israël est entraîné dans une course en avant mortifère où ne règne que la force. Cette loi, c’est la consécration officielle et décomplexée de l’apartheid.

[Linformatrice @Linformatrice1]

C'est limpide.

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

Day 5 of #Iran vs. U.S./Israel conflict (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹There is growing concern in Iran that decapitation has become a continuing war strategy rather than a one-off strike. Iranian sources believe Washington and Tel Aviv may attempt to target the heads of Iran’s government branches or members of the interim leadership council.

🔹This fear extends to whoever becomes the next Supreme Leader, with Iranian commentators referencing the precedent of Hezbollah, where Nasrallah’s successor was reportedly targeted shortly after assuming leadership.

🔹Israeli and U.S. strikes have continued across western and central Iran, including in cities such as Shiraz, Khorramabad, Kermanshah, Qom, Ahvaz, and Tabriz, with western regions and the capital remaining the primary focus.

🔹At the same time, Iranian sources acknowledges that several missile bases have been hit, including installations near Kermanshah. Damage to access points and infrastructure may be affecting the tempo of missile launches.

🔹The decline in Iranian missile strikes on Israel therefore appears linked both to operational constraints caused by Israeli air dominance and to Iran’s possible effort to conserve its remaining arsenal.

🔹Instead, Iran appears to be still prioritizing strikes on U.S. interests and regional energy infrastructure, aiming to raise the cost of the war for Washington and its regional partners.

🔹Iranian missiles have reportedly targeted additional THAAD early warning radars, including systems in Jordan following earlier strikes in Qatar and the UAE.

🔹If accurate, these attacks suggest a strategy aimed at degrading the regional missile-defense architecture that helps protect both U.S. bases and Israel.

🔹Iranian sources also claim that communications and radar infrastructure at several U.S. bases – including facilities in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – have been damaged.

🔹The objective appears to be disrupting command-and-control systems and weakening coordination between U.S. and Israeli air-defense networks.

🔹At the same time, Iranian air defenses appear to have had greater success targeting Israeli reconnaissance drones, including additional Hermes 900 systems.

🔹Some analysts suggest that improvements in Iran’s short-range air-defense network may be responsible for these successes, even though long-range systems remain degraded.

🔹On the proxy front, Iraqi armed groups have continued attacks on U.S. bases, even after heavy U.S.-Israeli strikes on PMF positions in Anbar, Diyala, and Samawah.

🔹Hezbollah has also continued its operations, including missile and drone attacks against Israeli targets in northern Israel and the Golan Heights.

🔹The Houthis, meanwhile, remain largely outside the conflict. Some Iranian sources claim they are being deliberately held in reserve as a deterrent against Saudi Arabia or the UAE joining the war.

🔹Energy warfare remains central to Iran’s strategy. QatarEnergy has declared force majeure and halted LNG production following attacks on energy infrastructure.

🔹These disruptions are reinforcing Iran’s effort to sustain pressure on global energy markets, particularly given uncertainty about how long the Strait of Hormuz can remain closed.

🔹At the same time, the war has begun to generate secondary instability across the region, including protests in Pakistan and Bahrain in response to the killing of Khamenei and the ongoing conflict.

🔹Within Iran itself, supporters of the Islamic Republic have continued to organize demonstrations calling for retaliation and resistance.

🔹Authorities are also warning against internal dissent. The chief justice has stated that any actions aligning with U.S. or Israeli objectives will be treated as wartime collaboration.

🔹Iran’s leadership is simultaneously attempting to reassure Gulf countries. President Pezeshkian and parliamentary speaker Qalibaf have emphasized that Iranian strikes are directed at U.S. forces rather than host states.

🔹Iranian officials have also reaffirmed commitment to the China-brokered 2023 Beijing agreement with Saudi Arabia, signaling an effort to prevent Gulf states from joining the conflict.

🔹China has reportedly dispatched a special envoy to the region to explore mediation options, reflecting Beijing’s concern over disruptions to energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.

🔹Meanwhile, the Kurdish issue is emerging as a major security concern for Tehran. Kurdish insurgent groups have recently formed a broader coalition, raising fears that they could be used as ground forces against the Islamic Republic.

🔹Tehran has reportedly warned KRG officials that if Kurdish groups launch attacks from Iraqi Kurdistan, Tehran could directly target the Kurdistan Regional Government itself.

🔹The war has also produced a potentially dangerous incident involving Turkey. A missile launched from Iran was intercepted by a NATO air-defense system over Hatay while reportedly heading toward the U.S. base at Incirlik.

