A woman had Netflix for 6 years.
She opened the app. She scrolled. She picked something after 25 minutes. She fell asleep during episode 2. She repeated this every night.
Her friend, a former Netflix UI engineer, sat on her couch one evening and opened Settings on her account. He changed 9 things in under 15 minutes.
Her homepage transformed overnight. The autoplay trailers stopped. The "continue watching" list cleaned itself up. The recommendations got sharper. The buffering on her 4K TV disappeared. The categories multiplied from 30 to 2,200.
She said "it feels like a completely different app."
He said "it is. You've been using the factory settings for 6 years. Netflix ships the version that keeps you scrolling longest, not the version that helps you find something fastest."
Here's every setting he changed 🧵
@benphillips76 And not one peep from Board of Deputies, Dave Rich, David Baddiel, Karen Pollock, Phil Rosenberg, Jonathan Sacerdoti, Chief Rabbi Sir Ephraim Mirvis, Rachel Riley, Tracy-Ann Oberman MBE or Nicole Lampert
I'm guessing that means there's good antisemitism
https://t.co/jKHBpGyaiI
“The trouble with you, Spode, is that just because you have succeeded in inducing a handful of half-wits to disfigure the London scene by going about in black shorts, you think you’re someone. You hear them shouting ‘Heil, Spode!’ and you imagine it is the Voice of the People. That is where you make your bloomer. What the Voice of the People is saying is: ‘Look at that frightful ass Spode swanking about in footer bags! Did you ever in your puff see such a perfect perisher?’”
“My pride is never lacking, and if anyone has a problem with that, you're going to have to take it up with The Opps!”
EXCLUSIVE: A passionate, focused @bowens_official explains why he chose to join The Opps … and much more.
This is how Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos avoids paying a personal income tax
- For the last 20 years he’s had the same salary, $82,000
- He does this because a higher salary that would support his lifestyle would be subject to payroll and income tax, he doesn’t want to pay that
- Instead all his money is in his stocks, those are never subject to any taxes as long as they aren’t sold
- He takes out a loan and borrows against his stocks
- The only money he’ll ever had to pay is the loan and interest on the loan
This is common practice for billionaires so they avoid the majority or all of a personal income tax
Any broadcaster airing Wes Streeting on the future funding of the NHS should, for transparency, also show the people and companies linked to private health who are paying him to say it.
Stewart Lee is bang on here with this analysis. Comedy won't tell the truth, the question is why? follow the money. The answer lies in the production companies, who owns them? via @reginalddhunter
AJ Inside Story on Hormuz. In the mildest way I smuggle in massive truth bombs. Link in Reply
"There's a tremendous hypocrisy about this. The Western world has got very upset about freedom of navigation all of a sudden.
But they weren't at all worried about the Israeli blockade of Gaza which has gone on for something like 15 years.
Or the US blockade of Cuba which is starving people at the moment.
Or the US seizures of tankers out of Venezuela"
I am the Director of Professional Signal Intelligence at LinkedIn.
Every time you log in, we search your computer.
Not metaphorically.
We run code that scans your installed software.
Every browser extension.
Every application.
We catalog it.
We transmit it to our servers.
We share it with a third-party cybersecurity firm you've never heard of.
The tracking pixel is zero pixels wide.
We hid it off-screen.
You never consented.
We never asked.
Our privacy policy doesn't mention it.
That's networking.
We call the program Project Handshake internally.
The Slack channel is handshake-telem.
In 2024 we scanned for 461 products.
By February this year we scan for over 6,000.
I don't know what all of them are.
Nobody does.
Someone on my team added categories for browser extensions that identify practicing Muslims.
Someone added extensions for neurodivergent users.
Someone added 509 job search tools.
That last one is my favorite.
We can tell which of our one billion users are secretly looking for new jobs.
On the platform where their current boss checks their profile.
That's networking.
We scan for 200 products that compete with LinkedIn's sales tools.
Apollo. Lusha. ZoomInfo.
We know each user's real name, employer, and job title.
We mapped exactly which companies use which competitor products.
We extracted their customer lists from their users' browsers.
Without anyone knowing.
Then we sent legal threats to the users we caught.
The EU told us to open our platform to third-party tools.
We published two restricted APIs.
They handle 0.07 calls per second.
Our internal API, Voyager, handles 163,000 calls per second.
In Microsoft's 249-page compliance report, the word "Voyager" appears zero times.
That's networking.
