georgy po

[georgy po @331167]

It was clear years ago that this is exactly where things were heading. And this is a good thing, because Democrats used to present themselves as more moral than Republicans and as defenders of democracy. But now that distinction has disappeared.
So the choice will be very simple: either the party that loves America and its foundations, or the other party that does not love America or its foundations.

That is the choice voters will face in this year’s elections and in 2028.

[georgy po @331167]

Read the right analysis and forecasts — and then nothing will come as a surprise to you.

From April 12:

//

🔴 Iran Missed Its "Istanbul Moment" 🔴

The negotiations with Iran went very successfully — exactly as they should have.

The main goal was achieved — driving an even deeper wedge into the ranks of Iran's political elite.

It's 100% certain that there are people inside Iran who were willing to accept the terms of a deal with America. These moderate and pragmatic elements — those who want to preserve their wealth, their power, and simply survive — already sense that continuing the war is suicide. They can see that Trump isn't bluffing and is ready to go all the way.

And they won't just sit quietly — the internal infighting inside Iran will intensify.

Yes, Iran didn't bend. But the leadership is now even more torn between the "pragmatists who want to survive" and the "radicals screaming for war until total victory."

Trump isn't just negotiating — he's injecting a virus into the operating system of Iranian power.

He's not looking for compromise. He's looking for the enemy's capitulation on terms that are most favorable to him. Believing that Iran in its current state can dictate anything to Trump is simply an admission that you don't understand the balance of power.

Trump isn't looking for a win-win.

He's looking for his win — on terms where the other side loses the most.

That's why what surprised me most in these negotiations wasn't even that Iran genuinely believed it was in a position to dictate its terms to Trump.

What surprised me most was that a large — even overwhelming — majority of experts actually believed that at this stage Iran could bend Trump to its demands.

This only tells us that these people still don't understand Trump. Which means their forecasts about him and his actions will continue to be inaccurate.

Honestly, I don't understand at all how anyone could have thought that Trump would agree to Iran's demands right now — that's a complete failure of analysis when it comes to understanding Trump.

And Iran, just like Ukraine, missed its Istanbul moment — and failed to stop in time.

But unlike Ukraine, this was obvious from the very beginning.

Iran's leadership backed itself into a corner by making promises to its own people in advance — promises so fantastical it was as if Iran was actually destroying the American military and inflicting millions of casualties on the battlefield.

After those foolish and very public promises, it will now be extremely difficult for them to accept Trump's terms — terms that are in complete contradiction with everything they promised their supporters back home.

Iran's leadership made the classic mistake of authoritarian regimes — they confused internal propaganda with external reality.

When you spend years projecting the image of "America's conqueror," you become a hostage to that rhetoric. Now any realistic agreement with Trump will look like capitulation to their radical wing.

They narrowed their own room to maneuver — by themselves.

But overall, everything played out exactly as it should have.

That's why when the analysis is right from the start, all you have to do afterward is wait and not panic — while events begin catching up to the theory.//

Text from March 27:(AS OF JUNE 3 — Marco Rubio confirmed in the Senate the forecast from the text below: the civil wing of Iran's leadership agrees to sign a peace treaty on America's terms, while the ultra-religious wing is opposed.)

🔴 Controlled Detonation of the Regime 🔴

What are the chances that Trump can find someone within Iran's current leadership with whom he can negotiate a favorable end to the war right now?

The chances of that are, let's say, not small — such a person, or a group of such people, can be found within Iran's current leadership.

What are the chances that this person or group of people would represent the entire political leadership of Iran?

That chance is actually quite small.

This means that Trump will be able to reach an agreement with someone about ending the conflict — but the problem is that this person or these people won't have the full support of the entire power structure behind them.

Which means their orders will be sabotaged at best — and at worst, the religious elite will simply declare them traitors.

And what is now an external conflict for Iran will shift into an internal one — internal power struggles will begin.

Does this mean Trump shouldn't bother looking for someone to negotiate with, if they won't be able to stop the conflict anyway?

No — quite the opposite.

He needs to find these people, negotiate with them, support them, and even do it openly — specifically to provoke hatred toward them from those who don't want to negotiate.

Because the goal is to create an alternative power center and dismantle the current power structure as a unified whole — pushing it toward internal fragmentation and infighting.