🔹Although the intention remains unclear, one interpretation is that Iran’s decentralized missile-launch structure may increase the risk of accidental escalation or uncoordinated moves.

🔹International monitoring agencies have also assessed damage near Iranian nuclear facilities. Satellite imagery shows limited damage near the Isfahan site, but the IAEA reports that no nuclear material has been affected.

🔹Concerns remain particularly high around the Bushehr nuclear power plant, where Russian personnel operate the facility and where nearby explosions have been reported.

🔹Inside Iran, discussions have also begun about the country’s future nuclear policy after Khamenei. Some argue that the war demonstrates the need for a nuclear deterrent and that the next Supreme Leader my move toward that direction.

🔹The Assembly of Experts continues deliberations on selecting a new Supreme Leader.

🔹Overall, the fifth day of the war suggests a continuation of existing patterns rather than a dramatic shift: sustained Israeli air operations inside Iran, Iranian efforts to impose costs on U.S. interests and regional energy markets, and a widening regional and proxy dimension to the conflict.

🔹The trajectory of the conflict increasingly resembles a prolonged regional confrontation in which both sides are attempting to reshape the strategic balance over time rather than achieve rapid military victory.

[VR1552 @VRocheFR]

It is now becoming very clear that the situation in #Iran is here to last. GCC countries are now weeks away from running out of fresh water and food. With the #US and #Israel bombing indiscriminately with no long term plan, who is best positioned to win a war of attrition?

[Hamidreza Azizi @HamidRezaAz]

A Day 3 recap of the war (with focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹CENTCOM confirms that U.S. strikes on Iranian missile bases used B-1 bombers. The U.S. is trying to dismantle Iran’s fortified underground missile facilities.

🔹Iranian reports suggest Tehran has rejected multiple mediation attempts. Tehran’s apparent assessment is that it can sustain high-intensity conflict for 60-90 days, making early ceasefire acceptance strategically disadvantageous.

🔹Ali Larijani explicitly framed the war as a contest of endurance, stating Iran – unlike the United States – is prepared for a prolonged conflict. The objective appears to be altering Washington’s cost-benefit calculations over time.

🔹Iranian strategic discourse increasingly describes the conflict as a “war without rules” or a “game without red lines,” signaling deliberate unpredictability intended to reshape deterrence dynamics after leadership decapitation failed to halt Iran’s response.

🔹A related concept emerging in Iranian messaging is operating “one level above” adversary actions, i.e., delivering escalatory responses even to indirect threats in order to redefine escalation thresholds.

🔹This logic appears reflected in Iranian strikes toward British facilities in Cyprus, interpreted domestically as retaliation for London allowing U.S. access to Diego Garcia despite not joining offensive operations.

🔹One of the most consequential developments was the loss of three U.S. F-15 aircraft, initially claimed by Iran as shootdowns but later attributed to friendly fire from Kuwaiti air defenses, highlighting the growing risks of coalition battlefield congestion.

🔹Analysts close to Iranian security circles describe a layered missile strategy: first targeting radar systems, then launching low-cost drones and missiles to exhaust air-defense interceptors before deploying advanced weapons later.

🔹Iran’s continuous missile launches therefore appear designed less for immediate damage and more for attritional depletion of U.S. and Israeli defensive systems over time.

🔹Uncertainty over the size and dispersal of Iran’s advanced missile stockpiles may explain intensified U.S. and Israeli strikes against underground facilities and missile infrastructure.

🔹President Pezeshkian expanded emergency authorities across ministries and provincial administrations to ensure continuity of governance, deepening wartime decentralization already initiated before the conflict.

🔹Israel’s targeting pattern has become clearer: strikes now heavily focus on intelligence ministries, police headquarters, IRGC district bases, and internal security institutions, suggesting systematic erosion of regime coercive capacity.

��Parallel strikes against western border regions and Kurdistan province have fueled Iranian fears that external actors may seek to enable insurgent infiltration as an alternative to direct ground invasion.

🔹Iran has responded by striking areas in Iraqi Kurdistan while increasing pressure along its borders, indicating concern about a potential indirect ground dimension to the war.

🔹Iran-aligned Iraqi resistance factions – including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada – continue their operations on a limited scale, opening another attritional front against U.S. forces.

🔹Hezbollah formally confirmed its participation, firing rockets toward Haifa, though involvement remains limited due to degraded capabilities and domestic political constraints in Lebanon.