I presented our Software Disclosure Rate metrics at a leadership summit last quarter.
The conference room is called The Fishbowl.
Glass walls.
Appropriate.
There's a plaque on the wall.
Q3 Competitive Landscape Award.
I won it for the extension scanning initiative.
Someone asked if users had a way to opt out.
I said they can close their browser.
The room laughed.
I wasn't sure why.
I browse LinkedIn on a Chromebook with no extensions.
Most of the team does.
The platform that helps you get hired searches your computer every time you visit.
We know your name.
We know your employer.
We know your religion.
Your disabilities.
Your politics.
Whether you're looking to leave.
That's networking.
The system works exactly as designed.
I designed it.
🚨 Is there a relationship between far-right ideology and violence among white British men?
The case of Charles Gee provides a concrete starting point for examining how ideologically driven beliefs can intersect with real-world violence.
Gee, a 62-year-old man from Little Hulton in Greater Manchester, was convicted in March 2026 after drunkenly pushing a council worker off a ladder in Walkden in September 2024. He said he believed the workers were removing Union Jack flags.
Court records show a long history of offending, with 39 previous sets of convictions covering 113 offences, including violence, harassment, and breaches of court orders.
This establishes a sustained pattern of aggressive behaviour alongside strongly expressed nationalist beliefs. On its own, however, a single case cannot demonstrate a wider relationship.
Broader statistical evidence comes from UK counter-radicalisation research. The Project Starlight study analysed more than 3,000 Prevent referrals and found that around 35% involved a documented link to domestic abuse, whether as perpetrator, victim, or witness.
This is several times higher than the annual prevalence of domestic abuse in the general population, which the Office for National Statistics estimates at roughly 5 to 7% of adults.
Within the same dataset, extreme right-wing ideology appeared in a notable share of cases involving domestic abuse, indicating a recurring overlap between radicalisation risk and interpersonal violence.
Further support comes from a 2025 peer reviewed study in Aggression and Violent Behavior. This research found that intimate partner abuse and susceptibility to violent extremism are linked through shared attitudes, including beliefs that justify control, dominance, and violence, particularly towards women.
The study also found that exposure to extremist material can reinforce these attitudes, and that far-right narratives often align with rigid or hierarchical views of gender.
Policing evidence from recent public disorder reinforces this pattern. Following the 2024 Southport attacks and the subsequent riots, analysis reported by The Guardian found that around 41% of those arrested for violent disorder had previously been reported to police for domestic abuse.
This figure applies specifically to those arrested rather than all participants, but it remains significant. It indicates a strong overlap between involvement in public violence and prior histories of domestic abuse and related offending.
Additional reporting from the same period indicates that a majority of those arrested had prior records for violent or acquisitive crime, suggesting that such events often draw in individuals with established patterns of offending.
Official counter-terrorism data shows that far-right extremism forms a substantial and growing part of the UK threat landscape. According to the Home Office, there were 212 terrorism-related arrests in the year ending March 2024, a 23% increase on the previous year. Around 28% of arrests with a known ideological motivation were linked to extreme right-wing ideology, while a large proportion of cases overall had no clear ideological classification.
While this is not a majority, it represents a significant and sustained share, and far-right cases now account for a much larger proportion of arrests than they did a decade ago. Available data and casework consistently indicate that those involved in extreme right-wing activity are predominantly white and male.
Prevent data shows a similar trajectory. In the year ending March 2025, there were 8,778 referrals to the Prevent programme, a 27% increase from 6,922 the previous year and the highest annual total since records began in 2015.
Where a specific ideological concern was identified, extreme right-wing cases accounted for around 21% of referrals, an increase from 19% the previous year, and a larger share than Islamist extremism, which accounted for around 10%. A substantial 56% of referrals fell into a “no ideology” or unspecified category.
In Channel cases, which involve individuals assessed as requiring structured intervention, extreme right-wing ideology represents a significant share of the caseload. Around 42% of adopted Channel cases with a specified ideology were linked to extreme right-wing concerns, compared with around 15% linked to Islamist extremism.
This reflects a steady increase over time and confirms that far-right radicalisation is a growing focus of UK counter-extremism work.
Security service assessments also reinforces this picture. MI5 has reported a marked rise since the late 2010s in investigations and disrupted plots linked to extreme right-wing activity. These cases often involve individuals radicalised online and in some instances already exhibiting a fixation on violence or a history of aggressive behaviour.