The faster Iran descends into internal conflict, the faster it will end — and accordingly, the war will shift largely from external to internal.

And at that point other players can be brought in — the Kurds, for example.

So there's no need to wait for a "unified representative of all of Iran." That person simply doesn't exist right now.

The strategy is to work with the pieces that are ready to negotiate — and deliberately provoke a split among the rest of the leadership.

Trump needs to find what you might call a "pragmatist group" — those who want to survive and preserve their wealth.

And then by cutting a deal exclusively with them, he automatically turns them into targets for the radicals and fractures the power structure.

This isn't a flaw in the strategy — it's the strategy's core mechanism.

This is what controlled detonation looks like.

The faster Iran turns inward and deals with itself — the faster the war on the outside ends, and the higher the chance of a real, if painful, transition away from theocracy toward something more pragmatically secular.

As was written even before the war: if Iranians want to dismantle theocratic rule and restore secular governance, they won't be able to do it without bloodshed and internal conflict.//

[georgy po @331167]

@ianbremmer @ezraklein And the Gracchi brothers, and their emergence, were the direct result of the stupidity of Cato the Elder. He planted the mine(The destruction of Carthage) that destroyed the Roman Republic and created the Roman Empire in its place. Rome did not die it was reborn in another form.

[georgy po @331167]

An incorrect comparison.

The Pax Romana rested on Rome and depended only on Rome. But today's world order does not depend only on America. Even if America wanted to preserve it, the other major players would still destroy it — which is exactly what is happening now.

So America has only two choices: either try with all its strength to preserve this world order, which is unrealistic, or enter the new global carve-up itself.

Trump chose the second path.

Text from 2023:

//If the global world is collapsing again, as has happened many times in our history — and now that time has come again — then the big and strong must shatter the world into as many small pieces as possible while preserving themselves.

So that later, from a position of strength, power, and size, they can crush all the smaller players and assemble the world anew on their own terms.//

[georgy po @331167]

@ianbremmer Perhaps if his political opponents did not want to eliminate him and had not carried out so many attempts on his life, the security measures would be different.

[georgy po @331167]

@ianbremmer So Trump understands poorly but the others understand well?😉 You yourselves also really believed that Trump could stop the war in Ukraine and that Zelensky really wants peace, and for the last two months you've also really believed that Trump and Iran will sign a peace treaty

[georgy po @331167]

@ianbremmer Oh, come on, quit being outraged — and is the other side any better?

[georgy po @331167]

It's hard to understand how anyone can fail to see that any liberal policy is unpopular in Germany today. Especially when that liberal agenda is spending money on things like the war in Ukraine instead of addressing problems at home. The right coming to power is only a matter of time, just as it is in France.

[georgy po @331167]

🤬People are tired of sticking plasters and compromises.🤬

Everything that happened in the English elections went exactly as written two years ago, two months after Labour won the election. Just as it was written back then that a new political force would fill the political vacuum — that’s exactly what happened now. A total collapse for Labour and a total victory for the Reform Party. Everything is playing out so predictably that it’s almost boring to watch and analyze. And going forward, no surprises are visible either.

Reform will either lose Farage or give up its position to another right-wing party. For example, the “Restore Britain” party, which split off from Reform last year, was only registered this year, and is already polling at around 4%. For comparison, the ruling Labour Party is sitting at 17% today. So 4% is actually a lot for a brand new right-wing party, especially when another right-wing party just won the election.

Why I don’t believe in Reform’s success, specifically because of Farage — Farage is trying to ride a radical wave without actually being radical himself. This victory for Reform is not Farage’s victory, it’s a victory for the right-wing agenda. People didn’t vote for the candidate, people voted for the right-wing agenda. And if Reform had a more commanding leader at the top, their victory would have been even bigger. Farage is not a charismatic leader and not a great orator, and on top of that he wants to plaster over the cracks instead of delivering the radical reforms that voters actually voted for.

Nigel Farage is a classic populist from inside the system, whose biography as an embedded member of the British establishment is in complete contradiction with his masterfully constructed image of a “man of the people” and an anti-establishment politician. Being flesh and blood of the elite himself, he skillfully uses its own tools and resources to effectively sell his voters the image of a “regular guy” standing up against the system. That’s exactly why he won’t radically change the system — he’ll just plaster over the cracks.