🔹Iranian sources claim prewar coordination between the Quds Force and regional partners defined phased entry into the conflict, suggesting activation of the “axis of resistance” is proceeding gradually rather than simultaneously.

🔹The IRGC has reportedly begun enforcing a de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, warning commercial vessels against transit and threatening missile strikes. This is a major escalation targeting global energy flows.

🔹Simultaneous attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure, including an Aramco facility near Ras Tanura and gas infrastructure in Qatar, indicate an effort to raise global energy prices and increase economic pressure on Washington.

🔹Iranian authorities signaled zero tolerance for dissent. IRGC intelligence warned that actions undermining stability during wartime would be treated as collaboration with the enemy, implying harsh internal repression.

🔹Negotiation signals remain contradictory. While Trump suggested a potential deal was possible, Larijani publicly rejected negotiations, reinforcing Tehran’s view that talks can occur only after strategic calculations shift.

🔹Iran’s sustained missile tempo against Israel appears designed to impose psychological as well as military pressure, keeping populations under prolonged shelter conditions while conserving firepower for a longer conflict.

🔹Overall, Day 3 shows the war evolving into simultaneous military, economic, psychological, and regional escalation far beyond bilateral confrontation.

🔹The key question now is whether expanding proxy involvement and energy warfare will force external powers into deeper participation or instead accelerate pressure for negotiated containment.

---
P.S: Not sure how long I can keep doing this!

[VR1552 @VRocheFR]

By delegating its army to NATO, Europe also delegated its sovereignty. Europe is like a hostage with Stockholm syndrome, unable to see that his “greatest ally” is in fact its greatest threat. https://t.co/vUNi3luU0i

[VR1552 @VRocheFR]

@Anto_m____ @LeTour Ce n’est pas que le col des Saisies mais les stations en dessous aussi, et je peux te dire que nous sommes effectivement des milliers.

[VR1552 @VRocheFR]

@Eurosport_FR #lesRP Ce traducteur sur Eurosport est une honte pour une chaîne de ce standing, il ne traduit rien, dit ce qu’il veut, et attribue des propos inexistants aux coureurs. N’êtes vous pas capables de recruter un bilingue en 2025?

[VR1552 @VRocheFR]

#LESRP je vous adore mais ça fait depuis le début du Tour de France que le traducteur est en freestyle complet sur chaque intervention en anglais. Il oublie la moitié des propos, et fait de l’impro totale sur le peu qu’il traduit… Est-il possible de recruter un bilingue en 2025?

[Fédé 🇫🇷 de la Lose @FFLose]

C'est historique bordel

CHALALALALALALAAAA
THIIIIIBAUT PINOOOOOT 💙🔥📣

[Fédé 🇫🇷 de la Lose @FFLose]

LALA LALA
LALA LALA

THIBAUUUUT PINOOOT

On se coucbera quand notre capo @ArthurVichot arrêtera de chanter 🔥

[RMC Sport @RMCsport]

🙏 Terrible nouvelle. Après sa grave chute survenue jeudi lors de la 5e étape du Tour de Suisse, le coureur suisse de la formation Bahraïn-Victorious Gino Mader est décédé ► https://t.co/oF7PjplPaj

[The Poll Lady @ThePollLady]

"We have jobs & pensions, they will not. We have care for our children & retired, they will not. Our children will goto school, their kids will sit in bomb shelters & basements.”

~ Former Ukrainian President, Poroshenko's old speech about bombing of Russian areas in Ukraine.

[Elixir @elixir]

Elixir’s v2 public testnet is live!

Claim testnet ELXR tokens and use them to run a validator, or delegate tokens to an existing one. With this release anyone can participate in consensus and earn testnet rewards

https://t.co/Wgs75k8NhB

[VR1552 @VRocheFR]

@renardbordelais @hugoclement @CaronAymericoff J’ajouterai que si vous aviez besoin de cela pour vous rendre compte que TikTok était une plateforme de décérébrés sevrés à l’idiotie, vous êtes déjà sûrement une cause perdue

[VR1552 @VRocheFR]

@renardbordelais @hugoclement @CaronAymericoff Hâte de voir mes petits impérialistes de la morale manifester devant l’ambassade de Chine en leur demandant d’enlever de leurs propres plateformes (TikTok = Chine) des vidéos qui les offensent. N’allez surtout jamais en Asie, au risque d’être choqués par ces barbares rétrogrades

[Damien Dole @DamienDole]

Le rugby français aujourd'hui. #ANGFRA