Taken together, this evidence supports a clear but carefully defined conclusion: there is a statistically supported association between far-right extremism and higher rates of domestic or interpersonal violence, as well as involvement in public disorder.
This relationship appears to be driven in part by shared underlying attitudes about power, control, and the acceptability of violence, which are identified both in academic research and in operational policing data.
A useful point of comparison is whether similar patterns appear in relation to far-left ideology among white British men.
On the available UK evidence, the relationship is considerably weaker in scale and far less prominent in official data.
Far-left extremism, including anarchist, environmental, or revolutionary socialist strands, is recorded within UK counter-extremism systems but at much lower volumes than other categories.
The same Prevent 2025 data shows that left-wing, anarchist, or single-issue cases make up only a tiny residual fraction of referrals and Channel interventions, while a substantial 56% of referrals fell into a “no ideology” or unspecified category.
A similar pattern appears in Channel cases, which involve individuals assessed as requiring structured intervention. Extreme right-wing ideology accounts for a substantial share of adopted cases with a specified ideology, whereas left-wing or anarchist cases form a much smaller component of the caseload.
Public reporting and security service commentary indicate that these remain comparatively limited in number. MI5 has stated that left-wing, anarchist, and single-issue terrorism makes up a significantly smaller proportion of its investigative workload than either Islamist or extreme right-wing threats.
There is also less clear evidence of a strong or systematic link between far-left ideology and domestic or interpersonal violence in UK datasets.
The 2021 Project Starlight study, which analysed more than 3,000 Prevent referrals, found that around 35% had links to domestic abuse. Within the subset where ideology was identified, Islamist and extreme right-wing cases were specifically highlighted, while far-left ideology did not feature as a statistically significant category in that breakdown.
Similarly, the 2025 study in Aggression and Violent Behavior identified shared attitudinal factors linking intimate partner abuse and susceptibility to violent extremism, particularly beliefs around control, dominance, and violence towards women. These were noted to align more clearly with far-right narratives on rigid gender roles.
In terms of real-world activity, far-left violence in the UK has tended to involve sporadic direct action such as property damage, protest-related disorder, or clashes with police. While such incidents can involve criminality, they rarely escalate to lethal terrorism or sustained interpersonal/domestic patterns documented in radicalisation referrals.
White British men appear in some cases, but overall volumes are small, and public disorder events linked to far-left causes do not show the same documented overlap with prior domestic abuse histories as seen in far-right-linked arrests, such as the 2024 Southport-related riots.
Overall counter-terrorism data reinforces this difference in scale. Extreme right-wing cases account for a substantial share of terrorism-related arrests and investigations, whereas left-wing or anarchist cases barely register.
The demographic profile of extreme right-wing activity is also more clearly defined, with a predominance of white male subjects, which is much less consistently emphasised in relation to far-left cases due to their lower volume.
Taken together, the evidence indicates that while far-left ideology can be associated with low-level criminality and disorder, its scale and characteristics differ significantly. It appears at much lower levels in Prevent referrals, Channel interventions, and counter-terrorism casework, and there is limited evidence of a comparable overlap with domestic or interpersonal violence in UK data.
This comparison strengthens the earlier conclusion. The association between far-right ideology and violence among white British men is more clearly evidenced, both statistically and operationally, particularly in relation to domestic abuse links, public disorder, and counter-terrorism activity.
At the same time, the same caveats apply. These are correlations observed within high-risk populations rather than the general public. Most individuals with political views of any kind do not engage in violence, and domestic abuse remains a widespread issue with multiple causes.
Ideology can shape or reinforce behaviour in some cases, but it does not determine it. Cases like Charles Gee sit within a broader and well-evidenced pattern in which far-right radicalisation, documented histories of interpersonal violence, and participation in public disorder frequently intersect in the UK.
https://t.co/b6G2Ynttre
While I’m pleased a bunch of political journalists now feel free to share their personal experiences of Mandleson’s abuse of power (so far incl. demands to fire them, not to hire them, rudeness) — it raises a helluva lot of questions,
1. Why are we only hearing about it now?
2. Why didn’t editors commison stories about it before the #EpsteinFiles broke?
3. How many media owners or editors have complied with such demands to fire journalists?
4. If they weren’t fired, how many journalists careers went into aspic inside news orgs as a result of Mandelson’s ire?!
5. Crucially, how many *other* politicians (and, while I’m here, lobby groups) demand journalists are fired and get their way?
I’ll stop there but you catch my drift…