Harry Halem

@YorktownInst, @LSEIRDept. Author of Arsenal of Democracy (Hoover Press, November 2025), Breaking the New Axis (Naval Institute Press, April 2026)

[Harry Halem @WarIntellectual]

@RKelanic Iranian wells and general facilities are several generations older than other gulf facilities. But never let facts get in the way of an ideological argument about American strategy!

[Harry Halem @WarIntellectual]

@warmatters @thinkdefence We certainly aren’t staying home!

[Harry Halem @WarIntellectual]

@warmatters @thinkdefence The idea that British social fabric is held together only by Our NHS and public assistance is either ludicrous or an indictment of British state potential. If welfare is the social fabric then there’s no point in cosplaying geopolitics. Just stay home.

[Harry Halem @WarIntellectual]

@ka_grieco It doesn't suggest anything. One can use JASSM for targets without any air defense considerations. B-52s are missile trucks in any event. If you were right we'd have seen an air campaign akin to Rising Lion.

[Harry Halem @WarIntellectual]

@ka_grieco We were dropping JDAMs under 48 hours into this war. JASSM use is a specific targeteering question, not a strategic or operational indicator in this campaign.

[Harry Halem @WarIntellectual]

@JulianWaller Interesting piece. Found the tangible evidence for IRI Shahed tech iteration and raid complexity a bit thin though - which reinforces the overall point!

[Anton Barbashin @ABarbashin]

Highly recommend this @WarIntellectual for @RiddleRussia on the evolution of war in Ukraine and how both parties are adapting to it
https://t.co/rNXpQYr8rh

[Harry Halem @WarIntellectual]

All wars must end. But they can escalate before they end. RU still has opportunities to push Europe, which is weakest link in UA-Europe-US chain, especially with its objectives still expansive and talks largely incoherent./25

[Harry Halem @WarIntellectual]

This NYT piece on US Ukraine-Russia policy in 2025 provides a useful opportunity to take stock. Its blind spots help us think about trajectories in 2026. The US made two mistakes, overestimating Russian openness and Ukrainian capacity./1 https://t.co/f8aGFlTjdY

[Harry Halem @WarIntellectual]

US refusal to designate a contact point for talks, and acceptance of multi-track, allows RU to manipulate pace and UA to wriggle out from constraints. Unlikely this changes before 2H2025, making a deal harder./24