The moment voters realize that Farage isn’t willing to take radical steps — deportations, changes to immigration policy, tough social reforms — the Reform Party will start losing its core voters. From there, people will quickly become disillusioned with Reform under Farage’s leadership, and then either he gets pushed out, or people move on to another right-wing party. One that will promise to deal with the real problems of modern England in a serious, no-nonsense way.

And here’s a repeat of the text from September 2024:

//The most interesting political situation among all Western countries has developed in England. While in other countries it’s more or less clear who could replace the current government, England has a real problem with that. Labour — the left — won the last election with 34% of votes cast, which works out to only about 22% of all eligible voters in England, and they are now in serious trouble. You’d have to really try hard to just walk in, take power, and then immediately disappoint the very 22% who voted for you. And Labour really tried — they managed to disappoint most of their own voters and turn even more people against them who hadn’t voted for them in the first place. In just three months in power, their decisions and statements managed to generate genuine hatred toward them from the majority of English citizens. They have no chance in the next election — that can already be stated as fact right now.

But the problem is — who replaces them? The Conservatives — the right — who were in power before the July election, also disappointed most citizens, which is exactly why they got crushed by a party that itself only got 22% of all voters. Both of England’s main parties ended up with minimal approval ratings and massive disapproval ratings. The smaller parties aren’t doing great either — there’s simply no party in sight that could pick up the votes from both main parties and actually win an election.

The Crown’s silence in the country’s political life, the pedophile scandal, Prince Andrew escaping prison — all of this is dragging down both the ratings and the public trust in the royal family. As I’ve written before, the Crown needs to come back into politics, or it will completely lose its authority along with the main parties.

So here we are in a situation where the political crisis of trust — which has consumed both Labour and the Conservatives and is now creeping toward the Crown — is creating a feeling of emptiness in the political space. People feel disillusioned with the elites, but there’s no visible alternative political movement that could offer new ideas and leadership.

A political vacuum can’t stay empty for long. The question is who or what will come to fill it — will it be a new political force, internal reforms, or a deeper crisis.//

[georgy po @331167]

@Dmitry__ @ianbremmer That is because you are not a wealthy person and you think like a person who is not wealthy. You do not represent the group of affluent individuals who purchase such expensive cars.

[georgy po @331167]

We have statistics from the last five years showing a retreat of high-end sports cars from electrification, but the future can take many forms; there is no clear picture of what it will look like yet. Comparing the shift from horses to cars with the transition from gasoline vehicles to electric ones is just foolish.

[georgy po @331167]

When your forecasts are accurate, you don't need to write something every day.
A couple of texts is enough.
And then you just wait for time to catch up with the prediction.
From April 12:
//
🔴 Iran Missed Its "Istanbul Moment" 🔴
The negotiations with Iran went very successfully — exactly as they should have.
The main goal was achieved — driving an even deeper wedge into the ranks of Iran's political elite.
It's 100% certain that there are people inside Iran who were willing to accept the terms of a deal with America. These moderate and pragmatic elements — those who want to preserve their wealth, their power, and simply survive — already sense that continuing the war is suicide. They can see that Trump isn't bluffing and is ready to go all the way. And they won't just sit quietly — the internal infighting inside Iran will intensify.
Yes, Iran didn't bend. But the leadership is now even more torn between the "pragmatists who want to survive" and the "radicals screaming for war until total victory."
Trump isn't just negotiating — he's injecting a virus into the operating system of Iranian power. He's not looking for compromise. He's looking for the enemy's capitulation on terms that are most favorable to him. Believing that Iran in its current state can dictate anything to Trump is simply an admission that you don't understand the balance of power.
Trump isn't looking for a win-win. He's looking for his win — on terms where the other side loses the most.
That's why what surprised me most in these negotiations wasn't even that Iran genuinely believed it was in a position to dictate its terms to Trump. What surprised me most was that a large — even overwhelming — majority of experts actually believed that at this stage Iran could bend Trump to its demands.
This only tells us that these people still don't understand Trump. Which means their forecasts about him and his actions will continue to be inaccurate.
Honestly, I don't understand at all how anyone could have thought that Trump would agree to Iran's demands right now — that's a complete failure of analysis when it comes to understanding Trump.
And Iran, just like Ukraine, missed its Istanbul moment — and failed to stop in time. But unlike Ukraine, this was obvious from the very beginning. Iran's leadership backed itself into a corner by making promises to its own people in advance — promises so fantastical it was as if Iran was actually destroying the American military and inflicting millions of casualties on the battlefield.
After those foolish and very public promises, it will now be extremely difficult for them to accept Trump's terms — terms that are in complete contradiction with everything they promised their supporters back home.
Iran's leadership made the classic mistake of authoritarian regimes — they confused internal propaganda with external reality. When you spend years projecting the image of "America's conqueror," you become a hostage to that rhetoric. Now any realistic agreement with Trump will look like capitulation to their radical wing. They narrowed their own room to maneuver — by themselves.
But overall, everything played out exactly as it should have.
That's why when the analysis is right from the start, all you have to do afterward is wait and not panic — while events begin catching up to the theory.

Text from March 27:

🔴 Controlled Detonation of the Regime 🔴
What are the chances that Trump can find someone within Iran's current leadership with whom he can negotiate a favorable end to the war right now?
The chances of that are, let's say, not small — such a person, or a group of such people, can be found within Iran's current leadership.
What are the chances that this person or group of people would represent the entire political leadership of Iran?
That chance is actually quite small.
This means that Trump will be able to reach an agreement with someone about ending the conflict — but the problem is that this person or these people won't have the full support of the entire power structure behind them. Which means their orders will be sabotaged at best — and at worst, the religious elite will simply declare them traitors.
And what is now an external conflict for Iran will shift into an internal one — internal power struggles will begin.
Does this mean Trump shouldn't bother looking for someone to negotiate with, if they won't be able to stop the conflict anyway?
No — quite the opposite. He needs to find these people, negotiate with them, support them, and even do it openly — specifically to provoke hatred toward them from those who don't want to negotiate.
Because the goal is to create an alternative power center and dismantle the current power structure as a unified whole — pushing it toward internal fragmentation and infighting.
The faster Iran descends into internal conflict, the faster it will end — and accordingly, the war will shift largely from external to internal. And at that point other players can be brought in — the Kurds, for example.
So there's no need to wait for a "unified representative of all of Iran." That person simply doesn't exist right now. The strategy is to work with the pieces that are ready to negotiate — and deliberately provoke a split among the rest of the leadership.
Trump needs to find what you might call a "pragmatist group" — those who want to survive and preserve their wealth. And then by cutting a deal exclusively with them, he automatically turns them into targets for the radicals and fractures the power structure. This isn't a flaw in the strategy — it's the strategy's core mechanism.
This is what controlled detonation looks like. The faster Iran turns inward and deals with itself — the faster the war on the outside ends, and the higher the chance of a real, if painful, transition away from theocracy toward something more pragmatically secular.
As was written even before the war: if Iranians want to dismantle theocratic rule and restore secular governance, they won't be able to do it without bloodshed and internal conflict.//

[georgy po @331167]

@Dmitry__ @ianbremmer The statistics clearly show that buyers are not eager to purchase expensive sports cars that run on electricity instead of gasoline.

[georgy po @331167]

@Dmitry__ @ianbremmer I mean that a gasoline-powered sports car holds much more significance and prestige than an electric sports car.

[georgy po @331167]

This seemingly anomalous situation is actually very easy to explain. Zero interest rates—the era of free money—compensated for the demographic problem. But now that has come to an end, debts have become expensive, and the yield on government bonds has increased, which has created safe investment competition for real estate.

[georgy po @331167]

@Mads_on_X @ianbremmer This is a foolish argument. Why, for instance, is Hawaii American territory? The fate of Taiwan will be decided by America and China—not by Taiwan itself.

[georgy po @331167]

@Mads_on_X @ianbremmer Wait—did they move it somewhere else on the world map?

[georgy po @331167]

@Ostap00793684 @ianbremmer Once again, I am convinced that there are so many fools here who bring up stupid arguments, and then, when those arguments get shattered, they just block you so that it is impossible to reply to their idiocy. @Ostap00793684
·
19m

[georgy po @331167]

@Ostap00793684 @ianbremmer First of all, it was an internal war, not an external one, and second of all, Chechnya was in Russia and remained in Russia.

[georgy po @331167]

@Ostap00793684 @ianbremmer I understand that Ukraine has its own alternative history that differs from the real history of the rest of the world. And once again, it was an internal war in which Chechnya lost, as it was part of Russia and continues to remain in it.